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
IE NE SCAY
PAIX ET PEV
THE
Sieur de
CHARRON's
Three Books of
WISEDOM
Made English
London Printed for
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S. Birt. T. Ward and
E. Wicksteed.
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OF

WISDOM.

THREE BOOKS.

Written Originally in FRENCH,

BY THE

Sieur *de CHARRON.*

With an Account of the AUTHOR.

Made ENGLISH

by GEORGE STANHOPE, D. D.

Late Dean of *Canterbury.*

VOL. I.

The THIRD EDITION, *Corrected.*

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

RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM

Lord *DARTMOUTH.*

MY LORD,

IT is now near Two Years, ſince I was deſired to employ ſome of my leiſure Hours in conſidering this Book, and putting it into a Condition of becoming

 ſomewhat

ſomewhat more uſeful and acceptable, than (it may without any ſuſpicion of Vanity be ſaid) the former Tranſlation could pretend to be. A little Time ſpent in the Peruſal ſatiſfy'd me, that there was Matter in it not unworthy my Pains, and ſuch as it was great Pity Men ſhould want the Knowledge of, who underſtand not the Original. And as unreaſonable did it ſeem, that others ſhould be diſcouraged from enquiring into this Author, by the Misfortunes which naturally attend even the beſt Undertakings of this Nature, when Time, and Improvements of Language have given another Turn to Writing, and created a Diſreliſh for every thing, which is not ſuitable to the Genius of the preſent Age.

The greateſt Difficulty which lay upon me, was that of finding Opportunities in the midſt of thoſe more important

important Cares of my Profeſſion, which neither This, nor any other Attempt or Conſideration, however commendable or beneficial in itſelf, muſt prevail with me to neglect. But here I found even my Duty aſſiſting; for That requiring part of my Attendance in a Place of ſomewhat more Retirement and Eaſe than where Your Lordſhip's Father was pleaſed to fix me, I made uſe of thoſe Advantages to this purpoſe, and finiſhed much the greateſt part of the following Book, in a way of Diverſion, as it were, and unbending from ſeverer Studies, and a more Laborious Station.

The particular Liberty taken by this Author, is a Qualification, which the preſent Generation, at leaſt in our Parts of the World, will certainly be fond of. But it happened to have the ſame Effect upon Him ſometimes, which we are not much to wonder

if we find very frequent in thoſe of leſs Judgment; and that is, over-ſtraining Points of Diſpute, by affecting to ſay all, which either the Caſe will bear, or which any other Perſon hath ſaid before. This gave Occaſion for my interpoſing ſometimes with an Advertiſement; and that I hope in ſuch a manner, as may not have injur'd the Author, while it deſigns the Benefit and Security of my Reader. One thing only I cannot forbear adding upon this Occaſion, that in the midſt of all his Free-Thinking, he conſtantly expreſſes a due and abſolute Deference for Revelation and Divine Truths. And This indeed was by no means the Effect of his Profeſſion, but of his Judgment; for Your Lordſhip is too diſcerning, not to know, that, as a little and ſuperficial Knowledge in Phyſick makes Men Quacks, ſo it is not the Abundance, but the Defect

of

of Reaſon and good Senſe, that makes them Infidels and Scepticks in Religion.

How little the Sieur *de Charron* ſuffer'd his Thoughts to be under the Bondage of any private Reſpects, will be ſufficiently evident to any conſidering Reader, from ſundry Inſtances; Particularly from what he hath deliver'd upon the Subject of Government, in his *Third Book:* In which, though ſome Moot Points may ſeem a little uncouth to Us of this Nation, yet if we reflect upon the Conſtitution, under which he liv'd, we ſhall rather have occaſion to wonder at his admitting ſo few reſerv'd Caſes, than mentioning ſo many. Beſides, that even thoſe mention'd would be of no mighty ill Conſequence, if always confin'd to thoſe Conditions, and Occaſions, which He hath temper'd and reſtrain'd them with. But, paſſing from the

Myſteries of State, and preſſing unuſual Emergencies, to the Ordinary Meaſures of a Publick Adminiſtration, there is ſomewhat of an Air ſo full of Ingenuity, and ſuch regard had to the Great Ends for which Government was inſtituted, as a very gentle Application would think an Encomium upon the Engliſh Conſtitution, and a ſort of Prophetick Satyr upon the late Oppreſſions of a People to whom he ſtood nearly related.

Upon the whole Matter (My Lord) I have Reaſon to hope, This may prove not only a Book of Good Entertainment, but Great Benefit, to Perſons who have the Capacity, and will give themſelves the Pains, to conſider it. Were it not ſo, I ſhould not have thought it worth my Trouble; and ſhould yet much leſs have preſumed to make an Offer of it to Your Lordſhip. I can with good Confidence ſay, that

no

no Man is better qualified to be a Maſter of the Subject it treats of. The particular and intimate Knowledge of Your Abilities, which my being Honour'd with the Care of Your Lordſhip at the Univerſity gave me, would bear me out in delivering more upon this Occaſion, than Your Modeſty will permit. And indeed the General Opinion of all that have the Honour of Your Lordſhip's Acquaintance, ſaves You that Decency, and hath prevented me in this Point. The Manly Senſe, and Wonderful Penetration, which appear'd very early in You, have given me many pleaſing Reflections; and I am ſure are Foundation ſufficient for making Your Lordſhip a Greater Ornament and Honour to Your Family, than even that Nobility which You have by Deſcent.

But I muſt beg leave (My Lord) to put you in mind, that beſides Your Own,

The Epiſtle Dedicatory.

Own, Your Lordſhip hath a mighty Stock of Honour and Eſteem to ſet out upon, deriv'd from the Memory of a Father, than whom Few, if Any, of his Condition, are more univerſally loved and admired. I ſay, *loved*, My Lord, for This, as a more rare, ſo is it a more valuable Tribute, than that of Honour, to Perſons of Quality, and in Great Offices. For where ſo much is paid to the Station, we can make very little Judgment, what is ſincere, and what is the Effect of Formality, or Fear, or Intereſt. But in his Lordſhip's Caſe there was ſomething ſo Diſtinguiſhing, in all the Reſpects paid to Him, as plainly ſhew'd a particular Regard to his Perſon, and that the outward Teſtimonies were not Things of Courſe, but that he had engaged the very Hearts of Thoſe who paid them.

I will not ſo far ſeem to diſtruſt Your

The Epiſtle Dedicatory.

Your Lordſhip's Acceptance of this Addreſs, as to make the leaſt Apology for it. You will interpret it, I doubt not, as a Teſtimony of the Honour I have for You, and a Deſire to publiſh my having it, to the World: And Your Lordſhip will do me the Juſtice too to believe, that were it in my Power to give any other Evidence of This, than ſuch an open Declaration, nothing ſhould be wanting on my Part, which might prove the Sincerity of thoſe Profeſſions I am Proud to make, of being,

My LORD,

Your Lordſhip's

Lewiſham, May 6. 1697.

Moſt Obedient, and

Moſt Devoted Servant,

Geo. Stanhope.

A

BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE AUTHOR.

From the *FRENCH.*

PETER CHARRON was born at *Paris*, in the Year 1541, and Baptized in St. *Hilary*'s Church in the *Clos Bruneau.* His Father was one *Theobald Charron*, a Bookſeller; and his Mother's Name was *Nicole de la Barre.* By Her, *Theobald* had One and Twenty Children; and Four more by a former Wife: So that our Author had no leſs than Four and Twenty Brothers and Siſters; and yet, which is very remarkable, among all this numerous Family, there is not any Male-Iſſue now remaining. The Condition of his Parents was not very plentiful; and their Expence, 'tis plain, was great; but however, in regard they ſaw ſomething in their Son *Peter*, which was very forward and promiſing, and argu'd a more than common Capacity, they took



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A brief Account of the Author.

ok the Hint from Nature's Kindneſs, and
t him out to a very good School. After he
d made ſufficient Progreſs in *Greek* and *La-*
, he took care to qualify himſelf with other
iences, and Parts of Human Learning, and
dy'd Logick, Metaphyſicks, Moral and Na-
ral Philoſophy. From thence he proceeded
the Civil and Canon Law in the Univer-
ies of *Orleans* and *Bourges*, where he com-
enced Doctor in that Faculty. At his re-
rn to *Paris*, he betook himſelf to the Pro-
ſſion of the Law, and was admitted Advo-
te in the Court of Parliament; Where Bu-
neſs often call'd him to the Barr, which he
ways declar'd to be the beſt and moſt im-
roving School in the World: And accor-
ingly he took care to loſe none of the Pub-
ick Hearings; From whence his Mind took
o ſtrong a Tincture, that a Man may plain-
y diſcern the Effects of it in his Diſ-
courſes, by the proper Application of Maxims
nd Terms of Law. This Courſe he con-
inu'd ſome Five or Six Years; but fore-
eeing, that Preferment this way, if ever
ained at all, was like to come hard and
low, (he neither having Relations among
he Sollicitors and Proctors of the Court, nor
particular Intereſt, nor Spirit little enough to
cringe, and flatter, and wriggle himſelf into
Buſineſs) he gave over that Employment, and
pply'd himſelf cloſe to the Study of Divinity.

To

To this Purpoſe he read the Fathers, and eminent Doctors of the Church; and having a Tongue well hung, and a Style free and eaſie, but yet refined and lofty too, above the rate of common Preachers, he made uſe of this Talent, by the Permiſſion of the Parochial Clergy, and that with ſo good Succeſs, that he quickly came into Reputation and Eſteem with the Greateſt and moſt Learned Men of his Time; inſomuch that the Biſhops and greateſt Prelates about the Town, ſeem'd to be in ſome ſort of Strife, which of them ſhould get him into his Dioceſs. Particularly my Lord *Arnaud de Pontac*, Biſhop of *Bazas*, a Prelate of excellent Learning, having heard him preach at St. *Paul's* Church, in the Year 1571, was ſo in Love with him, that he took him away from the Place of his Birth, and carry'd him to *Xaintes* and *Bourdeaux*, and into his Biſhoprick of *Bazas*, and ſeveral other Places in *Gaſcony*, and *Languedoc*, where his admirable Eloquence acquir'd ſo juſt Renown, that he had Proffers made by ſeveral Biſhops, of being the Theological Canon (or Divinity-Lecturer) in their Churches; and of ſeveral other Dignities and Benefices, beſides ſeveral noble Preſents made him. In ſhort, he was Theologal at *Bazas*, *Ars*, *Lethoure*, *Agen*, *Chaors*, and *Condom* ſucceſſively; Canon and School-maſter in the Church of *Bourdeaux*, and Chanter in the Church of *Condom*.

Condom. Queen *Margaret*, Dutcheſs of *Valois*, was pleaſed to entertain him for her Preacher in Ordinary; and the then King, tho' at that time of the Reformed Religion, was extremely pleaſed with his Sermons, and frequently did him the Honour to hear them. He was alſo a Retainer to the late Cardinal *d'Armagnac*, Legat to his Holineſs at *Avignon*, who had a great Value for him. He did great Good by his perſuaſive way of Preaching, and by the Excellencies both of his Life and Doctrine, for Two and Thirty Years together, converted and eſtabliſh'd many. He never took any Degree or Title in Divinity, but ſatisfy'd himſelf with deſerving and being capable of the Higheſt; and had therefore no other Title or Character but That of *Prieſt* only. He never ſaw *Paris* in Seventeen or Eighteen Years, and then reſolv'd to come and end his Days there; but being a great Lover of Retirement, he had obliged himſelf by Vow to become a *Carthuſian*; and was abſolved of it about the end of the Year 1588. He went from *Bourdeaux*, coming by *Xaintes* and *Angers*, where he made ſeveral learned Sermons, and arriv'd at *Paris*, at the time the States were conven'd at *Blois*. Then he preſented himſelf to the Prior of the *Carthuſians*, one *John Michel*, a Perſon of great Piety, who ſince dy'd Prior-General of the great *Carthuſian* Monaſtery in *Dauphine*. To

him he communicated his Intention; but it was not accepted, by reaſon of his Age, which was not leſs than Seven or Eight and Forty. And all the moſt preſſing Intreaties he could uſe were ineffectual; for the Excuſe was ſtill this, That that Order required all the Vigour of Youth to ſupport its Auſterities. Hereupon he addreſt himſelf to the Provincial of the *Celeſtines* in *Paris*; but there too with the ſame Succeſs, and upon the ſame Reaſons alledged for repulſing him. Thus after having done his utmoſt to fulfil his Vow, and himſelf not being in any degree acceſſory to its not taking effect, he was aſſured by *Faber* Dean of the *Sorbon*, *Tyrius* a *Scotch Jeſuite*, and *Feuardant* a *Franciſcan*, all very learned and able Divines, that there lay no manner of Obligation upon him from that Vow; but that he might with a very ſafe and good Conſcience, continue in the World as a Secular, and was at large, and at his own Diſpoſal, without any need of entring into any other Religious Order. Hereupon, in the Year 1589, he returned back by *Angers*, where he preached the whole Lent, to the great Admiration and Benefit of the People. From thence he went back again to *Bourdeaux*, where he contracted a very intimate Acquaintance and Friendſhip with Monſieur *Michel de Montagne*, Knight of the Order of the *King*, and Author of the Book

ſo

ſo well known by the Title of *Montagne's Eſſays*. For him Monſieur *Charron* had a very great Eſteem, and did from him receive all poſſible Teſtimonies of a reciprocal Affection: For, (among other things) Monſieur *Montagne* order'd by his laſt Will, that in regard he left no Iſſue-Male of his own, Monſieur *Charron* ſhould after his Deceaſe be entituled to bear the Coat of Arms, plain, and as they belong'd to his Noble Family. The Troubleſome Times detaining Monſieur *Charron* at *Bourdeaux*, from the Year 1589, to that of 1593, he compoſed his Book called *Les Trois Veritez*, *The Three Truths*, and publiſhed it in 1594, but without his Name to it. This was received with great Applauſe of Learned Men, and they printed it after the *Bourdeaux* Copy two or three times at *Paris*, and afterwards at *Bruſſels* in *Flanders*, under the Sham-Name of *Benedict Valiant*, *Advocate of the Holy Faith*; becauſe the Third Part of that Book contains a Defence of the Faith, in anſwer to a little Tract concerning the Church, written formerly by the Sieur *Pleſſis de Mornay*. The Publication of this Book brought him into the Acquaintance of Monſieur *Antony d'Ebrard de S. Sulpice*, Biſhop and Count of *Caors*, who upon peruſing and liking the Book, ſent for Monſieur *Charron*, tho' he had never ſeen him before, made him his Vicar-General, and Canon-Theologal in his Church,

which he accepted; and there he put out the *Second Edition*, with his own Name to it in 1595, enlarging it alſo with a Reply to an Anſwer, printed at *Rochelle*, and written againſt what he called his *Third Truth*.

While he was at *Caors*, the King was pleaſed to ſummon him to the General Aſſembly of all the Clergy of *France*, held the ſame Year 1595. Hither he came in the Quality of a Deputy, and was choſen firſt Secretary to the Aſſembly. As he was in this Attendance, an Invitation was ſent him to preach at St. *Euſtache*'s Church, the moſt populous Pariſh in the whole City of *Paris*, which he did upon *All-Saints-Day* 1595, and two Days after. As alſo the Six Sundays in *Lent* 1596. In 1599 he returned to *Caors*, and in that Year, and 1600, he compoſed Eight Diſcourſes upon *the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper*; as many others *upon the Knowledge and Providence of God, the Redemption of the World, the Communion of Saints:* And likewiſe his *Books of Wiſdom*. While he was thus employing himſelf, and enjoying that Retirement at *Caors*, my Lord *John Chemin*, Biſhop of *Condom*, preſented him with the Chanterſhip in his Church, to draw him over into that Dioceſe: But having at the ſame time an Offer from *M. Mirom*, Biſhop of *Angers*, and being courted by Him to reſide at *Anjou*, this was moſt agreeable to his Inclination. The making

making a determinate Reſolution was a Work of Time; for his Affection and Convenience drawing ſeveral Ways, kept the Balance long in ſuſpenſe. *Anjou* he looked upon as the ſweeteſt Dwelling, the moſt delightful Retreat that *France* could give him; but that Province being then embroiled in Civil Wars, (for *Bretany* was not then reduced, and ſo like to make a very troubleſome Neighbour) *Condom* carry'd the Point. It happen'd too, that the Theologal Chair at *Condom* was juſt then void, and this being tendred him by the ſame Biſhop, he accepted that, and reſolved to ſet up his Staff there. To this Purpoſe he bought a Houſe, which he built new, and furniſhed to his own Fancy and Convenience; reſolving to give himſelf all the Eaſe and Diverſion he could, and make the beſt of his growing Years, the Infirmities whereof would be ſoften'd at leaſt by good Humour, and a pretty Dwelling. After he was ſettled at *Condom*, he printed thoſe *Chriſtian Diſcourſes* mention'd juſt now, which were Sixteen in all; and alſo his *Books of Wiſdom* at *Bourdeaux*, in the Year 1601; which gave him a great Reputation, and made his Character generally known: So that Monſieur *Charron* began from that time to be reckon'd among the Glories, and topping Wits of *France*. Particularly Meſſieur *Claude Dormy*, Biſhop *of Boloigne by the Sea*, and Prior of St. *Martin's in*

the Fields at *Paris*, wrote him ſeveral Letters upon that Occaſion; expreſſing the great Eſteem he had for Him and his Writings, and as a Teſtimony of his Value and Opinion of him, offer'd him the Theologal's Place in his Church. Theſe Letters made Monſieur *Charron* deſirous to ſee *Paris* once more, that ſo he might contract a Perſonal Acquaintance with, and expreſs his Acknowledgments for the Favours of this great Prelate; and at the ſame time, in hope to get an Opportunity of reprinting his Books and Diſcourſes, with the Addition of ſome new Tracts. For indeed the Impreſſion at *Bourdeaux* he thought wanted correcting; and upon a Review was not at all to his Satisfaction.

In purſuance of this Deſign, he arriv'd at *Paris* the Third of *October*, 1603, and in a convenient time afterwards he went to pay his Reſpects to the Biſhop of *Bologne*, who receiv'd him with great Civility and Kindneſs, and repeated his Offer of that Preferment merely to have him near himſelf, and more within the Eye of the Court. Monſieur *Charron* return'd him many Thanks for the Honour he had done him, and the good Intentions he was pleas'd to entertain for his Advancement: And with his uſual Freedom, told an Advocate in the Parliament, who was a particular Friend of his, that he could be well pleas'd to accept that Preferment for ſome Years, but that

that the Moiſture and Coldneſs of the Air, and its Nearneſs to the Sea, did not only make it a Melancholy and Unpleaſant Place, but very Unwholſome, and Rheumatick, and Foggy too. That the Sun was his viſible God, as God was his inviſible Sun; and therefore, ſince he had no Hope of ſeating himſelf at *Bologne* with Safety to his Health, he thought it much better not to venture thither at all.

During his Stay at *Paris*, he lodg'd at one *Bertaud*'s a Bookſeller, that he might be near the Preſs, and correct the new Edition of his Books of *Wiſdom*, of which he liv'd to ſee but Three or Four Sheets wrought off. For on *Sunday* the Sixteenth of *November* 1603, going out of his Lodging, about one of the Clock, at the Corner of St. *John Beauvais* Street, he call'd to his Servants, and complain'd he found himſelf Ill: And immediately, while they ran to hold him up, he fell upon his Knees, and with his Hands and Eyes lifted up to Heaven, he expired upon the Spot, without the leaſt Agony or Appearance of Pain. His Diſeaſe was an *Apoplexy*, and the Quantity of extravaſated Blood was ſo great, that no Humane Help could have preſerved him. The Body was kept Two Days, but the Phyſicians being well ſatisfied that he was actually dead, and the Blood too which ſettled about his Throat, beginning to mortifie, and grow offenſive, they buried him

with great Decency, and a very Honourable Attendance, in St. *Hilary*'s Church, the Eighteenth of the ſame Month; where his Father, Mother, moſt of his Brothers and Siſters, and a great many other Relations were Interred. The Day of his Funeral he had his Face expos'd to view, and his Body dreſt in the Prieſt's Habit, as if he had been going to Officiate at Maſs. And this was done by a particular Direction of his own; for he had frequently left thoſe Orders in Charge, provided his Death happen'd to be ſuch, as wrought no mighty Change or Deformity in his Perſon.

As to his Perſon, He was of a moderate Stature, inclining to Fat; of a ſmiling Countenance, and cheerful Humour; a large open Forehead; ſtreight Noſe, pretty large downwards; light blue Eyes; his Complexion Freſh and Ruddy; his Hair and Beard very White, though he had not yet got through his Climacterick, being about Sixty Two Years and a Half when he died. The Air of his Face was always Gay, without the leaſt Allay of Melancholy; his Mien Graceful; his Voice Strong and Diſtinct; his Expreſſion Maſculine and Bold; his Health Firm and Conſtant: He had no Complaints, either from Age or Indiſpoſitions, till about three Weeks before his Death. Then indeed he now and then, while he was in Motion, felt a Pain in his Breaſt, and found himſelf oppreſt with Shortneſs of

Breath,

Breath. But this preſently went off again after a little Reſt, and fetching his Breath deep. However he acquainted his Phyſician, the eminent Sieur *Marſcot*, with his Caſe, who adviſed him by all means to open a Vein; aſſuring him, that all his Illneſs proceeded from Fulneſs of Blood; and, if ſome Courſe were not taken ſpeedily to prevent it, a Suffocation might enſue. And accordingly it happen'd; for, in all Probability, the neglecting this Advice of bleeding quickly was the very thing that coſt Monſieur *Charron* his Life.

His Books of *Wiſdom*, and *Chriſtian Diſcourſes*, were printed off after his Death, by the Particular Care of an Intimate Friend, whom he had charged with the Inſpection of them in his Life-time: And abundant Satisfaction was given to the World, that the Author himſelf had in this Impreſſion added, and corrected ſeveral Paſſages. Some particularly, which not Others only, but Himſelf alſo thought neceſſary to be changed from that firſt Impreſſion at *Bourdeaux*, in 1601. By theſe Alterations he hath explained his Meaning, ſtrengthened his Arguments, ſoftned many Expreſſions without any Material Alteration of the Senſe. All which was done Principally in Compliance with the World; to obviate the Malice of Some, and condeſcend to the Infirmities of Others. The whole had been peruſed and approved by ſome very good Friends

and Perſons of ſound Judgment; and till They had declar'd themſelves ſatisfy'd and pleas'd, he could not prevail with himſelf to be ſo. But above all, he ſubmitted his Writings to the Church; and hop'd there was nothing there, that might call for a juſt Cenſure, or miniſter ground of Offence either to Religion in general, or to that Communion, of which he was a Member in particular.

As to his peculiar Manner of handling the Subjects he undertook to treat of, whether in Books or Sermons, he was us'd to ſay, that there are Three Ways of expreſſing and communicating a Man's Thoughts, which bear Proportion, and ſeem to be adapted to the Three ſeveral Faculties of the Mind, the *Imagination*, the *Memory*, and *Underſtanding*. One of theſe proceeds upon Rules of Art, runs upon Etymologies and Diſtinctions of Words and Things, Definitions, Diviſions, Subdiviſions, Cauſes, Effects, Accidents, and the like: A Second collects together what other People have thought or ſaid upon the Occaſion, and values itſelf upon the nicety of quoting Books, and Chapters, and Pages: The Third is free and generous, including and doing in a manner all that both the former pretend to, but without any Oſtentation of doing ſo, or enſlaving itſelf to Niceties of Method, and Rules of Art. The Firſt of theſe he us'd to ſay was fit for

Schools, and to inſtruct young Beginners: The Second too much in Vogue with Preachers and Orators, who in Effect only tack together other Peoples Notions, and thoſe too very often after an affected and impertinent Manner; for having nothing to ſay for themſelves, they make other People ſpeak for them, tho' never ſo little to the Purpoſe. In reſpect of this way he declared himſelf of a Judgment directly oppoſite to the generality of the World; That to ſtuff a Diſcourſe with Quotations was an Argument rather of Weakneſs and Ignorance, than of Wiſdom: That Men took this Courſe in all likelihood to ſet themſelves and their great Reading off to the World, which after all amounts to no more than a good Memory; and This, if not attended with Judgment, is no ſuch mighty Commendation: That Theſe Things are oftentimes brought in at random, and all Adventures; picked up from Common-place Books, and *Indexes*, where they find Stuff ready made up to their Hands, and ſo they vend it without more to do. Allegations indeed have their Uſes and proper Seaſons; they are abſolutely neceſſary in controverted Points, where the Cauſe is to be decided by Authorities: But then they ought to be uſed with Moderation, and in Meaſure; and good Care taken, that they be home to the Purpoſe; that Prudence be uſed in the Choice of them; for generally the Fewer and the Weightier, tr

ſure the Better they are. For it was his Opinion, that of all the Three Manners of Expreſſing our Thoughts, This was the leaſt valuable.

As for the Third, That indeed was infinitely the beſt, and the Perſons who make it their Method, are by much the greateſt and moſt ſignificant Men. Antiquity and Authority were thus far of his ſide; The Ancient *Homiliſts* being ſo many Examples of it, in whoſe Writings and Orations you very ſeldom, or never, find a Quotation; and in truth the old Authors, of all Sorts and Profeſſions, ſeem to make ſound Reaſon and good Senſe their Buſineſs: This being the proper, the generous Food for entertaining Men deſirous of Knowledge, and of diſtinguiſhing Minds. This reliſhes and ſhews more of Judgment, and Underſtanding, which are Nobler, and more Exalted Parts of the Mind, than Memory. Laſtly, This is infinitely the moſt Free and Noble in itſelf, and more Delightful and Improving to Hearers, Readers, and the Perſon who makes uſe of it too, than any other Method whatſoever: For by this, Men are rather made Wiſe than Learned; and more accuſtomed to examine and make a Judgment of Things. Conſequently the Will is directed, and the Conſcience informed this way, whereas the reſt are good for nothing, but to ſtuff his Memory and Imagination, with other People's Notions.

trifling Niceties. This Account I thought not improper to trouble the Reader with, becauſe from hence he will gueſs, what he is to expect in this Treatiſe, and ſee withal what kind of Taſte our Author had in Matters of this Nature.

As for what relates to his Temper, Manners, Converſation, and Actions, whether in publick or private, I ſhall need to ſay only thus much; That he made it his conſtant Buſineſs, to render them conformable to thoſe Rules and Maxims contained at large in this Second Book of the following Treatiſe; and was very ſucceſsful, and very accurate in the Undertaking. What Perſuaſion and Church he was of, his *Three Verities* abundantly declare; as do likewiſe his *Chriſtian Diſcourſes*, which were printed ſince his Death, and make a convenient Volume by themſelves. How ſtrict and conſcientious he was, may appear from this ſingle Inſtance; That, tho' he were poſſeſs'd of ſeveral Theologal Canonries one after another, yet he would never be prevailed with to reſign any of them, in Favour of any Perſon; nor to name his Succeſſor, for fear of giving Occaſion to the Cenſure, of having upon private Reſpects put in an unqualify'd Man, and One who was not worthy to fill [illegible] Poſt: But he conſtantly gave them [illegible] and clearly, into the Hands of [illegible] who had collated him.

A brief Account of the Author.

The laſt Thing I ſhall mention upon this Occaſion is his Laſt Will; which was made and written all with his own Hand in *January* 1602, and after his Deceaſe, regiſtred in the Office at *Condom*. In This he firſt returns moſt humble Thanks to God, for all the Mercies and Benefits which by his Bounty he had enjoyed in his Life-time; begs him moſt earneſtly for his infinite and incomprehenſible Mercy's Sake, in the Name of his Well-beloved Son, and our Bleſſed Saviour *Jeſus Chriſt*, and for His Merits ſhed and multiplied upon all his Members the Elect Saints, to grant him Favour, and full Pardon for all his Offences; to receive him for his own Child; to aſſiſt and conduct him with his Holy Spirit, during his Continuance in this World, that he might ever remain in a ſound Mind, and the true Love and Service of Him his God; and that at the Hour of Death, he would receive his Soul to himſelf, admit him into the Society and ſweet Repoſe of his Well-beloved Ones, and inſpire all his Holy and Elect Saints with a Pious and Charitable Diſpoſition, to pray, and make Interceſſion for him.

Then proceeding to the Legacies, he bequeaths among other Things; To the Church of *Condom*, provided his Corps be Interr'd there, Two Hundred *Livres (Tournois)* upon Condition that every Year upon the Day of his Death, High Maſs ſhall be once ſaid in his Behalf,

Behalf, and Abſolution once pronounc'd over his Grave. He gives moreover to the Maintenance of poor Scholars, and young Girls, Two Thouſand Four Hundred Crowns; the yearly Income hereof to be diſtributed for ever, the one Moiety to Three or Four Scholars, the other to Three, Four or Five young Maidens, at the Diſcretion of his Executors, of which he conſtituted Five: The Maſter of St. *Andrew's* School, and Rector of the *Jeſuits* at *Bourdeaux* for the time being; his Heir, and Two of his Friends; the Three laſt to name ſome other Perſons to ſucceed in this Truſt after their Deceaſe, with This Qualification, that they nominate ſuch only, as are well known and reputed for their Abilities, Honeſty and Charity; and that any Three of theſe, in the Abſence of the reſt, might manage and diſpoſe Things as they ſhould ſee convenient. Likewiſe he gives and bequeaths to Mrs. *Leonora Montagne*, Wife to the Sieur *de Camin*, King's Counſel in the Parliament at *Bourdeaux*, half Siſter to the late Sieur *de Montagne*, the Sum of Five Hundred Crowns. And her Huſband Monſieur *Camin*, he conſtitutes his ſole Heir He paying the Charges and Legacies containe in his Will, amounting in the whole to abc Fifteen Thouſand *Livres Tournois*, in the gr Sum.

What hath been thus lightly touched u is a ſufficient Evidence how Religious and

ſcientious a Perſon Monſieur *Charron* was; that he feared God, led a pious and good Life, was Charitably diſpoſed; a Perſon of Wiſdom and Conduct, Serious and Conſiderate; a great Philoſopher, an eloquent Orator, a famous and powerful Preacher; richly furniſhed and adorned with the moſt excellent Virtues and Graces, both Moral and Divine: Such as made him very remarkable and ſingular, and deſervedly gave him the Character of a Good Man and a good Chriſtian; ſuch as preſerve a great Honour and Eſteem for his Memory among Perſons of Worth and Virtue, and will continue to do ſo, as long as the World ſhall laſt.

OF

WISDOM.

Three BOOKS.

The Author's Preface.

Wherein the Title, the Subject Matter, the Deſign, and the Method of this Treatiſe are explained.

BEfore we enter upon the Book itſelf; it is requiſite the Reader ſhould be well informed what he is to underſtand by that Wiſdom *which is the Name, the Subject, and the End of it; and after what manner it is intended to be treated of in the following Sheets.*

Now every One, at the very firſt hearing, underſtands by Wiſdom *ſome particular and uncommon Accompliſhment, whereby a Man is diſtinguiſh'd and ſet above the Vulgar.*

greater Ability, and more maſterly Readineſs whether in Good or Evil. For tho' there be not the ſame Propriety indeed in the Expreſſion, when converted to the worſt Senſe; yet it is uſed either way, and the Scripture itſelf makes mention of ſome Perſons, Wiſe to do Evil. *Thus then it does not by any means import a really Good and Commendable Quality of the Mind, but in general any ſort of Knowledge or Skill, exquiſite in the Degree, be the Object and Employment of it what it will. In this Senſe a Tyrant, or a Pirate, or a Robber, may have this Title apply'd to him, no leſs than a King, or a Pilot, or a Captain; becauſe all we intend by it is only Prudence, and Conduct, and a perfect Underſtanding in the Buſineſs of his Profeſſion. Hence it comes to paſs, that Folly is oppoſed to Wiſdom, not only as it denotes Extravagance and Vice, but in general any ſort of Indiſcretion, or meanneſs of Attainments. For Wiſdom gives us an Idea of ſomething extraordinary and lofty in its kind; as the contrary does of ſomewhat little, and low, and ſhort of the common Pitch. Take Wiſdom in a Good or a Bad Senſe, Two Things are manifeſtly included in it; Firſt, A Sufficiency of Mind, which implies its being furniſhed with all things neceſſary for its Purpoſe; And, Secondly, The Excellency or more than common Meaſure of that Proviſion; for to give a Man*

Right to this Denomination, it is no leſs neceſſary that he ſhould enjoy theſe Qualities in a great and eminent Degree. Thus you ſee the largeſt and moſt vulgar Notion of Wiſdom, according to which Men commonly tell you, that Wiſe Men are very ſcarce; that they who are ſuch, have a Right to direct and preſide over Others, and, in Matters of difficulty, to be conſulted like ſo many Oracles; from whence it is very frequently ſaid, that Men take the Judgment of the Wiſe, and let better Heads determine for them. But now, if we come to define the thing more nicely, and fix a right Notion of it, we ſhall not find ſo general an Agreement. For Wiſdom means one thing with the generality of the World, another among Philoſophers, and ſomewhat different from both, in the Acceptation and Treatiſes of Divines. Theſe Three are the ſeveral Stages and Claſſes of Men, under which all the World is comprehended. The Two laſt have the Advantage, and lead Men by Rules and Precepts, and a ſtricter Conſideration of Things: The Firſt looks upon Things but very ſlightly, and takes up with very looſe and imperfect Notions of them.

Now it may very truly be ſaid, that there are Three ſorts of Wiſdom, Divine, Humane, and Worldly; theſe relate and bear proportion to God, to Nature in its primitive Purity and Perfection, and to Nature lapſed and depravd.

Concerning each of theſe three ſorts, the Three Orders of Men, juſt now inſtanc'd in, deliver themſelves, each according to their Condition and Capacity. But more properly and peculiarly thus; The Vulgar are more skilled and converſant in the Worldly, the Philoſophers about the Humane, and the Divines about the Divine Wiſdom, as their particular Buſineſs and Study.

The Loweſt of theſe is Worldly Wiſdom, and this varies according to the great Ends which it propoſes to itſelf, Riches, Pleaſure, or Honour. With regard to theſe it degenerates into Avarice, Luxury, or Ambition; according to

1 Joh. ii. 16. *St.* John's *Diviſion of it,* All that is in the World is the Luſt of the Fleſh, the Luſt of the Eyes, and the Pride of Life. *From whence*

Jam. iii. 15. *St.* James *hath given it thoſe ſcandalous Characters of* Earthly, Senſual, Deviliſh. *Now This is what both Philoſophy and Divinity take upon them to reprove, and endeavour to ſuppreſs and reform. They pronounce it to be no better than Folly and Madneſs, and ſo accounted in the Sight of God. And accordingly you will find no mention made of This in the following Treatiſe of* Wiſdom, *except it be, to diſallow, and to condemn it.*

The Divine, and Higheſt of theſe Three ſorts is treated of by Philoſophy and Religion, after a manner ſomewhat different from each other.

As

As for what the Common and Vulgar ſort of People uſually ſay, or are capable of ſaying upon this Occaſion, I omit it all, as too mean and low to have any place in our Conſideration, and rather a Profanation of the Subject, than otherwiſe. Philoſophers repreſent it as a Matter wholly Speculative, the Knowledge of Firſt Principles, and the Hidden Cauſes of Things; and laſtly, the Higheſt and Supreme Cauſe, GOD Himſelf; which with other abſtracted Notions, is the proper Buſineſs of Metaphyſicks in particular. This reſides entirely in the Underſtanding, and is its chief Happineſs and Perfection; 'tis the firſt and moſt ſublime of all the Intellectual Virtues and Excellencies, which are capable of ſubſiſting without Probity, or Action, or any Moral Virtue. Divines on the contrary do not ſo confine it to Speculation, as not to extend it to Practice too; for they make it the Knowledge of things pertaining to God, ſuch as ſhould enable us to form a Judgment of Matters to regulate our Lives and Actions by: And This they tell you is of Two Sorts; The One acquir'd *by Study and Induſtry, not much unlike what I mention'd to be the Science intended by Philoſophers; The Other* infuſed, *and* coming from above: *This is the Firſt of thoſe, (which are ſometimes termed the Se-ven) Gifts of the Spirit, with regard where-unto he is ſtyled* The Spirit of Wiſdom;

as reſts only upon the Righteous, and the Pure;
Wiſd. i. 4. *and, as the Book of* Wiſdom *truly obſerves,* will not enter into a malicious Soul, nor dwell in the Body that is ſubject unto Sin. *This is what the preſent Treatiſe is not intended for neither; but is the Subject of my* Firſt Truth, *and thoſe other Works of mine, which are properly* Treatiſes of Divinity, *and* Religious Diſcourſes.

From hence my Reader eaſily perceives that Humane Wiſdom is the real Title, and Subject of the following Book; of which it is fit ſome ſhort Deſcription ſhould here be premiſed, which may ſtand for the Argument, or ſummary Account of the whole Work. Now, the Common Accounts of this Matter, as they are various and very diſtant from one another, ſo are they all narrow and imperfect. The vulgar and moſt general Notion of it, amounts to no more than Circumſpection, Addreſs, and Prudent Behaviour in Buſineſs and Converſation. This indeed is like the Vulgar, and a Thought worthy of Them, who place all Excellence in Action, and Shew, and outward Advantages, and conſider no good Quality any farther, than as it is obſerv'd and admir'd. They are entirely devoted to Eyes and Ears; the Internal Motions of the Mind are of little or no Conſequence with this ſort of Men; and therefore, in their Acceptation of the Matter, Wiſdom may ſubſiſt without

without either Piety or Probity; for All they require from it is a good Outside, and Appearance, and such Easiness of Conduct and Agreeable Management, as shall approve a Man's Discretion and his Parts. Others again mistake it for a Roughness and Singularity of Temper and Behaviour; a particular Stiffness of Fashion, Obstinacy in Opinions, Affected Expressions, and a Way of Living out of the Common Road. And therefore those that value themselves upon these Qualities they call Philosophers, when in truth, to return a little of their own Jargon back again upon them, They are nothing better than conceited Humourists, Fantastical and Capricious Coxcombs. This now, according to the Scheme and Measures pursued in this Book, is, in plain English, *Extravagance and Folly. The Nature then of this Wisdom must be learn'd from some other Hand; that is, from Philosophers and Divines, who have both explain'd and treated of this Matter in their Moral Tracts. The Former handle it as their proper Business; for they consider Men as they are in Nature, and with regard to practice: But the Latter rise higher, and aspire to infused and supernatural Grace, such as are Speculative and more than Humane, that is Divine Wisdom, and with Regard to Faith. Hence it comes to pass, that the Former [illegible] extensive and large [illegible]*

direct private, but publick Duties; Societies as well as ſingle Perſons are inſtructed by it; Whatever can be neceſſary or advantagious to Families, Communities, Common-Wealths and Kingdoms, all falls within its Compaſs and Juriſdiction. Divinity on the Other Hand is more ſilent and ſparing upon theſe Accounts, and Aims chiefly at the Eternal Happineſs and Salvation of particular Perſons. Beſides, The Manner and Air of their Treatiſes is very different; That of Philoſophy more free, and eaſie, and entertaining; that of Divinity, more plain, and authoritative, and with leſs Pains to recommend itſelf to Mens Fancies and Palates. Philoſophy therefore, which is the Elder of the Two, as Nature muſt have been antecedent to our Supernatural Aſſiſtances, tries to inſinuate itſelf and win Mens Favours,

* So as to join Inſtruction with Delight,
Profit with Pleaſure — Lord *Roſcommon.*

And therefore ſhe dreſſes and adorns her ſelf with Diſcourſes, Arguments, Turns of Wit and Flights of Fancy; Apt Examples, and moving Similitudes; Ingenious Expreſſions, uſeful Apothegms, and all the Graces of Art and Eloquence. Divinity comes in a commanding Strain,

* Simul & jucunda & idonea dicere vitæ,
Lectorem delectando, pariterque monendo. *Horat.*

and

and thinks it a Diminution of her Majeſty to deſcend to ſuch popular and mean Methods. And accordingly there wants a great deal of that Freedom and Gaiety, and (if I may ſo ſay) Cheerfulneſs and Good Humour in this, which you are to expect in Philoſophy, which yet muſt be ſo temper'd, as not to degenerate into Trifle and Meanneſs, but ſtill continue to be truly Generous and Brave. It muſt be allow'd, that Philoſophers have acquitted themſelves admirably well in this particular; not only in the Inſtructive, but the Moving and Perſuaſive Part; ſetting off all their Virtues to the beſt Advantage, and taking care, that all the Heroick Excellence of them ſhall appear in its juſt Dignity and Proportions. Under which Title of Philoſophers, I comprehend not only ſuch as the World have thought fit to dignify with the Fame of Wiſdom, as Thales, Solon, *and thoſe that were of the ſame Strain, about the time of* Cyrus, Crœſus, *and* Piſiſtratus; *nor them only of the next in Succeſſion, who taught and profeſs'd Wiſdom publickly, as* Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Ariſtotle, Ariſtippus, Zeno, Antiſthenes, *who were all of them Heads and Maſters in their Art; nor their Diſciples and Followers, who afterwards divided into particular Sects; but I include likewiſe all thoſe great Men, who render'd themſelves exemplary for Virtue and Wiſdom, as* Phocion, Ariſtides, Pericles,

ricles, Alexander, *(whom* Plutarch *dignifies with the Character of Philoſopher as well as King)* Epaminondas, *and the reſt of the Brave* Greeks. *The* Fabricii, Fabii, Camilli, *the* Cato's, *the* Torquati, Reguli, Lælii, *and* Scipio's, *among the* Romans, *moſt of them Military Men and Commanders of Armies.*

Upon this Account, though I do not refuſe or diſregard the Authorities of Divines, yet I have more frequent recourſe to thoſe of Humaniſts and Philoſophers in the following Treatiſe. Had I deſign'd to prepare Men for a Cloiſter, or a Life of ſuch Perfection, as aſpires above the Precepts, and aims at the Perfection of Evangelical Counſels, then indeed my Subject would have obliged me to keep cloſe to thoſe Authors: But ſince I am training a Man up for the World, and forming him for Buſineſs and mix'd Converſation; Humane, and not Divine Wiſdom, is the proper Accompliſhment for me to recommend, and the Method of anſwering my Purpoſe.

Speaking therefore in general Terms, and according to the Nature of the Thing, We muſt, in Agreement with Philoſophers and Divines, acknowledge, that this Humane Wiſdom conſiſts in a Rectitude of the Man, when every part within and without, his Thoughts and Words, and Actions, and every Motion is Graceful and Noble, and what is for the Honour of his Nature.

ture. For this is the Excellence of a Man, conſider'd as a Man: So that, as we call That Piece of Workmanſhip Perfect, which hath all its Parts entire, and is finiſh'd according to the niceſt Rules of Art; He is in like manner ſaid to be a wiſe Man who underſtands upon all Occaſions how to ſhew himſelf a Man, by acting in perfect Conformity to the Fundamental and Firſt Rules of Humane Nature; Or, to ſpeak more particularly, He that is well acquainted with himſelf in particular, and Mankind in general; that preſerves himſelf from all the Vices, the Errors, the Paſſions, the Defects incident to him, as well from the inward Cauſes of his own Mind, as the outward, proceeding from Cuſtom and Common Opinion; that aſſerts the Native Freedom of his Mind, and hath a large univerſal Soul; that conſiders and judges every Thing, without enſlaving himſelf to any; that directs all his Aims and Actions ſo as that they ſhall agree with Nature, that is, pure, uncorrupted Reaſon, the Primitive Law and Light inſpired by God, and which ſhines ſtill in every Breaſt, the Model by which the wiſe Man ſquares his own private Judgment; that in his outward Behaviour complies with the Laws, and Cuſtoms, and Ceremonies of the Countrey where he dwells; that demeans himſelf toward others with Diſcretion and Prudence, is always firm and conſiſtent with himſelf, pleaſed and contented;

tented, without any diſcompoſure o
pecting and entertaining any Accid
ever, and eſpecially Death, the laſt a
rible of them all. All theſe Strokes
which go to the making up this Ide
reduced to Four, that are the principa
commanding of all the reſt: The Kn
a Man's ſelf; Free and Generous La
Mind; the acting in Conformity with
(which is of an Extent ſo large as wh
ly underſtood, to be ſingly, and by itſelf
ſufficient) and true Content and Even
Temper. For theſe are Qualifications
never meet, except only in the wiſe Man
that is defective in any one of them, do
come up to the Character. He that eithe
ſtakes his own Condition, or whoſe Mind
any ſort of Bondage, either to his own Pa
or to the Common Vogue; that is partial,
ty'd up to any particular Notions, cramps
his Thoughts, and cuts himſelf out from his N
tive Right of examining, and judging eve
Thing; He that lives in Contradiction to N
ture, (that is, Right Reaſon) upon what Pr
tence ſoever he forſake it, whether he be ſe
duced by Paſſion, or Opinion; He that trips ana
ſtaggers through Trouble, or Terror, or Diſcon-
tent, and lives in dread of Death; This M
is not, cannot be W
tle the Piece, whi

ſigns to draw in its full Proportions. Particularly the Second Book, which conſiſts of the General Rules, and a Deſcription of Wiſdom in the groſs; and this indeed is more properly mine, than either of the others; ſo peculiarly ſuch, and ſo full to my purpoſe, that I once had Thoughts of ſending it into the World alone. And what I have here deſcribed in Words, the Graver hath done with his Style, in the Frontiſpiece of this Book, which the Reader will find an Explanation of, immediately after this Preface.

Now there are two Things, which principally conduce to this Wiſdom, and help Men forwards in the Attainment of it. The Firſt of Theſe is a Good Conſtitution, or Temperament of the Brain, which makes us capable of ſuch Improvements, as our own Care and Induſtry ſhall be able to acquire. Of how very great Conſequence this is, and how far it falls under the Power of Men to contribute to it, you will find at large in the XIII. Chap. of the Firſt, and the XIV. Chap. of the Third Book.

The Second is the Study of Philoſophy; not all the Branches of it equally, but the Moral Part chiefly; yet ſo as that the Natural be not wholly neglected. For this is our Candle to enlighten, our Guide to direct, our Rule to chalk out the Way for us; It explains and gives us true Idea's of the Law of Nature, and

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by this means furniſhes a Man for every part of his Duty as a Man; whether it concern him in Publick or in Private; in Company or Alone; as a Member of a Family, or of a State; it ſweetens and takes off all the Beaſt in us, makes us tame, and gentle, and good-natured; faſhions and poliſhes this rude Maſs, and forms it into Wiſdom. In ſhort, This is the true Learning; all the reſt a Man is capable of is mere Vanity in compariſon; at leaſt it is in no degree neceſſary, and in a much leſs degree uſeful. For here we learn both to Live and to Die well; and this is the whole we have to take Care of: It teaches a generous and noble Integrity, and Honeſt Prudence, and well adviſed Probity; ſuch as raiſe a Man above little Ends, and low Reſpects, and put him upon Virtue from the more exalted and Divine Principles, for the ſake of its own Excellence, and the Senſe that this is what becomes him to do. But alas! This Second Help is almoſt as generally neglected, or as ill uſed as the former. For the generality of the World are ſo entirely taken up with worldly Wiſdom, that they give themſelves little or no Trouble about this which I am now mentioning.

Thus Nature and Induſtry muſt both do their Parts, in order to a Man's obtaining Wiſdom. He who hath been kindly dealt with by Nature, and brings the Diſpoſition to Wiſdom with him,

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in a convenient Temper of Brain, will find good Actions and Manners flow very naturally from hence, and feel himſelf advanc'd a great way, without his own Pains; and thoſe Pains need not be very great, where he is not ſo much obliged to conquer, as to promote Nature, and moves with ſpeed and inclination towards the Prize he aims at: But if the Temper on the other hand be amiſs, All will be difficult and ſtrained: Induſtry muſt then correct and ſupply, oppoſe and ſubdue Nature; as Socrates *obſerved of himſelf, that by infinite Pains, and laborious Study of Philoſophy, he had at laſt got the better of a very ill Diſpoſition.*

In proportion to theſe two Helps, there are on the other Hand two Hindrances, or powerful Countermines, which carry Men into Folly; the one natural, the other acquir'd. The Former proceeds from the Diſtemper of the Brain, whether that be Original or Accidental; by this means it happens ſometimes to be too ſoft, or too moiſt, or the Parts of which it conſiſts are too heavy and groſs; from whence proceed Dulneſs of Apprehenſion, Weakneſs of Judgment, Dark and confuſed Notions of Things, flat, and low, and little Thoughts, ſuch as we generally find among the mean and illiterate ſort of People: Or elſe in the other Extreme, it is too hot and dry, which diſpoſes the Perſon to be furious and bold, extravagant and intractable in Vice. Theſe

are

are the two Extremes, like Fire and Water, Mercury and Lead, each of them improper for Wiſdom, which requires a ſtrong and vigorous, but at the ſame time a fix'd and ſteddy Mind; and ſuch as in the midſt of all its Gallantry and Firmneſs, may be manageable, and yielding, and modeſt. This Second Defect however, of the two, ſeems the eaſier to be redreſs'd; the Firſt is hardly curable.

The acquir'd Obſtruction proceeds either from Want of all Inſtruction, or from being Ill Inſtructed; which, among other Things, conſiſts very much in ſtrong Prepoſſeſſions, wherewith the Mind was early tinctur'd, and ſo finds itſelf captivated to them, not able to get above theſe firſt Impreſſions, nor to think freely and impartially. Such Men we commonly ſay are Headſtrong, and touch'd in the Crown, Whimſical, and wedded to their own Opinions: And, if to that Obſtinacy of Humour, there happen to be added any degree of Learning, This blows them up into Preſumption and Arrogance, puts Weapons into their Hand to defend their Prejudices, finiſhes them in Folly, and renders their Diſeaſe incapable of all Remedy. Natural Defects, and acquired Prepoſſeſſions, are indeed two very formidable Obſtructions; and if Learning do not, as in truth it very ſeldom does, cure them, it adds to the Diſeaſe, and renders them impregnable. Which yet is by no means any Reflection upon

upon Learning, or Diſhonour to it, as ſome may be apt to imagine, but rather a Commendation, and to its Advantage.

Learning is, without all Controverſy, a moſt excellent Weapon, but not fit to be truſted in every Hand; and he who knows not how to manage it, will find more hurt than good from it. For it makes ſick and weak Minds giddy and conceited, perfects and poliſhes Fools, no leſs than it does thoſe of good Capacities and Diſpoſitions. A weak and injudicious Man knows not how to uſe his Weapon; on the contrary it weakens and over-powers Him: He is oppreſs'd with it, like a Stomach over-charg'd with more Meat than it can digeſt, or an Arm that is benumb'd and born down by a Staff heavier than it can uſe. The ſtrong and ſound Mind, quite contrary, plays with it dexterouſly, ſhews a maſterly Skill in the uſe of it, turns it to Advantage perpetually, forms his Judgment, rectifies his Will, pours in this Oil to make the Lamp of Nature burn ſtronger and brighter; is the wiſer and better for that very thing which makes the other but the more exquiſite and more inſupportable Fool. But, all this while, Learning is not accountable for thoſe ill Conſequences, any more than Wine is guilty of all the Exceſſes committed by it, or a good Medicine ill appli'd, for the Patient's growing worſe upon it. Now againſt theſe conceited half-witted Fellows,

whom Nature hath diſpoſed to Folly, and their own Acquiſitions have perfected in it, I denounce formal War in my Book, as looking upon them to be irreconcilable Enemies to Wiſdom; and the fitteſt Title I can find to diſtinguiſh them by, is that of Pedants; *for which I have the Authority of ſeveral good Writers, who have uſed the Word in this Signification. It is confeſs'd, that in its Original Language and proper Senſe, it is taken in a very good and commendable Meaning; but in latter Times, and other Languages, the great Abuſe and Corruption of Learning hath given occaſion for the fixing a very ill and contemptible one upon it; a vile, ſordid, peeviſh, ſtiff way, that makes no other uſe of Learning, but for Gain and Oſtentation, Arrogance and Preſumption: In ſhort, all That which makes Learning deſpicable and derided, is ſignify'd by it. And ſo this, like* Tyrant, Sophiſter, *and the like, is one of thoſe Words which hath abſolutely loſt its firſt Signification, and is now become a Mark of Reproach and Contempt.*

It is very poſſible ſome Perſons may be offended at my uſing this Term, imagining that I deſign an Affront to thoſe who make Learning their Buſineſs and Profeſſion. But they, I hope, will be ſatisfy'd with this ingenuous Declaration, that I have not the leaſt Intention of reflecting upon any Science or Condition of Men, particularly not the Gown, which I have the

Honour to wear, and to be one of thoſe who are called Men of Letters, *my ſelf; my Meaning is only to charge a certain Quality of Mind, a ſort of Souls which I have been deſcribing, of mean and low Capacity, but moderately provided by Nature, and afterwards depraved by Art and Study; Men prepoſſeſs'd, and obſtinate, and fierce in certain Opinions; and theſe are to be found in all Robes, and all Conditions; as in truth there is* a World of Mob in the Pit and Boxes, as well as in the Upper Gallery. Vulgum tam chlamydatos quàm coronam voco. *Let theſe Objectors but find me another Word as expreſſive of thoſe Qualities, and I will moſt readily conſent to the Exchange. In the mean while, after this Declaration, I think I may juſtly ſay, that whoever ſhall ſtill be peeviſh, and have any Reſentment upon this account, does but injure Me, and accuſe Himſelf. 'Tis true, there are other Terms of Oppoſition to the Wiſe Man; but not any, I think, ſo extenſive and ſignificant as This. The Vulgar, the Ignorant, and Others, which I frequently take occaſion to make uſe of: Theſe are oppoſed more directly, like Low to High, Weak to Strong, Common to Scarce, a Servant to his Maſter, Prophane to Sacred: Thus likewiſe Fool is ſet the moſt directly in Oppoſition to Him; but then This is, as Crooked is oppoſed to Streight, Vain-glorious to Modeſt, Conſtraint*

to Freedom, Sickneſs to Health. But now Pedant *includes all this, and a great deal more, in the Senſe which I apply it to: For it gives us an* Idea *of a Man, not only different from, and contrary to a Wiſe Man, as the reſt of them do, but a Fellow that hath the Impudence to oppoſe and make Head againſt him; that comes armed* Cap-a-pee, *ſawcily challenges him to Combat, and talks magiſterially and dogmatically. And, becauſe in the midſt of all this Vanity and fierce Arrogance, he hath ſome ſort of Miſgivings, and thinks himſelf diſcover'd; therefore he bears an inveterate Spight to this Perſon who checks his Follies; is eternally cenſuring, condemning, running him down; eſteeming and behaving himſelf as the only Perſon who has any Right to that Character of Wiſdom; tho' in reality he infinitely exceed all others in the Exquiſiteneſs and Troubleſomeneſs of his Folly.*

Having thus given my Reader a ſhort Account of the Argument and Deſign of the following Treatiſe, it may not be unſeaſonable to premiſe one Word or two concerning the Order and Method obſerved in it. He muſt know then, that it conſiſts of Three Books. *The* Firſt *directs the Knowledge of a Man's Self, and the Condition of Humane Nature in general. This is laid as a neceſſary Preparation to Wiſdom; and largely illuſtrated under Five General Conſiderations, each of which is ſubdivided into ſeveral*

veral Particulars. The Second *contains the principal Lines and general Rules of Wiſdom. The* Third *deſcends to particular Inſtructions and Circumſtances, branched out under the Four Cardinal Virtues, of Prudence, Juſtice, Fortitude, and Temperance; and here every Part and Relation of Humane Life, hath ſome Proviſion made for the Duties it engages us in.*

I add too, that I write and treat my Subject, not after a Pedantick Manner, and in ſet Forms, according to the Methods of the Schools; nor with regular Arguments in Mood and Figure, nor with Pompous Eloquence, nor any other Artifice whatſoever. I am verily perſuaded what Tully *ſays is moſt true, That* Wiſdom, could ſhe but render her ſelf viſible to Humane Eyes, would charm our Souls, and raviſh our Affections, and make every Creature ſtrangely in Love with her. (Quæ ſi oculis ipſis cerneretur, mirabiles excitaret amores ſui.) *And therefore ſhe need only diſcover her native Beauties, and is too noble, too glorious, to uſe any of thoſe little modiſh Garbs, to adorn and ſet her off. But this I do too with a Liberty which all, perhaps, will not be well pleaſed with: The Propoſitions and Truths are compact and cloſe, but oftentimes very dry, and ſerved up crude and coarſely, like Aphoriſms, Overtures, or ſhort Hints of Diſcourſes.* De Offic. Lib. 1.

The PREFACE.

Some Perſons, I am ſenſible, may be apt to think me too bold with ſome commonly received Opinions, and take Offence that I pay them no greater Deference. To theſe Perſons, and the Fault they find with my free way of expreſſing my Thoughts; I anſwer,

Firſt, *That Wiſdom, when above the common Standard, hath a Right to this Liberty. It is the Privilege and Juriſdiction of a Wiſe Man, to call Matters before him, to examine and try them, to cenſure and condemn vulgar Notions, which indeed, for the moſt part, are no better than vulgar Errors. And who ſhall pretend to bar this Privilege? Why ſhould he who hath it, decline the Exerciſe of it, though he knows at the ſame time that this cannot be done, without incurring the Envy and Diſpleaſure of a great part of the World?*

Nay, Secondly, *I cannot but think, the juſter Ground of Complaint lies on my Side, and muſt therefore reprove Them for this fooliſh and feminine Niceneſs, as a thing that is infinitely too ſqueamiſh and tender to bear neceſſary Truth, or attain to ſound Wiſdom. The boldeſt Expreſſions and Truths are moſt becoming a truly great Soul; and a Man who hath at all ſtudy'd the World, will not think any thing ſtrange or ſhocking. For this proceeds from Weakneſs of Judgment only, which ought to be corrected; and a Man muſt harden his Mind, and accuſtom himſelf*

[redacted]

Is it becauſe I am of another Opinion? Let them give me fair Quarter at leaſt, for I am not in any Degree diſpleas'd with Them for differing from me. Is it for ſaying ſome Things not agreeable to their Taſte, and that of the World? Alas, 'Tis for this very Reaſon, that I mention them. I hope at leaſt, there is nothing ſaid without Reaſon for it; if they can reliſh it, and diſcern the force of that Reaſon, 'tis well: If they have better for the other ſide of the Queſtion, and ſuch as will overthrow mine, I am always ready to hear it; and ſhall be both pleaſed and thankful for better Information. But let them not think to run me down with Numbers and Authority, for Theſe have no Weight with me, except in Matters of Religion only; and there Authority ſingle is Argument ſufficient to induce my Belief of things, which my Reaſon cannot comprehend. This is its proper Empire, but out of theſe Territories Reaſon reigns and hath abſolutely Juriſdiction, as St. Auguſtin *himſelf hath very truly and very ingenuouſly acknowledged. 'Tis a moſt unjuſt Uſurpation over our Native Rights and Liberties, the very Madneſs of Tyranny and Rage, to think to enſlave us to All that either the Ancients have deliver'd, or the Generality of the World entertained: But eſpecially the Latter, ſince the greater Part of Mankind know neither what they do, nor ſay. None but Fools*

will

will ſuffer themſelves to be led by the Noſe at this rate; and for ſuch this Book I confeſs is not calculated; if it ſhould meet with Popular Acceptance, I ſhould ſuſpect it did not anſwer its Character. The Ancient Authors ought indeed to be heard, and conſidered and duly reſpected; but to be captivated by them, is an Exceſs of Veneration they muſt not pretend to. For though a Man ſhould bear all, and pay a Deference to ſome, yet he muſt aſſent and yield up his Mind to none, but Reaſon only. And indeed, put the Caſe we might, and would be governed by Authorities; yet I would be glad to know how this is poſſible to be done; or how we ſhall find ſuch an Agreement among them, as ſhall enable us to ſay, Authority is on our ſide. Ariſtotle, *for Inſtance, pretended to be the greateſt Man that had then appeared in the World; he took upon him to arraign and condemn all that had gone before him; and yet he ſaid and wrote more abſurd Things, than all of them put together had ever thought of. Nay, he is inconſiſtent with himſelf, and many times does not know what he would be at; of which his wild Notions, concerning the Soul of Man, The Eternity of the World, The Generation of Winds and Waters, &c. are undeniable Teſtimonies. And, in truth, a Man who conſiders the Matter will find, that to have all People of the ſame Opinion would be infinitely more prodigious*

and

and amazing, than to find them otherwiſe. For Diverſity of Opinions is as comely and beautiful in the Minds of Men, as Variety is in the Works of Nature. That Wiſe as well as Inſpired Apoſtle, St. Paul, *allows a great Liberty, in theſe Two Rules*; Let every Man be fully perſuaded in his own Mind; *and* let no Man condemn or deſpiſe others of a different Judgment and Behaviour. *And it is obſervable, that theſe Directions are given in a Matter much nicer and of greater Conſequence, than what we now treat of. For they do not concern Actions merely Humane, and External, and Civil Compliances, in which I have declar'd, that my Wiſe Man ſhould not take upon him to be ſingular, nor think it any Diminution of his Character, to ſubmit and conform to Cuſtom and Preſcription: But St.* Paul's *Rules are of a Religious Conſideration; and relate to ſuch Diſtinctions of Meats and Days, as Men thought themſelves bound upon a Principle of Conſcience to make; whereas all the Hardineſs and Freedom I contend for, is only that which enlarges a Man's Thoughts and private Opinions from Captivity and Reſtraint; and ſuch as no other Perſon is or can be concern'd in, but what a Man is entirely and ſolely accountable to himſelf for.*

Rom. xiv. 3, 5.

Fourthly, *However, to give all reaſonable Satisfaction even in this Point too; In regard ſome Things might ſeem too ſrude and hard for the*

the weaker ſort of People, (thoſe of ſtrong and ſound Conſtitutions I am ſenſible will reliſh and digeſt them all very well,) in Tenderneſs and Condeſcenſion to ſuch queaſie Stomachs, I have taken Care, in this Second Edition, to explain, illuſtrate, and ſoften any thing that might offend their feebler Judgments. And accordingly do now preſent you with a Book diligently reviſed, and conſiderably enlarged above what it was before.

Laſtly, *I beg leave of the Reader, who undertakes to paſs a Judgment upon this Work, that he will permit me to forewarn him of Seven dangerous Miſtakes, which other Perſons by falling into already, have entertained a leſs favourable Opinion of the Former Edition, than I have the Vanity to think it deſerved.*

The Firſt *is, That he would make a Difference between Matter of Fact and Right; and not from what is related as Done, conclude That ought to be Done.*

Secondly, *To make a great Difference between Acting and Judging; and not conclude from any Liberty of Opinion maintain'd by me, that I pretend to vindicate the ſame Liberty in Behaviour.*

Thirdly, *That he would not look upon all That as Reſolved and Determined, and Declared in Favour of, which is only offered to Conſideration,*

Argued

Argued and Diſputed Problematically, and in the old Academick Way.

Fourthly, *That what I relate from, or concerning other People, be not imputed to Me, or paſs for my own Senſe and Judgment of the Thing.*

Fifthly, *That what is ſpoken of the Mind and its internal Qualifications, be not appropriated to any Sort or Profeſſion of Men, or extended to outward and particular Circumſtances and Conditions.*

Sixthly, *That what is ſpoken of Humane Opinion, be not applied to Religion and Matters of Faith.*

And, Seventhly, *That what belongs to Virtue, and Actions merely Natural and Moral, be not interpreted of Grace and Supernatural Operations.*

Let my Reader but lay aſide all Prejudice and Paſſion, and take theſe Cautions along with him, and I am well aſſured, his own Scruples may be reſolved by them, the Objections raiſed by himſelf or others againſt this Treatiſe abundantly anſwered, and the Deſign I had in it, cleared from all Blame or Suſpicion. But if, after all, he be ſtill diſſatisfied, let him come forth into fair Combat, and attack me openly. For to traduce, and ſnarle and mangle an Author's Reputation in a Corner, is, I confeſs, an eaſie, but withal a baſe, and Pedantick Practice,

almoſt ador'd, you will now be tempted as much to loath and deſpiſe; For what is Man thus above a Beaſt? What but a Load of Corruption, and a Sink of Ill-Humours? And yet this wonderful Diſparity notwithſtanding, theſe two ſo diſtant Parts are link'd together with ſuch amazing Art, and embrace each other ſo cloſe and kindly, that there is at the ſame time eternal Quarrels, and yet an inviolable Friendſhip between them. They cannot live together peaceably, and yet they cannot part contentedly: Like a Man that hath a Wolf by the Ears, and neither knows how to hold him, nor to let him go: So is each of theſe principal Parts in Man; and each may ſay to the other what the Poet did. Chap. 2.

* *My Help and Hindrance, Health and Sickneſs; I Cannot live with thee; and without thee die.*

2. *Them into Three.*

But in regard one of theſe Parts admits of a Subdiviſion, by reaſon of a great and manifeſt Difference in the Faculties and Parts of this Soul of ours; the One Part Noble and Pure, Intellectual and Divine; the Other Mean, and Senſual, and Brutiſh: The beſt and moſt lively Repreſentation of Man, and the ſureſt Method of attaining to the Knowledge of him, ſeems to be the making of this Firſt Diviſion to conſiſt of Three Branches; and ſaying, That the *Conſtituent Parts* of Man are the *Mind*, the *Soul*, and the *Fleſh*. Of theſe the *Mind* and the *Fleſh* are the two diſtant Extremes, diſtant as Heaven and Earth are from each other; and the Soul hath a middle

* Nec tecum poſſum vivere, nec ſine te.

Station

An Explanation of the Figure in the Frontiſpiece of this Book.

AT the upper End of the Page, and over the Title of the Book, you have *Wiſdom* repreſented by a beautiful Woman: She is naked; yet ſo that there is no Offence given to the Chaſteſt Eyes, (intimating, that ſhe needs not any Additional Beauties, or the Aſſiſtance of Art to recommend Her, but is natural, plain, and ſimple; yet ſo as in the midſt of Nature and Simplicity to have always a ſtrict Regard to Modeſty.) Her Countenance is Healthful and Maſculine, Smiling and Chearful, Strong and Authoritative. Her Body Streight, with her Feet fixed cloſe together, upon a Cube, that denotes Juſtice and Firmneſs. Her Arms acroſs, as if ſhe were embracing her ſelf; intimating, that ſhe is happy in, and ſatisfy'd with her ſelf. Upon her Head ſhe wears a Crown of Laurel and Olive, which imports Victory and Peace. The void Space round about her, ſignifies Liberty: She looks in a Glaſs, held by a Hand coming out of a Cloud, at ſome Diſtance from her, which preſents her with the Reflection of her own Face; for Wiſdom is employ'd

employ'd in the Knowledge and Contemplation of her ſelf. Upon the Right Side are theſe Words, *I know not*; not thereby to give Countenance to perpetual Doubt and Scepticiſm; but arguing, that ſhe is mature and cautious in Deliberating, ſlow in Determining, not poſitive or peremptory, but reſerving an Ear open for freſh Reaſons, and not aſhamed to confeſs, that the beſt Humane Knowledge is ſtill dark and imperfect. On the Left Side are thoſe other Words, *Peace, and a little*; which are the Author's own Device, repreſented by a Root impaled, wound about with an Olive-Branch, and encircled with two Branches of Laurel in an Oval Form; implying, that a Competency is ſufficient; and that Men have it in their own Power to be eaſy and contented. *See Book II. Chap. vi. Fig. 6.*

Below, on each ſide the Title, are Four little deformed, wretched, wrinkled old Women, bound in Chains; the End of which is faſten'd to the Pedeſtal of *Wiſdom*; who deſpiſes, condemns, and tramples them under her Feet. The Two on the Right Side of the Title are *Paſſion* and *Opinion*; *Paſſion* hath a meagre and diſcompoſed Countenance, intimating Diſorder and Fury. *Opinion* hath wild ſtaring Eyes, an unſettled and ſtupid Face: ſhe is ſupported by ſeveral Perſons, denoting the Extravagance and general Infection of vulgar Errors, and how fond of, and how ſtiff the common Peo-

ple

ple are in them. The other Two on the Left Side of the Inſcription are *Superſtition*, with an amazed Look, her Hands claſped together like a Slave trembling for Fear; ſhewing the Terrors and Aſtoniſhment of People, poſſeſs'd with this Phrenſy of the Mind: And laſtly, there is *Learning*, which is a counterfeit, artificial, acquir'd, and pedantick Virtue; a Slave to Laws, and Cuſtoms, and Forms; with a ſwell'd Face, a haughty arrogant Look, bold ſtaring Eyes; and ſhe reads in a Book, wherein is written, *Yea, Nay*; importing the Vanity and Confidence of Learned Men, their Eternal Diſputes, and the wide Diſagreement of their Notions; and yet the Preſumption and Poſitiveneſs they betray in the midſt of all this Difference and Uncertainty. And laſtly, The Chains which terminate in the Footſtool of *Wiſdom*, ſhew that Captivity of the Mind, which all theſe Qualities bring Men under, which they who ſtudy Wiſdom labour to get above; and they who attain to it, break thoſe Fetters, and are wholly free from that miſerable Bondage.

charge and empty it. This Veſſel receives, col- Chap. 3.
lects, mingles, and concocts the ſeveral ſorts of Nouriſhment taken in at our Mouths; and from thence works off a whitiſh Juice call'd *Chyle*, proper for the Suſtenance and Nutriment of the Body, and afterwards wrought over again more accurately in the *Meſeraick Veins*, thro' which it paſſes into the Liver. The *Liver* is hot and moiſt, lying ſomewhat more to the Right Side. This is the proper Work-houſe of the Blood, the great Source of the Veins, the Seat of the Vegetative Faculty. Here the *Chyle* drawn off from the *Meſeraick Veins* is converted into Blood; which is taken into its Cavities by the *Vena Porta*, and diſcharg'd again by the *Vena Cava*, (which iſſues from the Convex Part) and its Branches, in abundance of Ducts, like Rivulets or Streams from a Fountain. In the Left-Side lies the *Spleen*, which receives the Diſcharge and Excrementitious Humours of the *Liver*. Then follows the *Reins* and the *Guts*, which hang all together in one Link, and, as according to the uſual Proportion, the Stature of a Man is ſeven times as much as the length of a common Foot; ſo the Bowels, when drawn out, are uſually ſeven times the length of a Man. Theſe Two former Apartments, which ſome contract into One, (tho' the Offices of them are ſo very different, as to juſtify the diſtinguiſhing them into Two) are, by many Authors, reſembled to the loweſt Region of the Univerſe; the Elementary one, which is the Seat of Generation and Corruption; and here that which goes by the Name of the *Concupiſcible Soul*, keeps its peculiar Reſidence.

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

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OF

WISDOM,

THE

FIRST BOOK;

Which consists of the Knowledge of a Man's own self, and the Condition of Humane Nature in general.

An Exhortation to the Study and Knowledge of one's self.

The Introduction to this whole First Book.

THERE [illegible]

Search of other Objects, and fixes them every where, any where, rather than upon themſelves: For when all is done, the true Learning is at home, and the proper Science and Subject for Man's Contemplation, is *Man* himſelf.

2. *The Dictates of Univerſal Reaſon.*

Were this Advice thus generally neglected for want of being ſeaſonably or ſufficiently given, the Omiſſion were more excuſable: But the Matter is quite otherwiſe: For *God*, *Nature*, *Wiſe Men*, the *World*, All conſpire to inculcate it; and both by the Inſtructions they give, and the Examples they ſet, preach this Doctrine, and loudly call upon *Man* to make Himſelf the Employment of his own *Thoughts*, and the Object of his own *Studies*. God, we know, is perpetually taken up with the Contemplation of Himſelf; and the unſpeakable Happineſs, as well as conſtant Buſineſs, of that vaſt Eternity, is the viewing, conſidering, and knowing his own Infinite Perfections.

The World is ſo contriv'd, as to have all its Eyes turn'd inward; and the ſeveral Parts of this Univerſe are ever beholding the Beauties and Conveniences of themſelves, or of one another: "For Heaven, and Earth, and Air, and Sea, "may ſeem ſo many independent Bodies, yet are "they in reality but ſo many diſtinct Parts of "one Body; and the mutual Regards of theſe to "each other, are but the ſeveral Proſpects which "one vaſt united Whole takes of itſelf." So perpetually are the Eyes of the World open upon itſelf, ſo neceſſarily contracted and determin'd to itſelf alone. But why ſhould we go abroad for Arguments, who have ſuch convincing ones at home? For Man hath this Engagement to ſtudy

and

and know Himſelf, which no other Part of the World hath, that it is natural to him to *think*. This is the peculiar Character, the very Eſſence of Man; and nothing is ſo near, nothing preſents itſelf ſo immediately to his Thought as Himſelf. So that Nature here hath plainly taught our Duty, and ſhewed that this is the Work ſhe cuts out for every Man. Nothing can be ſo eaſy, as for a Man to meditate, and entertain his Thoughts. It is incomparably the moſt frequent, moſt common, moſt natural Practice. *Thought* is the Food, the Support, the Life of the Mind; it muſt needs be ſo indeed, ſince the very * *Eſſence of Mind is Cogitation.* And where, I pray, ſhall this Mind begin? Where will you find a more proper Subject for its Exerciſe and Entertainment than its own ſelf? Can there be any more natural, any that hath a greater Right to this Contemplation? Any that is nearer related, or that more highly concerns it to be well acquainted with? Certainly, to ramble abroad, and fix upon foreign Matters, and at the ſame time quite overlook and forget one's ſelf, is the greateſt Injuſtice, and the moſt unnatural Neglect that can be. No doubt, every Man's true Buſineſs, and the Thing he is properly call'd to, is the thinking of Himſelf, and being well employ'd to ſee how Matters go at home. Theſe are our Trade and our Concern; the reſt but Entertainment and Diverſion. And thus we ſee it is in every other Creature. Each of theſe takes care of itſelf, makes the Study of itſelf the firſt and principal Buſineſs, hath Bounds ſet to its Deſires, and

* Cujus vivere eſt cogitare.

Book I. neſs of their Perſons turn to good Account in their weightieſt Affairs; and ſo did *Scipio* more than any of them. *Handſome* and *Good*, have a great Affinity, and both the * *Greek* Language, and the Style of Holy Scriptures, ſeem to expreſs this, by uſing one and the ſame Word to ſignify both. Several great Philoſophers found their Beauty ſerviceable, in their Study, and Acquiſition of Wiſdom; and to ſhew that this Recommendation is univerſal, it is not confined to Men only, but is valued, and of great Requeſt, even among Brutes.

* Καλὸς.

3. *Different ſorts of it.*

Now Beauty is of great Variety, and may be conſider'd in very different Reſpects. That which is proper to Men, conſiſts chiefly in a Majeſtick Form and goodly Stature: The other ſorts of Beauty are of a ſofter and more effeminate kind; they may be rather called Prettineſſes, and theſe are more peculiar to the Female Sex. In each of Theſe, there is a Subdiviſion; One, which is a fixed and laſting Beauty; and this conſiſts in having the Parts well proportion'd, and the Colours juſtly mix'd: A Body not ſwell'd nor bloated, and yet not ſo thin and meager neither, that the Nerves ſhould ſhew themſelves, or the Bones ſtart out of the Skin; but full of Blood, and Spirits, and well in Fleſh; the Muſcles high and clear; the Skin ſmooth and ſoft; the Complexion freſh and ruddy. The Other is a moveable and inconſtant Beauty, which may be term'd Gracefulneſs; and this conſiſts in a good Air, and becoming Motions; wherein all the Parts of the Body are concern'd, but the Eyes more ſo than any of the reſt. The former is as it were dead, when

* *Weigh no Merit by the common Scale.* *Dryden.*
The Conſcience is the Teſt of every Mind;
Seek not thy ſelf without thy ſelf to find.
Pleaſe not thy ſelf the flatt'ring Croud to hear;
'Tis fulſom Stuff to feed thy itching Ear.
Reject the nauſeous Praiſes of the Times: ——
Survey thy Soul; not what thou doſt appear, *Dryden Eng. Perſ.*
But what thou art, and find the Beggar there.
† *Sift well thy Soul, its Product nicely view,*
And learn from whence thy Tares and Darnel grew;
Which are to Nature, which to Cuſtom due:
If the thin Crop ſprung from a Soil too lean,
Or long neglected Weeds have choak'd the gen'rous Grain.

The *Knowledge* of a Man's ſelf is a Step to the *Knowledge* of God: The beſt and ſhorteſt Method we can poſſibly take of raiſing our Minds up to Heaven. It muſt needs be ſo, becauſe there is no other thing capable of being known by us, which carries ſuch lively Stroaks, ſuch expreſs Images and Characters, ſuch clear and convincing Teſtimonies of God, as Man does: And alſo becauſe whatever there is of this kind, may be more perfectly known by us: For a Man muſt be of neceſſity more ſenſible of thoſe Faculties and Motions, which are within himſelf, and better quali- 3. *A Scale leading to Divine Wiſdom.*

* Noſce teipſum! —— nec te quæſiveris extrà.
Reſpue quod non es —— *Perſ. Sat. 1.*
Tecum habita, & noris quàm ſit tibi curta ſupellex. *Perſ. Sat. 4.*
† ——Tu te conſule.
Teipſum concute, nunquid vitiorum,
Inſeverit olim natura, aut etiam conſuetudo mala. *Hor.*

fied to give an Account of them, than he can be of thoſe which belong to any other Creature; becauſe theſe are at ſome Diſtance from him, and he cannot be alike conſcious of them. * *Thou haſt faſhioned and cloſed me in, and laid thy hand upon me: therefore is thy Knowledge become wonderful.* That is, *The Knowledge of Thee*, which reſults from the Contemplation of my ſelf, and the Reſemblance of the Humane to the Divine Nature, as ſome interpret that Paſſage. From hence perhaps it was, that *Apollo* (who among the Heathens was eſteem'd the God of Knowledge and of Light) had this Inſcription, *KNOW THY SELF*, engraven in Characters of Gold upon the Front of his Temple, as a neceſſary Greeting, and Advertiſement from the God, to all that ſhould approach him; intimating that this was the firſt Motion from Ignorance and Darkneſs; the moſt neceſſary Qualification for gaining Acceſs to ſuch a Deity: That upon theſe Terms only they could be admitted to his Temple, and fit for his Worſhip; and that all who were not acquainted with themſelves, muſt be excluded from that Place and Privilege. † *If thou know not who thou art, O thou faireſt among Women, go thy way forth and follow thy Kids.*

Pſ. cxxxix. 5, 6.

Cant. i. 8.

4. *It ſuppoſes Men to be wiſe.*

Would a Man make it his Buſineſs (as every Man ſure ought to do) to lead the moſt regular, compoſed, and pleaſant Life that can be, we need go no further to fetch Inſtructions for it, than our own ſelves. Had we but the Diligence and Ap-

* Mirabilis facta eſt ſcientia tua, *i.e.* tui ex me.

† Si te ignoras, O pulcherrima, egredere, & abi poſt hœdos tuos.

and Communication, if Mens Faces were so like, as to make us liable perpetually to mistake one Person for another; a Daughter for a Wife, an Enemy for a Friend; and thus a second and worse *Babel* would follow. Were there no Resemblance at all indeed, then Men would not be distinguished from Brutes; but were there not some Unlikeliness too, then any one Man could not be discern'd from any other Man. And, which is yet more wonderful, Nature hath dealt these Differences so artificially, as to satisfy all Parties; and found out a Secret, that those who are most unlike should be highly contented themselves, and should please others also. For the Matter is so order'd, that there is no Person but is approved, and thought very well to pass, by some Body or others; and the Faces themselves do not disagree more than Peoples Fancies, and their Inclinations to several sorts of That which they call *Beauty*. A Fifth Quality peculiar to Humane Faces, is the Dignity and Honour of them, resulting from the [illegible] Figure, the Straight Position, the Elevation above the Body, their Direction upwards to Heaven, their naked Graces, without any Covering of Shag, or Hair, or Feathers, or Scales, as Beasts and Birds have. A [illegible] the Air of the Face, a pleasant agreeable Sweetness, so insinuating, so engagi[illegible] was said before. Hearts are inme[illegible] and our Wills and Affections viol[illegible] [illegible] In a Word, The Face [illegible] Beauty and of Love; Seat of S[illegible] [illegible] Things peculiar [illegible] [illegible]

Chap. 5.

reaſonable and peeviſh Poſitiveneſs and Preſumption, which, of all Qualities in the World, is the moſt oppoſite, moſt mortal Enemy to better Information and Diſcovery of the Truth. The Man that ſhall reflect upon the many Hazards and Sufferings, in which he hath been actually involved, and the many more that have threaten'd him; how ſlight and trifling Accidents have yet given great Turns to his Fortunes, and changed the whole Face of his Affairs; how often he hath been forced to take new Meaſures, and found Cauſe to diſlike what once appear'd well deſign'd and wiſely managed: This Man will expect and make Proviſion for Changes hereafter, will be ſenſible how ſlippery Ground he ſtands upon, will conſider the Uncertainties of Humane Life, will behave himſelf with Modeſty and Moderation, will mind his own Buſineſs, and not concern himſelf with other People, to the giving them any Offence, or creating any Diſturbance, and will undertake to aim at nothing too big for him. And were all Men thus diſpoſed, what a Heaven upon Earth ſhould we have? Perfect Peace, and Order, and Juſtice, every where. In ſhort, the trueſt Glaſs we can conſult, the moſt improving Book we can read, is *Our own ſelves*, provided we would but hold our Eyes open, and keep our Minds fixed with all due Attention upon it; ſo bringing to a cloſe and diſtinct View, and watching every Feature, every Line, every Act and Motion of our Souls ſo narrowly, that none may eſcape us.

But alas! this is the leaſt of our Care, and the fartheſt thing from our Thoughts. 5. *Againſt thoſe who know not themſelves.*

* *Into himſelf none labours to deſcend.*

And hence it is that we fall ſo low and ſo often. To this muſt be imputed our perpetual Relapſes into the ſame Fault, without being ever touched with a Senſe of our Error, or troubling ourſelves at all about the Matter. We play the Fool egregiouſly, at our own vaſt Expence: For Difficulties in any caſe are never rightly underſtood, except by ſuch as have meaſur'd their own Abilities. And indeed as a Man muſt thruſt at a Door before he can be ſure that it is ſhut againſt him; ſo there is ſome degree of Application and good Senſe neceſſary, in order to the perceiving the Defects of one's own Mind. And we cannot have a more infallible Demonſtration of the univerſal Ignorance of Mankind than this, that every Body appears ſo gay, ſo forward, ſo undertaking, ſo highly ſatisfy'd; and that none can be found, who at all queſtion the Sufficiency of their own Underſtanding. For were we throughly acquainted with ourſelves, we ſhould manage our ſelves and our Affairs after quite another manner: We ſhould be aſham'd of our ſelves and our Condition, and become a new kind of Creatures. He that is ignorant of his Failings, is in no Pain to correct them; and he that knows not his Wants, takes no manner of care for Supplies; and he that feels not his Diſeaſe and his Miſery, never thinks of repairing the Breaches of his Conſtitution, or is ſo

* Nemo in ſeſe tentat deſcendere.

licitous

licitous for Phyſick. † *You muſt know your ſelf before you can mend your ſelf; the firſt Step to Health and Recovery, is the being ſenſible that you need a Cure.* And this very thing is our Unhappineſs; that we think All is ſafe and well. We are highly contented with our ſelves, and thus all our Miſeries are doubled. *Socrates* was pronounc'd the wiſeſt Man, not for any Excellencies of natural or acquir'd Parts, which render'd him ſuperior to all the World; but becauſe he underſtood himſelf better, behav'd himſelf with Modeſty and Decency, and acted like a Man. Thus *Socrates* was a Prince among Men, as we commonly ſay, *He that hath one Eye is a King among them that have none.* Such as are doubly blind, and have no Senſe at all left; (For ſo are the Generality of the World;) Nature makes them weak and wretched at firſt; but they make themſelves doubly ſo afterwards, by their Pride and lofty Conceits of their own Sufficiency, and an abſolute Inſenſibility of their Wants and their Miſeries. The former of theſe Misfortunes *Socrates* ſhared as well as others; for he had his blind Side too: That is, he was a Man, and conſequently had the ſame Allay of Infirmity and Miſery with other Men: But here was the difference, that he knew he was *but a Man:* He conſider'd his Condition, and made no difficulty to acknowledge all the Imperfections of it; and therefore he dealt honeſtly, and acted wiſely; for he liv'd and behav'd himſelf as a Man ſhould do. To this

† Deprehendas te oportet priuſquam emendas; ſanitatis initium ſentire ſibi opus eſſe remedio.

purpoſe

purpoſe may that Reply be taken, which Truth it ſelf made to the haughty *Phariſees*, who, in Deriſion, ſaid unto him, *What then? Are we blind alſo? If you were blind* (ſays he) that is, if ye were ſenſible of your Blindneſs, *ye would ſee better*; but becauſe you ſay, *we ſee*, therefore ye remain ſtark-blind. For thoſe who have an Opinion of their own good Sight, are really blind; and thoſe who are conſcious of their own Blindneſs, are the Men that ſee beſt. How wretched a Folly is it to degenerate into Beaſts, by not conſidering carefully that we are Men? * *Since Nature hath made thee a Man, take care conſtantly to remember that thou art ſuch.* We read, that ſeveral great Perſons have order'd that their Attendants ſhould often ring it in their Ears, *That they were Men*, intending that Admonition for a Curb to their Exorbitances. And ſure the Practice was admirable, if, as the Sound ſtruck upon their Ears, the Conſideration enter'd their Hearts too. What the *Athenians* ſaid to *Pompey the Great*, was not much amiſs, *You are ſo far a God, as you acknowledge your ſelf a Man.* For thus much at leaſt is beyond Contradiction, That the way to be an excellently good Man, is to be throughly poſſeſs'd with the Senſe of one's being a Man. Joh. ix. 41.

6. *Means of coming to the Knowledge of one's ſelf. Falſe ones.*

Now this Knowledge of one's ſelf (a thing by the way, very difficult to be attain'd, and ſcarce to be met with; as on the contrary, the miſtaking and paſſing wrong Judgments of one's ſelf, is exceeding obvious and eaſy:) This Knowledge, I ſay, is never to be acquir'd by the Help of o-

* Homo cùm ſis, id fac ſemper intelligas

thers.

thers. My Meaning is; Not by comparing our ſelves with others, meaſuring by them, depending upon their Character, or obſerving what Agreement or Diſagreement there is between our Practice and their Example, ſo that a Man ſhall applaud or condemn himſelf, for doing or not doing as they do, or as they like or diſlike.

* *What the World ſays thou art, believe not true,*
This Credit only to thy ſelf is due.

Nor indeed can we depend upon our own Word or Opinion in the caſe; for This oftentimes is ſhort-ſighted; it diſcovers not all that is to be ſeen, and it makes a falſe Report of what it diſcovers; like a treacherous or a brib'd Witneſs, that ſhuffles in his Evidence, and is afraid to ſpeak out. Nor can we form a Judgment from any ſingle Action; for this may come from a Man without being intended, or ſo much as thought of; it may be a ſudden Puſh upon an unuſual preſſing Occaſion; the Work of Neceſſity, or the Work of Chance; a lucky Hit, or a ſudden Sally; and owing to Heat or Paſſion; to one, to all of theſe, to any thing indeed, rather than to the Man himſelf. And therefore we can fix no Character from a thing which is not of our own growth. One couragious Action no more proves a Man Brave, nor one Act of Juſtice Juſt, than the breadth and depth of a River, and the ſtrength of its Current, is to be taken from a ſudden accidental Flood, when all the neighbouring Brooks empty themſelves into it, and ſwell it above its Banks. For thus there are Circumſtan-

* Plus aliis de te quam tu tibi credere noli.

ces

ces and Accidents in Humane Life too, which, like ſtrong Winds, and rapid Torrents, change our uſual Courſe, and carry us beyond our ſelves; and this in ſo ſurprizing a manner, that Vice itſelf hath ſometimes put Men upon doing very good Things: So extreamly nice a thing it is, to know Men truly. Again, We can learn nothing to purpoſe by all the outward Appendages of the Man; his Employments, Preferments, Honours, Riches, Birth, good Acceptance, and general Applauſe, of great and common Men; no, nor yet by his Deportment when he appears abroad; for there the Man plays in Check, ſtands upon his Guard, and every Motion is with Reſerve and Conſtraint. Fear, and Shame, and Ambition, and a thouſand other Paſſions, put him upon playing the Part you ſee then acted. To know him throughly, you muſt follow him into his Cloſet, ſee him in the Tireing Room, and in his every-day Garb. Alas! he is oftentimes quite another thing at Home, than what he appears in the Street, at Court, or upon the Exchange, one ſort of Man to Strangers, and another to his own Family. When he goes out of his Houſe, he dreſſes for the Stage, and the Farce begins: you can lay no ſtreſs upon what you ſee of him there. This is not the Man, but the Character he has himſelf to maintain: And you will never know any thing of him, till you make a diſcourſe between the Perſon of the Comedian that plays, and the Perſon repreſented by him.

The Knowledge of a Man's ſelf [illegible] is not to be compaſſed by any, or all of theſe four ways, nor can we rely upon, or make any true Conclu-

true ones.

ſions

ſions from them. The only way to arrive at it, is by a true, long, conſtant Study of a Man's ſelf; a ſerious and diligent Examination, ſuch as ſhall obſerve and nicely weigh, not only his Words and Actions, but even his moſt ſecret Thoughts, and that ſo critically, as to diſcern how they are firſt born, upon what they feed, and by what degrees they grow, the time of their Continuance, the manner and the frequency of their Returns upon him. In ſhort, no Motion of his Mind muſt eſcape his Notice; no, not his very Dreams: He muſt view himſelf near, muſt be eternally prying, handling, preſſing, probing, nay, pinching himſelf to the quick: For there are many Vices in us, that lurk cloſe, and lie deep; and we know nothing of them becauſe we do not take the Pains to ſearch far enough, and ferret them out: As the venomous Serpent, while numm'd with cold, is handled ſafely, and Stings not till he is warm'd. And further yet, when all this is done, a Senſe and Acknowledgment of particular Failings, and perſonal Faults, and an endeavour to mend them, will not do the Buſineſs; but a Man muſt be convinced of his Weakneſs and Miſery throughout, that every part of him is tainted with it; and from thence he muſt proceed to amend the whole, and make the Reformation equally general.

The Diviſion of this Firſt Book.

8. To this purpoſe we will now apply our ſelves in the Firſt Book of this Treatiſe, to conſider and underſtand Man; by taking him in every Senſe, looking upon him in the ſeveral Proſpects capable of; feeling his Pulſe, ſounding the bottom, going into him with Candles,

of Nature and univerſal Practice in it; for we ſee Chap. 7.
that Beaſts and Birds do the ſame Thing. The
Care and Proviſion of Victuals was unqueſtionably of far greater Antiquity than either of the former; for this ſeems to have been one of the firſt Impulſes and Dictates of Nature, the Neceſſities and Appetites whereof return ſo thick upon us, that it is not eaſy to ſuppoſe Man could ſubſiſt at all without this Care. But of theſe Matters we ſhall have other Opportunities to treat more fully, when we come to give Rules for the Uſe and Regulation both of *Food* and *Raiment*, hereafter. Book III. *in the Virtue of Temperance.*

CHAP. VII.

Concerning the Soul *in general.*

WE are now entring upon a Subject of all others the moſt difficult and nice; One which has been treated of, and particularly canvaſs'd by the greateſt Philoſophers, and moſt penetrating Wits of all Ages and Countries, *Ægyptian*, *Greek*, *Arabian*, and *Latin* Authors; but yet ſo that their Opinions have been infinitely various, according to the ſeveral Nations from whence they ſprung, the Religions they embraced, the Profeſſions in which they had been educated, and the Reaſons that offer'd themſelves to their Thoughts: So that how far ſoever each Man might ſatisfy his own Mind, yet they have never been able to come to any general good A-

Book I. greement or certain Determination in the Matter. Now the main Points in Controverſy upon this Occaſion, are thoſe *Ten* that follow: What may be the *Definition* of the Soul; What its real *Eſſence* and *Nature*; Its *Faculties* and *Actions*; Whether there be *One* or *More* Souls in a Man; Whence its *Original*; What the *Time* and *Manner* of its entring the Body; the *Manner* of its *Reſidence*; the *Seat* where it dwells; the *Sufficiency* to exerciſe the ſeveral *Functions* belonging to it; and *laſtly*, Its *End*, or *Separation* from the *Body*.

1. *Its Definition.* Firſt of all: It is exceeding hard to give an accurate *Definition* of the Soul, or be able to ſay exactly *What it is.* And this in truth is the Caſe of all Forms in general; and we cannot well conceive how it ſhould be otherwiſe with Things which are relative, and have no proper and independent Subſiſtence of their own, but are only *Parts* of ſome *Whole.* Hence, without queſtion, it hath come to paſs, that the Definitions of it put abroad have been ſo many, and at the ſame time ſo infinitely various too, that not any one of them hath been received without Claſhing or Contradiction. *Ariſtotle* hath rejected no leſs than Twelve among the Philoſophers who had written before him; and yet he hath found but little better Succeſs with That of his own, which he labour'd (but in vain) to eſtabliſh in the room of them.

Nothing can indeed be more eaſy and obvious than to determine what the *Soul is not.* We dare be confident that it is not *Fire*, *Air*, nor *Water*, nor a *Mixture* and due Temperament of the Four Elements together, the Qualities or the Humours nicely

ly adjuſted: For This is a thing in perpetual Flux and Uncertainty; the Animal ſubſiſts and lives without it: And beſides, This is manifeſtly an *Accident*, whereas the *Soul* is a *Subſtance*. To this we may add, that *Minerals*, and ſeveral *Inanimate Creatures*, have a Temperament of the Four Elements, and prime Tactile Qualities, and ſtill continue Inanimate notwithſtanding. Nor can the *Soul* be the *Blood*; for ſeveral Inſtances may be given of Animated and Living Creatures, without any Blood at all belonging to them; and ſeveral Creatures die without loſing one Drop of Blood. Nor is it the *Principle* and *Firſt Cauſe* of Motion in us; for ſeveral Inanimate Things impart Motion: So does the Loadſtone to the Iron; the Amber to the Straw; Medicines, and Drugs, and Roots of Trees, when dry'd, and cut to pieces, draw and create very ſtrong Motions. Nor is it the *Act*, *Life*, *Energy*, or *Perfection*, (for *Ariſtotle*'s Term *Entelechia* hath been interpreted in all theſe differing Senſes) for all this cannot be the very *Eſſence* of the *Soul* itſelf, but only the *Operation* and *Effect* of it, as *Living*, *Seeing*, and *Underſtanding* are plain and proper Actions of the *Soul*. Beſides, admitting this Notion, it would follow from thence, that the *Soul* were not a *Subſtance*, but an *Accident* only, that it could not poſſibly ſubſiſt without that Body, whoſe Act and Perfection it is, any more than the Roof of a Houſe can ſubſiſt as ſuch, without the Building which it covers and is ſupported by, or a Relative without its Correlate. In a Word, when we expreſs our ſelves after this manner, we only declare what the *Soul* does, and what it is with reſpect to

Chap. 7.

Book I. ſomething elſe; but we pronounce nothing of its proper and abſtracted Nature, or what it is in itſelf.

Now, though Things are thus far clear and eaſy, yet when we go farther the Caſe alters extremely. A Man may ſay indeed that the *Soul is an Eſſential Life-giving Form*, which diſtributes this Gift as the Receiver is capable of it. To the Plant it imparts Vegetation; to the Brute Senſe, which includes and contains Vegetation under it; and to Man Intellectual Life, in which both the former are imply'd, as the Greater Numbers comprehend the Leſs; and as in Figures, a Pentagon includes a Quadrangle, and That again a Triangle. I rather chuſe to term this the *Intellectual Life* than the *Rational*, (which is compriz'd and underſtood by it, as the Leſs is within the Greater) and that particularly in Deference to thoſe many renown'd Philoſophers, who have allow'd *Reaſon* in ſome Senſe, and ſome Degree, even to the Brutes; but not Any of them have ever gone ſo high, as to attribute the *Intelligent Faculty* to Them; and therefore I take *Intellectual Life* to be a more unexceptionable, more diſtinguiſhing Character of the Humane Soul than the other, which ſome have thought not entirely and peculiarly our own. The *Soul* in the mean while is not the Principle and Original of Life: (This, in my Judgment, is a Term due to none but the Sovereign Author of our Being, *the Lord and Giver of Life)* but it is the Internal Cauſe (if you pleaſe) of Life and Motion, of Senſe and Underſtanding: It moves the Body, but is not moved itſelf; as on the contrary, the Body is moved, but

but moves not; I ſay, it moves the Body, but it moves not itſelf; for though Self-Motion be in ſome Senſe a Character by which we expreſs the Freedom of the Humane Will, yet, conſidering the depending State of a Creature, I rather forbear a Term, which, in its ſtrict and moſt exalted Senſe, cannot, in my Apprehenſion, belong to any but God himſelf: For whatſoever moves itſelf thus, muſt be Abſolute and Eternal; and that Power of moving the Body which the Soul hath, it hath not from itſelf, but from Above. Chap. 7.

2. *Its Nature.*

The next Enquiry concerns the *Eſſence* or *Nature* of the *Soul*, (the Humane one I mean; for as to that of Brutes, little Doubt is to be made but this is Corporeal and Material, conceiv'd, born, and bred with *Matter*, and corruptible with it too) and this is no ſuch inconſiderable Diſpute as ſome perhaps may imagine; for ſome have affirm'd it to be *Corporeal*; others again, contend as vehemently, that it is *Incorporeal:* Which Opinions we will beg the Reader's Leave to compare a little, and how wide ſoever they may ſeem, we'll try if it be not poſſible to reconcile them. The Arguments which have perſuaded Men to believe the Soul *Corporeal*, are ſuch as follow. Firſt, The Authority of the moſt Eminent Philoſophers and Divines; and of the latter, no leſs than *Tertullian*, *Origen*, St. *Baſil*, *Gregory*, *Auguſtine*, and *Damaſcene*, who all admit, That the Spirits, both Good and Bad, which are entirely ſeparated from *Matter*, are yet *Corporeal*; and if They be ſo who have nothing to do with *Matter*, how much more probable is this Notion of the Humane Soul, which is in conſtant Dealings with, and cloſely

Book I. united to it? The Ground of their determining these Things to be Corporeal, is a Notion, that All Creatures of what kind ſoever, when compared with God, are Groſs, Corporeal, and Material; and that God Himſelf alone is ſo excellent a Subſtance as to be Incorporeal; and therefore every Spirit is Body, and of a Corporeal Nature. To this of *Authority* may be added another Argument drawn from *Reaſon*. All that is contain'd in this Finite World, muſt needs be Finite itſelf; limited in Virtue and in Eſſence; circumſcrib'd by ſome Superficies, confin'd within ſome Place; all which are the true and natural Conditions of a bodily Subſtance. God alone is every where; He alone is Infinite, and therefore he alone is Incorporeal. The common Diſtinctions of a *Circumſcriptive*, *Definitive*, *Effective* Preſence, ſeem to be merely verbal, and to carry very little or no Force at all: For ſtill it is undeniably certain, That *Spirits* are in a Place after ſuch a manner, that at the ſame time they are there, they are not elſewhere too, nor can be in more Places than one at once. They are not in infinite Space, nor in extreme Little, nor extremely Large Room, but to take up ſo much as is proportionable to their Size, and equal to their Finite Subſtance. And, did not the Caſe ſtand thus with them, how could Spirits change their Place and Reſidence? How could they aſcend or deſcend, which yet the Scripture frequently takes notice of their doing? For, if Incorporeal, they muſt be incapable of Motion, Indiviſible, and ſo every where indifferently. Since then 'tis evident they change their Places, is not this ſufficient to convince us that

See Advertiſements.

that they are capable of *Motion* and *Diviſion*, ſub- Chap. 7.
ject to *Time*, and the Succeſſions of it, which is
requiſite for the adjuſting of Motion, and meaſuring the Paſſages and mutual Diſtances from one Place to another? All which are Qualities belonging to a *Body*. But now, in regard that the generality of People, who ſee not to the bottom of theſe Diſtinctions, by the Word *Corporeal*, form to themſelves an Idea of ſomething Viſible and Palpable, and ſo groſs as muſt affect our Senſes: Since they have no Notion of pure and ſubtil Air, nor entertain any Conception of Fire abſtracted from Fuel and Flame; ſince, I ſay, they cannot perſuade themſelves that Things ſo ſubtilized are Corporeal, hence it hath grown into Uſe, to ſay, That *Spirits* in a State of Separation, and Humane Souls in the Body, are not *Corporeal Subſtances:* Nor are they ſo indeed in this groſs and vulgar Senſe; for they are of an Inviſible Subſtance, whether that be *Airy*, as many Philoſophers and Divines have perſuaded themſelves; or whether *Cæleſtial*, and yet more refin'd, as ſome *Hebrew* and *Arabian* Authors, who call Heaven and Spirit both by the ſame Name, of an Eſſence proper to Immortality; or whether it conſiſt of a Subſtance ſtill more ſubtil and purify'd than even the *Æthereal* or *Cæleſtial* itſelf; but ſtill Corporeal nevertheleſs, ſince ſubject to all thoſe Conditions of a Body, of being confin'd and circumſcrib'd within a certain Space; capable of Motion, and meaſurable in that Motion, by the ſucceſſive Periods of Time. Again, were they not *Corporeal*, they muſt be impaſſible; for which way could they ſuffer as we find they do? The

Book I. *Soul* of *Man* manifeſtly receives, and is affected with, Satisfaction and Uneaſineſs, Pleaſure and Pain; and as deeply and ſenſibly touch'd with theſe Things in her Turn, as the Body is from her Dictates and her Paſſions. Again, She is likewiſe wrought upon and diſtinguiſh'd by Good and Ill Qualities, Virtues and Vices, Affections and Inclinations of all Sorts: All which are Accidents; and as ſuch require ſome Bodily Subſtance for their Support and Subſiſtence. Laſtly, All *Souls*, whether ſeparated or united, Evil Angels and Spirits, as well as Men, are obnoxious to Puniſhment and Torture: From whence it muſt follow that they are *Corporeal*; for nothing can be in a Condition of enduring Torment, which is not ſo; and ſo the Subject of Accidents is one particular Property of a Bodily Subſtance.

See Advertiſement *at the End of this* Chapter; *and alſo That at the Concluſion of the* Tenth.

3. *Its Faculties and Operations.* Now the *Soul* abounds exceedingly in Faculties and Powers, as many almoſt as the *Body* hath Members. Some of theſe ſhe exerts in Plants; a greater Number yet in Beaſts, but vaſtly more in Mankind: Such as the Vital, Locomotive, Appetitive, Attractive, Collective; the Retentive, Concocting, Digeſtive, Nutritive; thoſe of Growing, Sprouting, Hearing, Seeing, Taſting, Smelling, Speaking, Reſpiration, Generation, [illegible] tation, Reaſoning, Contemplating, Aſſ[illegible] Diſſenting, Remembring, Judging: Faculties are by no means Parts of t at that rate we muſt admit the *Soul*

of *Diviſion*, and made up of nothing but *Accidents* and *Properties*; but they are the Natural Qualities and Powers of it. Upon theſe follow the Actions or Operations of the *Soul*, which muſt needs, in order of Nature, be after thoſe Faculties that qualify it for the Performance of them. And thus the great *Dionyſius*, whoſe Doctrine in this Particular is univerſally aſſented to, obſerves, That in Spiritual Creatures there are Three Things to be conſider'd; The *Eſſence*, the *Faculty*, and the *Operation*. By the laſt of theſe, which is the *Action*, we are led to the Knowledge of the *Faculty*; and from the *Faculty* again we are carry'd on to the *Eſſence*. Now we muſt take notice by the way, that the Actions may be obſtructed, ſuſpended, or a final Stop, and abſolute Ceſſation put to them, without any Prejudice at all being done by this means to the *Soul*, or its Faculties: As the Skill and Faculty of Painting ſhall remain entire in the Artiſt, though his Hands be ty'd up, or he be otherwiſe diſabled from exerting that Skill. But, upon a Suppoſal that the *Faculties* themſelves periſh, the *Soul* muſt periſh with them; as the Fire can be no longer Fire, if we ſuppoſe the Faculty of Warming to be taken away from it. Chap. 7.

4. *Its Unity.*

The *Nature* and *Eſſence* of the *Soul* being thus in ſome meaſure explain'd, there is another Enquiry which offers itſelf to our Conſideration, and That indeed of very great Intricacy and Importance both, which is, Whether each Animal (but more eſpecially each Man) have a Multiplication of ſeveral *Souls*, or but *One* only, concerning which a multitude of Arguments are offer'd on all Sides,

Book I. Sides, and great Variety of Opinions have grown; but they may, I think, be reduced to Three. Some of the *Greek* Philoſophers, and almoſt all the *Arabian*, after Their Examples, have fancy'd that there is but *One Immortal Soul*, not only in each diſtinct Individual Perſon, but in all Mankind, and diſtributed throughout the whole Species in general. The *Ægyptians* are in the other Extreme, and conceive that each Perſon hath *ſeveral Souls* totally and eſſentially diſtinct from one another. That every Brute hath *Two* of theſe, and every Man hath *Three*. *Two* of which (the Vegetative and Senſitive) are Mortal; and the *Third* (which is the Intellectual) Immortal. The Third Opinion lies between theſe Two, and as it is more moderate, ſo hath it likewiſe been more generally entertain'd than either of the former; for moſt Nations ſeem to be agreed, That however Men may have been obliged to conſider the ſeveral Faculties diſtinctly, yet there is in reality no actual Plurality, and but *One Soul* in each Perſon, which extends to all thoſe Operations aſſign'd to ſeveral.

The *Firſt* of theſe Opinions I ſhall ſay nothing to, thinking it too abſurd, and too generally exploded, to ſtand in need of any particular Confutation.

The *Second*, which aſſerts a *Plurality of Souls* in each Animal, and particularly in each Man, muſt be confeſs'd on the one hand exceeding marvellous, if not altogether incredible and abſurd: For what Philoſophy will allow us in giving ſeveral Eſſential Forms to one and the ſame Thing? But then, on the other hand, it muſt be acknowledg'd

ledg'd too, that this Notion makes the Way fair and ſmooth for that of the *Intellectual Soul*'s being Immortal: Becauſe upon a Suppoſition of *Three diſtinct Souls*, there is no great Difficulty or Inconvenience in admitting that *Two* of theſe may die, without at all impairing the Immortality of the *Third*: Whereas the *Unity* of the *Soul* ſeems to make War upon its Immortality: For which way can we conceive the ſame Thing to be Mortal in one Part, and Immortal in another? Which yet ſeems to have been *Ariſtotle*'s Notion. Certainly there is an abſolute Neceſſity of concluding, That it is All of a piece in this reſpect, and either entirely Mortal or Immortal throughout; which yet are each of them loaded with very abſurd Conſequences: For the former Concluſion is deſtructive of all Religion and ſound Philoſophy; and the Latter advances the Brutes to the ſame Dignity, the ſame Immortal State with our Selves. But the moſt general, and, in my poor Judgment, the moſt probable Opinion is, That each Animal hath but *One Soul*; but *One* in Subſtance; That This is the Cauſe of Life, and the Univerſal Source of all the Actions perform'd by him; That though it have but *One Eſſence* entire and undivided, yet is it adorn'd, enrich'd, diverſify'd with a vaſt number of Faculties and diſtinct Powers wonderfully different, and ſome contrary to each other; according to the vaſt Variety of Inſtruments made uſe of by it, the Veſſels in which they are contain'd, and the Objects they are employ'd about: Thus the *Soul* exerciſes what we call the Senſitive and Reaſonable Faculties more peculiarly in the *Brain*; there being the In-

Chap. 7.

Book I. ments adapted to ſuch Operations: The Vital and Iraſcible in the *Heart*; the Natural and Vegetative, (which are ſometimes diſtinguiſh'd by the Concupiſcible) in the *Liver:* Theſe are the Chief and moſt Material Diſtinctions. But theſe ſo many and ſo different Operations, Inſtruments, and Faculties, no more impair the *Unity* of the *Soul*, or argue a *Plurality* of *Cauſes*, than a Multitude of Streams conclude againſt one Fountain or common Source; or the different Effects of the Sun-beams prove more Suns than One in the Univerſe: For thus we daily ſee he ſheds his Rays, and ſhines upon different Places and Objects with very different Succeſs: To One he adminiſters *Heat*, to Another *Light:* The Wax he ſoftens and melts; the Clay he dries and ſtiffens: He makes the Snow whiter, and the Complexion blacker: He ſcatters the Clouds, and contracts the ſtanding Pools. And if all this be done by One Sun in the Firmament, what ſhould hinder the Former to be effected by *One Soul* in the *Body?* Why ſhould That be admitted for an Argument againſt the Eſſential Unity of the Cauſe in one of theſe Inſtances, which we our ſelves are content to allow, and conſtant Experience makes it plain beyond all Contradiction, is of no weight at all in a Caſe ſo very parallel as This I have laſt mention'd.

As to the *other Difficulty*, which relates to the Soul's *Immortality*, when the Matter is carefully conſider'd, it will appear, that this Opinion of the *Unity* of the Humane Soul, does it no [redacted] of Injury. For this Soul does not ſi[redacted] proper Eſſence, by the Death of the

and Senſitive Faculties; by which Death in reality is meant no more than an Incapacity of exerciſing and exerting thoſe Powers in a State of Separation from the Body. Which muſt neceſſarily follow, upon the Want and Abſence of the proper Subject and Inſtrument to exerciſe them upon. But all this hinders not, but that the *Third* and moſt exalted, which is the *Intellectual Faculty*, may ſtill exert itſelf; becauſe a Body, though at preſent it be made uſe of as its Inſtrument, is not yet ſo neceſſary and eſſential to that, that it ſhould not be able to ſubſiſt and act without it. Suppoſing then this *Soul* to return to the *Body* a ſecond time, it would return at the ſame time to the Exerciſe of its Vegetative and Senſitive Powers, as we ſee plainly by Inſtances of Perſons who have been raiſed from the Dead, to live here below: But this would not infer a Neceſſity of the ſame Things for living in another State. For thoſe Faculties, whoſe Exerciſe ſupports this Life we now lead, are not thereby proved of ſuch Conſequence, that no other kind of Life could be ſupported or enjoy'd without them. It is in this Caſe with the *Soul*, as with the *Sun*, (for the ſame Inſtance will be of uſe to illuſtrate our Argument in this Branch alſo) which continues the ſame in himſelf, every whit as entire and unblemiſh'd, not in any degree enfeebled, tho' his Luſtre and Vital Influences be ſometimes intercepted and obſtructed. When his Face is cover'd with a *Total Eclipſe*, we loſe the chearful Light and cheriſhing Heat; but though no ſenſible Effects of him appear, yet he is in his own Nature

Chap. 7.

Book I. Nature the ſame Powerful Principle, and Glorious Creature ſtill.

5. *Its Origine.* Having thus (as I hope ſufficiently) evidenced the *Unity of the Soul*, in each individual animated by it; let us in the next Place proceed to obſerve from whence it is *deriv'd*, and how it makes its *Entry* into the *Body*.

Concerning the Former of theſe Particulars, great Diſputes have been maintain'd by Philoſophers and Divines of all Ages. Concerning the *Origine* of the *Humane* and *Intellectual Soul*, I mean; for as to the *Vegetative* and *Senſitive* attributed to Plants and Beaſts, thoſe, by general Conſent, have been eſteem'd to conſiſt entirely of *Matter*, to be transferred with the *Seminal Principles*, and accordingly ſubject to Corruption and Death. So that the whole Controverſy turns upon the ſingle Point of the Humane Soul; and concerning this, the *Four* moſt Celebrated Opinions have been theſe which follow. I omit the Mention of any more, which are almoſt loſt in the Crowd, becauſe Theſe have obtain'd ſo much more generally, and gain'd greater Credit than the reſt.

The *Firſt* of theſe is that Notion of the *Stoicks*, embraced by *Philo* the Jew, and after him, by the *Manichees*, *Priſcillianiſts*, and others. This maintains Reaſonable Souls to be ſo many Extracts, and genuine Productions of the Divine Spirit; Partakers of the very ſame Nature and Subſtance with Almighty God himſelf; who being ſaid expreſsly to have breathed it into the Body; theſe Perſons have taken the Advantage of *Moſes's* Words, and fixed the ſublimeſt Senſe imaginable upon

upon them. *He breathed into him the Breath of Life*; by which they are not content to understand that the *Soul* of Man is a diſtinct Thing, and of a different and more exalted Original than the Body; a Spirit of greater Excellence than that which quickens any other Animal, but they ſtretch it to a Communication of God's own Eſſence. Chap. 7.

The *Second* was derived from *Ariſtotle*, received by *Tertullian*, *Apollinaris*, the Sect of the *Luciferans*, and ſome other Chriſtians; and This aſſerts the Soul to be deriv'd from our Parents, as the Body is; and in the ſame Manner, and from the ſame Principles with that, whence the Souls of Brutes, and all that are confin'd to Senſe and Vegetation only, are generally believ'd to ſpring.

The *Third* is that of the *Pythagoreans* and *Platoniſts*; entertain'd by moſt of the Rabbinical Philoſophers and Jewiſh Doctors; and after them by *Origen*, and ſome other Chriſtian Doctors too; which pretends that all Souls were created by God at the Beginning of the World; that they were then by Him commanded, and made out of nothing; that they are reſerv'd and depoſited in ſome of the Heavenly Regions; and afterwards, as his Infinite Wiſdom ſees occaſion, ſent down hither into Bodies ready fitted for, and diſpoſed to entertain them. Upon this Opinion was built another, of Souls being *well* or *ill* dealt with here below, and lodged in ſound and healthful, or elſe in feeble and ſickly Bodies, according to their *Good* or *Ill* Behaviour in a State and Region above, antecedent to their being thus incorporated with theſe Mortal and Fleſhly Tabernacles.

How

Book I. How generally this Notion prevail'd, we have a notable Hint from that great Maſter of *Wiſdom*, who gives this Account of his large Improvements, above the common Rate of *Men*, *I was a witty Child, and had a good Spirit; yea, rather being good, I came into a Body undefiled.* Thus intimating a Priority of Time, as well as of Order and Dignity in the Soul, and that its good Diſpoſitions qualified it for a Body ſo diſpoſed too.

Wiſd. viii. 19, 20.

The *Fourth*, which hath met with the moſt general Approbation, among Chriſtians eſpecially, holds that the *Soul* is created by God, infus'd into a Body prepared duly for its Reception: That it hath no Pre-exiſtence in any ſeparate State, or former Vehicle, but that its Creation and Infuſion are both of the ſame Date.

Theſe *Four* Opinions, are all of them Affirmative. There is yet a *Fifth*, more modeſt and reſerv'd than any of the former. This undertakes not to determine Poſitively one way or other; but is content Ingenuouſly to confeſs its own Ignorance and Uncertainty; declares this a Matter of very abſtruſe Speculation, a dark and deep Myſtery, which God hath not thought fit particularly to reveal; and which Man by the Strength and Penetration of his own Reaſon, can know but very little or nothing of. Of this Opinion we find St. *Auguſtine*, St. *Gregory* of *Nice*, and ſome others. But tho' they preſume not ſo far, as to give any definitive Sentence, on any Side; yet they plainly incline to think, that, of the *Four* Opinions here mention'd, the *Two* latter carry a greater Appearance of Truth, than the *Two* former.

But

But how, and when this *Humane Soul* (for of the *Brutal* there is little or no Diſpute, nor is the preſent Enquiry concern'd in it) Whether This, I ſay, make its Entrance all at once, or whether the Approaches are gradual and ſlow; Whether it attain its juſt Eſſential Perfections in an Inſtant; or whether it grow up to them, by Time and Succeſſion, is another very great Queſtion. The more general Opinion, which ſeems to have come from *Ariſtotle*, is, That the *Vegetative* and *Senſitive Soul*, whoſe Eſſence is no other than Matter and Body, is in the Principles of Generation; that it deſcends lineally, and is derived to us from the Subſtance of our Parents; that This is finiſhed and perfected in Time and by Degrees, and Nature acts in this Caſe a little like Art, when That undertakes to form the Image of a Man; where firſt the Out-Lines and rude Sketches are drawn; then the Features ſpecify'd; yet Theſe, not of his whole Body at once, but firſt the Painter finiſhes the Head, then the Neck, after that the Breaſt, the Legs, and ſo on, till he have drawn the whole Length: Thus the *Vegetative* and *Senſitive Soul* (they tell you) forms the Body in the Womb; and when That is finiſh'd, and made fit for the Reception of its new Inhabitant, the *Intellectual Soul* comes from abroad, and takes Poſſeſſion of its Dwelling: But that (all this notwithſtanding) They are not *Two* nor *Three diſtinct Souls*, neither together, nor in Succeſſ[illegible] That the Vegetative ſuffers no Diminution [illegible] Acceſſion of the Senſitive; nor that again [illegible] Addition of the Intelligent Mind; but [illegible] coaleſce into One, and are form'd and [illegible]

Chap. 7. *The Entrance into the Body.*

Book I. according to the ſtated Times, and uſual Proceſs of Nature.

Others rather incline to believe, that the Soul enters the Body entire, and takes Poſſeſſion with her Faculties of every kind at the ſame Inſtant: That This is done, when all the Organs of the Body are framed, and the whole Shell finiſhed and compacted: That till Then, the Body is only a ſenſeleſs dead Maſs, without any Soul at all: That it had only a Virtue or Natural Energy, (The Eſſential Form of that Matter out of which it is made) and this acting upon the Spirituous Parts, does, by the Agitation and Ferment Theſe are put into, form and build the whole Body, and adjuſt every Part of this Structure duly: When Things are brought to this Head, then that Energy vaniſhes, and is quite loſt, and the Soul ſucceeds into its Place: And when this New, this Noble Gueſt arrives, all Things change their Form; and That, which before was nothing but dead ſenſeleſs *Matter*, exalts its Name and Nature, and from thenceforth commences *Man*.

7. Its Reſidence, and the Manner of it.

When it hath actually enter'd the Body, we ſhall do well to know after what Manner it exiſts, and dwells in it. Some Philoſophers, whoſe Notions of this Matter ſeem to have been much perplex'd, and at a mighty Loſs, how to make out any tolerable Conjunction between theſe Two, have imagin'd the Soul to reſide in the Body, like a Maſter in his Houſe, or the Pilot in a Ship. But tho', as to the Governing and Directing Part, the Compariſon be not much amiſs; yet when apply'd to explain the particular Mode of its Exiſtence, it is abſolutely improper, and ſtark naught. For at this rate

rate the Soul would not be the *Form*, the *Internal* Chap. 7.
or *Eſſential* Part of the Animal or the Man: It would have no Occaſion for the Members of this Body to give it Reception; would not be affected in any kind from this cloſe Affinity, nor have any of thoſe tender and mutual Reſentments and Sufferings ariſing from Bodily Pains and Pleaſures; but would be a Subſtance entirely diſtinct; ſubſiſting from and by itſelf; at its own Diſpoſal to go or come, to ſeparate from the Body, without making any Difference in it; or any way taking from its own Functions, or the Exerciſe of them. All which are intolerable and moſt notorious Abſurdities. The Soul then in the Body, is like *Form* in *Matter*, diſperſed and extended over every Part of it; giving Life, Motion, and Senſe, all thorough: And both Theſe taken together make one Perſon or *Hypoſtaſis*; that is, one entire Subject, which we call an *Animal*. Nor are we to be ſolicitous for the finding out any intermediate Quality, which ſhould connect theſe Two; for there is no ſuch Thing in Nature. All Philoſophers conſenting in This, That there can nothing come between *Matter* and *Form*, no common Link or Band more intimate for them. The Soul then is *all* in *all* the Body; but as for what is commonly added, of its being *all* in *every* Part too, I forbear the Expreſſion; becauſe, in my Apprehenſion, it divides the Soul, and implies a Contradiction.

Now, although the Soul (in Agreement what we have but juſt now aſſerted) be really municated and diffuſed thro' the whole B ſural; yet it muſt be acknowledg'd, that

Book I. more *eminently* preſent and powerful, in ſome Parts than others; where, for the Sake of a clearer and more viſible Exerciſe of her reſpective Faculties, ſhe may be ſaid to keep her Reſidence, or have her Seat; tho' not to be entirely there; becauſe This would import *Confinement*, and the other Parts, upon the Account of her Abſence, would be left void of all Soul and Form. In regard therefore that the Soul is remarkable for the Exerciſe of Four Predominant Faculties above the reſt; Four Principal Places of Action and Reſidence have accordingly been aſſigned to her. Now theſe are the *Four* diſtinct Apartments or Work-houſes, taken Notice of formerly, when we had occaſion to treat of the Fabrick and Contexture of the *Humane Body*. Theſe are the moſt Important and Prime Inſtruments of the Soul; the reſt are ſubordinate to, and reducible under them, as the other Faculties are likewiſe to thoſe exerciſed in theſe Parts: Namely, the Continuation of the Species in the *loweſt Region:* The Natural or Nutritive Faculty in the *Liver:* The Vital in the *Heart*; and the Animal and Intellectual in the *Brain.*

9. *Its Sufficiency.* The next Advance to be made upon this Subject, concerns the Exerciſe of theſe Faculties in general, and how the Soul is qualified for this Purpoſe. Now we ſhall do well to take Notice that the very *Nature* and *Form* of every Living Creature, conſiſting in This Soul, it cannot be, but the Soul muſt be abundantly provided with neceſſary *Knowledge*, and underſtand its Buſineſs, without Pains or Induſtry, or the ſlow and laborious Methods of acquir'd Inſtruction. As cer-

tain it is too, that what ſhe is thus inſtructed in by Nature, ſhe fails not to exert, and punctually to fulfil, as Need requires; provided no accidental Obſtruction prevent or interrupt her, and that the Inſtrument ſhe is obliged to make uſe of, be rightly diſpoſed to follow her Directions. The Philoſophers therefore were much in the right, when they ſtyled Nature a Wiſe, Skilful, and Induſtrious School-Miſtreſs; One that qualifies her Children and Scholars for all that is required from them. * *The Seeds of all Art and Virtue* (ſays one of them) *are implanted in us originally; and Almighty God, the Great Maſter, brings forward our Natural Abilities, and draws them forth into Action.* It were eaſy to prove this by pregnant Inſtances of every kind. The *Vegetative Soul*, of its own Accord, without Artifice or Inſtitution, forms the *Embryo* in the Womb, ſo curiouſly, ſo conveniently, ſo wonderfully, that we can never ſufficiently expreſs and extol the Excellence of this Skill. Afterwards it takes equal Care of the Nouriſhment and Growth; conveys, ſeeks, and receives Suſtenance; retains what is eaten; digeſts and lives upon it; throws off the ſuperfluous and excremental Parts; refreſhes, recruits, repairs thoſe Parts which ſink or faint, or fall to decay. And Theſe are all of them Operations manifeſt and conſtant, not in Men only, but in Brutes and Plants alſo. Chap. 7.

The *Senſitive Soul*, in like manner, of her own accord, puts Men and Brutes upon all neceſſary

* Inſita ſunt nobis omnium artium ac virtutum Semina; Magiſterque ex occulto Deus producit Ingenia.

Book I. Actions. Such as moving their Feet, their Hands, and other Limbs and Parts, which may be of uſe to them, to ſcratch, to rub, to ſhake themſelves, to ſuck, to menage their Lips and Mouth, to cry, to laugh, and other Expreſſions of Want, and Grief, and Pleaſure.

The *Reaſonable* and *Intellectual Soul* does the very ſame Thing in its Capacity: And thus it acts not by vertue of any Reminiſcence, or Recollection of any Knowledge it had before this Union with the Body, as *Plato* fondly imagin'd; a Notion which proceeds upon the Suppoſal of another State, in which the Soul pre-exiſted before its Entrance into, or the Formation of this Body; nor does it owe this Power to Knowledge receiv'd in at the Senſes, and acquir'd by Their Means upon Uſe and Obſervation, as *Ariſtotle* conceives, who repreſents the Soul at the Birth, to be a *perfect Blank*, utterly void of all Characters or Images, but ready to receive Impreſſions of any kind: But it ſeems rather to diſcharge this Office by the Original Strength of its own Native Powers: It Imagines, Underſtands, Retains, Argues, Reaſons, Concludes of itſelf, without any Inſtruction or additional Helps at all. This Aſſertion, I muſt own, ſeems more difficult to comprehend than the Former; and we can more readily aſſent to ſuch a Native Aptitude in the *Vegetative* and *Senſitive*, than we do in the *Intellectual Soul*. It is manifeſt too, that *Ariſtotle*'s Authority lies in ſome degree againſt the Thing: And therefore to ſatisfy all theſe Difficulties, I will allow this Matter a more particular Conſideration, when we come to diſcourſe of the *Intellectual Soul* diſtinct

Chap. 7.

There remains yet one Point more concerning the Soul, to be enquir'd into, which relates to its Separation from the Body: Now This may happen different ways, and be of ſundry kinds. The only uſual and natural Separation is by *Death*. Only herein is a mighty difference between other Animals and Mankind, that when the reſt die, their Souls die too; agreeably to that Rule in Philoſophy, *That when the Subject-Matter is corrupted, the Form is perfectly loſt, though the Matter ſtill remain.* Whereas the Soul of Man is indeed ſeparated from his Body by Death, but by no means loſt or annihilated: So far from periſhing, that it remains entire and unhurt, as having the Privilege of an Immortal and Incorruptible Nature.

10. *Its Separation. Twofold.* 1. *Natural.*

There is not in the World any one Opinion which hath been more univerſally entertain'd, more eagerly embrac'd, more plauſibly defended, more religiouſly ſtuck to (I may well ſay Religiouſly, ſince this Doctrine is in truth the very Foundation of all Religion) than That which aſſerts the *Immortality of the Soul.* All this now is meant of an External and Publick Profeſſion; for, alas! it is but too manifeſt and too melancholy a Truth; (and the prodigious Numbers of diſſolute Epicures, abandon'd Libertines, and prophane Scoffers at God and a Future State, bear Teſtimony to it;) That what Pretence ſoever the Generality of the World may make of receiving this Doctrine in Words and Speculation, there are [illegible] few who expreſs an inward Senſe [illegible] of it, by living like Men [illegible] Of that practical Aſſent, [illegible]

Book I. ſpeak more largely hereafter. In the mean while, give me leave to lament, that ſo little and ſo poor Effects appear, of an Opinion capable of producing ſo many and ſo noble: For certainly, there is not any one Point whatſoever, the Perſuaſion whereof can bring greater Benefit, or have a ſtronger Influence upon Mankind. It may be objected, I confeſs, that all the Arguments which Humane Diſcourſe, and meer Natural Reaſon endeavour to eſtabliſh it by, cannot amount to a Demonſtration. But it muſt be confeſs'd, that there are ſeveral other Things, which Men are content to yield their Credit to, upon far more weak and inſufficient Suggeſtions. And whereinſoever *Reaſon* falls ſhort, it is abundantly ſupply'd by *Revelation*; which, as it is the beſt, ſo it is the proper Evidence in Matters of this Kind. But yet to ſhew the Importance of this Doctrine, even Nature her ſelf hath implanted in all Mankind a ſtrong Inclination to think it true: For it is natural for us to deſire the lengthening out, nay, the perpetuating our own Exiſtence. And no Reflection is more uneaſy, than That which attempts to perſuade us that we muſt *once ceaſe to be*. This Diſpoſition is interwoven with our very Frame; and hath given Birth to another no leſs general than itſelf, which is That anxious Care, and impatient Regard for Poſterity, that takes ſuch faſt hold on every Man of us.

Nor wou'd I be ſo far miſunderſtood, as to have it thought, that this Diſpoſition of Mind is the only Humane Foundation upon which our Belief of the *Soul's Immortality* ſtands: For there are Two other Moral Arguments in particular, which giv

it great Credit, and, to ſay the very leaſt of the Caſe, render it exceeding probable. Chap. 7.

The *Firſt* is, That Hope of Glory and Reputation, and the tender Care of preſerving a Good Name when we are gone; nay, the Thought and Endeavour that our Fame ſhould be Immortal. Now tho' I cannot but condemn this Sollicitude of Vanity, when Men pretend to place their *Happineſs* in the *Opinions* of other People after themſelves are dead; yet the marvellous Regard, and univerſal Concern Mankind expreſs for it, ſeems to ſay, that Nature inſpires thoſe Deſires and Expectations. And Nature, we know, is a *Wiſe Agent*, and does not uſe to cheat Men with Hopes, which are altogether impoſſible and vain.

Another Reaſon not eaſy to be got over by them who oppoſe this Doctrine, is, That common Impreſſion that Thoſe Crimes which are committed in ſecret, or which otherwiſe eſcape the Obſervation and Puniſhment of Civil Juſtice, and the Vengeance of Man, are ſtill reſerv'd to a farther Reckoning; that Almighty God ſupplies the Defects of Temporal Judicatures, and hath a ſevere Judgment in ſtore for ſuch Offenders as Thoſe cannot extend to. And ſince we find by frequent Inſtances, that many Enormities of this kind are not made the Marks of the Divine Vengeance in the Preſent World; it is a good Conſequence of all the Idea's we can reaſonably entertain of God, that He ſhould purſue the Guilty Wretches into Another World, and chaſtiſe them as they deſerve, even after Death. And now I would be glad to know, what greater Aſſurance can be expected for a Judgment

Book I. procur'd by the Interpoſition of Good or Evil Spirits, many whereof are mention'd in Story: And we are told of *John Duns-Scotus* in particular, that having lain a long time in a Trance, and being taken for dead, he was carry'd to be buried, and put into his Grave; but being rouz'd with the Blows and Bruiſes of the Mould thrown upon him, he came to himſelf, and was taken up again; and in a few Days after dy'd in good earneſt, with the loſs of Blood, and the Bruiſes he had received upon his Head. *Cardan* mentions ſomewhat of this Nature, with which both Himſelf and his Father were poſſeſs'd. And many Creditable Authentick Relations have been made from ſeveral diſtant Parts of the World, of abundance of People, moſt of them of the Vulgar ſort, too weak and ignorant to contrive ſuch Stories; and of Women poſſeſs'd, whoſe Bodies have not only continu'd long without any Senſe, or Motion, or Pulſe, but have been cut, bruiſed, burnt, without ever feeling it, and afterwards when they came to themſelves, they have complain'd of intolerable Torture and exquiſite Pain, and have given very ſtrange Accounts of what they have ſeen and done in Places a great way off.

A *Third* Separation there is, which we may call *Humane*, becauſe proceeding from Humane Means, and ſuch as no Superior or Inviſible Power ſeems to be concern'd in: This comes either from that Diſeaſe, which from *Hippocrates* is call'd *Morbus Sacer*, but commonly known by the Name of the *Falling-Sickneſs*, (attended with Foamings at the Mouth, which are look'd upon as the Mark and Character of it, and diſtinguiſh this Diſtemper from

from Poſſeſſions, in which the Patients are ſaid to have none of theſe Frothings, but a very noiſom Stench in the room of them:) Or this Separation may be owing to the Force of Stupifying and Sleeping Medicines: Or to the Strength of Imagination, which being vehemently intent upon ſome One Thing, perfectly carries away the Soul, and renders it ſtupid and inſenſible to all other Objects beſides. Chap. 7.

Now in theſe Three kinds of Extaſy and Tranſport, whether *Divine*, *Dæmoniacal*, or *Humane*, the great Doubt ariſing is, Whether the *Soul* be really and truly ſeparated from the *Body*; or whether, without any ſuch Separation, it ſtill continue there, but be ſo entirely taken up with ſome External Object, as perfectly to forget the Body belonging to it: So that its Natural Operations, and the Exerciſe of its proper Offices and Vocation are, during that Time, ſuſpended, and wholly ſuperſeded.

As to *Divine Extaſies*; The Apoſtle ſpeaking of Himſelf, and what happen'd in his own Caſe, will not preſume to define any thing: *Whether in the Body, or out of the Body, I cannot tell*, (ſays he) *God knoweth*. And this Caution of His, is, methinks, a good Warning to all other People, that They too ſhould be modeſt and reſerv'd, and not raſh in determining any thing poſitively, not only in Theſe, but even in leſs Abſtractions of the Mind. 2 Cor. xi.

As to the Second Caſe, That of *Dæmoniacks*, Their having no Senſe of great Blows, and exquiſite Tortures, and reporting Things tranſacted at Two or Three hundred Leagues diſtance; theſe, I con-

Book I. I confeſs, are great Conjectures, and very violent Preſumptions of an actual Separation; but yet, I think, they are not concluſive and neceſſary Arguments for it: For the Devils may amuſe the Soul, and keep it ſo fully employ'd even when at Home, that it ſhall have no Commerce or Communication with the Body for ſome conſiderable Time; and at the very ſame Time too he may repreſent to the Imagination what paſſes at a great diſtance, in ſo lively and clear a manner, as to fool the Man with a Perſuaſion, that he hath really been there, and ſeen thoſe very Things which the Images thus ſtrongly imprinted upon his Fancy, have enabled him ſo particularly to relate. How far the Activity of Evil or Good Spirits extends, is not poſſible for us to ſay. But it is a very bold Aſſertion, and what Nature will very hardly endure, That the Whole Soul, formally taken, goes out, and abandons the Body; for upon theſe Terms the Body muſt die to all Intents and Purpoſes: And ſuch Mens coming to themſelves again, wou'd not be a *Recovery* of their Senſes, but a *Reſurrection* from the Dead. And yet to ſay, That the Soul does not All go, but the Imaginative and Intellectual Faculties rove abroad, while the Vegetative ſtay behind and keep Houſe, is ſtill more monſtrous and abſurd: For at this rate, the Soul, which is entire, and One in her Eſſence, wou'd be divided; or elſe we muſt ſuppoſe the Accident only to be tranſported and born away, and the Subſtance to remain fixed in its proper Place; and therefore we have reaſon to admit any other Solution of the Caſe, rather than that of an Actual Separation.

As

As to the Third and Laſt ſort, which was term'd *Humane*, the Thing is clear beyond a Doubt, that there is no real Separation in it, ſince all that can be pretended to in this Caſe, amounts to no more than ſome preſent Stupefaction and Diſorder, by means whereof ſuch of the Soul's Operations as are Viſible and External, ceaſe in Appearance, and are ſuſpended for ſome time. Chap. 7.

What becomes of this *Soul*, and in what State or Condition ſhe continues after that Real and Natural Separation made by *Death*, Wiſe Men have not been able to agree; nor does this Point fall properly within the Compaſs and Deſign of the preſent Treatiſe. The *Tranſmigration* of Souls, advanced by *Pythagoras*, hath found (in ſome Parts of the Notion eſpecially) tolerable good Acceptance with the *Stoicks*, the *Academicks*, the *Ægyptian* Philoſophers, and ſome Others. Not that they all admitted it in the ſame Senſe and Extent, or to all the Purpoſes he intended it ſhould ſerve: Some allowed it only ſo far as it might contribute to the Puniſhment of Wicked Men, who might ſuffer by being turn'd into Brutes, in a manner like that miraculous Inflict upon *Nebuchadnezzar*, as a Scourge from God for his Vanity and Atheiſtical Pride. Some again, and thoſe of conſiderable Eminence and Authority, have imagin'd, that Pure and Pious Souls, upon their quitting this Body, are tranſlated into Angels; and the Black and Guilty ones transform'd in Fiends and Devils. Methinks it were more p dent to ſoften the former Branch of this Not as our Bleſſed Saviour hath done already, by Dan. iv.

Book I. ing, *That they neither marry nor die any more, but are as the Angels, and are the Children of God:* Luke xx. Some again have fancy'd, That the Souls of the wickedeſt and moſt profligate Wretches, after a very long Term of Time and Puniſhment, utterly periſh, and are reduced to their Firſt Nothing. But Humane Reaſon is, and muſt needs be for ever, in the Dark about all ſuch Matters. And therefore theſe Diſquiſitions ſhould be conſtantly referr'd to their proper Topick of Inſtruction: For, as nothing but *Revelation* and *Religion* can inform us truly in what concerns a Future State; ſo they have not been wanting to declare what is full and ſufficient for our Purpoſe, and therefore it is our *Duty*, as well as our *Wiſdom*, to receive this without more ado, and ſtedfaſtly to reſt in it.

ADVERTISEMENT.

IN the Second Particular, which concerns the Eſſence and Nature of the Soul; the Author makes a very odd Diſtinction between Matter and Body, and tries to reconcile the Opinion of Thoſe who ſay the *Soul* is *Immaterial*, with Theirs who affirm it to be *Corporeal*. The Reſult of which is, That the Souls of Men do not conſiſt of groſs and palpable Matter, but of a Body thin and ſubtle, even beyond all Imagination: And therefore, in the Sequel of this Diſcourſe, he continues to make a Difference between the Souls of Men, and thoſe of Brutes, even in this very Point of Materiality it ſelf.

But now, ſince *Body* and *Matter*, ſtrictly and Philoſophically taken, come all to one; and ſince no

no Subtlety, or Fineneſs of Compoſition, makes any Body the leſs a Material Subſtance; ſince again the Humane and Intellectual Soul hath evidently ſeveral Faculties, and performs ſeveral Operations, (ſuch as *Cogitation*, *Volition*, nay, even *Senſation* itſelf) which are neither inherent Qualities of Matter, as ſuch, nor what any Motion or Modification whatſoever, can render it capable of, Monſieur *Charron*'s Subtlety of the Body will not help the Cauſe at all: For *Ætherial* or *Cæleſtial Bodies* are as truly *Matter* as any of the Courſeſt and Groſſeſt whatſoever. And the Notion of *Matter* is not to be taken from its Purity or Fœculency, its Palpability or its Fineneſs; but from its Eſſential Properties, ſuch as Extenſion, Quantity, and Diviſibility, being purely Paſſive, and Acting only as it is acted upon; its being ſubject to the Laws of Motion, and the like. Theſe now are the inſeparable Properties of every thing that is *Body*; and from hence it muſt needs follow, that all Bodies whatſoever are equally diſtant from, equally unqualify'd for Thought, and Perception, and all other Operations and Faculties, which are the proper and diſtinguiſhing Characters of a Reaſonable Soul. Concerning which, if my Reader deſire farther Satisfaction than the Nature of a ſingle *Advertiſement* allows me room for, I refer him to Dr. *Bently*'s Second Sermon againſt Atheiſm, where he will find this Argument handled at large. Chap. 7.

When once ſuch an Abſurdity as This hath been ſhewn to attend that Notion which maintains the Soul's Corporeity; it is to very little Purpoſe to urge us with the Difficulties concerning the mu-

Book I. tual Intercourſe of our Souls and Bodies; or what the Soul ſuffers either in her United or in her Separate State: Some of which are capable of the ſame Reſolutions with thoſe given in the Caſe of Brutes, (by thoſe Philoſophers who allow them Senſe) and are not the Actions or Affections of the Intelligent, but of the Senſitive Powers: And for Others, which are ſuperior to Humane Diſcourſe, we acknowledge our Ignorance, and reſolve all into the ſole *Will*, and wonderful *Wiſdom* of our Almighty Creator. He hath not told us what is the Band of Union between theſe Two; nor how this Communication and intimate Correſpondence is kept up, and carry'd on: And we think it is impoſſible for any to acquaint us with this Proceſs, except Him only, who contrived and conſtituted it. But Ten thouſand ſuch Objections weigh little, when balanc'd againſt a Flaw in the very Foundation: Every thing at this rate may be diſputed, and *Univerſal Scepticiſm* be advanced, for we are able to trace nothing thro' all its Motions and Operations. But an Argument *ab Abſurdo*, made evident in the Firſt and moſt ſubſtantial Principles, is allowed, even in that Science, which profeſſes the greateſt Accuracy in Arguing, to be a Juſt and Legitimate Demonſtration againſt any thing, which ſuch Principles are alledg'd to eſtabliſh.

See more concerning the Immateriality *of the* Soul, *and her* Operations, *in the Advertiſement at the End of the Tenth Chapter.*

Chap. VIII.

Of the Soul in Particular; and Firſt, of the Vegetative Faculty.

HAving thus given a General Deſcription of the Soul, in the Ten Points already inſiſted on, I come in the next Place to treat of it ſomewhat more diſtinctly; by conſidering its reſpective Principal *Faculties* a-part. And the moſt convenient Order, as I apprehend, will be to begin with the Loweſt firſt, and ſo proceed from the *Vegetative* to the *Senſitive*, from thence to that of *Imagination* and *Appetite*, and laſt of all to the *Intellectual*, which is the Supreme of all the Faculties, and that which is the true and peculiar Character of the Humane Soul. Under each of Theſe here are ſeveral ſubordinate Powers, of leſs Note and Figure, which hold, as Branches of, or Deities under thoſe, and will fall in naturally to be mention'd, in the Proſecution of that Method I have here propoſed.

As for That which concerns *Vegetation*, it is the meaneſt by much, and given us in common with the very Plants. I ſhall therefore ſay but very little of it, not only becauſe the Subject is not of Dignity enough to bear me out in long Enlargements; but alſo becauſe this is more properly the Buſineſs of Phyſicians, whoſe Profeſſion leads to the Study of Health and Sickneſs, the Preſerva-

Book I. tives of the One, and the Remedies againſt the Other. I ſhall only call upon my Reader at preſent to obſerve, That under this Faculty, there are Three Great and very Important Subalterns concern'd, and each of them ſubſequent and aſſiſting to each other in a regular Progreſſion. For the Firſt promotes the Second, and the Second the Third; but not ſo, as that the Order can be inverted, and the Remark hold back again.

The firſt of theſe is the *Nutritive*; inſtituted for the Preſervation of the Individual; and under This there are ſeveral Aſſiſtants, ſuch as the Attractive or ſeeking of neceſſary Suſtenance; that of Concoction and Digeſtion, which ſeparates the good and uſeful Parts from thoſe which are noxious and naughty; the Retentive, for what is neceſſary; and the Expulſive, to throw off what is offenſive or ſuperfluous.

The Second is that of *Growing*, which tends to the Perfection of the Individual, and giving it all its juſt Proportions.

The Third is the *Generative*, for the Continuance and Succeſſion of the Species.

From hence now it is plain, that the Two former of theſe were inſtituted by Nature, for the Sake and Benefit of the Individual, and terminate in the Advantage of one ſingle Perſon, and his own Body. The Third extends to the Species in general, and its Effects do not, cannot center in the Perſon himſelf; and therefore This, as more Extenſive and Beneficial, is eſteem'd ſuperior in Dignity to the other Two, and advancing nearer to That Faculty next abovei t, which is the Senſitive. For producing one's own Likeneſs, is a very

very Eminent Perfection in Nature, and gives us the Honour of ſome diſtant Reſemblances, even to the great Creator himſelf. Chap. 8.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Senſitive Faculty.

THE Exerciſe of this Faculty, or the Operations of Senſe, require the Concurrence of no leſs than *Six* ſeveral Things; *Four* within, and *Two* without the Body. And they are theſe which follow. 1.

I. The *Firſt* is the *Soul:* This is the Prime Efficient Cauſe of Perception.

II. The *Second* is the Faculty of *Senſation*, (which I diſtinguiſh here from the Former, having already proved, that it is only a Quality of the Soul, and not the very Eſſence or Soul itſelf.) This conſiſts in the Perception and Apprehending of External Objects: Which may be done Five ſeveral Ways; for which reaſon we are commonly ſaid to have Five Senſes. Concerning that Number I ſhall ſay ſomething in the next Chapter; in the mean while my Reader need ſcarce be told that theſe *Senſes* are call'd, *Hearing*, *Seeing*, *Smelling*, *Taſting*, and *Feeling*.

III. The *Third* Thing neceſſary is the *Bodily Inſtrument*, or *Organ* of *Senſe*, and theſe are proportionably *Five* too: The *Eye* for Sight; the *Ear* for Hearing; the *Cavity* at the Top of the Noſe (which goes into the firſt Ventricle of the Brain)

Book I. for Smelling; the *Tongue* for Taſting; and the *Skin* all over the Body, for that of the Touch or Feeling.

IV. The *Fourth* requiſite, is that Animal Spirit, derived from the Brain, (which is the Origine and Seat of the Senſitive Soul) and convey'd through the Nerves, to theſe ſeveral Organs: by the Motion and Mediation of which Spirit and Organ, the Soul exerciſes her Faculty.

V. The *Fifth* is, what the Philoſophers were uſed to call the *Species Senſibilis*, which is, in plain *Engliſh*, the Object which moves and affects, or is propounded to the Organ: And This is of a different kind, according to the different Senſe excited, or apply'd to by it. That of *Sight*, or the *Eye* (according to the commonly received Opinion) is *Colour*; a Quality or Accident inherent in the Body colour'd. *Six* of theſe are ſtyled Simple Colours, as *White*, *Yellow*, *Red*, *Purple*, *Green*, and *Blue*: To which ſome add *Black*, and call them Seven. But, ſtrictly ſpeaking, Black is not any Colour, but only a Privation of Light, reſembling Darkneſs; as other Colours do more or leſs reſemble Light: The Number of Compounded Colours is infinite. And, indeed, if we go to the Philoſophical Nicety of the Thing, there is no Colour at all in any Body, whatſoever; for This is nothing elſe in Truth but the various Repreſentation which Light differently modified makes upon our Senſes. For when the Light is gone, all Colour is gone with it, and as this never appears without ſome Colour, ſo it never diſappears, ſo as to leave Colour behind.

Now

Now *Light* is a Quality proceeding from a Lu- Chap. 9.
minous Body, which creates in us a Perception and Sight of itſelf, and of all Things elſe within our View. When this terminates upon, and is ſtopp'd by any ſolid Body, it rebounds back again, and doubles its Rays by Reflection: But if it penetrate the Body, and find farther Paſſage, it cannot be ſeen except only in its firſt Source, the Luminous Body from whence it was ſhed originally; nor does it then do us any Service in ſhewing other Objects.

The Object of *Hearing* is Sound; by which we are to underſtand that Noiſe which reſults from the mutual Colliſion of Two Bodies; and this is very various: For ſome Sounds are ſweet and melodious, they ſooth and charm the Soul, calm the Paſſions, compoſe the Humours of the Body, and chaſe away the Diſorders of the whole Man. Others again are ſmart and piercing, ſtrike thro' the very Soul, wound and diſturb our Faculties with an ungrateful Harſhneſs. But of all our Senſes, the Mind ſeems to be moſt under the Power of This; none entertains it with greater Variety; none takes more abſolute Poſſeſſion of it.

The Object of *Taſte* is what we call Savour or Reliſhes; of which the Simple are *Sweet*, *Bitter*, *Sour*, *Sharp*, *Salt*, *Acid:* But of the Compounds there is no Number; they are made ſo exquiſite, and multiplied ſo induſtriouſly.

That of *Smelling* is Flavour; which is a ſort of Vapour ariſing from the Odoriferous Object, and aſcending thro' the Noſe into the firſt and moſt prominent Ventricles of the Brain. Such Per-

Book I. fumes as are very ſtrong, commit a ſort of Violence upon the Brain, and are prejudicial or offenſive to it: But thoſe that are agreeable and moderate, miniſter wonderful Comfort and Refreſhment, and both delight and do good to the Head.

The Objects of *Feeling* are ſuch as uſually are term'd the Tactile Qualities, *Hot*, *Cold*, *Moiſt*, *Dry*; to which we may add *Soft* and *Sharp*, *Rough* and *Smooth*, *Motion* and *Reſt*, *Tickling*, &c.

VI. The Laſt Thing which muſt concur in Senſation, is the *Medium*, or Space betwixt the Object and the Organ; and this, to render the Operation what it ought to be, is the *Air*, not in any wiſe changed or corrupted, but free, and in its Natural Purity and Diſpoſition.

2. From hence we may gather, That the Act of Senſation is perform'd, when the Object, or *Senſible Species* preſents itſelf by the Help of a *Medium* diſpoſed to convey this Repreſentation to the proper Organ fitted to receive it; and that the Animal Spirits lodg'd there do accordingly take the Impreſſion, and apprehend the Thing: So that here is *Action* and *Paſſion* both; and the Senſes are not purely *Paſſive*; for, notwithſtanding that they receive an Impreſſion, and in that reſpect are acted upon, yet do they likewiſe act, in ſome Degree, themſelves, ſo far as they perceive the Image, and apprehend the Object propounded to them.

See the Advertiſement at the End of the next Chapter.

The

The old Philoſophy before *Ariſtotle*'s Time, made a very remarkable Difference between the *Sight* and the reſt of the Senſes: Suppoſing This to be meerly *Active*, and imagining, that, whereas the Others receiv'd the Object and Impreſſion from without, and ſo cou'd only be *Paſſive*; The Eye quite contrary, ſhot out its Rays of Light from within, and made an Impreſſion upon the Viſible Object. But ever ſince *Ariſtotle*, this Account of Viſion hath been better ſtated, and all the Senſes are allow'd to be equally *Paſſive*, equally wrought upon from without: All the Arguments of the Ancients to the contrary being very eaſily anſwer'd and ſet aſide. Chap. 9. 3.

But now, beſides theſe Five particular Senſes, the Organs whereof appear outwardly, there is another, which is call'd the *Common Senſory* within. Here it is that the ſeveral Objects of every ſort, perceiv'd by the Corporeal Organs, make their *Rendezvous:* Hither they are brought to be examin'd, compar'd, ſorted out, and diſtinguiſh'd aſunder: For were there no ſuch Office of Enquiry, all wou'd end in Confuſion. This diſcerning Power is above the Capacity of any particular Organ of Senſe; for each of theſe is intent upon his own Buſineſs, and whatever his Fellows do, is out of his Sphere; he knows nothing at all of the Matter; nor can he be a competent Judge in it. 4.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of the Senſes, which are the moſt Exalted and Noble Parts of the Body.

1. *Of what Conſequence they are to us. See* Chap. xv. 11.

THE ordinary way of being conducted to the Knowledge of Things, is, by the Aſſiſtance and Miniſtry of our *Senſes*; ſo ſay the Schools, but it is not univerſally true. Theſe are our firſt Inſtructers: All our Learning begins with them, and is at laſt reſolv'd into them: We can go no farther back than they lead us, or give occaſion for us to build Conſequences upon. Each of theſe is ſupreme within its own Territories; and a large Dominion each of them poſſeſſes: An infinite Number of Reflections and Notions ariſe from each; nor does any One of them hold under, depend upon, or ſtand in need of the reſt: Thus the Power of them all is equally abſolute, though ſome of them have a wider Range, and more Buſineſs, and a longer Train of Conſequences and Inſtructions, than ſome others. Nor are we to wonder at This, ſince the Caſe is the ſame in other Inſtances: For a Petty Prince is as independent, as truly Sovereign within his own ſmall Territories, as the greateſt Monarch upon Earth in Kingdoms of the largeſt Extent.

2. *Their Number.*

It is a Maxim univerſally receiv'd, *That there are but Five Senſes in Nature*; and that which inclines all the World to think ſo, is, becauſe we

can

can obſerve no more in our ſelves: But poſſibly there may be more, and ſome queſtion may be made of it; nay, indeed, ſome probable Reaſons may be offer'd, that there are more. But, ſuppoſing that there are, it is certainly not in our Power to know it; nor can we poſſibly aſſert or deny the Thing poſitively: for there is no way to diſcover the Want or Defect of a *Senſe* we never had. Several Brutes enjoy all the Advantages of Life that are neceſſary to them, notwithſtanding they do not enjoy all the Methods of Senſation, which Nature hath given to Mankind; and I ſee no Reaſon, why an Animal may not ſubſiſt without any of the *Five Senſes*, that of Touch only excepted, which alone would ſupply the bare Neceſſities of Life. It is plain we live very conveniently with *Five*; and yet perhaps there may be *One*, or *Two*, or *Three* more in *Nature*, which we in no degree partake of. But, as I ſaid, this is more than we do or can know; for each Senſe is confin'd within its own Diviſion, and can make no Diſcoveries, nor hath any Juriſdiction out of its own Compaſs. A Man blind from his Birth can never be brought to any Idea of Sight; nor can he (ſtrictly ſpeaking) either deſire it, or be concerned for the want of it. 'Tis true, he will tell you perhaps, that he wiſhes to *See*, but this is ſpoke by rote, and according as he hears other People expreſs themſelves; for indeed he wiſhes he knows not what: And all it comes to at laſt is, That he would be glad to have ſomewhat which he is told the reſt of the World have, and himſelf hath not. The Reaſon of all This is, Becauſe the *Senſes* are the *Doors* at which all our Knowledge makes its firſt Entrance; Ch. 10. See Note.

Book I. Entrance; and that which did not begin, and is not let in that way, cannot come in at all. Thus a Man is not capable of forming to himſelf a Conception of more Senſes than thoſe Five which himſelf hath, and conſequently cannot perſuade himſelf, that there are, or can be more in Nature; but it does not follow from hence that there can be no more, becauſe he hath no Notion of any more. Who knows whether the many Difficulties which ſtill remain unaccounted for in many of the Works of Nature, and the Operations of Animals, that eſcape the niceſt Enquiry, and ſubtileſt Penetration of Humane Wit, may not be charged upon the Want of ſome Senſe, which we are not provided with to diſcern them? What the World uſually expreſſes by the Title of *Sympathies*, *Antipathies*, and *Occult Qualities*, may have ſome Senſitive Faculties in Nature, accommodated to perceive, and make a competent Judgment of them; and perhaps our Ignorance of them is owing to our being deficient in this Point. Who can tell, whether it be not ſome particular *Sixth Senſe*, which informs the Cock, when it is Midnight, and the firſt Dawning of the Day, and, by ſome ſecret Impulſe, puts him conſtantly upon Crowing at thoſe Times? The ſame may be ſaid of that Direction, by which ſome Brutes are led to ſuch Herbs, as are proper for their Recovery, when ſick or ſurfeited; and of many other ſuch Things as theſe, which are notorious Matters of Fact, but the Reaſons of them perfectly unknown. This is a Caſe in which we are utterly in the dark; and no Man can be poſitively aſſur'd on either Side of the Queſtion.

Some

Some indeed have undertaken to give a Reaſon for this particular Number of *Five Senſes*, and to prove that Theſe are ſufficient, by comparing and diſtinguiſhing them, and the Uſes they ſerve. All *Bodies* (ſay they) without us, which are Objects of our Senſes, are either very near and cloſe to Our Body, or they are at ſome diſtance from it: If they be cloſe to us, and ſtill remain without us, then they fall under our *Touch*: If they approach, and come into us, then they are the Objects of our *Taſte*: If they are more remote, and ſtand before us, ſo that their Diſtances are meaſur'd by a Right Line, then the *Sight* diſcerns them: If the Line be Oblique, and the Motion Reflex, then the *Hearing* does it. Now, methinks, the Diſtinction were better thus: Of the *Five Senſes* accommodated for the Service of the whole Man, as he is compounded of Body and Soul, ſome are appropriated to the Uſe of the Body only; and theſe are the *Touch* and the *Taſte*; the One for all that enters within, the Other for that which ſtill continues without it. Some again are firſt and chiefly deſign'd for the Benefit of the Soul, and thoſe are *Sight* and *Hearing*; the Former to aſſiſt Invention, the Latter for Improvement and Inſtruction, and all manner of Communication. And One more in the midſt of theſe Extremes, fitted to thoſe Spirits and Avenues that belong to Soul and Body both, which is *Smelling*. Again, They anſwer to the *Four Elements*, and their reſpective Qualities; the *Touch* to the *Earth*; *Hearing* to the *Air*; *Taſte* to *Water* and *Moiſture*; *Smelling* to *Fire*; and *Sight* to a Compound of *Water* and *Fire*, becauſe of the Brightneſs

Ch. 10.

3. *Whether enough of them.*

Book I. neſs of the Eye. It is likewiſe pretended, that there are as many Senſes as there are General Diviſions of ſenſible Objects; and theſe are Colours, Sounds, Scents, Reliſhes, and a Fifth ſort, which wants a Name to expreſs it, adapted to the *Touch*, and comprehending all the Tactile Qualities, as Hot, Cold, Hard, Soft, Rough, Smooth, Sharp, and the reſt of them. But this is evidently a Miſtake; for the Number of the Senſes is by no means adjuſted, according to the Number of the Objects they are capable of. Nor are theſe Objects the Cauſe of their being juſt ſo many, and no more. Were this a good Account, it would follow, that we muſt have been endu'd with a great many more than we now have; whereas now one and the ſame Senſe entertains Objects of different Kinds; and one and the ſame Object creates a Perception, and impreſſes itſelf upon ſeveral Senſes at once. The moſt probable Account of this Matter ſeems rather to be, That the Senſes were intended for Means and Inſtruments of conveying Knowledge to us; and that Nature, which, as ſhe is not niggardly, ſo neither is ſhe profuſe, hath given us as many Senſes as are ſufficient for this Purpoſe; and that when ſhe had ſupply'd us with enough for our Uſe, ſhe did not think fit to give us any more.

4. *A Compariſon of them.* Of Theſe the Senſe of *Seeing* does ſurpaſs all the reſt in the Quickneſs of its Operation; for it reaches the very Heavens in an Inſtant, and acts in the Air, which is full of Light and Images, without any Trouble or Motion; whereas all the reſt of the Senſes receive their Impreſſion by the Motion of thoſe Bodies which make it. And

all Motion requires Time to be perform'd in; ſo that all the other Senſes muſt needs proceed more ſlowly than This, which need but open its Organ, and is ſure to find Light and Colours ſtand always ready to be diſcern'd by it. All the Senſes are likewiſe capable of Pleaſure and Pain; but This is obſervable of the Two groſſeſt of them, That the *Touch* is capable of abundance of *Pain*, and but very little *Pleaſure*; and the *Taſte*, juſt contrary, feels a great deal of *Pleaſure*, and little or no *Pain*. Ch. 10.

5. *The Weakneſs and Uncertainty of them.*

The *Weakneſs* and *Uncertainty* of our Senſes is the great Cauſe of our Ignorance and Error, and all ſort of Miſapprehenſion: For, ſince Knowledge is attain'd by the Mediation of the Senſes only, if theſe make a falſe Report, what can we do but receive and ſtick to it? But after all, who can tell what Reports they make, or how can any Man accuſe them of Falſhood, ſince we learn all from Them, and, conſequently, even that which gives us this Jealouſy, and is the Ground of the Accuſation. Some indeed affirm, That the *Senſes are faithful* in all their Meſſages, and repreſent the very Truth; That, when we imagine they deceive us, the Fault is not in Them, but in ſomething elſe; and that we ought rather to lay it at any other Door; for no other Thing is ſo free from, ſo incapable of impoſing upon us. Some again run into the contrary Extreme, cry out upon the Senſes as downright *infamous Lyars*, and tell you, That nothing at all of Certainty can be had from them. But the Truth lies between theſe Extremes. *See Advertiſement.*

Now,

Book I. Now, Whether the Senſes themſelves are deceiv'd or not, thus much at leaſt is evident, That they put a Cheat, nay, ſometimes a Conſtraint, upon *Reaſon*; and that, by an unhappy Viciſſitude, *Reaſon* pays them back in their own Coin, and returns the *Cheat* upon Them. And is not Man, think you, like to be wonderful Wiſe and Knowing, when the outward and the inward Inſtruments of Inſtruction are eternally tricking one another, and his whole Compoſition is full of Falſhood and Weakneſs in the moſt neceſſary and eſſential Parts of it? Now, that the Senſes deceive, and commit a Violence upon the Underſtanding, we ſee plain enough in thoſe Inſtances, where ſome of them immediately put us in a Rage, Others ſweeten and appeaſe the Soul, and Others again tickle and pleaſe it exceedingly. And why ſhould Men turn their Heads away, when they are let Blood, or lanced, or ſuffer Inciſions and Burnings, but from their Conſciouſneſs of the Power their Senſes have to *diſturb* their Reaſon; and that the ſame Thing is better born, when the Eyes do not obſerve the Operation? The Looking down a Pit, or a vaſt Precipice, diſorders and confounds a Man, though he knows at the ſame time, that he ſtands ſafe himſelf, and cannot reaſonably apprehend any Danger of falling into it? And, to inſtance in no more, 'tis evident, that Senſe of Pain and Pleaſure both, does every Day vanquiſh, and utterly confound the beſt and braveſt Reſolutions of Virtue, and Temperance, and Patience.

6. *The mutual Deceits of the Mind and the Senſes.*

Again, It is no leſs evident, that the Senſes on the other hand, are cheated by the *Underſtanding*. This

This is demonſtrated by thoſe Agitations of Anger, and Love, and Hatred, and other Paſſions, which impoſe upon us, and make us ſee and hear Things quite otherwiſe than they really are. Nay, ſometimes our Senſes are not only deceived, but perfectly ſtupify'd, and bound up from all Power of Action, by violent Diſorders of the Soul, as if the Soul retir'd inwards, and were entirely taken up there: For thus it often happens when our Mind is very intent upon ſomewhat elſe, the Eye never ſees, nor takes the leaſt Notice of thoſe Objects that ſtand directly before it, and preſent themſelves to our View. And Reaſon and Senſe judge very differently of the Magnitude of the Sun and Stars, and of the Shape of a Stick in the Water. Ch. 10.

7. *Theſe Senſes are common to Men and Brutes.*

Other Living Creatures have a Share in this Gift of Nature as well as We, and ſometimes are more liberally dealt with in it: For ſome are quicker of Hearing than Men; Others have a ſtronger and clearer Sight; Others a nicer Smell; and others a more diſtinguiſhing Taſte. The general Opinion is, That a *Stag* excels all other Creatures in *Hearing*, an *Eagle* in *Seeing*, a *Dog* in *Smelling*, an *Ape* in *Taſting*, and a *Tortoiſe* in *Feeling*. But yet the Pre-eminence in this laſt hath been allow'd to *Man*; which is not much for our Credit, ſince This, of all the Senſes, is reckon'd the groſſeſt and moſt brutal. In the mean while, this Reflection upon what hath gone before, may not be unſeaſonable; That if the Senſes are the Means and Inſtruments of Knowledge, and Brutes have Senſes too, nay, frequently more acute and penetrating than Ours, there may a fair Argument

Book I. be drawn from hence, for Their partaking in Knowledge with us, as well as they partake of the Helps and Means that convey it to us.

8. *It is hard to truſt our Senſes.* But tho' the Senſes be the *Inſtruments of Knowledge*, yet are they not the *only* Inſtruments; much leſs are our own Senſes alone to be conſulted or depended upon in the Caſe: For if it happens that Brutes have from their Senſes a Report different from that which Ours make, and the Judgment given upon that Evidence do conſequently diſagree with the Notions we form to our ſelves, (as in ſundry Inſtances 'tis plain it does happen) which of theſe two Teſtimonies ſhall we believe? Our *Faſting-Spittle cleanſes* and *heals* our own *Wounds*, and yet it *kills a Serpent:* Now from Two ſo different Effects, what Concluſion can be made concerning the true Nature of Humane Spittle? Shall we ſay that it is of a Drying and a Cleanſing, or of a Poyſonous and Killing Quality? To make any certain Determination of the Operations of Senſe, we ſhould do well, methinks, to agree with the Brutes, who have the ſame Faculties as well as We. But the leaſt that can poſſibly be requir'd in order to it, is, That we ſhould be conſiſtent with our own ſelves, and that the ſame Judge, and the ſame Evidence ſhould always concur in the ſame Sentence. And yet even This we are not come to: Shut your Eye, and put your Finger upon part of the Lid, and this Eye ſo preſs'd ſees Things after another manner, than it does in the Natural and Common Poſture. Stop your Ear, and the Sound is vaſtly different from what it is in the ordinary Impreſſion: Theſe Differences every Man, when he will, may make for

for himſelf. But ſome there are which Nature hath made to our Hand: A Child Taſtes, and Hears, and Sees much otherwiſe than a Grown Man; and a Man in his full Strength differs no leſs from an Old Man; One in perfect Health, from a Sick Perſon; a Wiſe Man from a Fool. Now where the Diverſity and Diſtance is ſo great, nay, where there is even a Contrariety of Perceptions, where ſhall we fix, or what can we depend upon for Truth? Even one Senſe contradicts and gives the Lye to another; for a Piece of *Painting* which ſeems Raiſed, and in *Relief* (as they term it) to the Eye, when we come to feel it with the Hand, is perfectly flat and ſmooth. Ch. 10.

ADVERTISEMENT.

IN order to giving the Reader a right Notion of the Matter treated of in this Chapter, I ſhall beg leave to detain him a little, with the Conſideration of theſe *Three Particulars.*

Firſt*, What Dependance may be had upon the *Evidence of Senſe.

Secondly*, Whence thoſe *Miſtakes* do really proceed, which we find ſometimes charg'd upon the *Deceivableneſs of our Senſes.

***Thirdly*, Whether All our Knowledge depends upon our *Senſes*, ſo as that we can know nothing but by Their means.**

I. *As to the Evidence of Senſe*; This is what all Mankind, who have ever allow'd any thing of Knowledge or Certainty at all, conſtantly look'd upon, as the ſureſt and moſt irrefragable in all

Book I. thoſe Caſes, which are the proper Objects of it: And therefore he that went about to evacuate or weaken this, was eſteem'd a Man not fit to be diſputed with: Becauſe one muſt needs deſpair of producing any better and more convincing Proofs, and ſo he muſt continue in incurable Ignorance, unleſs we cou'd ſuppoſe ſo abſurd a Proceſs in arguing, as that a Man ſhould be perſuaded of a thing more manifeſt, by a *Medium* which is leſs ſo. It were an Affront to Humane Nature, to endeavour the eſtabliſhing this by Arguments, ſince none ever diſclaim'd the Truth of it, but They who wou'd not allow us to be ſure that any thing was true; and conſequently, cou'd no more depend upon their own Objections againſt it, than they cou'd upon the Thing they brought them againſt. Therefore *Lucretius* hath very deſervedly expoſed the Folly of ſuch perverſe Scepticks, in his *Fourth Book.*

Denique nil ſciri ſiquis putat, &c.

He that ſays Nothing can be known, o'erthrows
His own Opinion; for He Nothing knows;
So knows not That. What need of long diſpute?
Thoſe Maxims kill Themſelves, Themſelves confute:
But grant This might be known, and grant He knew;
Yet ſince he hath diſcover'd Nothing true,
What Mark, and what Criterion then can ſhew,
Or tell, what 'tis to know, *or* not to know?
Or how cou'd He what's Truth, *what's* Falſhood *learn?*
How what was Doubt, *what* Certainty *diſcern?*
From Senſe all Truth and Certainty inferr,
In vain ſome ſtrive to prove that Senſe can err;

For that which wou'd convince, which wou'd oppoſe Ch. 10.
The Senſes, muſt be ſurer far than thoſe.

So that upon theſe Terms, it is evident all Knowledge muſt be given up, becauſe if our Senſes be falſe, we can have no ſtronger Conviction than what ariſes from Them, that any Thing is true; nor that there is ſuch a thing as *Truth* or *Falſehood* in the World. But beſides, if it were proper to argue in ſuch a Caſe, any reaſonable Perſon would find no Difficulty in the Belief of this Matter; For if he only allow the *Being of a God*, and conſiders the mighty Conſequence of our Senſes to us in all our Affairs whatſoever; it can never enter into one's Head, that a Being of ſuch Perfections wou'd leave his Creatures in perpetual Ignorance and Uncertainty, and give them ſuch Organs and Inſtruments, as ſhou'd only deceive and confound them: For God indeed is the true Efficient Cauſe of all our Senſations, and the Foundation of our Certainty; and his Goodneſs and Truth are our Pledges, that we are not miſtaken, and always in the wrong, in the due Uſe of thoſe Faculties he hath given us to diſtinguiſh Things by.

Again: If we obſerve the Manner how theſe Operations are perform'd, that it is by External Impreſſions, by which the Object ſtrikes upon the proper Organ, and that Impreſſion is continu'd till it be carry'd on to that, which is called the *Common Senſory*, or the inward Seat of Senſe; All this muſt depend upon the ſame neceſſary Laws of *Matter* and *Motion*, by which *Bodies* in general act upon one another. And therefore, ſuppoſing the

Book I. ſame Object, the ſame Force of Impreſſion, the ſame Situation, the ſame Diſpoſition of the Organ, the ſame *Medium*, and the like; the Report of the Senſe cannot but be the ſame: But where there is a Variation in any of theſe, the Perception is under a Neceſſity of varying too. Thus, (to uſe the Inſtance mention'd by *Charron*) when part of the Eye-Lid is preſs'd down by the Finger, the Rays are differently admitted into the Pupil, and fall upon two ſeveral Places of the *Tunica Retina*, which conſequently creates a two-fold Impreſſion of the Object: And This Duplicity is as natural and neceſſary in ſuch a Diſpoſition of the Eye, as truly agreeable to all the Rules of *Matter* and *Motion*, as a ſingle Repreſentation would be in the uſual Poſture; ſo far from a Reflection upon the Truth of Senſe, that our Senſes could not be true, if the thing were otherwiſe repreſented. A proportionable Difference muſt needs follow in the different Modifications of Light and Shades; (which is the Reaſon of that Appearance taken Notice of here, of Pieces in *Relief*) the dextrous Management whereof makes the great Secret of the *Art of Painting*. So it is again, if there be any thing uncommon in the *Medium* through which the Rays paſs from the Object to the Organ of Senſes; which is the Caſe of Priſms, or of Eyes, either diſtorted in their Situation, or diſcolour'd in any of the Humours: and as Theſe make a Change in the repreſented Colour of the Object, ſo does the Contraction or Dilation of the Pupil, in the Magnitude or Figure of it. And the Eye, and other Organs of Senſe, varying by Age, Sickneſs, Nature, or Accidents, unavoid-

unavoidably require different Senſations, in Perſons of different Years and Conditions; the Matter coming much to one, whether the Object be variouſly repreſented through Diſtance, or its own Poſture and Form, or through ſome Change and Defect of the Organ, which receives the Impreſſion. All which ſufficiently accounts for the differing Senſations of Children, Grown Men, and Aged Perſons; the different Taſtes of the Sick and the Healthful; and indeed the vaſt Diverſity of Palats among Mankind in general: For here is a mighty Diverſity in the Organ of Senſe; and the making one and the ſame Report is therefore impoſſible: For our Senſes are like Meſſengers, and all their Buſineſs is, To be Faithful and True in delivering their Errand, as they have receiv'd it. If it were not given as it ought to be at firſt, (that is, if there be any accidental Defects to change the Appearance) This they are not reſponſible for; but they are to tell what they feel, and hear, and ſee; and in This they are faithful, and may be depended upon. For, That they may be truſted even in Matters of the greateſt Conſequence, is beyond all reaſonable Contradiction; not only from the moſt neceſſary and important Matters of Humane Life, being carry'd on upon the Confidence of this Teſtimony, but (which to a Chriſtian is much more conſiderable) from all the External Evidences of *Religion* being put upon this Iſſue. The Life and Death, the Reſurrection and Aſcenſion of our Bleſſed Saviour, the Doctrines he taught, and the Miracles he did in Confirmation of them, being ſo many Appeals to the Senſes of thoſe with whom he convers'd, and the

Ch. 10.

Book I. great Motive to Perſuaſion, which the Apoſtle urges, is, that he deliver'd That to his Proſelytes concerning the Word of Life, of which they had all poſſible Demonſtrations, ſince it was what He 1 Joh. i. 1. and his Fellow-Preachers *had heard*, *what they had ſeen with their Eyes*, *what they had looked upon*, and their *Hands had handled*. All which was certainly a very weak and impertinent Allegation, if the Senſes are ſo liable to Miſtakes, and ſo uncertain a Foundation of Knowledge, that we cannot with Safety fix any Concluſions from the Reports they make to us. And yet it cannot be deny'd, but Men do very frequently err by too eaſy a Credulity in this reſpect, which miniſters ſufficient Ground for our Second Enquiry.

II. *Whence thoſe Errors do really proceed, which we find ſometimes charged upon the Deceivableneſs of our Senſes.* In This, as well as ſome Other Particulars, *Epicurus* ſeems to have been very unfairly dealt withal by the *Stoicks*, and ſome other Philoſophers of a contrary Party; who, becauſe he aſſerted the Truth of the Senſes, and vindicated their Fidelity in Reporting, have charg'd him with affirming, that a Man could not poſſibly miſtake in forming Judgments according to thoſe Appearances. Whereas in Truth *Epicurus* only places the Senſes in the Quality of Evidence, whoſe Buſineſs it is to relate bare Matter of Fact, but does by no means deny the Juriſdiction of the Court to which thoſe Accounts are given, to paſs Sentence as ſhall ſeem juſt and equal. To this Purpoſe is that προσμυθόμυθον, which *Diogenes Laertius* in his Tenth Book mentions; and *Gaſſendus* in his Comment upon it, ſo rationally enlarges upon.

upon. By which is meant, that Men ought to avoid Precipitation, and not raſhly pronounce, that Things are in reality as they are repreſented; but calmly and ſlowly examine Circumſtances, and obſerve the Cauſes of ſuch Repreſentations. Thus likewiſe *Lucretius* in his Fourth Book, after having inſtanc'd in ſeveral Appearances, which, when ſtrictly enquir'd into, are found to differ from the Nature of the Things themſelves, cloſes his Account with theſe very ſignificant Verſes, Ch. 10.

Cætera de genere hoc mirando multa videmus,
Quæ violare fidem quaſi ſenſibus omnia quærunt.
Nequicquam. Quoniam pars horum maxima fallit,
Propter Opinatus animi, quos addimus ipſi, &c.

Which the *Engliſh* Reader may take from Mr. *Creech* thus:

Ten Thouſand ſuch appear, Ten Thouſand Foes
To Certainty of Senſe; and All *oppoſe:*
In vain. 'Tis Judgment, not the Senſe miſtakes,
Which fancy'd *Things for* real *Objects takes.*

If then One Light appear to be Two, when the Eye-Lid is preſs'd; if a Square Building at a Diſtance ſeem Round; if a Piece in Perſpective ſeem a Cloyſter or a Portico; a Man is not preſently to conclude that theſe are really ſuch; nor can he be excus'd if he do ſo. For Reaſon and Conſideration wou'd convince him, that theſe Ideas muſt be ſo, and cou'd not be otherwiſe; That the unnatural Diſpoſition of the Eye muſt needs double the Image in the firſt Inſtance; That the Diſtance of the Object will naturally cut off the Angles, and render the Perception

leſs

Book I. leſs diſtinct, in the ſecond; and that Shades artificially caſt, and ſome Strokes of the Pencil or Style bolder and ſtronger than the reſt, will of neceſſity create imaginary Protuberances, and imaginary Diſtances in the Laſt. What Courſe then ſhall one take to prevent Errours in theſe Caſes? In general, he muſt not be too haſty in giving Judgment, but bring theſe Things to the Teſt. The Firſt muſt be viewed with his Eye in its uſual Form and Condition; the Second he muſt make nearer Approaches to, and view it cloſe at Hand: For the Third he may call in another Senſe to his Aſſiſtance; and if the Eye alone cannot, the Touch muſt ſet him right.

But to this *Charron* replies, and not only He, but *Lucretius*, That no One Senſe can poſſibly correct another:

An poterunt Oculos Aures reprehendere, an Aures Tactus? &c.

What? Can the Ears convince the Eyes? Can Thoſe
Confute the Hand, the Palate, or the Noſe?
Tell them wherein they err, when e'er they miſs,
And give falſe Notices? Fond Fancy this!
For Each a proper Uſe and Power enjoys,
A proper Object every Senſe employs.

But after all, What is the true Meaning of this Argument, and how much does it amount to? No more than this. That All the Senſes are not equally adapted to receive and diſtinguiſh all manner of Objects: That Each of them is equally Faithful in thoſe peculiar to it: And conſequently,

ly, the Eyes cannot correct the Ear in Sounds; nor the Ear the Noſe in Smells: But does it follow from hence, that when two, or more of theſe Evidences are join'd, they will not corroborate the Teſtimony, and give a firmer Aſſurance? or that Reaſon, which is the proper Judge may not ſift out the Truth by confronting theſe Evidences againſt one another? This is a Conſtruction wholly Foreign to the Place, and to the Philoſopher's Deſign. And therefore (ſays *Empiricus*) *as Phyſicians pronounce of a Diſeaſe not from One ſingle Symptom, but from the Concurrence of ſeveral; and a Fever is diſtinguiſh'd, not only by the Quickneſs of the Pulſe, but by the Exceſs of Heat, the Redneſs of the Complexion, the Height of the Water, the Exceſſive Thirſt, and other Characters known to the Skilful in that Art: So a doubting Philoſopher makes a Judgment of Truth, by the Co-incidence and good Agreement of ſeveral Ideas compar'd together.* And to the ſame Purpoſe, *Macrobius* hath deſcribed the Proceſs fit for ſuch Caſes. *If* (ſays he) *a Man ſees the Figure of an Apple at a Diſtance, it does not preſently follow that this is a real Apple; becauſe this Reſemblance may be form'd out of other Materials. What then ſhall he do to ſatisfy himſelf? Let him put it to the Tryal of another Senſe, and judge it by the Smell: But poſſibly it may have lain among Apples, and retain the Scent: Then conſult the Touch, and examine the Weight of it: But perhaps the Cunning Artificer hath been very Nice in adjuſting this too: If ſo, let him have recourſe to the Taſte, and if he find the true Reliſh of an Apple; theſe concurring Evidences leave no reaſonable Doubt of its being really the very Fruit it at firſt ſeem'd to be.* From hence Ch. 10. Saturn 7. 14.

it

Book I. it does not only appear, what Care ought to be taken in judging the Repreſentations of Senſe; but likewiſe, how it comes to paſs, that Men ſo often err upon this Occaſion. That it is merely the Effect of Raſhneſs, and Negligence; and the determining more than we have Evidence for. For theſe Ideas and Impreſſions give us only the Appearances, and external Accidents of Things; and ſo long as we affirm them to appear ſo to us, we are ſafe, and cannot err. But if from theſe Accidents we ſhall undertake to determine of their Subſtance and Nature: If we ſhall definitively ſay, They actually are what they appear, our own Mind miſguides us; and the Fault lies not in the Evidence, which told us true; but in the Judge, who decides the Cauſe, without canvaſſing the Witneſſes, and declares That for Right and Truth, which was never pos'd before him.

My Reader will eaſily apply what hath been ſaid here (perhaps too tediouſly) to what our Author inſinuates of the mutual Cheat, in his Sixth *Paragraph* of this *Chapter*. For hence it is that our Panick Fears, and other groundleſs and violent Paſſions of the Mind, grow to ſuch Exceſſes, that they run away with the Firſt Impreſſions, and never call in Reaſon, to calm and moderate the Diſorder of the Spirits; but are perfectly tranſported in the preſent Heat and Agitation, and inſtead of examining, magnify the tormenting Ideas to themſelves. All which is in no degree owing to the Natural Defect, either of Senſe or Reaſon; but to Strength of Paſſion, and Neglect of ſuch timely Remedies, as Nature hath provided us with, if not wholly to prevent, yet at leaſt

to

to abate, and ſoften, and reduce it to a convenient Temper. Ch. 10.

III. I proceed now to the laſt Enquiry, *Whether all our Knowledge depend upon the Senſes, ſo as that we can know nothing but by Their Means.* Here *Gaſſendus* forſakes me, and fiercely vindicates that receiv'd Opinion of ſome Old Philoſophers, *That nothing can come at the Underſtanding, except it paſs through ſome of the Senſes in its Way thither.*

It is not aſſerted by thoſe who undertake to maintain that Opinion, That nothing more can be known by us, than what the Impreſſions of Senſe give us an immediate Perception of; but that we are inſtructed from Reflexion as well as Senſation; ſo that, by abſtracting, enlarging, or otherwiſe modifying our Ideas, we come to underſtand the Nature of Things; yet ſo as that we can underſtand nothing, except the Ideas of it are entertain'd clearly and diſtinctly; either ſo as to repreſent to us the Thing itſelf; or ſo as to give us ſufficient Matter for Reflection to work upon, in raiſing freſh Ideas from it.

I. Thus it is, that they pretend to anſwer the Argument commonly urged againſt them, from that very Power we find in our ſelves, and the common Exerciſe of it, to correct the Errors of Imagination. For if all *Perceptions* of the *Mind* were *Corporeal Images* of the *Brain*, we muſt neceſſarily judge according to the Report of our Senſitive Organs; and ſo the Sun muſt be concluded no bigger than he appears. No (ſay they) for the Mind knows very well that Diſtance leſſens the Object to the Eye; and therefore reflecting agree-

Book I. agreeably to the Rules given in the former Particular, it pronounces the Sun vaſtly bigger than it ſeems. But ſtill, All this will not amount to thoſe Reaſons, which adjuſt its Magnitude, to be 160 times bigger than the Earth. Or, If they would, yet Proportions and Diſtances are mere Reſpects, and ſuch as we can have no Corporeal Images of. Theſe then are the Effect of another Principle; and ſo is the Determinate Magnitude of this Body; for though inlarging the Idea, and allowing for Diſtance, would create an Image vaſtly Bulky perhaps, yet this could not ſtate the exact Dimenſions, nor form the Compariſon in ſuch Odds, between that Globe of Fire, and this of Earth.

II. Another Argument againſt all *Knowledge* proceeding *from the Senſes*, is taken from Thoſe, which are commonly call'd the *Reflex Acts of the Mind*, ſuch as we perceive our Own Operations and Thoughts by: For all Ideas, which are intromitted by the Senſes, come from Material Objects, and ſuch Impreſſions are ſubject to the common Laws of Matter; one of which is, To act by Impulſe, and upon ſomething elſe, but not upon itſelf. So that it is impoſſible for the Mind to have its own Image convey'd through the Organs of Senſe; and conſequently theſe ſorts of Operations, by which it retires inward, and recollects, and views itſelf, as they are undeniable in Fact, ſo are they in all Reaſon to be aſcribed to ſome other Power than *Imagination*; and ſuch as the Senſes and External Impreſſions have nothing to do in.

III. But though we ſhould allow, that the Mind (as ſome have contended, though they have not been able to prove it) can by Similitude, Abſtraction, and ſuch other Methods, form Ideas even of theſe Things; yet what ſhall we ſay to the Caſe of *Immaterial Subſtances?* And that ſuch there are, a Reflection upon our own Souls, the Objects about which they are converſant, their ſeveral Operations, and the manner of them, very incompatible with Matter and the Laws of Motion, will not ſuffer reaſoning People to doubt. Now if all Knowledge be derived from our Senſes, it muſt proceed from ſuch Ideas as are drawn upon the Imagination, by Impreſſions upon the outward Organ, convey'd thither in the uſual Courſe and Method of Senſation; but theſe Impreſſions cannot be made otherwiſe, than by *Matter* and *Motion*, and conſequently, either we can have no diſtinct Notion, no Aſſurance of any Immaterial Subſtances; or elſe we may have ſome Knowledge which does not depend upon, nor accrue to us from our Senſes. Ch. 10.

IV. At this rate, neither can we have any Idea at all of the Firſt and moſt Perfect Being, God himſelf: For what Repreſentations can Senſe give us? What Reflections can it help us to, of a Being Infinite and Eternal, Independent, and produced from no other Cauſe; ſuch as hath the Properties of *Self*, and *Neceſſary Exiſtence* inſeparable from the Notion of it? It is not the Image of an Old Man, nor the multiplying of Years into a vaſt Duration, that will do the Buſineſs here; for ſtill the main Difficulty, of never beginning, never ending; Self-Origination, or *aſeitas*, remains; and

Book I. and will for ever remain, not only incapable of any ſenſible Repreſentation, but a Contradiction to them all. And yet *Reaſon* aſſures us, That ſuch a Being there certainly is; nay, that there needs muſt be; for without it, nothing could ever have been at all; but we muſt loſe our Selves, and all our Ideas, in a Maze and infinite Circle of Cauſes; and ſhall never be able to account for the Exiſtence of any Thing, which our Senſes are confeſs'd to repreſent to us, unleſs we admit of One Thing, which, it muſt be confeſs'd, they never can give us any ſort of Repreſentation of.

V. Once more. To come lower, and obſerve even Corporeal Subſtances themſelves. Such as we ſee, and feel, and converſe with every Moment. From ſuch as theſe it is that our Senſes are moved. But let us conſider, what it is that moves them; or how far we can be inform'd by ſuch Impreſſions. Now it is granted on all Hands, That *Senſe* can only inſtruct us in the Modes and Accidents of Things; and yet all thinking Men muſt allow that thoſe Accidents are not capable of ſubſiſting alone. So that we can learn this way the Powers and Properties of Things, but not the Things themſelves. Thus, while we are forced to make a Difference between the Natural and Real Eſſence, and the Properties or Accidents inherent in that Nature; we muſt yield plainly, that all our Knowledge is ſo far from depending upon *Senſe*, that we cannot know any one Thing by it. Since every Man's Reaſon undeniably aſſures him, that there is ſomething more intimate and deep, which no Ideas can reach to; and without which thoſe Superficial Qualities, of which

which he hath any Idea, could not poſſibly ſub- Ch. 10.
ſiſt.

Upon the whole Matter it is certain, that there muſt be ſome common Notices and Principles, ſuch as evidence themſelves to every conſidering Mind, which do not only aſſiſt, but carry us beyond any ſenſible Ideas, or any Reflections they can be improved into: Concerning which, if my Reader deſire more full Satisfaction, and would ſee this Argument illuſtrated at large, he will do well to conſult the incomparably Learned and Judicious Biſhop *Stillingfleet*, in his late *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*. Chap. X.

I add only upon this Occaſion, That the foregoing Reaſons are of good Force to prove, that the Humane Soul is of a more Noble Principle than *Matter*. For, indeed, not only *Reaſon*, but *Senſation*, is not to be ſolved upon other Terms. Of which the Modern Philoſophers were well aware; who, when they aſſerted the Souls of Brutes to be meer Matter, ſoon found an abſolute Neceſſity of affirming, that they were altogether void of Senſe too: For tho' the outward Impreſſion be made upon the Organ, yet it is a Reflex Act, which makes the Senſation, and informs the Patient of it. And ſuch Acts they have not been able to conceive how *Matter* ſhould be capable of. Since it is the Property of one Body to act upon another, but no Body can act upon itſelf.

CHAP. XI.

Of Sight, Hearing, and Speech.

1. *Theſe Three compared together.*

THeſe are the Three Jewels, the moſt excellent and valuable Endowments, that belong to the Body of Man: None that appear to outward View, are comparable to them; but it will bear ſome Diſpute which of the Three ought to be preferr'd. As to the Organ, by which they are perform'd, it muſt be confeſs'd, that That of the *Sight* is admirable for its charming Form, and nice Compoſition; it is beautiful, lively, and ſparkling, made up of great Variety; its Parts ſubtle and ſmall, and their Humours mix'd to Aſtoniſhment, both for Uſe and Comelineſs. From whence that common Obſervation hath obtained, that the *Eye* is one of thoſe Parts, which Nature firſt begins to form, and finiſhes one of the laſt. Upon the ſame Account This is one of the tendereſt and moſt delicate Parts about us: Subject to a vaſt Number of Diſeaſes and Infirmities. Phyſicians and Anatomiſts have reckon'd no leſs than a Hundred and Twenty Indiſpoſitions incident to it. *Speech* is eſteem'd the next in Dignity, but *Hearing* makes ſome Amends for the laſt and loweſt Place, by the many great Advantages belonging to it. *Sight* ſeems to be the moſt neceſſary and moſt ſerviceable to the Body. And this ſeems to be the reaſon, why it is of greater Conſequence to Brutes, whoſe Advantages are chiefly Corporeal, than

Hearing can be: But *Hearing* ſeems to challenge the Preference, with regard to the Advantages and Improvement of the Mind. *Sight* is principally uſeful for Invention, for moſt Things are diſcover'd by the Help of this Senſe; but tho' it lays the firſt Foundations, and gives the Hints, yet it brings nothing to Perfection. It is farther to be conſider'd, that Sight is capable of Perception in nothing but what is Corporeal, and it gives no Knowledge of Univerſals. Individuals and Bodies are its proper Object, and it cannot penetrate into theſe any deeper than the Shell or Surface. It is the proper Inſtrument of Ignorant and Unlearned Men, who look no farther than that which is juſt before them, and makes an Impreſſion upon the outward Senſes. Ch. 11.

2. *Hearing* may be term'd an *Inward* and *Spiritual Senſe:* It is the Agent and Conveyer of Intelligence to the Underſtanding; the Inſtrument of Learning and Thought; and receives not only Individuals, as Sight does, but dives into their moſt ſecret and abſtruſe Parts; nay, it hath a Capacity ſo large as to comprehend General, Spiritual, Abſtracted, and Divine Truths; ſuch as Sight is ſo far from giving us any Aſſiſtance in, that it rather diſturbs and confounds us in the Diſquiſition of them. Accordingly, there have been many Inſtances of Great Men who have been blind, and yet ſingularly eminent for Wiſdom and Knowledge; and ſome of Perſons who have depriv'd themſelves of Sight, in order to the becoming more exquiſite Philoſophers; but no one Example of either of theſe Kinds can be produced in Deaf Perſons. This is the Gate by which we en- *Hearing prefer'd.*

Book I. ter, and ſtorm the Caſtle; by This we bend the Mind to Good or Evil. So profane Story tells us of *Agamemnon*'s Queen, whoſe Chaſtity was preſerv'd by Muſick: And ſo Sacred Story relates, that *Saul*'s Evil-Spirit was charm'd by *David*'s Harp: And ſo the *Roman* Hiſtory obſerves, that *Gracchus*, the famous Orator, ſweeten'd his Voice by the Help of one that play'd to him upon the Flute, and taught him ſuch Tones as were moſt moving, and for his Purpoſe. In ſhort, This is the Only Paſſage that Learning, and Truth, and Virtue have found to our Souls; and the *Goſpel* itſelf enters by it: For the Apoſtle hath told us,

Rom. x. 17. That *Faith cometh by Hearing, and Hearing by the Word of God.* And that they who obſtinately ſtick to the Report of their Sight, will find it rather an Obſtruction than an Informer in the higheſt

Heb. xi. 1. Myſteries of Religion. That *Faith is the Evidence of Things not ſeen*, and the Belief of Teſtimonies that are heard: And accordingly the Primitive Chriſtians had a Claſs of Believers to whom they gave the Title of *Audientes*, Hearers. To all This I may add, That This Senſe is of great Uſe in the Dark, and when Men are aſleep, by giving them ſeaſonable Alarms, and awakening them to provide for their Defence and Preſervation. Upon all theſe Accounts, the Philoſophers are ſo profuſe in their Praiſes of *Hearing*, recommending the diligent Uſe of it, adviſing us to purge our Ears, and keep them clean from Prejudice and Corruption: This being the beſt Security, the ſureſt Guard of our Souls, as a Commander in Garriſon would make it his firſt and chief Care, to keep ſtrict Centry, and line the Gates and Walls well,

for

for fear an Enemy ſhould ruſh in and ſurprize him. Ch. 11.

3. *The Power of Speech.*

Speech is a particular Favour of Nature to Mankind, and a very uſeful, neceſſary, and excellent Gift it is. Conſider it with reſpect to the Speaker, and it is the Image and Interpreter of the Soul; the Meſſenger of the Heart, the Door by which all that lies within comes out, and ſhews itſelf abroad. Whatſoever is born in Darkneſs, is thus brought forth into the Light; the Mind diſcovers and diſplays itſelf moſt clearly this way; which gave occaſion to that Saying of one of the Ancients, * *Speak, that I may know what you are.* Thus Men are like Veſſels, which by the Sound are quickly diſtinguiſh'd, whether they be broken or whole, full or empty; and Speech to Them is like the Touchſtone to Metals; the Counterfeit and the true Standard are immediately known by it.

But if we conſider it with regard to the Perſons to whom it is directed, thus it is a powerful and an imperious Maſter; enters the Caſtle, ſeizes the Governour; it moves and ſtirs him, it animates and encourages, it provokes and appeaſes, it raiſes and dejects him; it overwhelms him with Grief, and tranſports him with Joy; makes what Impreſſions, inſpires what Paſſions it pleaſes; manages and moulds the Soul into any Form, and bends it all manner of ways: Nay, it extends its Dominion over the Body too; makes that Red with Bluſhes, and Pale with Fear; provokes Laughter and Tears; forces it to ſtart and ſhiver; to trem-

* Eloquere, ut videam.

Book I. ble with Anger, leap for Joy, ſwoon and faint away with Violence of Paſſion.

Conſider it with regard to the World in general, and *Speech* is as it were the Hand of the Soul, which This uſes as the Body does the Natural one, for taking and receiving, for aſking and for giving Aſſiſtance. This is the great Goer-between, the Carrier of Intelligence, the Factor for Trade *, as the *Latin* Etymologiſts tell us, that the Word which ſignifies *Traffick* and *Commerce*, derives itſelf from *Mercury* the God of *Eloquence*. By It Treaties of Peace are made, War proclaim'd, all manner of Buſineſs publick and private negotiated and diſpatched; Learning, and all the hidden Treaſures of the Mind uttered and diſtributed: For This in Truth is the Original and the Inſtrument of all Communication; the Band and Cement of Humane Society, (provided the Language be perfectly underſtood; for, as one of the Ancients ſaid, *A Man had better be in the Company of a Dog that he knows, and is acquainted with, than in that of another Man, who cannot make himſelf underſtood by us.* So that one Foreigner to another does by no means anſwer the † Character of his Nature, and is in effect as no Man.)

In ſhort, The *Tongue* is a Tool converted to all manner of Uſes; and Inſtrument of Good and Evil, as *Wiſdom* itſelf hath taught us; *Life and Death are in the Power of the Tongue.* The Advantages and the Inconveniencies that proceed from it are never to be expreſs'd; a prudent or an incautious, a wicked, or a conſcientious uſe of it,

Prov. xviii. 21.

* Merx à Mercurio. † Ut externus alieno non ſit hominis vice.

diſpoſes

diſpoſes our own, and ſometimes other People's Fortunes; or draws down infinite Dangers; preſerves or deſtroys Reputation: So that nothing is of better or worſe Conſequence than the Tongue. Ch. 11.

Of a good and ill Tongue.

The Tongue of the Wiſe and Juſt (ſays the ſame Divine *Wiſdom*) *is as choice Silver*, it is *Health*, it is *a Tree of Life*, enriching, healing, reconciling; a Preſervative and a Happineſs. It is as the Door to a Royal Cabinet, upon the opening whereof we immediately ſee a Thouſand precious Rarities, more beautiful, and more valuable than all the Wealth of both the *Indies*; more fragrant and refreſhing than all the Gums and Spices of *Arabia*. The Wiſe draws out his Artillery in order, ſets his Philoſophical Aphoriſms and profitable Sentences in array, applies his Similitudes and Examples pertinently and ſeaſonably, improves others by his reading, and renders the Hiſtories of former Ages of preſent and publick Uſe, enriches all he converſes with out of his own inexhauſtible Mine; offers nothing but what is ſolid, and ſubſtantial, and try'd; and is ready upon all occaſions, (like the Wealthy and Prudent Houſholder alluded to in the Goſpel) *to bring forth out of his Treaſures* Prov. x. 20. xii. 18. xv. 4. Mat. xiii.

Things new and old. **Such beneficial Inſtructions as may be of uſe to regulate the Manners of private Perſons, and direct the Government and Adminiſtration of the Publick; ſuch as may be ſerviceable to all Circumſtances, all the Parts and Duties of Men, and teach them both how to Live, and how to Die well.** And when theſe are introduc'd at ſeaſonable Times, and manag'd with Diſcretion, **the Beauty and the Pleaſure of them is exceeding great, as well as the Benefit and Ad-**

Book I. vantage; *A Word fitly ſpoken is like Apples of Gold in Pictures of Silver.* So the Wiſeſt of Men hath expreſs'd the Counſels, or Reproofs, or Comforts handſomly deliver'd; and what can poſſibly be more grateful, more valuable, more ornamental?

Prov. xxv. 11.

The *Mouth* of a wicked Man, quite contrary, is a noiſom ſtinking Pit; his Breath is contagious, and kills like a Peſtilence; murders his Neighbour ſecretly, ſtabs and wounds his Reputation to Death; and then inſults over his mangled Honour with a barbarous Triumph. It is Sword, and Fire, and Poiſon, and Death, and Hell, and every thing that is Miſchievous and Deſtructive. The Holy Spirit itſelf hath allow'd it no better a Character; for St. *James* hath call'd it *a Fire, a World of Iniquity, a Defiler of the whole Body, and Incendiary to the Courſe of Nature; and this Firebrand itſelf kindled in Hell.* And the Son of *Syrach* hath enlarg'd upon the Subject ſo well, that the whole Paſſage ought to be inſerted. *Curſe the Whiſperer and Double-tongued, for ſuch have deſtroyed many that were at Peace. A backbiting Tongue hath diſquieted many, and driven them from Nation to Nation; ſtrong Cities hath it pull'd down, and overthrown the Houſes of great Men. Whoſo hearkeneth unto it ſhall never find reſt, nor dwell quietly. The Stroke of the Whip maketh Marks in the Fleſh, but the Stroke of the Tongue breaketh the Bones. Many have fallen by the Edge of the Sword, but not ſo many as have fallen by the Tongue. Well is He that is defended from it, and hath not paſs'd through the Venom thereof; who hath not drawn the Yoke thereof, nor hath been bound in her Bands. For the*

Jam. iii. 6.

Eccluſ. xxviii. 13---21.

Yoke

Yoke thereof is a Yoke of Iron; and the Bands thereof Ch. 11.
are Bands of Braſs. The Death thereof is an evil Death, the Grave is better than it.

Now theſe two, *Hearing* and *Speech*, anſwer, and have a near and intimate Relation to one another; each of them ſingle is of no Significance at all; and therefore Nature, to make Either of them uſeful, found it neceſſary to ſupply us with Both. They are the Two Doors of the Soul, whereby ſhe ſends in and out, and holds a Correſpondence all the World over; nay, ſhe does not only ſend, but go; for by theſe two, like Veſſels with their Orifices join'd, the Soul communicates and pours out her Thoughts, and transfuſes her very Self into another's Breaſt. Where theſe Paſſages are ſhut and cloſed, as they are in the *Deaf* and *Dumb*, the Mind is in perpetual Miſery and Solitude; for *Hearing* is the Door for Entrance, and *Speech* for going Abroad: By the former of theſe, the Soul receives the Conceptions of others; by the latter ſhe imparts and enriches them with her own. The mutual Operation of theſe Two may be reſembled to the Flint and the Steel, from the Concuſſion and Strokes whereof, *Truth*, like a Sacred Fire, is kindled; for They agitating and poliſhing each other, ſcour off the Ruſt of the Mind, brighten and beautify it, and bring all Knowledge to Perfection. Only we muſt obſerve, that theſe Noble Effects have their firſt Beginning from the Hearing; for Wiſdom muſt needs have been put into the Mind before it can be drawn out from thence. And accordingly we ſee that Perſons born Deaf, are conſtantly Dumb too. The firſt thing to be done is to furniſh this Houſe within,

4. *Correſpondence of Hearing and Speech.*

Book I. within, which is ordinarily done by Hearing; and then follows the diſtributing our Stores by Converſation and Speech: So that the Good and Evil of what we ſpeak, will depend upon the Good and Evil of what we hear: For ſuch as we are accuſtomed to receive, ſuch of neceſſity we muſt give back again: And therefore a Man ſhould above all things keep his Ears chaſte and unpolluted, and ſtop them againſt Vice and Indecency; for this ſort of Communication is exceeding infe-
Book III. Chap. 43. ctious, and taints the Mind preſently. The Advices that are proper for the Uſe and Government of our Speech, will be inſiſted upon hereafter.

CHAP. XII.

Of the other Faculties, viz. *Imagination, Memory, and Appetite.*

THE *Fancy* or *Imaginative Faculty*, firſt collects the ſeveral Images receiv'd by the Senſes, forms Ideas out of them, and lays them up for uſe. This is done in ſo accurate and faithful a manner, that though the Objects themſelves be far diſtant, nay, though the Man be aſleep, and all his Senſes lock'd up, yet this Faculty repreſents them to the Mind and Thoughts, in Images ſo ſtrong, ſo lively, that the Imagination does the very ſame to the Underſtanding now, which the Object itſelf did, by the firſt and freſheſt Impreſſions heretofore.

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The *Memorative Faculty* is the Regiſter and Store-Houſe of all the Ideas and Images firſt perceiv'd by the Senſes, and then collected and ſealed up by the Imagination. Ch. 12.

The *Appetite* ſeeks, and purſues, and culls out of all theſe Things ſo apprehended, ſuch of them as appear to be Good and moſt Agreeable.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Intellectual Faculty; which is peculiar to the Humane Soul.

1. BEfore we enter upon any other Diſcourſe relating to this Subject, it is neceſſary to obſerve the Seat or Inſtrument of this Faculty, and then its Action, or Method of Operating.

2. *The Seat and Inſtrument of the Soul.* Now the Seat, or rather the Throne of the Reaſonable Soul, where it ſits and reigns Supreme, is not the Heart, (as was generally ſuppoſed before *Plato* and *Hippocrates)* but the Brain: For the Heart is not capable of Wiſdom, but is properly the Seat and Source of Vegetation. Now the Brain, which in Man much exceeds the Quantity aſſign'd to any other Creature, muſt be ſo contriv'd and diſpos'd, that the Reaſonable Soul may act freely; and in order hereunto, the Figure of it muſt be almoſt like that of a Ship; it muſt not be a perfect Round, it muſt not be too Great, nor too Little; though of the Two Extremes the Exceſs is much leſs to be found fault with, than the Defect: It muſt be compos'd of a delicate fluid Subſtance,

Book I. Subſtance, of fine and ſubtle Parts, and theſe well join'd together, and all united without any Separation, or void Spaces throughout the whole. It hath Four ſmall Cavities or Ventricles, Three of which lie forward in the Middle, and are plac'd in a Collateral Line to one another: The Fourth lies behind theſe, toward the hinder part of the Head, and is ſingle by itſelf. This is the Shop in which the Vital Spirits are firſt form'd and united, in order to the being afterwards converted into Animal Spirits, and then convey'd into the Three Cavities that lie forward: And theſe Animal Spirits are the Inſtruments made uſe of by the Soul, for diſcharging her ſeveral Functions, and exerciſing all her Faculties. Thoſe Faculties are likewiſe Three; the *Underſtanding*, the *Memory*, and the *Imagination:* And theſe are not exercis'd diſtinctly and apart, nor hath each of them a different Ventricle of the Brain appropriated to it; (which is all an old and vulgar Error concerning them) but their Operations are altogether, and in common. All the Three Faculties exert themſelves in all and every of the Three Cavities; ſomewhat like our Bodily Senſes, which are double, and have Two Organs, in each of which the ſame Senſe performs all its Operations entire. From hence it comes to paſs, that a Man who is hurt or diſabled in Two of theſe Three Ventricles, (as one in a Palſy, for Inſtance) does yet continue to have the uſe of all his Three Faculties: That is, he underſtands, and remembers, and forms Ideas ſtill, by virtue of that One Cavity, which the Diſeaſe hath not yet ſeized upon. It is true, he does this more weakly, and every Operation

ration of every kind is more imperfect than it was formerly, becauſe the Strength and Vigour of One is not equal to the united Force of Three: But yet it evidently follows from hence, that each Faculty hath not its Work-houſe in a diſtinct Apartment, and entire to itſelf alone; for then, as ſoon as any of theſe Ventricles begins to be diſabled, that Faculty to which it belongs, muſt immediately ceaſe, and cou'd never more be exerted in any Degree at all. Ch. 13.

3. *How far the Reaſonable Soul is Organical.*

Some Perſons have been of Opinion, that the *Reaſonable Soul* is not Organical; that is, that it can act ſeparately and independently, and hath no need of any Corporeal Inſtrument to aſſiſt it in the Diſcharge of its Functions. And this Notion they have been more fond of, becauſe they imagine it of Conſequence for proving the *Immortality of the Soul.* Now without engaging in a vaſt and dark Labyrinth of Diſpute, about a Matter which we are incapable of knowing perfectly, this Queſtion may be brought to a ſhort Iſſue; For if we will but credit our own Eyes, and our own Experience, every Day gives us Demonſtrations, which overthrow this Opinion, and eſtabliſh the contrary. It is certain that all Men have not equal Capacities, nor do they apprehend Things, or argue upon them alike, but the Diſparity is very great and viſible between one Man and another. It is no leſs evident, that the ſame Perſon changes and differs from himſelf; that his Reaſon is more clear, and perfect, and ſtrong at one Time, and at one Age, in one Diſpoſition of Body, and in one Circumſtance of Fortune and Life, than it is in another. One Man can do

Book I. nothing except he have Eaſe and Leiſure; another requires Dangers and Difficulties to rouze him, and never thinks to purpoſe, till he be preſs'd hard, and driven to Extremities: A Third finds himſelf much more capable in Health than in Sickneſs: And a Fourth feels his Mind moſt vigorous and active, then when his Diſeaſes and Weakneſs have reduc'd his Body loweſt. The ſame Man at one Seaſon excels in Judgment, and flags in his Fancy; ſo that One Faculty decays in proportion as Another improves. Now the moſt probable Account that can be given for all theſe Differences and Alterations, ſeems to be a Difference in the State and Diſpoſition of the Organs, which are to the Soul as Tools to the Artificer. Which way but this ſhall we anſwer for the ſtrange Effects we ſee produc'd by Drunkenneſs, by the Bite of a Mad Dog, by a high Fever, by a Blow upon the Head, by the Vapours that riſe from the Stomach and annoy the Brain; and by ſeveral other Accidents which affect any of the Parts thereabouts? What Confuſions do they make, how perfectly ſtupid, and childiſh, and frantick do Men grow upon them, loſe their Memory quite, and feel their Heads turn'd upſide down, their former Ideas eraſed, their Judgment deſtroy'd? All the Wiſdom of *Greece* is not able to maintain itſelf againſt them; and if the Shock be very violent indeed, then it does not only diſturb and enfeeble, but quite drive away the Soul, and conſtrain her to remove out of the Body. Now it is plain, that theſe Accidents are purely Corporeal, and conſequently they cannot affect what is not ſo; they can never fly ſo high as the Exalted

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and Spiritual Faculties of the Reaſonable Soul; Ch. 13.
all that they can do is to vitiate the Organs, to put Them out of their Courſe, and intercept the uſual Communications; and when This is once effected, the Soul can no longer act regularly: She may command, but they cannot obey; and if theſe Organs are ſore bruiſed, and diſtorted very grievouſly, then She and They can no longer ſubſiſt together: The Lodging is no longer fit to entertain her, and ſhe muſt be gone.

Now I do by no means ſee, how this Opinion can be guilty of any Prejudice to that of the *Immortality of the Soul:* For firſt, We are not here enquiring what the Soul is, but how ſhe operates, and what Laws of Action ſhe is bound up to, while in Conjunction with a Mortal Body. And Secondly, The making Uſe of Corporeal Inſtruments, does by no means prove the Uſer to be Corporeal, or Mortal. God, without all Queſtion, is Immortal, and yet God himſelf does not think it below him to uſe ſuch; and to proportion the Effects and Operations of his Providence to them. He produces Men of different Underſtandings and Parts, according to the Conſtitution of their Parents, and the Concurrence of other Natural Cauſes; nay, even according to the different Climate, and Country, and Air they are born in. For *Greece* and *Italy* have ever been obſerv'd to produce Men of quicker and clearer Wit than *Muſcovy* and *Tartary*. And as God does in this Caſe, ſo does the Mind in others. It reaſons better or worſe, remembers more or leſs faithfully, hath a more fruitful, or more barren Imagination, according as the Organs (which are the Corpo-

Book I. Corporeal Inſtruments appointed to ſerve it upon theſe Occaſions) are better or worſe diſpoſed to do their Duty. Now the Brain is properly the Inſtrument of the Reaſonable Soul, and therefore upon the due Temperament of This, a great deal muſt needs, indeed the Whole in a manner will depend: That therefore ſhall be the next Thing we attempt to give an Account of.

4. *Of the Temperament of the Brain.* By this *Temperament* is to be underſtood the Mixture and Proportion of the *Four* Prime *Qualities*, *Hot* and *Cold*, *Moiſt* and *Dry*; or rather a *Fifth Quality*, which is, as it were, a Harmony reſulting from a due Conjunction of all theſe together, like that Concord in Sounds, which ariſes from a Friendly Complication of different Notes. Now upon that Mixture of the Brain it is, that the State and the Operations of the Reaſonable Soul depend. Only This is Man's great Unhappineſs, that the *Three Faculties*, *Underſtanding*, *Memory*, and *Imagination*, do each of them require different, nay, contrary Temperaments, for their Exerciſe and Perfection. The *Temperament* proper for the *Underſtanding* is a Predominance of Dry; and this gives us ſome Account, how it comes to paſs, that Perſons far gone in Years, are more Intelligent and Judicious than thoſe that are Younger. For, beſides the Advantages which Art, and Study, and Experience may give them; they have a Diſpoſition to it from Nature. The Brain, as Men grow older, purifying itſ[illegible] from Excrementitious Humours, and [illegible] dryer every Day: For the ſa[illegible] likelihood, Melanch[illegible] Affliction and W[illegible]

ing (it being an Effect of Grief and Faſting to keep the Brain dry) may be better diſpoſed to think; and qualify'd to do it to good Purpoſe, as well as ſome of them are neceſſitated, by their Circumſtances, to apply themſelves to it. This is farther obſervable in Brutes; Ants, and Bees, and Elephants, as they are the dryeſt, ſo they are the moſt capable and ingenious of any; and thoſe of a moiſt Conſtitution, (the Swine for Inſtance) are ſtupid and ſenſeleſs. Thus again in Men; Thoſe of Southerly Countries excel in Wiſdom, from the Drought of their Brain, and their inward Heat being moderated by that of a violent Sun without, which exhales it. Ch. 13.

The *Temperament* beſt accommodated to the *Memory* is *Moiſt*; and hence it is that Children are more ready and perfect in it than Old People; hence it is moſt apt and faithful in a Morning, when the Brain hath been well refreſhed, and throughly moiſten'd by a good Night's Sleep; hence alſo the Inhabitants of the *Northern* Climates have the ſtrongeſt Memories, for Theſe are under a moiſter Air, by means of their great Diſtance from the Sun. But this Moiſture muſt not be ſo miſtaken, as if I meant, that the Temper of the Memory is fluid, like Water; but rather ſuch a Moiſture as we may obſerve in Air, Glew, Greaſe, or Oil; ſomething of ſuch a Subſtance and Continuity of Parts, as may both take the Impreſſion eaſily, and keep it a great while; as we ſee Pictures do that are laid in Oil Colours.

The *Temperament* fitteſt for the *Imagination*, is, *Hot*, which makes Diſtracted, Hair-brain'd, and Feveriſh People, excel all others in bold and lofty

Book I. ty Flights of Fancy. Thus *Poetry*, *Divination*, and all that depends upon *Imagination*, were always thought to proceed from a ſort of Fury and Inſpiration. This Faculty is for the ſame reaſon moſt vigorous in Youth and the Flower of our Age: The Poets accordingly flouriſhed at theſe Years, and Almighty God, (who even in Supernatural Influences and Effects, made great Uſe of Natural Cauſes, and did as little Violence as was poſſible, to a Courſe of his own Inſtituting) order'd the Matter ſo, that moſt of the Prophets ſhould do ſo too. The ſame Reaſon holds likewiſe for thoſe Middle Regions, and more moderate Climates, between the *North* and the *South*, where Men are obſerv'd to excel in thoſe Arts and Sciences, which are deriv'd from the Strength and Sprightlineſs of Fancy.

Now, from this great Inequality of theſe Mixtures and Proportions, it frequently happens, that a Man may be tolerably well to paſs in all theſe Three Faculties, and not arrive at an Excellence in any one of them; as alſo, That a Man may be conſpicuous, and exceeding well Accompliſh'd in one of theſe Reſpects, and yet very Wanting and Deſpicable in the other Two. It is manifeſt, the *Temperaments* adapted for the *Memory* and the *Underſtanding*, are the moſt Diſtant and Contrary in the World; for what can be more ſo than *Moiſt* and *Dry?* That of the *Imagination* does not ſeem ſo remote from the reſt, for *Hot* will agree well enough with *Moiſt* or *Dry*, and is far from being Incompatible with either; and yet, though theſe ſeem ſo conſiſtent in Nature, we ſee them very ſeldom reconcil'd in Fact; for thoſe who are e-

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ſteem'd moſt Excellent in *Imagination*, are gene- Ch. 13.
rally found very Weak both in Point of *Memory* and *Underſtanding*, and thought near a-kin to Fools or Mad-men. The Reaſon whereof may poſſibly be This: That the *Heat*, which feeds and exalts their *Imagination*, waſts and exhauſts that *Moiſture*, with which the *Memory* is aſſiſted; and alſo the fineſt and moſt volatile of Thoſe Spirits, of which that *Dryneſs* partakes, which is ſerviceable to the *Underſtanding*; and the Faculty, when deſtitute of theſe, grows flat and heavy. So that in effect This is an Enemy to both the other Temperaments, and Experience ſhews it to be deſtructive of them.

5. *But Three of them.*

From all that hath been ſaid, we may plainly ſee, that the Principal *Temperaments*, which ſerve, aſſiſt, and ſet the Reaſonable Soul on working, and which diſtinguiſh the Excellencies of the Mind, according to its Faculties, are *Three*, and cannot exceed that Number. For *Cold*, which is the *Fourth*, is of no Significance at all; *Hot*, and *Moiſt*, and *Dry* only, can contribute to Mens Ingenuity. The Other is a ſluggiſh unactive Principle, and, inſtead of quickening, does only benumb and ſtupify the Soul, and put a Stop to all its Motions. Therefore, when in reading ſome Authors, we find them recommending *Cold*, as of Uſe to the *Underſtanding*, and ſaying, that Men of a Cold Brain, ſuch as thoſe of Melancholy Complexions, or under the Southern Climes, are Prudent, Wiſe, Ingenious, and the like; we muſt not there underſtand the Word *Cold* in its natural and moſt received Senſe, but interpret it of a large Abatement and more moderate Degree of

Heat only. For nothing can be more oppoſite to *Wiſdom*, and a good Underſtanding, than that Exceſs of *Heat*, which yet to the bettering of the Imagination, and refining the Fancy would be of great Importance. And, according to the Three Temperaments of the Brain, there are Three correſponding Faculties of the Reaſonable Soul. But both the One and the Other of Theſe admit of ſeveral Degrees, and may be variouſly ſubdivided and diſtinguiſhed.

6. *The Faculties ſubdivided.*

The Principal Offices to be diſcharged by the *Underſtanding*, and the different Qualifications of Men, with regard to it, are *Three*; To *conclude truly*, To *diſtinguiſh nicely*, and To *chuſe wiſely*. The Sciences that fall properly under this Faculty, are School-Divinity, The Speculative Part of Phyſick, Logick, Natural and Moral Philoſophy.

The *Memory* hath likewiſe Three Qualities to be diſtinguiſh'd by. For there is *One ſort of Memory*, which eaſily receives Impreſſions, and eaſily loſes them again: A *Second*, which quickly remembers, and ſeldom or never forgets: And a *Third*, where the Impreſſion is hard to be made, and yet is preſently worn out again: The Sciences proper to this Faculty are Grammar, and the Theory of the Civil Law, Dogmatical Divinity, Coſmography, and Arithmetick.

The *Imagination* abounds in Diſtinctions, and Differences are occaſion'd by it, much more than either the *Memory* or the *Underſtanding* is capable of. To this belong, after a more peculiar manner, Fanciful Inventions, Pleaſant Conceits, Witty Jeſts, Sharp Reflections, Ingenious Repartees; Fictions

tions and Fables, Figures and Compariſons, Ch. 13.
Propriety and Purity of Expreſſion; and, in a Word, All that Quaintneſs, and Elegance, and Fineſs, which adorns Converſation, and becomes the Character of a Man of Senſe and Good Breeding. And therefore we may range under this Diviſion, Poetry, Eloquence, Muſick, Correſpondence, Harmony, and Proportion.

7. *The Properties of the ſeveral Faculties.*

Now, from hence it appears, that Sprightlineſs, Subtilty, Readineſs of Parts, and all that which commonly goes by the Name of *Wit*, is to be imputed to the *Warmth of Imagination*; *Solidity*, *mature Judgment*, and Truth, to the *Dryneſs of the Underſtanding*. The *Imagination* is Active, and Bluſtering, and Buſy; keeps all about it awake, and ſets the other Faculties on *work*. The *Underſtanding* is a grave, ſedate, and ſevere Action; The *Memory* acts not at all, but is purely Paſſive; and the Manner of theſe Operations ſeems to be thus. In the Firſt Place, the *Imagination* collects together the Ideas and Figures of Things, not only ſuch as are preſent by the Conveyance and Miniſtry of the Five Senſes; but thoſe that are abſent too, by the Aſſiſtance of that Inward and Common Receptacle, called the *Senſorium commune*, where the Forms of them lie depoſited. The next Thing in order, is to repreſent theſe to the *Underſtanding* (if that be thought fit) and then the Faculty takes them into Conſideration; examines, digeſts, and makes a Judgment of them. When That is over, the *Imagination* lays them up carefully to be preſerved in the *Memory*; (as a Man takes down a Memorandum in his Table-Book) that ſo they may be conſulted, and made uſe of

Book I. again, when any future Occaſion ſhall call for them. Or if the *Imagination* be not ſo diſpoſed, then ſhe commits theſe Things into the *Memory*'s Cuſtody, without referring them to the *Underſtanding* at all, and ſo the Second Branch of this Operation is wholly ſuperſeded. Now this Account informs us, that the Acts of Recollection, repreſenting to the Intellectual Faculty, laying up in the Memory, and drawing out thoſe Stores again for Uſe, are all of them Operations of the Imaginative Faculty. So that That *Common Repoſitory*, the Internal Senſe, (*Reminiſcence*, as it is called) and Fancy, come within the Compaſs of This, and are not (as ſome pretend) Powers of the Mind, diſtinct and ſeparate from it. And, conſequently, there is nothing in thoſe Operations that ſhould oblige us to quit the former Diviſion, or allow more Faculties of the Reaſonable Soul, than the Three already inſiſted upon.

8. *The Faculties compared together.*

The Common People, who (to give them their due) are very ſeldom in the right, have an high Eſteem, and make a marvellous to do with *Memory*, extolling This infinitely above the other two; The only Reaſon whereof ſeems to be, that this hath more of Shew, is more pretending and forward, and makes a greater Noiſe in Converſation. Hence it is, That a Man whoſe Memory is well ſtored, is uſually reputed a great Scholar; and that to pronounce one a Perſon of good Parts, you look no farther than his having a good Memory; as if *Learning* were to be preferr'd before *Wiſdom*, which indeed c
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least valuable of all the Three; for it is consistent with great Folly, and insufferable Impertinence; and very rarely to be met with in any great Degree, where the Person excels in Understanding and Wisdom; for the Temperaments indeed from whence they result, are contrary to one another. From this vulgar Error, I suppose the improper Methods of Teaching Children to have taken their Rise; it being the Custom of Countrey-Schools almost every where, to follow them close with Tasks to be got by Heart, (as they call it) that so they may be able to repeat, and quote Things readily out of Books. Thus they stuff their Memories full, and load them with the Riches of other Men, without taking any care to awaken and whet the Understanding; to form or to refine the Judgment: Which, after all, is the most necessary Part of Instruction, to shew them the true Worth of their Natural Faculties, to draw out the Stores and Abilities of their own Mind, and by the Exercise and Improvement of their Home-Growth, to render them considerate, and wise, and qualify'd for all manner of Business. Accordingly we see, that many of your Scholars, which carry all *Aristotle* and *Cicero* in their Heads, are mere *Prigs* and *Puts*, and incapable of any Management at all, and that, (generally speaking) the World is led by the Nose, and all the weightiest Affairs of Governments entrusted with Men of little or no Learning. Which yet, no doubt, is of infinite Advantage, and would render even the prudential and unmingled Politicians, yet more capable [illegible] instill'd, and well [illegible] the

Ch. 13.

Way

Book I. Way of the World is) value themſelves upon Other Mens Wiſdom; nor think it their Own, becauſe they remember it; but make it ſo, by digeſting what they read, incorporating it with their own Thoughts, refining and improving upon it, and knowing how to convert it to the Uſe and Benefit of themſelves and others. But to return; All Wiſe Men have given the Preference to the *Underſtanding*; and admit it to be the moſt excellent and choiceſt Piece of Furniturebelonging to the Mind. If this moves right, all the reſt goes true, and the Man is wiſe; and if this be falſe, the whole Movement is out of Courſe. *Imagination* is the Second in Dignity; and *Memory* is the Laſt and Loweſt.

An Image of the Three Faculties.

9. The following Similitude may perhaps contribute ſomething to our apprehending the true State of theſe Faculties, and the different Circumſtances and Relations they are in, more perfectly. The *Reaſonable Soul* then cannot be more painted to the Life, than by forming an Idea of it to our ſelves, as a Court of Judicature. Now in every ſuch *Court* there are *Three Degrees* and Orders of Perſons concern'd: The Uppermoſt and moſt Honourable Order is the *Bench of Judges*; and here there is little or no Noiſe, but a World of Buſineſs and Diſpatch: For They proceed calmly and quietly; and without any Hurry or Paſſion, try Cauſes, decide Controverſies and Claims, make Decrees, and give the Final Determination to all Matters brought before them: This carries a very lively Reſemblance to the *Underſtanding*, which is the higeſt, the moſt honourable, and the judging Faculty of the Soul. The *Second* is the *Bar*, where the

the Council and the Attorneys are placed; and here is a World of Clutter, and Bawling, and Noiſe, but nothing done; for they can bring nothing to an Iſſue; They make no Orders nor Awards, pronounce no Sentences: All their Buſineſs is only to diſcuſs Matters, to plead the Cauſe, and to lay it before the Judge. This is a lively Picture of the *Imagination*, which is a loud, a bluſtering, and a reſtleſs Faculty; never lies ſtill, not even then, when the Soul ſeems perfectly bound up in the profoundeſt Sleep; but is eternally buzzing about the Brain, like a boiling Pot, and this can never fix, or come to a peremptory Reſolution in any thing. The *Third* and laſt Degree is that of the *Notaries*, and *Regiſters*, and *Clerks*; where there is neither Noiſe nor Action: It is no Part of their Concern which way Things go; they are purely Paſſive; and all they have to do, is to make Entries of what paſſes in Court, and to take Care that the Records be faithfully kept, and ready to be produced upon Occaſion. This gives us no ill Idea of the *Memory* and its Office. Ch. 13.

10. *Its Operations.*

The *Action* or Employment of the Soul is *Knowledge* or *Underſtanding*; and this is of Univerſal Extent: For the Mind is a Houſe open to every Gueſt; a Subject ready to receive any Impreſſion. As the Philoſophers ſay the Primitive Matter is diſpoſed to be moulded into any Forms; or as a Looking-Glaſs receives and reflects all Faces; ſo this Soul is capable of conſidering all Things indifferently, be they Viſible or Inviſible, Univerſals or Particulars; Objects of Senſe or not, the *Underſtanding* is in at All. But (if we may be al-

Book I. low'd to argue from the vaſt, and almoſt infinite Diverſity of Opinions, and the ſtill growing Doubts upon this Matter) it is acquainted with itſelf the leaſt of any thing. This Knowledge is but dim and indirect: It is attained by Reflection only, and the Knowledge of other Things brought home, and apply'd to itſelf: By which it feels, that it does underſtand, and thence infers a Power and Capacity of this kind. This ſeems to be the Method, by which our Minds attain to the Knowledge of Themſelves. Almighty God, who is the Sovereign Mind, knows Himſelf firſt, and all Things elſe in Himſelf: But Man, who is the laſt and loweſt of all the Intellectual World, inverts that Order quite, and diſcerns other Things before he can come to any Knowledge of Himſelf, for his Mind is in Contemplation of other Objects, (like the Eye in a Looking-glaſs) which cannot work upon itſelf without the help of a *Medium*, and ſees nothing at Home, while the Viſion is continued in a ſtraight Line, but can do it by Reflection only.

11. *The Manner of it.* But the great Difficulty to be enquir'd into upon this Occaſion, concerns the Manner of Operation, and by what Method the Soul attains to the Knowledge of Things. The moſt receiv'd Opinion is that deriv'd from *Ariſtotle*, importing, That the Mind underſtands and is inſtructed by the Senſes: That it is naturally and of itſelf a perfect Blank, a clean white Paper; and that whatever is written in it afterwards, muſt be dictated by the Senſes, and cannot be convey'd thither any other way.

But firſt of all, This is far from being Univerſally true; for, (as was hinted before, and the Point referred hither for a farther Diſquiſition) there have been great Authorities of Philoſophers, that the firſt Seeds of all Sciences, and Virtues, and neceſſary Knowledge, are originally ſown in our Minds, and grafted there by Nature; ſo that Men may, if they pleaſe, live very comfortably, and grow Rich out of their own Stock; and, provided they take but a little care to cultivate and cheriſh the kindly Beginnings, the Harveſt will not fail to be plentiful, and abundantly to reward their Pains. Ch. 13.

Again: That Opinion ſeems highly injurious to God and Nature, and taxes them with unreaſonable Partiality: For upon theſe Terms the Rational Soul is more ſparingly dealt with, and left in a much worſe Condition, than either the Vegetative, or Senſitive, or any other Creature whatſoever: For all Theſe, as hath already been obſerved, exerciſe their Functions readily, and are ſufficiently inſtructed by their own Native Endowments, in all Things neceſſary for their Purpoſe. Thus Beaſts apprehend ſeveral Things without Experience, and the Diſcipline of Senſe: They make Inferences, ſo far as their Caſe requires, and conclude Univerſals from Particulars: From the Sight of one Man they know [illegible] Humane Shape whereſoever they ſee it [illegible] they are forewarned to avoid [illegible] while inviſible; and to follow [illegible] is agreeable and beneficial to [illegible] their Young: And would it not be [illegible] or ſcandalous Blunder and Abſurd[illegible]

Book I. if this Noble, this Divine Faculty, ſhould have no Proviſion at all of its own, but ſent about a begging, and depend for mere Neceſſaries upon ſo mean, ſo frail Relief, as what the Senſes are able to give?

Once more; How can we perceive that the *Underſtanding* ſhould go to School to the *Senſes*, and be taught by Them, who are not able to teach themſelves? What precious Maſters are theſe, whoſe utmoſt Knowledge goes no deeper than barely the Accidents and Outſides of Things? For as to the Natures, Forms, and real Eſſences of them, they know nothing at all of the Matter. And if This be the Caſe of *Individual* Subſtances, much leſs are they capable of penetrating into *Univerſals*, and dark and profound Myſteries of Nature, and all thoſe Things which do not affect the Senſe at all.

Beſides; If all *Knowledge* were deriv'd from the *Senſes*, the Conſequence of this (one would think) ſhou'd be, That They, whoſe Senſes are the quickeſt, ſtrongeſt, and moſt diſcerning, wou'd always be the Perſons moſt conſpicuous for Ingenuity, and Learning, and Skill in Reaſoning. But we frequently ſee it happen juſt contrary; that ſuch People are the dulleſt, moſt ſtupid, and moſt incapable of all others. Nay, ſome Perſons have thought their Bodily Senſes rather an Obſtruction than any Advantage to their Improvement: And upon that Account have wilfully depriv'd themſelves of them, ſo that the Soul might be more expedite and free, and do her Buſineſs without Diſtraction, when the Avo
of Senſible Objects we

Now if this Matter be as I have repreſented it; you will aſk perhaps, Why theſe Things are not always perform'd by the Soul, and why not by every Man alike? What hinders that all ſhould not be equally Wiſe and Knowing; but eſpecially, why it ſhould lie dormant, without being reduc'd into act; or, if it do act, how comes it to paſs that its Operations are not always equal, that it goes about its Duty feebly, and performs its Functions much more lamely and imperfectly at one ſeaſon than at another? This is the Caſe even of the Wiſeſt and moſt Capable Perſons; and ſome are ſo miſerably ſtupid, that the *Intellectual Soul* ſeems never to exert itſelf at all. Where it does, the *Vegetative Soul* is vigorous and active in Youth, and very weak in Old Age: It is then decay'd, and ſpent, and cannot repair the Loſſes of Nature, (thoſe of teeth eſpecially.) Which yet it does with the greateſt Eaſe imaginable, in Children and young People. The *Reaſonable Soul*, quite contrary, is evidently weaker in Infancy and Youth, and cannot exert itſelf then, as it does afterwards in riper Years, and old Age: This alſo performs ſome ſort of Actions in ſome ſorts of diſtempers, which it hath not power to do in time of perfect Health: and others again there are perform'd in time of Health, which it is utterly incapacitated for, when the body labours under a Diſtemper. Ch. 13.

Now all theſe Objections are inſufficient: For, Firſt of all, They who hold the Opinion I am now contending for, never pretend, that the Faculty and *Power of Underſtanding is communicated to every Man in equal Proportions.* They admit a very

Book I. very great Inequality; from whence that Ancient and Noble Aphoriſm became ſo uſual in the Mouth of Philoſophers, That *the acting Intellect is given to very few*; and this very Inequality they make uſe of, as an Argument to prove that *Science* does not proceed from *Senſe*; ſince it is very manifeſt, according to what hath been urged already, that they who are moſt advantageouſly provided for in point of ſenſe, are oftentimes leaſt ſo in point of Learning and Wiſdom.

As to the Second Part of the Objection, That theſe Functions are not always perform'd alike; The true Reaſon of this is certainly, The different Condition of thoſe Inſtruments, which the Soul hath abſolute occaſion for, and conſtantly works by; for Theſe neither are, nor can be at all times in the ſame Order and Diſpoſition. Sometimes they are diſturbed ſo as to be fit for no Buſineſs at all: And when they are not put out of their Courſe by any accidental Interruption, yet, even in their Natural State, they are not qualify'd for all Buſineſs alike; nay, they act in perfect Contrariety, and croſs, and interfere with one another. To expreſs this now in as few Words, and as clearly as the Thing will bear:

That *Temperament of the Brain*, which you have heard ſo much of already, is the next and immediate Inſtrument, by which the Soul is aſſiſted and determin'd in her Actings. Now This is exceeding various and mutable; and at thoſe Seaſons when it ſerves well for one Function of the Soul, it obſtructs and runs counter to another. In *Youth* it is *Hot* and *Moiſt*; and this Complication is extremely proper for ſtrengthening the Vegetative

tive Faculty; but it keeps the Rational one Weak and Low. On the other hand it is *Cold* and *Dry* in *Aged People*; and This is a convenient Temper for the Reaſonable Soul, but highly prejudicial, and improper for the Vegetative. When this Temperament of the Brain is ſoundly heated and refin'd by a high Fever, it is then accommodated to the Imaginative Faculty, and does Wonders in Invention and Fancy; but this very Condition diſables the Intellectual Faculty, and is the moſt oppoſite that can be, to *Mature Deliberation*, and ſound Wiſdom and Judgment. Ch. 13.

It is no part of my Intention, by all this Diſcourſe, to defraud the *Senſes* of any part of the Commendation, which is their juſt due; but only to prevent their ingroſſing All, and aſſuming more than their due. 'Tis confeſs'd, that the *Mind* reaps great Advantage, and is very conveniently ſerved by the *Senſes*; eſpecially in the beginning of its Contemplations, the firſt Hints and Occaſions, the Invention and new Diſcoveries of Things. But ſtill we affirm, in vindication of the Mind's juſt Rights, that it does not depend upon the Senſes entirely; that it is capable of Knowledge and Underſtanding; can reaſon and diſcuſs Matters, infer and conclude, without the Senſes: Whereas, on the contrary, all Knowledge proceeds from the Mind; and the Senſes, when left to themſelves, cannot make the leaſt Progreſs, nor have one ſingle Perception without it.

12. It is farther obſervable, that the *Mind* proceeds in different Methods, and makes regular and gradual Advances in the Conſideration of Things. Sometimes it proceeds by the Addition

Book I. and Conjunction of Idea's: As firſt it concei
Lion ſimply and directly, without attendin
any of his Qualities: Then it adds the Id
Strength to the former; and ſo having from
Effects had reaſon to believe that theſe will
well together, and be true of each other, it
cludes, that the *Lion* is *Strong*. This is what
call the *Affirmative* way of Arguing. Some
it proceeds by the Diviſion of Idea's, whi
what they term the *Negative* way. Thus i
derſtands the *Hare* to be *Fearful*; for obſe
her to run away and hide herſelf, it conc
from this Timorous Behaviour, that a *Hare* i
Stout. Sometimes again we come to the K
ledge of Things by Similitude, and the he
Compariſon; and of Others by a Collectio
ſeveral Idea's, Exaggerating and Amplifying
as we ſee fit. Other Methods there are, w
need not be inſtanced in particularly, becauſ
Man, from his own Obſervation, and what
been already deliver'd here, may eaſily repr
the manner of them to himſelf.

CHAP. XIV.

Of the Parts of the Humane Soul: firſt, of the Underſtanding, whic its nobleſt Function; Imaginat Reaſon, Wit, Judgment, &c.

THIS *Mind* of *Man* is a dark and deep A
an intricate Labyrinth, full of Corners

Cr

Creeks, and ſecret lurking Places: Such is the Diſpoſition and State of this exalted Part of the Soul, diſtinguiſh'd by the Term of *Intellectual*, which conſiſts of vaſtly many Parts, and Faculties, and Operations, and different Movements; each of which have their proper Names, and each of them infinite Doubts and Difficulties peculiar to them. Ch. 14.

1. The Firſt Part of its Office is commonly known by the Name of *Apprehenſion* or *Imagination*; and this conſiſts in barely receiving and apprehending Images and ſimple Ideas; which is, indeed, in the Nature of a Paſſion and Impreſſion, occaſion'd by the Preſence of Things that ſtrike upon, or are repreſented to it.

2. The next is that Power by which we feed upon thoſe Ideas, to which the Imagination hath given ſuch Entertainment; we handle and turn them about, chew the Cud, concoct and digeſt them; and this is *Reaſon*, or λόγος.

3. The Third Action or Office, is what we commonly term *Diſcourſe* or *Ratiocination* (λογισμὸς, διάνοια, becauſe διὰ νῦν) and the Exerciſe of this Power conſiſts in collecting or ſeparating; joining together, or taking aſunder the Ideas thus received; and, according as thoſe are found to agree or diſagree, adding ſome freſh to them, which is the Nature of Inferences and Concluſions.

4. The Doing all this with Eaſe, Nicety, and Readineſs, ſearching deeper, and ſeeing farther into Matters than the World commonly do, is an Excellence known by the Name of *Penetration*, or Sagacity, (*Ingenium*;) and the Perſons happy in it, are diſtinguiſh'd by the Titles of *Ingenious*, ſhrewd,

Book I. ſharp Men, Perſons of good Parts, good Senſe, and the like.

5. The bringing Things over again, allowing them a Second Thought, and applying the Touch-ſtone to them over and over, that our Diſquiſition may be as curious and elaborate as poſſible, and nothing may paſs, but what we are well aſſur'd is true Standard; this is *Judgment*; and its Buſineſs is to go upon ſure Grounds, and come to no Reſolutions, but ſuch as one may abide by.

6. The Effect, Laſtly, of the *Underſtanding*, thus exerciſed is, as you perceive, *Knowledge*, Speculative Wiſdom, and Reſolution.

7. The Action, which follows next, and is a Natural Conſequence of ſuch Knowledge and Reſolution, is that of the *Will*, or *Volition*; by which the Mind reaches forward, and makes ſome Advances, towards the Object ſo known.

8. Now from hence, I think, it follows, that the *Eſſence* of all theſe Things is the ſame; and the Operations of them only are different. That is, *Underſtanding*, and Imagination, and Reaſon, and Diſcourſe, and Penetration, and Judgment, and Wiſdom, and Reſolution, are only ſo many ſeveral Methods, by which the ſame Mind moves and exerts itſelf. And accordingly we find ſome Perſons better diſpoſed to one of theſe Ways, than they are to others; a Man, for Inſtance, ſhall be excellent for Quickneſs and *Readineſs of Wit*, and yet very weak and childiſh with reſpect to his *Judgment*. Every Man hath all theſe Powers inherent in his Mind; but every Man hath them not alike, nor is alike qualify'd for the Exerciſe of them all.

I am

I am well enough content to hear the Chara- Ch. 14.
ers and lofty Commendations of the Soul of
lan; and take great Delight in the Account of 1. *Deſcription of the Mind.*
Comprehenſion, and Sprightlineſs, and vaſt
bilities. I allow it be called the *Image of the* 2. *Its Advantage.*
ving God; a *Drop of the Fountain of Immortality*; *Efflux of the Divinity*; a *Beam of Heavenly Light*.
hat the Great Creator hath furniſhed it with
eaſon, by which, as by a living Rudder, this
eſſel may ſteer its Courſe regularly; That it is
Inſtrument moſt exquiſitely Harmonious; That
it we contract a great Reſemblance, and have
e Honour of being near of Kin to God; and
at therefore he hath ſo diſpoſed the Seat and Si-
ation of this Mind, that it ſhould be in a perpe-
al Diſpoſition of looking upward, to the Place
its Birth. In a Word, I agree, that there is
thing in this lower World truly Great, but on-
Man; and nothing truly Noble in Man but his
ind; that if you come up to the utmoſt Height
this, you have climb'd higher than the very
eavens themſelves: Theſe Characters I conſent
very heartily, and they are ſuch as the Schools,
d Chairs of Philoſophers and Divines, have
mmonly abounded in; with a Deſign to render
en duly ſenſible of the Dignity of their Nature,
d to teach them not to debaſe or undervalue
emſelves.

All This, I ſay, is admitted; but ſtill with this 3. *Its Diſadvantages.*
oviſo, that Men wou'd apply themſelves with-
to examine, and come to a more diſtinct Know-
lge of This *Soul* of ours. For upon a more in-
nate Acquaintance, we ſhall find, that it is ca-
ble of being made, and (as the Matter is com-

Book I. monly order'd) does actually prove an Inſtrument of much Danger and Miſchief to one's ſelf and others; a terrible Diſturber of the Publick Peace; which, like a common Jugler, with his Legerdemain, amuſes you with Slight of Hand; and waits all Opportunities of putting the Cheat upon you. For in Truth, all the Falſehood, and Forgery, and Miſchief, that the World labours under, are owing purely to This, and have no other Original.

4. Different Sorts of Souls. The *Bodies* of Men, as infinitely various as we ſee them, are yet leſs different from one another than their Souls are: In general, They may properly enough be reduc'd into Three Claſſes; each of which is capable of being ſub-divided again, and hath ſeveral Diſtinctions and Degrees comprehended under it. The *Loweſt* of theſe are poor and *weak Souls*, not much removed from that of Brutes. And this Defect may be cauſed ſometimes from the Faults and Imperfections of the Natural Conſtitution; too great a Predominance of Cold and Moiſture in the Temperament of the Brain; as Fiſhes, whoſe Compoſition is of this Kind, are reckon'd the loweſt and moſt wanting of all other Animals: This Infirmity is born with us, and deriv'd from our Parents. Sometimes it is chargeable upon accidental Failings afterwards: Want of due Care to awaken and exert the Natural Powers, and letting them ruſt upon our Hands, till they degenerate into Senſeleſneſs and Stupidity: Of theſe we can make no certain Account, nor can they be eſteem'd a certain Species; for in Truth, they are not in a Condition to govern themſelves as Men, but are Minors and Ignorants

norants all their Days, and ought to be conſtantly kept under the Tuition and Care of others, wiſer than themſelves. * They ſnore and nod with their Eyes open; and, while they ſeem to live and act, are dead in the very midſt of Life; Moving Carcaſſes, and Men that walk in their Sleep. Such are the *Boors* and Common People, without Senſe, without Apprehenſion, without Judgment. The *Uppermoſt* Claſs are thoſe Elevated, and ſingularly Excellent Souls, that ſeem rather to be Angels and Demi-Gods than Common and Mortal Men; Strong and Vigorous, and every way Accompliſh'd; Theſe are conſpicuous and admirable indeed, but ſo rare and few withal, that if we could bring all of them together that ever the World knew, this long and numerous Succeſſion could not furniſh enough to compoſe one Commonwealth. The *Middle Sort* is infinite in Partitions and Degrees, Men of moderate Endowments, refin'd from the Dregs, but ſtill beneath the Cream and Flower of Humane Nature. And Theſe take in much the greateſt Part of Mankind. Of thoſe Diſtinctions, there will come a more proper Time to treat more largely hereafter. In the mean while, we muſt try to give a more particular Deſcription of this *Soul*, with regard to its Nature and Qualities, which yet are ſo intricate and manifold, that it is as hard to repreſent them truly, as it would be to draw a Picture like, from a Face that is always in Motion.

Ch. 14.

* Qui vigilans ſtertit.
Mortua cui vita eſt prope jam vivo atque videnti.

Book I. First of all; We may obſerve, that it is perpetually in Action. The *Soul* indeed *cannot live idle*, for to be doing ſomething is its very Eſſence; and hence it is, that for fear of lying quite unactive, it employs itſelf in falſe and fantaſtical Imaginations, forms a Thouſand wild Ideas, will ſtudy to cheat and deceive itſelf, and go directly contrary to its own Knowledge and Perſuaſion, rather than be out of Buſineſs. Like Fallow and neglected Grounds, which muſt always be kept ſown with ſome Grain or other, if the Soil be rich and fruitful; otherwiſe they will provide themſelves a Harveſt, and put forth vaſt Crops of wild and noxious Weeds. Thus the *Mind*, if it be not ſet on Work, and kept cloſe to ſome particular Subject, turns Vagabond, wanders and floats among a Thouſand Whimſies; there is nothing ſo Fooliſh, or ſo Extravagant, but it will produce it. And if it be not fix'd down, it is loſt; for to be every where, is in Truth to be no where. *Agitation* is, indeed, the very Life and Beauty of the Soul, but then this Agitation ought to be directed and preſcribed; found for it by another Hand, but by no means left to its own providing. Suffer it to go all alone, and on its own Head, it ſanters about and tires its ſelf to no purpoſe; languiſhes and grows feeble. And yet the other Extreme is every whit as dangerous; for if you hold it too high, and lay too much upon it; this is keeping the Bow always bent. Conſtant intenſe Thought, is what cannot be born; it ſtrains and puts the Mind upon the Stretch, till at laſt it cracks and breaks it.

5. *Its Deſcription* *A perpetual Agent.*

This

This *Agent* is alſo *Univerſal*, and in at every Thing. No Subject whatſoever, no Topick is out of its Compaſs; let the Farce be what it will, the Soul will have a Part in it, though it be never ſo low or ſo extravagant. The vaineſt and moſt trifling Matter will ſerve its Turn to work upon, as well as that of the greateſt Conſequence and Weight; Things which it knows not, nor hath any Comprehenſion of, as well as thoſe, with which it is never ſo well acquainted. For even the being made ſenſible, that it is out of a Man's Power to enter deep, and ſearch Things to the Bottom, and that in many (in moſt Caſes indeed) all the Knowledge we can have is merely ſuperficial, and goes no farther than juſt the Shell, and Outſide of Things; The very Coming to this Senſe, I ſay, is a very brave and bold Stroke, and argues a Maſterly Judgment. *Learning*, nay, *Truth* itſelf, may be found in a Man that wants *Judgment*, and many may have a good Judgment too, who are unſkill'd in Learning and Books, and under ſome Miſtakes, as to particular Opinions. But for a Man to ſee, and to acknowledge **his own Ignorance and Perſonal Defects; to pretend to no more than he really hath, and is; this ſingle Quality argues ſo much Judgment, that there are few better Teſtimonies to be given of it.**

Ch. 14.

6. *An Univerſal Agent.*

A Third Character very conſiderable in this Agent, is the *Nimbleneſs* of its *Motions*; whereby it traverſes the whole World, and runs from the one End of it to the other, in a Moment of Time; never ſtanding ſtill, never at reſt; but fluttering about, and peeping and meddling every

7. *Ready and quick in its Motions.*

Book I. where. **Man is endu'd with a buſy, active Mind; that never keeps at home; but expands and dilates itſelf; wanders every where, cannot bear any Reſt, and is never ſo agreeably entertain'd as with Novelties, and freſh Objects. Nor is it ſtrange; For this Mind of ours is deſcended from that Celeſtial Spirit above; and Motion, we know, is ſo natural there, that the Heavenly Beings, are never out of it.* This mighty Quickneſs and Agility muſt be confeſs'd in one reſpect prodigious, and one of the moſt miraculous Qualifications belonging to the Soul. But on the other hand, it is very dangerous too; for Spirits ſo exceeding ſubtle and refin'd, are liable to great Inconveniencies; and an Excellence of this kind is obſerved to be a mighty Diſpoſition to Folly, and borders hard upon *Madneſs*, as you will hear by and by.

Upon the Conſideration of theſe Three Qualities it is that the Arguments for the *Immortality of the Soul* are uſually grounded. Since *Matter* (which is corruptible by Nature) hath none of theſe; and what is not Material, no Reaſon in Philoſophy can evince to be Mortal. Now an Agent in *perpetual Motion* is very diſtant from Matter, to which *Reſt* ſeems natural, ſince it neither does, nor ever can move itſelf. An unlimited and univerſal Agent differs extremely from Matter, which is cramp'd and confin'd in all its Operations, and proper only for One, or a Few; but always the

* Mobilis & inquieta mens homini data eſt; nunquam ſe tenet; Spargitur vaga, quietis impatiens, novitate rerum lætiſſima; Non mirum ex illo cœleſti ſpiritu deſcendit. Cœleſtium autem natura ſemper in motu eſt.

ſame

ſame Matter can ſerve only ſome and the ſame determinate Uſes: And That again which is ſudden and inſtantaneous, which is bounded by no Time, no Place, but carries its Thoughts to the moſt diſtant Objects with equal Swiftneſs as to thoſe that are neareſt: This ſure is moſt contrary to *Matter*, whoſe Motions are local and gradual, bound up by neceſſary Laws, and proportion'd by the reſpective Diſtances of the ſeveral Objects. Conſequently This *Mind* is ſomething above *Matter* and *Mortality*, a *Spark* of *Divine Fire*, and the expreſs Image of that Active and Omnipreſent Spirit, which we call *GOD*. Ch. 14.

8. *Its Employment.*

Now the Trade and conſtant Employment of this Soul, is to be perpetually upon the Seek, ferretting, and doubling, and hot in the Purſuit of Knowledge, as of its proper Food. This *Appetite* and Hunger for the *Truth*, makes Men eternally prying, and curious, and inquiſitive; which made the *Greek* Poets call Men φιλοψευδεῖς, a ſort of Creature, whoſe Thoughts and Inventions are always at work. Nor is there any End of our Enquiries; for they are circumſcrib'd within no Bounds, nor regulated by any Forms and Meaſures. Doubts and Difficulties are the Suſtenance we live upon; and the Principle within us is a *perpetual Motion*. The whole World is our School, and our Theme, and, which is particular to the Caſe now before us, *We labour for Labour's ſake*; The Chaſe and Purſuit is not ſo much our Toil, or our Diverſion, as it is our Game and our Prey: For the ſucceeding, or not ſucceeding in our Diſquiſition, is a Thing of another and a very different Conſideration.

But

Book I. But ſtill, in the midſt of all this buſy Curioſity, it is raſh, tumultuous, and diſorderly, obſerves no certain Rules and Meaſures, but is eternally roving, and variable, and inconſiſtent with itſelf: 'Tis a perfect Noſe of Wax, that bends every way, ſtretches itſelf to any length, is accommodated to all Forms, more ſubtle and yielding than Water or Air. * Thus juſtifying the Character given of it, that as a Spirit is more refin'd and ſubtle, ſo it is likewiſe more flexible and yielding than any the thinneſt Matter whatſoever. Of this *Theramene*'s Shoe was the true Emblem, which fitted Feet of all Sizes. All it is at a loſs for is, only for ſome Contrivance how to turn and change with ſome Appearance of Probability; for when This is once found, it moves every way, takes all Sides, croſſes and contradicts itſelf, and argues for Truth or Falſhood indifferently.

9. *Its manner of working.*

10. Thus *Reaſon* ſports wantonly, and invents or entertains Arguments for the wideſt and moſt diſtant Contrarieties. Nothing ſo extravagant, nothing ſo abſurd, but hath found its Aſſertors and Abettors: And this not only in the fanciful Conceits of private Perſons, but in the more general Senſe and Agreement of large Societies and Communities. Thus *Hiſtory* tells us, that what is deteſted as Impious, Unjuſt, and Unnatural in one Countrey, has been received with Veneration, and practis'd as highly Decent, and a Duty, nay, even eſteem'd an Act of Religion in another. And there are not many Laws, or Cuſtoms, or Opi-

* Flexibili omni humore obſequentior, & ut Spiritus, qui omni Materiâ facilior, ut tenuior.

nions,

nions, which we can ſay, have univerſally obtain'd, or have been every where rejected. The *Marriages of near Relations* Some condemn as Inceſtuous; but Others have not only allow'd, but recommended, nay, in ſome Caſes, even enjoin'd them. The *Murdering of Infants*, and *of Parents, when old and decrepid*, and the *having Wives in common*, are now, and in our Parts of the World, look'd upon as barbarous and execrable; but the Worſhippers of *Moloch*, we know, thought their Children the moſt acceptable Sacrifice; and if *Herodotus*, and ſome other Hiſtorians, ſay true, the *Scythians* thought the other not only innocent, but a Mark of Tenderneſs and Reſpect; and never pretended to any Propriety in a Marriage-Bed. When *Dionyſius* offer'd *Plato* a rich Embroider'd Robe, he refus'd it, with this Reaſon for his Denial, That it was not fit for a Man to be ſo effeminately clothed; and yet *Ariſtippus*, another Philoſopher, accepted it; and he had his Reaſon for That too, which was, That no External Habit cou'd corrupt the Mind; and that the Soul might ſtill be Maſculine and Chaſte, though the Body were attir'd in Clothes never ſo Soft and Effeminate. The *Dialogue* between this laſt Philoſopher and *Diogenes*, each vindicating his own Manner of Living, and reflecting upon the other's that differ'd from him, is thus repreſented by *Horace* *,

Ch. 14.

Diog. *If* Ariſtippus *patiently cou'd dine*
On Herbs, he wou'd the Courts of Kings decline.

* Si pranderet olus patienter, Regibus uti
Nollet Ariſtippus. Si ſciret Regibus uti,
Faſtidiret olus, qui me notat——

Ariſt.

Book I.

* *In each Man's Breaſt that Weathercock, the Mind,*
Moves with the Rack, and ſhifts with every Wind.

And a Thouſand other external Cauſes may contribute to it. But if we come nearer home, and look within, much may be laid upon the ſeveral ſorts of Motion, which the Mind is put into, both by its own natural and conſtant Agitation, and by the different Impreſſions, which the Paſſions make upon it. Much alſo may be argued from the different Manner of the Objects being repreſented to it, according to the different Proſpects taken of them: For in this reſpect it happens to the *Eye* of the *Mind*, as it does to that of the *Body*, that no two Perſons ſee the ſame Thing exactly, and in all reſpects alike. Their Situation, their Organs, and infinite other little unobſerv'd Accidents there are, that make ſome, tho' perhaps not ſo great a Diverſity as to be diſcern'd in the Act of Viſion. Beſides, every thing we know hath different Gloſſes and Faces, and is capable of being conſider'd under different Reſpects; which was *Epictetus*'s Meaning, when he ſaid, *That every Thing hath two* (he might very truly have ſaid a great many) *Handles.* "But after all, "nothing adds more to this Ambiguity, and Va- "riety of Opinions, than that *Spirit* of *Contradi-* "*ction* and *Diſpute*, and a vain Affectation of "*Wit*, generally predominant in the Wo- "which lets nothing paſs quietly in Con- "tion; and accounts it a Reflection upon "Parts, not to have ſomewhat to ſay by

* Tales ſunt hominum mentes, quali pater ipſe
Jupiter auctiferâ luſtravit lampade terras.

" Repartee and Objection, though never ſo con- Ch. 14.
" trary to Truth, and ſometimes even to the
" Perſon's own Judgment too. And hence it is
" frequent for ſuch People to take contrary
" Sides; for their Buſineſs is not ſo much to ad-
" vance an Opinion, or to urge what is really Ar-
" gument and good Senſe, as to ſhew their Ta-
" lent in oppoſing what any Body elſe ſhall ſay.

From hence it comes to paſs, that the Mind ob- 12.
ſtructs itſelf in its Buſineſs, like Silk-worms that are entangled in Webs of their own ſpinning: For while it reaches forward, and expects to attain ſome diſtant Truth, and is led on in this Hope by I know not what imaginary Probabilities; in the midſt of his Courſe, up ſtart ſome freſh Difficulties, and theſe multiply and croſs the way upon the Man, and ſo by putting him upon a new Scent, carry him off from his firſt Deſign, till he is quite intoxicated, and bewildred in the Maze of his own Thoughts.

The End of all this anxious Purſuit is two-fold; 13.
That which is more general, and more natural in- *Truth, its End, but not attainable.*
deed, is *Truth:* For of all the Deſires that we feel our ſelves moved with, there is not any of them more cloſely interwoven with our Nature, than the Deſire of *Truth:* It is with great Eagerneſs and Diligence that we try all the Means capable of leading us to the Knowledge of it; but alas! our utmoſt Attempts are ſhort and inſufficient; for Abſolute Certainty is not a Prize allotted to us; nor does it condeſcend to be taken, and poſſeſſed by any the moſt aſſiduous Humane Soul. *Truth lodges in the Boſom of God*; there is its Retreat and proper Apart[illegible]

Book I. ſtand not any thing in its utmoſt Perfection; *We know in part*, and *here we ſee through a Glaſs darkly*, ſays the Fountain of all Truth. We turn and tumble Objects about, and grope like Men in the Dark for probable Reaſons; but theſe are to be found every where; and *Falſhood* as well as *Truth* hath ſomewhat to be alledg'd in its Behalf. We are born indeed to ſearch and ſeek for *Truth*, but the Enjoyment of it ſeems to be a Bleſſing reſerv'd for ſome greater and more exalted Powers than any that Mortals are endued with. "That is "the Happineſs of Beings above us at preſent, "and is reſerved for Mankind in a future State, till "he be purify'd from the Droſs of Matter, and "Fleſh, and Infirmity; and the Clouds that now "hang before us, and dim our Sight, be ſcatter-"ed by clear and everlaſting Day." At preſent the Difference between one Man and another, is not who reaches the Goal, and gains the Prize, and who not; but who is diſtanced, and who not; who runs beſt, and makes the neareſt Approaches to that which none of us All can come up to. If at any time it happens that a Man in the ſtudy of Nature fixes upon Truth, This is more by a lucky Hit than otherwiſe; and his good Fortune is to be extoll'd as much as his Induſtry; and when he hath it, 'tis odds if he can keep it; for many times a Man ſuffers it to be wreſted out of his Hands again by Sophiſms, and Deluſions, and contrary Appearances, for want of being Maſter of his Point, and able to diſtinguiſh Truth from Falſhood, and Reality from the Counterfeit. Errors are entertain'd by the ſame way that Truth is; the Paſſage by which both enter our Souls, is

one and the ſame; the Methods made uſe of for diſcovering it, are *Reaſon* and *Experience:* And both Theſe are extremely weak and defective, floating and uncertain, hard to fix, and changeable upon every ſlight Occaſion, when we think they are fixed. The great Argument of Truth is that of *Univerſal Conſent.* But what will all this amount to, when a Man hath conſider'd, what a vaſt Majority of Fools there are, and how very few wiſe Men in the World? And again, To any one that obſerves how Opinions ſpread, and become general: Men take them from one another, as they do *Diſeaſes*, by *Infection:* And *Applauſe* is that Breath that corrupts the Air, and bears about the Venom: This Applauſe again is given commonly blindly and inconſiderately, by them who never examine into the true Merits of the Cauſe; and by them too, who if they do pretend to examine, are not capable of judging in the Caſe. And thus, when ſome few have begun the Dance, the reſt have nothing to do but to fall in with the Tune, and follow them that lead it up of Courſe. Ch. 14.

14. *Invention.*

The other End aim'd at by the Mind, is *Invention*; which if it have leſs of Nature, yet hath more of Ambition and bold Pretenſion in it: This is aſpired to, as its higheſt Point of Honour, that which makes moſt Shew to the World, and contributes moſt to its Reputation; That which it looks big with, and thinks the livelieſt Image of the Divine Nature: It is this particular Accompliſhment, to which all thoſe noble Works have owed their Original, which have filled the World with Tranſport and Wonder.

Book I. And thoſe that have been of Publick Uſe among them, have even Deify'd their Authors, and Immortaliz'd their Names. What Renown have ſome gain'd, that were mere Curioſities, only for being eminent in their Kind, though no Benefit at all accrued to Mankind by their means? Such as *Zeuxis*'s Vine, *Apelles*'s *Venus*, *Memnon*'s Statue, the *Coloſſe* at *Rhodes*, *Archytas*'s Wooden Pigeon, the Sphere of *Sapores* King of *Perſia*, and infinite others. Now the Excellence of Art and Invention ſeems to conſiſt not only in a good Imitation of Nature, but in outdoing it. This often happens in particular Inſtances; for no Man nor Beaſt ſeems ever to have been ſo exquiſitely formed in all its Parts, nor the Proportions of any one and the ſame Body, to have met together of Nature's Compoſition, ſo exact as theſe Artiſts have delineated and repreſented them in Their Pieces. There are likewiſe ſeveral *Improvements* and Exaltations of *Nature*, in producing and compounding thoſe Things by *Art*, which Nature alone never produces. This is plain from the Mixtures of Simples and Ingredients, which is the proper Buſineſs for Art to exerciſe itſelf in; the Extraction of Spirits and Oils, and Diſtillation of Waters, and compounding of Medicines more refined, more powerful and efficacious, than any Nature furniſhes us with. And yet after all, Theſe Things are not ſo wonderful, nor do they commend Humane Wiſdom and Induſtry ſo highly, as the Generality of the World are apt to imagine: For, if we will paſs that Judgment in this Matter, which is agreeable to Truth and Duty, and pay a juſt Deference and Acknowledgement to

to the First Author, These are but *Imitations*, and not properly *Inventions*; They are Improvements, but they only promote and perfect what God hath first revealed. And what we commonly value and extol as our own Original Contrivance, is nothing more than observing the Works of Nature, arguing and concluding from what we find there, and then reducing those Observations into Practice. Thus *Painting* and *Opticks* were first rude and imperfect Hints, taken from Shades; and the Perfection they are now in, consists only in a due, and proper, and beautiful Mixture of Colours, which makes those Shades. The *Art of Dialling* comes from the Shadows cast by Trees; and what they do in our Fields, we do upon our Plans; They are Nature's Measure of the Sun's Motion, and the Gnomon is Ours. *Sculpture*, and Engraving of Seals, and Characters, and Cyphers, seems to be derived from the particular Marks, and Figures, and Embossings found in Precious Stones. And if This be allowed, the Result of all our Boasts is very poor; for it all terminates here, That Man (in Truth, and strictly speaking) hath invented nothing, but God and Nature give the Hints and first Draughts of all, and We improve, and, by degrees, refine upon them. Ch. 14.

15. *The Dangers it exposes us to.*

If all that went before be true, we easily perceive to what Rashness and Error the Mind of Man is subject, and how great the Dangers are which it exposes every one of us to; but those Men above all the rest, in whom it is more sprightly and vigorous than ordinary: For, since the Nature of it is perpetual Agitation, since its

Book I. Motions are ſo free and unconſtrain'd, and ſince all kind of Objects fall within its Contemplation; ſince it refuſes to be bound up, or directed by any certain Forms and Meaſures; and upon all Occaſions is ſo bold in the Uſe of its Native Liberty, without ſubmitting to be captivated and controuled by any thing: The common and natural Effect of this is, to ſhake and diſſettle Opinions generally receiv'd, and already eſtabliſh'd, and to complain of all thoſe Rules by which Men endeavour to regulate and reſtrain it, and check thoſe Extravagancies which ſome Men call *Free-Thinking*, as an unjuſt Tyranny and Uſurpation upon Nature, and a Yoke which every Man hath a Right to break. Hence it pretends a Privilege of taking nothing for granted, but aſſumes a Power of examining every thing; and pronounces the greateſt part of thoſe *Notions* which are entertain'd and approv'd by the Generality of the World, to be no better than *Vulgar Errors*, ridiculous and abſurd Prepoſſeſſions. It finds ſome Appearance of Reaſon on every ſide; and becauſe nothing above a bare Probability is to be found, it believes nothing certain. Some Notions may have more, and ſome leſs; but all have ſome Allegations in their Favour: And by indulging theſe ſorts of Ambiguities, it is to be fear'd, that at laſt Men are loſt in a Labyrinth, give all up, and ſit down in *Doubt* and *Scepticiſm*. That thus it often hath happen'd is too manifeſt; and as evident, that this is commonly the Diſeaſe of warm and witty Men, who truſt to their own Sufficiency, and have briſker Parts than their Neighbours; (ſuch as, according to our former Scheme, may deſerve a

Part II.

Place

Place toward the upper Part of the middle Claſs of Souls. For ſuch as theſe, we commonly find by Experience, are more looſe in their Principles, more particular in their Opinions, more extravagant and diſorderly in their Manners, than any other ſort of Men whatſoever. There are but very few of this Conſtitution, fit to be left to their own Conduct; or who know how to manage their Abilities to their own Safety and Advantage, and how to let their Judgments run beyond the common eſtabliſh'd Opinions, without plunging out of their Depth, and paying dear for their Raſhneſs. A great and ſprightly Wit, well temper'd with Solidity and Diſcretion, is now ſo hard to be found, that it is almoſt a Miracle among Men. For this is an Edged-Tool, and apt to do great Miſchief, if it be not in a very Wiſe Man's Hand: 'Tis like a nimble Sailor without Balaſt, whoſe Swiftneſs does but haſten its Ruin, and drive it ſo much the ſooner upon Rocks and Shelves. And if Hiſtory be enquir'd into, all the Diſorders in the State, Hereſies in the Church, Revolts in Armies, Parties and Factions of every kind, will be generally found to have taken their Riſe from ſuch Authors as Theſe. * *Great Errors* (ſays one) *have never ſprung from any but great Wits; Nothing is more prejudicial, more deteſtable to true Wiſdom, than too much Smartneſs of Parts.* No doubt, That Man hath a better Time on't, lives longer, enjoys more Eaſe and Happineſs, and is better qualify'd for Government, (ſays *Thucydides*) who is but moderately, or not ſo much as Ch. 14.

* Magni errores non niſi ex magnis ingeniis; nihil Sapientiæ odioſius acumine nimio.

Book I. moderately, provided in Point of Natural Parts, than He, who hath a very Noble and Tranſcendent Elevation of Soul: For This Temper commonly is good for nothing, but to create Trouble and Torment, and never let one's ſelf, or others, live in quiet. It is obſervable, that the deareſt Friends, when they fall out, make the bittereſt and moſt irreconcileable Enemies: And that the ſoundeſt Health, and moſt vigorous Conſtitutions, are ſubject to the acuteſt and moſt mortal Diſeaſes; and our Minds do ſo far ſympathize with our Bodies, that Thoſe of them, whoſe Operations are more quick and ſubtle than ordinary, are of all others moſt exquiſite in their Follies, and have the ſtrongeſt Propenſion to Madneſs and Extravagance. Wiſdom and Folly may be ſaid to dwell pretty near one another; there is but a ſhort Turn between them; the Behaviour of diſtracted People plainly ſhews it. Philoſophy tells us the ſame Predominance of Humours diſpoſes to both; for each abounds in Melancholy. And ſure there is no Folly comparable to That which we find is the Effect of nice and ſubtle Wiſdom. This moved *Ariſtotle* to affirm, That *Nature never made a great Soul without an Allay of Folly*; and *Plato* upon the ſame Account declar'd, That *it was a vain Attempt for a Man of good Judgment and ſound Senſe to knock at the Door of Poetry*; That was not a Place for ſuch as him to be admitted into; The Solidity of his Judgment wou'd hinder the Soaring of his Fancy. And upon this Conſideration it is, that the moſt ſkilful and celebrated Poets have not always thought it neceſſary to ſubmit to Rules, but approve of extravagant

Flights,

Flights, and the giving one's ſelf a Looſe now and then. Thus we may underſtand thoſe known Sayings, * *It is pleaſant to fly out. 'Tis decent ſometimes to be vain. While the Mind continues itſelf, its Performances are mean: Great and Noble Thoughts require a vehement Agitation to give them Birth.* Ch. 14. Creech. Hor. Ode XII. Lib. IV.

16. *The Neceſſity of reſtraining it.*

Upon this account, They were certainly in the right, who have ſet ſtrong *Barriers* and *Boundaries about the Soul.* The Neceſſity of curbing and fettering it with all manner of Reſtraints, with the Articles and Precepts of Religion, with the Authority of Laws and Cuſtoms, the Rules and Sciences of Learning, the Promiſes of Reward and Threatnings both in This and a Future State; This Neceſſity, I ſay, hath been well conſider'd both by God and Man; and great indeed it is; for notwithſtanding all theſe Checks, the Soul hath its Frolicks and Flyings-out ſtill; and in theſe Humours, it leaps over, and burſts thro' all; ſo exceeding fierce and intractable, ſo head-ſtrong and ſelf-conceited is it naturally: And therefore *Art* muſt manage and make it tame, for *Force* is to no purpoſe at all. † *The Mind of Man* (ſays *Seneca*) *is naturally ſtiff and rebellious, continually bending the wrong way, and bearing hard upon the Bit, and is eaſier led than driven; as high-mettled Horſes are better ridden with a Snaffle than with a Curb.* It

* Inſanire jucundum eſt. Dulce eſt deſipere in loco. Non poteſt grande & ſublime quicquam niſi mota mens, & quamdiu apud ſe eſt.

† Naturâ contumax eſt Animus humanus, in contrarium atque arduum nitens; ſequiturque facilius quam ducitur, ut generoſi & nobiles equi melius facili fræno reguntur.

Book I. is a much ſafer Courſe to keep it under the Cuſtody of a Guardian, to ſoothe and gently lay this indiſcreet Minor aſleep, than to let him have his Head, and ramble abroad at his own Pleaſure, and go his own Pace. For, if the Mind be not very regular and prudent, as well as very lively and ſtrong, (the Conjunction of which Qualities make that happy Diſpoſition of Souls, of the firſt and higheſt Order) or if it be not weak, and tender, and ſomewhat dull of Apprehenſion, (which were ſaid to be the Characters of the laſt and loweſt Set) there is great Hazard of its loſing and ruining itſelf, by the Freedom it takes of examining and judging Things, and ſubmitting to no Preſcription or Authority. And therefore very expedient it is, that it ſhould be put under ſome Confinement; and if it go abroad, that it be duly and conveniently equipp'd: For there is greater need of a Clog than of Wings; and of a ſtreight Rein, than of a Spur: The Advice of *Perſius* to his Son;

* *Son, ſpare the Whip, and ſtrongly uſe the Rein;*
They of their own accord will run too faſt,
'Tis hard to moderate their flying Haſte.

That Advice is neceſſary here too; otherwiſe This, like another *Phaeton*, and his Steeds ungovern'd, would ſet the World on Fire. The Prevention of that Inconvenience, is what hath been chiefly aim'd at by all thoſe Great Men, who have either modell'd Mankind into particular Societies at firſt, or deviſed Laws for them ever ſince. And

* Parce puer Stimulis, & fortiùs utere Loris. — *Ovid.*

this

this ſort of Men are the very Perſons, with whom both the Founders and the Governours of States have been moſt of all perplex'd. For the Common People, and thoſe of meaner Capacities, are generally more peaceably diſpoſed, than thoſe whom *Wit* and *Parts* make thoughtful and buſy, and conſequently factious and troubleſome. The general Genius of a People is very remarkable to this Purpoſe; for in the ſingle City of *Florence*, who are a Sharp-witted People, there have been more Seditions, and Civil Confuſions, within the Compaſs of Ten Years, than have been known among all the honeſt dull *Suiſſes* and *Griſons* for above Five hundred Years together. And juſt ſo it is with particular Perſons in the ſame Community: They that have but a bare Competency of Underſtanding, are generally the honeſteſt Men, the beſt Subjects; more flexible and tractable, more contented to ſubmit to the Laws, to be commanded by their Superiors, to hearken to Reaſon, and be govern'd by it, than theſe briſk and diſcerning Sparks, whoſe Parts and Penetration are above being controul'd by Power or Perſuaſion, and put them upon new Hazards and Projects, and will not let them content themſelves with their own Buſineſs, and ſleep in a whole Skin. So very wide a Difference there is between *Wit* and *Wiſdom*. Ch. 14.

17. *The Defects of the Mind.*

The *Mind* hath likewiſe its *Defects*, Decays, and Diſeaſes, as well as the *Body*, and indeed the Number of theſe is greater, the Conſequence of them more dangerous, and the Cure of them more difficult and impracticable, than that of Bodily Diſtempers. For the better underſtanding of theſe, it

Book I. it is neceſſary to diſtinguiſh them into their ſeveral Sorts. Now ſome of theſe are purely Accidental, and fall upon it from outward Cauſes. Among which we may take notice of three more eſpecially.

Accidental.

The Firſt is, The *State and Diſpoſition of the Body*. For Diſeaſes which make any Alteration in the Temperament of the Body, do manifeſtly carry their Influence farther, and produce a mighty Alteration in the Mind, and impair the Judgment at the ſame time. Sometimes the Subſtance of the Brain is not of a good Compoſition, and ſo the Organs of the Soul are not in a Condition to do their Duty. And this again happens either from a Fault in the firſt Formation, as in Them who have an ill-ſhap'd Head, too little, or too round; or elſe from ſome accidental Hurts afterwards, as many have ſuffer'd extremely in their Reaſon and Memory, by Falls, and Blows, and Wounds upon their Head.

From the Body.

Prejudicate Opinions.

For the Second Cauſe of theſe Defects, we may aſſign that *Univerſal Infection of common and popular Opinions entertain'd in the World*; With which the Mind is tinctur'd early, and theſe take Poſſeſſion, and uſually keep it obſtinately. Or, which is yet worſe, ſometimes wild and fantaſtical Deluſions have been drunk in, and with theſe the Mind is ſo ſtrongly ſeaſon'd, ſo groſly cheated, that They are not only not diſmiſs'd, but made the Rule of our Judgments, and the Meaſure of Truth in other Caſes. All is brought to this Standard; and receiv'd or rejected as it agrees or diſagrees with it. Here the Man fixes his Foot, and will not be got one Step backward or forward. The Inſtances of this kind among the Vulgar are infinite;

infinite; moſt of whom are guided by ſome fan- Ch. 14.
taſtical Notion, ſome erroneous Conceit, that hath grown up, and is like to live and die with them. And, indeed, when theſe Fancies or Opinions are common, they are like a ſtrong Torrent; Every Body hath not Force and Vigour of Mind enough to ſtem it, and keep himſelf from being carried down the Stream with his Neighbours.

Paſſions.

The Third, and That which ſticks much the cloſeſt to it of all the reſt, is the *Sickneſs and Corruption of the Will*, and the *Inordinacy and Strength of the Paſſions*. And in this Caſe, the Soul is a World turn'd upſide-down. The *Will* is made by Nature to follow the Directions of the *Underſtanding*; This is its Guide to inſtruct; its Candle to give it Light; but when once the Strength of Paſſion hath corrupted, and, as it were, laid violent Hands upon the *Will*, then the *Will*, in like manner, corrupts, and commits a Violence upon the *Underſtanding*. And from this diſorderly Procedure it is, that the greateſt Part of our falſe Judgments grow. Envy and Malice, and Love, and Hatred, and Fear, make us ſee Things with other Eyes; and take them for what they really are not; and draw ſuch Concluſions and Inferences from them, as they miniſter no juſt Ground for. From whence it is, that we ſo often are admoniſh'd, and do admoniſh others, *to judge without Paſſion*. This puts us upon all thoſe baſe and black Interpretations, by which we labour to eclipſe the virtuous Behaviour, and generous Actions of other Men; Hence we ſtudy and invent Cauſes and Intentions for them, and,

of

Book I. of our own Malice, aſſign vain and wicked Motives and Occaſions for what they do. This is a moſt abominable Vice, and an evident Proof of great Malignity in our Nature, and of a diſeaſed Mind; There is no great matter of Wit or Judgment ſhewn in ſuch Proceedings, but they betray a World of Baſeneſs and Ill-Nature. For whence can all this Miſconſtruction ſpring, but either from that Envy, which our Neighbour's Honour and Reputation provokes in us; or from a meaſuring of others by our ſelves, and ſo taking that for granted in Them, which we are conſcious of in Our ſelves; or from a Weakneſs and Diſtemper in the Mind, which, like ſome Sickneſſes in the Body, alters and vitiates the Palate, confounds and blinds the Sight, that we neither ſee nor taſte Things as they are; and that Virtue, in its Native Purity and Luſtre, is too ſtrong for us to bear or conceive? From the ſame Cauſe it is, that we are ſo officiouſly ſpightful, in publiſhing other Mens Vices and Failings; that we aggravate theſe beyond what they deſerve, but take good Care to extenuate their Virtues as much; hence from ſingle Actions, and particular Circumſtances, we draw general Inferences, and fix ſtanding Characters upon Men; Hence comes our Partiality in judging, and our Regards, not to the Thing, but the Perſon. If he be a Friend, or of Our Opinion, or in Our Intereſt; then all he does is juſtified or applauded, and every Thing becomes him; and his very Vices are Virtues: But if he be an Enemy, if he have diſoblig'd us Perſonally, or be engaged in a contrary Faction; he is ſtark nought, and nothing is as it ſhould be. Thus

are content to wrong and diſgrace our Judgment, provided we may but gratify our Paſſions. But alas! we are not come to the End, nor to the worſt Part of it yet; For moſt of the Impieties and Hereſies, the Errors in Point of Belief, and Controverſies of all ſorts in Religion, if we examine them ſtrictly, and trace them up to their firſt Head, will appear to be ſo many noiſom Streams of this bitter Fountain; a polluted and wicked Will, inordinate Paſſion and ſenſual Pleaſure; which by degrees bribes and debauches the Underſtanding, and wins it over to its own Side. *The People ſat down to eat and to drink, and roſe up to play*; As the Scripture obſerves of the *Iſraelites* Idolatry; and St. *Auguſtine* very well to this Purpoſe; * *That when a Man feels an Error agreeable to him, he does not believe what is True, but what he would gladly have to be True.* Thus, by degrees, it hath come to paſs, that the Wickedneſſes which at firſt were committed with many Doubts, and Miſgivings, and great Reluctancies, have not only out-worn all Scruple in Time, but been aſſerted and maintain'd for Divine Truth, and Expreſs Revelation. What was at firſt in the Senſual Appetite only, hath made its Way higher, and got the upper Hand of the Underſtanding; what was merely Paſſion and Pleaſure, hath been advanced into a Principle of Religion, and an Article of Faith. So dangerous a thing is it for any part of the Soul to be diſeaſed; ſo ſtrong the Infection, and ſo quickly does it ſpread from one Faculty to another. And thus you have had an Account,

Ch. 14.

* Quod vult, non quod eſt, credit, qui cupit

Book I. what thoſe Three Cauſes of our Mental Defects, and the Errors in our Judgment are, which were ſaid to be external and foreign to the Mind itſelf. For it appears, that the Underſtanding may be wanting or impaired, by Means of Sickneſs or Bodily Indiſpoſition, more eſpecially any Diſeaſe or Hurt in the Head, or any inconvenient Shape of the Skull: From the prejudicate Opinions of the World, and taking up groundleſs Whimſies for meaſured and certain Truths. And laſtly, from any Diſorder in the other Faculties of the Rational Soul; which are placed below, and ought by Nature to be under the Governance of the Mind. Thoſe whoſe Failings proceed from the firſt of theſe Cauſes, deſerve our Pity, not our Cenſure or Blame; and of them ſome are curable, and others incurable. The Second are not wholly Innocent, but yet Faulty in ſuch a Degree, that we may pardon, and excuſe them. But the Third ſort are altogether guilty. They deſerve both Cenſure and Puniſhment, for ſuffering the Order of their Creation to be ſo inverted, that thoſe which were born Subjects, and ought to ſubmit, ſhould uſurp the Throne, and preſume to give Laws to their Natural Sovereign.

18. *Its Natural Defects.* But, beſides theſe outward and accidental Failings, there are others, Natural and Internal, ſuch as take their firſt Riſe from, and are born and cheriſhed in the Mind itſelf. The greateſt of All, and indeed the Source and Root of all the reſt, is *Pride* and *Preſumption*. (The Firſt, and the Original Sin of Mankind, the Bane of every Soul, and the Cauſe of all manner of Evil.) 'Tis This that puffs Men up with *Sufficiency* and *Self-Satisfaction*;

Elion; This will not ſuffer us to yield to any Body, or think others Wiſer or Better than our ſelves. This makes us deſpiſe the good Counſel of our Friends, and place an entire Confidence in our own Opinions. This calls the Judgments of other People into Queſtion; arraigns and condemns them; nay, ſometimes, ſuch as we underſtand nothing of, nor are capable of examining or comprehending the Reaſons of them. 'Tis moſt truly obſerv'd, that *Judgment* and *Wiſdom* is not only the Beſt, but the Happieſt Portion God Almighty hath diſtributed among Men. For tho' this Diſtribution be made with a very uneven Hand, yet no Body thinks himſelf ſtinted or ill dealt with; but he that hath never ſo little is contented in this Reſpect however, and thinks he hath a Child's Share at leaſt. Now this Diſtemper is owing to no Cauſe ſo much, as the want of being more intimately acquainted with our ſelves; for by this means we are Strangers to our Wants and Weakneſſes, and not at all ſenſible of our greateſt Misfortunes; So that the Root of all our Diſeaſes is *Ignorance*, not That which is oppoſed to Skill in Arts and Sciences, and converſing with the Writings of learned Men; but Ignorance of our own Affairs and Condition; the Removal and Cure whereof was propoſed in the Beginning, as the Deſign of this whole Firſt Book. Ch. 14.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Memory.

MEMORY is very often miſtaken by the Vulgar for *Underſtanding* and *Good Senſe*; but in truth they are very different Things. For both Reaſon and Experience tell us (as hath been obſerved formerly) that it is very poſſible and uſual, for a Man, who is Excellent in one of theſe Reſpects, to be wretchedly weak and wanting in the other. This indeed is a Faculty very Serviceable and Uſeful to Mankind; but it comes far ſhort of the *Underſtanding*; and is much the Tendereſt, and moſt Feeble of all thoſe Parts, whereof the Rational Soul is compoſed. To excel in it is not very neceſſary; except for Three Sorts of People. 1. Men of *Trade, and much Buſineſs.* 2. Thoſe that are *extremely Talkative*; for this is the Storehouſe, from whence they muſt be furniſh'd with Matter for Diſcourſe; and it is naturally more full and fruitful than Invention; but he that cannot be ſupplied from hence, muſt make it up by Stuff of his own forging. And, 3. *Great Lyars*, for * *Theſe, indeed, ought to have good Memories.* The want of Memory hath its Conveniences too. For this will diſpoſe Men to ſpeak Truth, to be Modeſt, and talk no more than their Share, and to forget the Faults and Injuries of other People.

* Mendacem oportet eſſe Memorem.

A mo-

A moderate Proportion of this Faculty, will ſerve one's Turn, and anſwer all the Ends of it very well. Ch. 15.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Imagination and Opinion.

THE Power of *Imagination* is exceeding great; This is in Effect the very Thing, that makes all the Noiſe in the World: almoſt all the Clutter and Diſturbances we feel, or make, are owing to it. (Accordingly it was obſerv'd before, that This is, if not the *Only*, yet at leaſt the moſt *active* and buſtling *Faculty* of the Soul.) And, in good Truth, the Effects of it are Wonderful, Unaccountable, and almoſt Incredible. For the Influences of *Imagination* are not confined to the Body or the Mind of that Perſon alone, where it is born and cheriſhed; but extend and transfuſe themſelves far and wide, and act very ſtrongly upon other People. It is fitted for all manner of Operations, and the moſt diſtant and contrary Paſſions are raiſed by it; it puts the Man into all manner of Forms, and the Face into all Colours and Complexions: Makes Men bluſh with Shame, look pale with Fear, tremble and quake, caſts them into Fits of Raving and Confuſion; Theſe, tho' ſtrange, are yet ſome of its leaſt Effects, and gentle in Compariſon of others. It checks and enfeebles Men in their hotteſt Career; balks th Pleaſures, and chills all their Spirits. It m 1. *The Effects of Imagination.*

Book I. and deforms, nay, ſometimes kills *Embryo's* in the Womb; haſtens Births, or cauſes Abortions; takes away the Speech, and ties the Tongue; and ſometimes enables the Dumb to ſpeak, as the Story of *Cræſus* his Son aſſures us. Makes Men Stiff and Motionleſs, benumbs and binds up the Senſes, ſtops the Breath; Theſe are its Effects upon the Body. Then for the Mind, It robs Men of their Knowledge and Judgment, turns them into Fools and ſtupid Sots; as *Gallus Vibius* for Inſtance, who having ſtrain'd his Imagination too far in the Study and Practice of Folly, and its Motions, is ſaid to have diſturb'd his Underſtanding to that Degree, that he turn'd a mere Natural, and could never return to ſound Judgment and good Senſe again. It inſpires Men with ſtrange Preſages of Things hidden and future, fills them with Enthuſiaſms and Fancies, out of the common Road of Thinking; throws them into Extaſies and Raptures; nay, poſſeſſes them with the Thoughts and Expectations of Death, till at laſt they die indeed; as it did that Malefactor, who, when his Cap had been pull'd over his Eyes in order to Execution, was found ſtark dead upon the Scaffold, when they came to uncover him again, and read his Pardon. In a Word, A great part of thoſe unuſual Operations, which create ſuch Amazement in the Vulgar, Apparitions, and Viſions, and Witchcrafts, are to be attributed to the Force of Imagination; and what They think done by the Power of the Devil, or ſome familiar Spirits, (for I meddle not here with the Supernatural Operations of God's own Spirit) is commonly no more than a ſtrong Fancy, either

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in the Perſon that does theſe ſtrange Things, or of the Spectators that are deluded with them, and think they ſee thoſe Objects, which really they do not. And the great Care in theſe Caſes is, to diſtinguiſh wiſely between Truth and Falſhood, and not ſuffer our Judgments to be captivated with vulgar Errors. Ch. 16.

2. In this Part of the Soul it is, that *Opinion* keeps its Reſidence, which is nothing elſe but a vain and eaſy, a crude and imperfect Judgment of Things, taken up upon ſlight and inſufficient Grounds; too credulous an Aſſent to the Repreſentations of our outward Senſes, or common Report, which reſts in the firſt Appearances of Things, and fixes in the Imaginative Faculty, without ever going farther, or referring the Matter to the Underſtanding, to be throughly examin'd, and digeſted there, and ſo wrought up, and finiſh'd into ſolid Reaſon. Till this be done, no true Judgment can be made, and ſuch as a Man may venture to abide by. And accordingly we ſee the other is mutable and inconſtant, fleeting and deceitful. A very dangerous Guide, that makes Head againſt Reaſon; of which it is only the Image and Shadow, and that but an empty and falſe one neither. This is the Source of all our Evils, our Confuſions and Diſorders, our Paſſions and Troubles; the moſt, and the worſt of them riſe out of a prepoſſeſs'd Fancy, and heated Imagination: So that in truth Mad-men and Fools, the Ignorant and the Mob, are blindly led by the Noſe by it, and follow this Leader; and betray their Folly in doing ſo; as Wiſe and Judicious Men diſtinguiſh themſelves, and approve their

Book I. Prudence in ſuffering nothing but *Reaſon* to guide and govern them.

The World is govern'd by Opinion.

3. That thus it is, we ſee plainly; for, as hath been obſerv'd long ago by one of the Ancients, *It is not the Reality, nor the true Nature of Things, but the Notion and Opinion Men entertain of them, that diſquiets, and ſo violently torments their Souls* †. Thus we turn our own Executioners, form Evils to our ſelves which *are not*, and ſtrangely aggravate thoſe that *are*, by frightful Idea's, which belong not to them. The Truth and Eſſence of Things never enters our Minds in its true Proportions, nor works upon us by its natural Force and Authority; for were it thus with us, all Things that are alike in themſelves, would be alike to us; and the ſame Object would produce the ſame Affections and Reſentments in all Men, allowing only ſome ſmall matter of Difference in the Degree of them. At this rate all Mankind wou'd be of the ſame Opinion: What is falſe wou'd be univerſally rejected, and what is true as univerſally embraced; for *Truth* can be but one and the ſame; and is always equal and conſiſtent with itſelf. But quite contrary, We find that the Difference of Opinions is infinite; Men do not only vary from, but directly contradict one another. And there are but very few Inſtances, in which even Men of the beſt Natural Abilities, and moſt eminent for their Improvements and acquired Learning, are all of a Mind. This ſhews ſufficiently, that the Idea's of Things

† Opinione ſæpius quàm Re laboramus: plura ſunt quæ nos terrent, quàm quæ nos premunt.

are compounded and mix'd before we entertain them, that we have them at our Mercy, and put what Forms we pleaſe upon them; And, that the Condition they come to us in, is not what Nature gave, but what the Temper and Diſpoſition of our own Minds have moulded and modelled them into. That which I firmly believe my ſelf, I cannot prevail with my Friend to believe; thoſe are Arguments to Me, which to Him are none at all. Nay, which is more; Let one be never ſo confidently aſſured of a Thing to Day, I cannot engage that I ſhall continue in the ſame Opinion of it to Morrow: And it is odds I may, (and plain that I often do) entertain very different Notions of it, and be quite otherwiſe affected with it another time. So ſure it is, that Things have juſt that Place in our Opinion and Eſteem, which we think fit to aſſign them; that they are reliſh'd juſt as our Palate ſtands at that time; and ſhew to us according to thoſe Colours which we our ſelves have tinctur'd them with. Like the Eyes of Men in the *Jaundice*, or the *Priſms*, that refract and vary the Rays, that fall upon the Organs of our outward Senſes, ſo does the Soul alter its Objects too; and the preſent Conſtitution of it is the *Medium*, through which they muſt paſs to us. St. *Paul*'s Obſervation with regard to Morals, may be apply'd to Speculation too, *Unto the Pure all things are pure, but unto the Defiled is nothing pure.* Thus our Thoughts are like our Clothes, that keep us warm, with a Heat which is none of their own, but ſuch as we gave them, and they keep it; and at the time that they receive our Warmth from us

Ch. 16.

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Book I. they receive and keep the Cold of Froſt and Snow without. But ſtill the Warmth we feel is all our own; we firſt impart it to them, and they in Requital preſerve it for our Benefit, and pay what they received, back again to us.

4. How few are there of thoſe Opinions, which we profeſs to entertain, that, when look'd into, are not at laſt reſolv'd into Authority, and taken upon Truſt? We believe and act, we live and die upon Credit and Content; and our great Buſineſs is to conform our ſelves to Cuſtom, and to think and do like the reſt of the World, and according to what They, not our own Reaſon, eſteems moſt adviſeable. Thus *Faſhions*, and not *Judgment*, govern Mankind; and perhaps indeed, for the greateſt Part of Mankind, this is not much amiſs; for moſt People have not Wit enough to chuſe for themſelves, and therefore ought to reſign the Government of their Actions to others: But Wiſe Men are above theſe mean and ſervile Compliances; they have a better Rule to walk by than *Authority* and *Example*; as I hope to ſhew at large in the following Parts of this Book II. Treatiſe.

CHAP. XVII.

The Will.

1. *Its Pre-eminence.* THE *Will* is a moſt exquiſite Piece, a magnificent Accompliſhment of Humane Nature indeed; of wonderful Importance, and ſuch as deſerves

deſerves and requires our utmoſt Care and Study, Ch. 17.
to regulate and manage it well: For this hath the
moſt commanding Influence upon a Man's Condition; and his whole Happineſs in a manner depends upon it alone. This is the only Faculty which Nature hath put in our own Power. All the reſt, ſuch as *Memory*, *Underſtanding*, *Imagination*, are at the Mercy and Diſpoſal of a Thouſand Accidents, which oftentimes diſturb, and change, and impair, nay, ſometimes deſtroy, and take them quite away from us. Again: This draws the whole Man after it, and carries him whitherſoever itſelf is determin'd; for he that conquers the *Will* hath ſubdu'd the Perſon. When the *Underſtanding* is convinced, the Conqueſt is by no means entire; for the *Will* frequently holds out afterwards, and makes an obſtinate Defence againſt Reaſon and ſober Judgment. But when once This yields, All is ſurrender'd, and the Man is not now any longer his own Maſter, he hath from thenceforth nothing left that he can call his own. Once more; This is the very Thing that fixes our Character; It makes and it denominates Good or Ill Men: This gives our Temper and Complexion, and we appear to the World under its Colours and Diſpoſitions. As of all Virtues and Qualifications of the Soul, *Probity* is the firſt and chief, and infinitely more deſirable than Learning or Parts: All that Nature, or Art, or Induſtry can give, are not comparable to it; ſo it muſt be confeſs'd, that the *Will*, which is the Seat and proper Reſidence of Virtue and Goodneſs, is infinitely the moſt excellent Faculty that Humane Nature can boaſt of. A Man is neither virtuous

Book I. nor vicious, honeſt, nor diſhoneſt, for knowing what Virtue and Vice, Honeſty and Diſhoneſty are; tho' this Knowledge be never ſo nice and exact in the Speculation; but by his Inclination, and Love, and Practice of theſe Things, by the Diſpoſition of his Mind, the Choice of his Heart, the Bent of his Affections, and the general Tendency of his Manners and Behaviour. There are indeed ſome other Pre-eminences peculiar to the Underſtanding; it is as the Huſband in the Family, and this as the Wife, which ought to be under its Governance and Direction: That is the Guide, or as the Light, This as the Traveller, which ſhould follow its Inſtructions, and walk by them: But ſtill the laſt Reſult of all depends upon the *Will*; This finiſhes the Action, and determines the whole Matter; and in that reſpect the *Will* is ſuperior even to the *Underſtanding* itſelf.

2. The true and moſt remarkable Difference between theſe Two Faculties, with regard to the manner of their Operation, ſeems to be this: That by the *Underſtanding* Objects come into the Soul, and are there receiv'd and entertain'd, as the ſeveral Terms by which the Offices proper to this Part, are uſually expreſs'd, (ſuch as Apprehending, Conceiving, Comprehending, and the like) do plainly import. And here they make their Entrance, not according to what they really are in their true Nature and full Proportions, but according to the preſent Diſpoſition and Capacity of the Perſon, and in ſuch Meaſures only as he is able to receive them in. Thoſe Objects which are great and ſublime, are for this reaſon under a neceſſity of condeſcending and contracting themſelves,

ſelves, and come to us with conſiderable Abate- Ch. 17.
ments and Defalcations; becauſe the Paſſage at
which they enter is not large enough for their true Height and Bulk: Juſt as the Ocean flows into the *Mediterranean*, not in ſuch Quantities as are agreeable to its own Fulneſs, but ſuch only as the *Streight's Mouth* can give Admiſſion to. Now in the Operations of the *Will*, the Method is quite contrary: Here the Soul goes as it were out of itſelf, it ſtretches and moves forward toward the Object; it ſeeks and runs after it with open Arms, and is eager to take up its Reſidence, and dwell with the Thing deſir'd and belov'd: Nay, it even transforms itſelf into *That*, aſſumes its Name and its Nature, wears its Livery, and is diſtinguiſh'd by the Things it ſerves, and retains to. Hence we give it the Title of a *Virtuous* or a *Vicious*, a Spiritual or a Carnal Mind; according as it purſues commendable and exalted Objects, or is ſunk into Senſuality and Vice. Thus the true and only way by which the *Will* can ennoble itſelf, is by loving and chuſing worthy and noble Things; and the abandoning itſelf to little and low, baſe and unworthy ones, is the debaſing and Diſparagement of it. So that our former Compariſon is in this regard juſtify'd again for thus the *Will* is as a Wife, who gets or lo Quality, according to the Perſon ſhe m and in Strictneſs can claim no Honour, no but that which belongs to her Huſband.

Daily Experience aſſures us, that there are *Things* which whet and ſtimulate the *Will*; Difficulty of Obtaining; The Rarity or Ex lence of the Thing we ſeek; and The Abſ or Fear of Loſing it: And the Three

derations oppoſite to Theſe, which are, Its being Eaſy, and in our own Power; The Abundance or Commonneſs of it; and the Conſtant Preſence, and Secure Enjoyment, do as much blunt and pall our *Will*. The Three former raiſe our Eſteem of any Thing; the Three latter render it cheap, and beget Neglect and Contempt. We are alſo ſharpned and made more eager by Oppoſition and Refuſal; and entertain ſome ſort of Indignation, which makes us more reſolute againſt any thing that pretends to ſtand in our way, and diſappoint our Deſires. And thus, in the other Extreme, we diſdain and overlook the Bleſſings we have in hand, tho' never ſo valuable; and loſe what we are already poſſeſs'd of, for Things diſtant and in Reverſion; and in Proportion, what we lawfully do or may enjoy, for ſuch as we cannot or ought not.

* *What comes with Eaſe we nauſeouſly receive;*
Reſtraint inflames; and Hardſhips Pleaſure give.

Thus the Caſe ſtands with us in our Pleaſures of all ſorts. † *The Danger, which in reaſon ſhould abſolutely deſtroy Delight, is the very thing which heightens it, and the ſtrongeſt Incentive to our Appetites in the Purſuit of it.* So that both Extremes have at laſt the ſame Effect, and either of them ſerves to make us miſerable: Want and Plenty, Security and Fear, Deſire and Enjoyment, all give us the ſame Diſquiet, and put us to perpetual

* Quod licet, ingratum eſt; quod non licet, acrius urit.
Ovid. Eleg. Amor. Li

† Omnium rerum Voluptas ipſo quo debet fugari pe
creſcit.

Pain. And this unhappy Diſpoſition is the true Account why Men ſo ſeldom make a right Eſtimate of Things; from whence grew that Proverb of the *Prophet in his own Country*, to intimate, how very different Intrinſick Worth and Common Opinion are; and that the higheſt Endowments, and moſt Divine Excellencies, when Cuſtom and Acquaintance hath render'd them familiar to us, can no longer preſerve the Value and Veneration moſt juſtly due to them. Ch. 17.

What Courſe is to be taken for the managing and regulating our Will, will be ſhewn hereafter. See B. II. Chap. 2. Book III. Chap. 6.

The Paſſions and Affections.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE *Paſſions* of the Mind are a very large and copious Subject, furniſh great variety of Matter for Reflection, and are one of the moſt conſiderable Topicks in all this Treatiſe of *Wiſdom:* And upon this Occaſion, we are to obſerve, that the firſt Step to be made in this Branch of it, is to learn the true Nature of the Paſſions, and how to diſtinguiſh them from each other, which ſhall be taught you here in the *Firſt Book:* And then, for the Remedies of Cure, by which they are to be curb'd, controul'd, and brought within due Bounds, ſuch of them as are general will be laid down in the *Second*; And thoſe that are proper for each Paſſion in particular, will be directed and ſpecify'd accordingly in the *Third Book*. This Method being moſt agreeable to that Scheme

Book I. Scheme of the whole Work drawn out in the *Preface.*

Now in order to attaining a clear and diſtinct Knowledge of them at preſent, I deſign to employ one Chapter in treating of the *Paſſions* in general, and then to ſpeak of each *Paſſion* ſingly in the Chapters that follow. But before I enter upon that, I think my ſelf oblig'd in Juſtice to declare, that of all the Authors I have ſeen, none hath repreſented this Matter more copiouſly, and to the Life, than the *Sieur de Vaux* in his Moral Tracts; to whom I have been much beholding, and have borrow'd a great deal from thence, of what I ſhall ſay upon this Subject of the *Paſſions.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the Paſſions in general.

1. *An Account of Paſſion; what and whence it is.*

PAſſion is a violent Motion of the Soul, in that which is diſtinguiſh'd by the Name of its Senſitive Part: And the Cauſe and Tendency of this Motion is, either to purſue ſomewhat which the Soul apprehends to be *Good*; or to decline and run away from ſomething which it apprehends to be *Evil.*

But it is very neceſſary, and of great Conſequence upon this Occaſion, to be rightly inform'd how theſe Motions begin, and what it is that cheriſhes and kindles theſe Fires in us. Of This, ſeveral Accounts may be given, and different Compariſons made uſe of to illuſtrate it by, according to

to the different Reſpects in which we conſider them. And firſt of all, with regard to the Suddenneſs and Vehemence of their Emotions, it is to be obſerv'd, That the Soul, which, however ſeemingly multiply'd by Diſtinctions, is really but one and the ſame in the Body, hath ſeveral Powers belonging to it; and Theſe differ greatly in their Qualities and Operations, according as the ſeveral Veſſels in which the Soul keeps her Reſidence, and the Inſtruments ſhe makes uſe of in diſcharging her Functions, and the Objects propounded to her Contemplation are differently diſpos'd. Now when the Parts, where the Soul takes up her Lodging, are not crowded or overburthen'd, but fill'd in ſuch Proportions as ſuit well with their ordinary Cuſtom and Capacity, and ſuch as are convenient for a due Diſcharge of their reſpective Duties, then all the Operations of the Soul are gentle and mild, ſedate and regular. But, on the other ſide, when any of theſe Parts are either put into a ſwifter and more violent Motion, or are heated above their ordinary and proper Temper, then they immediately feel a conſiderable change, to the great Prejudice and Diſorder of the Soul. The like we ſee in the Beams of the Sun, which, when ſcatter'd looſely with all that Freedom they naturally take in diffuſing themſelves, impart a moderate and gentle, and cheriſhing and kindly Warmth; but when contracted within the Concave of a Burning Glaſs, they burn up, and quite conſume the very Things to which they gave Life and Nouriſhment before. It muſt be farther obſerv'd too, that Theſe Parts are not always diſtributed alike; Ch. 18.

Book I. alike: And from hence ariſes another Diſtinction, not only with regard to the Kind and Quality, but to the Degree of their Emotion; and ſo they differ in the ſame ſort as their Violence is greater or leſs. Thoſe Motions that are moderate, are capable of being reliſhed and digeſted; a Man knows what he feels, and is in a Condition of expreſſing his Reſentment in Words, or giving it Vent by Tears. But thoſe that are exceſſive and extreme, are too big, and too mighty. They ſtun and take away our Senſes quite, fill the Soul with Confuſion and Amazement, bind up, and quite over-bear her Powers, and diſable her from acting.

* *Slight Paſſions find a Vent, and Words command;*
The Fierce ſwell inward, dumb and ſtupid ſtand.

2. *Of the Vicious Irregularity in them.* Thus much may ſuffice, to give us ſome little Notion of the *Paſſions*, the manner of their Operation, and their Degrees in general. But if we now look upon them, in the Second Place, with regard to the Viciouſneſs, and Irregularity, and Extravagance; the Injuſtice and Unreaſonableneſs theſe Paſſions are frequently guilty of; thus Man may not unfitly be reſembled to a State or Commonwealth, and the Condition of the Soul to that of a Monarch, preſiding over that State, conſtituting ſeveral Officers and Magiſtrates under him, to aſſiſt in the good Government of ſuch vaſt Multitudes of People; giving particular Laws and Directions for their Behaviour, and for the due Exerciſe of their particular C

* Curæ leves loquuntur, ingentes ſi

Commiſſions; but ſtill reſerving to himſelf and his own Supreme Juriſdiction, the Cognizance and Determination of all Matters of great Weight and general Importance; and for the giving freſh and neceſſary Orders, commanding that all extraordinary Accidents and Emergences, ſhould immediately and faithfully be reported to himſelf in Perſon. Now upon ſuch a Conſtitution, and ſuch Orders duly obſerv'd, the Peace and Proſperity of the whole Kingdom will depend. But if theſe be neglected and broken, and put out of their proper Courſe; If the Magiſtrates, which go between, and are a ſort of Balance between King and People, ſhall ſuffer themſelves, either to be impos'd upon thro' Eaſineſs or Credulity; or corrupted by Favour or Affection; or if they ſhall employ their Authority in acting contrary to the eſtabliſhed Laws, and Duties of their Places; or, if they ſhall go beyond their Commiſſions, and come to a final Reſolution in Cauſes, which they ought not to determine, without ever laying them before their Sovereign, who hath reſerv'd the Hearing and Deciſion of all ſuch Matters to himſelf in Perſon: In all theſe Caſes, I ſay, the publick Peace is violated, the Eſtabliſhment infring'd, the Prerogative incroach'd upon, and nothing but Miſchief, and Miſery, and Confuſion can be the End of it. Now thus it is likewiſe in our *Little World*. The *Underſtanding* is *King* in *Man*; and under him is employed a Faculty, whoſe Buſineſs it is to receive Ideas, and [illegible] an Eſtimate of them; This is the Sub[illegible] Office obliges him to [illegible] Evi-

Ch. 18.

Book I. dence he goes upon, is that Report the Senſes make of all Things repreſented to them; and according to this Teſtimony, and the Judgment in Conſequence of it, the Affections are by the ſame Faculty put forward, in order to execute this Sentence. For his Direction and Governance in the Execution of this Office, our Judge in Commiſſion hath the Law, the Light of Nature, and Dictates of Reaſon to go by; and this, in ordinary Caſes, is ſufficient without any farther Formality: But if it happen, that the Affair be of great Moment, or if any Difficulty ariſe, then he muſt have recourſe to, and know the Pleaſure of his Superior; and in this Caſe the Underſtanding, which ſits Supreme, anſwers all Doubts and Points of Law, and expects to be conſulted and applied to for Orders and Advice. This is the Scheme of our Government and Conſtitution; and ſo long as Matters are thus managed, all is quiet and well. But it is our great Unhappineſs, that this Imaginative Faculty, (which is under the Intellectual, but over the Senſitive, and to whoſe Juriſdiction the firſt Examination and Judgment of Things belong,) often ſuffers itſelf to be bribed, corrupted, impoſed upon; and the Effect of this is, Firſt to paſs wrong and raſh Judgment; then to ſet the Affections at work to very ill Purpoſe; and at laſt to diſturb, and confound, and ruin All. Now ſeveral Things there are, which may contribute towards the depraving, and diſordering this Power, in its Judgments and Operations: As firſt of all; The *Senſes* themſelves, which cannot penetrate into the Bottom, nor comprehend the real Subſtance, and hidden Nature of Things, but

but the bare Surface, and next Appearance of them only: And theſe make a Report to the Soul, according to their preſent Apprehenſion; ſet before it the outward Images only, and that, ſo as may gain them Favour and Recommendation, and pre-poſſeſſing it with a Character of their Qualities, founded upon the Satisfactions and Delights they are capable of adminiſtring to theſe Senſes in particular, and not upon the Conſiderations, how Neceſſary, or how Advantagious they may prove to the whole Man in general. A Second Corruption, which often confirms, and ſtrikes in upon the Neck of This, is the Falſe Notions, and Unthinking Cry of the *Vulgar*; when we look upon our ſelves obliged to Approve and Diſapprove, as Others do; and when nothing is reputed needful to eſtabliſh an Opinion, more than its being Popular. From theſe two falſe Offices of Intelligence, the *Report of our own Senſes*, and the *Voice of the People*, proceeds a raſh Inconſiderate Opinion, which the Soul takes up of Things; and without fair Tryal, or ſufficient Deliberation, pronounces them, Good or Evil; Advantagious or Hurtful; fit to be courted, or fit to be deteſted and avoided. And this is without all Diſpute a very dangerous Guide; a very hot and haſty Miſtreſs; for as ſoon as ever we entertain it, without more ado it ſeizes upon the Imagination; and there ſtanding upon its Defence, ſtrengthens itſelf as in a Caſtle, mans all the Works, and holds it out againſt Reaſon; then it comes down to the Heart, and there ſtirs and agitates the Affections, with the violent Reſentments of Hope and Fear, and Joy and Grief. In

Ch. 18.

Book I. a Word, it is a perfect Incendiary in the State, looks out all the Fools, and diſaffected in the Soul, and blows them up into Sedition; raiſes the *Mob*, that is, the Paſſions, and ſets all in an Uproar and Confuſion. And all this by taking wrong Methods, going Headlong to work, and not ſubmitting the Matter to the *Underſtanding*, as by the Nature of this Eſtabliſhment, and the Duty of its Station, that Faculty was obliged to do.

Permit me to ſet before you another Illuſtration of this Matter by a Compariſon taken from Military (as the former was an Alluſion to Civil) Government. The *Senſes* anſwer here both to the Centinels, whoſe Poſt it is to watch, and be conſtantly upon the Guard, for the Safety of the Soul; and alſo to Scouts, who are to look out, and ſcour the Countrey, and bring in Intelligence to the *Underſtanding*, which is the Supreme *Commander* of the *Soul*. To qualify them for this Duty, They are endued with a Power, of perceiving Things; diſcerning and taking the Faces and Forms of them; and embracing or rejecting them, according as they appear Agreeable or Diſagreeable, Delightful or Odious to them. But now in the Execution of their Office, their Buſineſs is only to ſpy out, and to report; to take Care, that their Intelligence be true, and to bring it Faithfully, and relate it Plainly and Calmly. And they ought to ſatisfy themſelves with delivering their Meſſage, without taking upon them to diſturb the higher Powers, or to ſound to Arms immediately, and ſo put all into Conſternation and univerſal Diſorder. And thus it often happens;

that as the Centinels in an Army, may lie under Ch. 18.
Miſtakes, becauſe they are not acquainted with
the ſecret Deſigns of the General; and ſo receive
Them for Friends, which are Enemies in Diſguiſe,
and ſuſpect thoſe for Enemies which are Allies, and
marching to their Aſſiſtance; The *Senſes*, in like
manner, not being privy to all that paſſes above,
and for want of conſulting Reaſon in the Caſe, are
frequently impoſed upon by counterfeit Appear-
ances, and apt to take That for a Friend, which
is, in truth, our deadly Enemy. And when they
go giddily to work upon this Imagination, and
without ever expecting Orders from the *Under-
ſtanding*, fall on immediately, and alarm the *Con-
cupiſcible*, and *Iraſcible* Faculties; then they raiſe
Tumults, and Mutinies in the Soul; and while
theſe laſt, there is nothing but Clamour and Vio-
lence; the Voice of *Reaſon* cannot be heard, nor
the Commands of the *Underſtanding* be at all o-
beyed.

Let us now in the next Place, obſerve their ſe-
veral Regiments and Ranks; the General, and the
Subordinate Kinds and Diviſions of them. Now
we muſt know, That all *Paſſion* whatſoever, is
moved by the Appearance, either Real or Imagi-
nary, of Good or Evil; what actually is, or what
is by the Perſon apprehended ſo to be. If the
Object be good, and the Soul conſiders it as ſuch,
ſimply, and without any other Circumſtances, this
is that Motion of the Soul, which goes by the
Name of *Love*. If to that Good, ſo conſidered as
before, be added the Circumſtance of its being pre-
ſent, and the Man reflect upon himſelf, as in full
Poſſeſſion and actual Enjoyment of it, This is cal-

3. *Their Diſtinctions.*

According to the Object and Subject

Six in the Concupiſcible Part. Three for Good, and three for Evil.

Book I. led *Joy*, or *Pleaſure*; but if it be future and diſtant, then it is *Deſire*. On the other Hand, conſider an Evil Object, abſtractedly, and merely as ſuch, and the Paſſion it ſtirs in us, is *Hatred:* If it be preſent, and affect us ſenſibly, it is *Grief* and *Pain*; if ſome other Perſon labour under it, 'tis *Pity* and *Compaſſion*; if it be future and approaching only, then 'tis *Fear*. And This is remarkable, concerning the Paſſions already named; that Thoſe of them, which proceed from the Apprehenſion, or the Appearance of Evil, ſuch as we run away from, and are poſſeſs'd with an Abhorrence of, do of all others ſink deepeſt into the Heart, take faſteſt hold of us, and are moſt difficult to be diſpoſſeſs'd again. This now is the firſt Regiment of Mutineers, which diſturb the Content, and break the Peace of our Souls, and theſe are quarter'd in that which is term'd the *Concupiſcible* Part. The Effects and Diſorderly Carriage of Theſe are, it muſt be confeſs'd, of very dangerous Conſequence; but yet they are not near ſo outragious and Miſchievous, as thoſe that we are going to mention. For theſe firſt Motions, formed here by the Repreſentation of the Object, are afterwards continued, and communicated to the *Iraſcible* Part of the Soul, that is, the Place where the Soul is active, and contriving Means to obtain what ſhe apprehends to be Good; and to deliver her ſelf from that which ſhe apprehends to be Evil. And then, as a Wheel already in Motion, when a freſh Force puſhes it, receives that Addition eaſily, and whirls about with wonderful Strength and Swiftneſs; ſo the Soul, which is already ſtirred and warmed with the firſt Apprehenſion,

Five in the Iraſcible: Two for Good, and Three for Evil.

ſion, when a Second Attempt is made upon it, and the Coals are blown, flames out, and is tranſported with Rage and Violence, much greater than before. The *Paſſions* Then raiſed, ride higher; are much more furious and ungovernable; for now indeed they are double: the firſt have come in and join'd them, and thus they back and ſuſtain one another, by this Union, and mutual Conſent. For the former Paſſions, which were the Reſult of Good or Evil in Appearance, conſidered in Speculation only, now fall in with the Practical Conſideration of Means proper for the acquiring or avoiding them, and ſo excite in us *Hope* or *Deſpair*. And here, thoſe that ariſe from the Proſpect of a future Evil, produce in us, either *Fearfulneſs* or *Courage*; the Apprehenſion of a preſent Evil, kindles *Anger* and *Indignation*; which are Paſſions extremely Furious and Violent, and ſuch, as when they find the *Reaſon* once diſturbed, confound and abſolutely overturn it. Theſe are the Principal Winds, that raiſe all the Storms in our Souls; and the Cavern (like that of *Æolus*) where they are engender'd, and from whence they break looſe, is nothing elſe but *Opinion*, (and *Opinion* is moſt commonly a falſe, fleeting, and uncertain Thing; contrary to Nature and Truth, to Reaſon and Certainty) that is, A Notion we have, that the Things which are then repreſented to our Imaginations, are Good or Evil. Nor matters it much, how wild, and extravagant, this Notion is in itſelf, provided we do but give it Entertainment. For Men proceed not upon Realities, but upon their own Fancies; and when once we have taken a Conceit that a Thing Ch. 18.

Book I. is Good or Evil, we run after, or we run away from it, with as much Eagerneſs and Impatience, as if it were actually ſuch; and yet it often, very often happens, that the Nature of the Object is directly contrary to our Apprehenſions, and ought to move Reſentments, juſt oppoſite to thoſe we feel upon its Account. And ſuch in general are our *Paſſions*.

ADVERTISEMENT.

See Book III. In the Virtues of Fortitude and Temperance.

THE Nature of theſe *Paſſions* comes next to be conſider'd; and my Deſign in it is, to expoſe the Folly, the Vanity, the Miſery, the Unreaſonableneſs and Injuſtice, the Horror and Deformity that is in them; that ſo Men may be taught to know them as they are, and to hate them as they deſerve. The Advices proper for preſerving our ſelves from the ill Effects of them, will be deliver'd at large in the following Books. For the two Parts of a Phyſician's Buſineſs, you know, are firſt to ſhew the Diſeaſe, and then to apply fit Remedies. My preſent Care then ſhall be, to tell Men what they ail, and where their Diſtemper lies; and for the Preſcriptions they muſt wait a little longer.

Now of the ſeveral *Paſſions* here to be deſcrib'd, thoſe ſhall firſt be ſpoken to, which have a reſpect to the Appearance of Good, ſuch are *Love*, and the ſeveral Sorts of it; *Deſire*, *Hope*, *Deſpair*, *Joy*, and the like. And after theſe we will enter upon thoſe that are excited in us by the Apprehenſion of Evil, which indeed are very numerous, as *Anger*, *Hatred*, *Envy*, *Jealouſy*, *Revenge*, *Cruelty*, *Fear*, *Grief* and *Compaſſion*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Love in general, and at large.

Love compar'd with and diſtinguiſh'd from the reſt.

LOVE is the Firſt, the Chief, the Reigning Paſſion; the reſt are all deriv'd from, and reduced at laſt into This; But it is of vaſt Extent, employ'd upon different Subjects, diſtinguiſh'd into different Sorts and Degrees. Of Theſe the *Three* principal that fall within our preſent Purpoſe, and to which all the reſt may very well be referr'd, are *Ambition* or *Pride*, which is the Love of Honour and Greatneſs; *Avarice*, which is the Love of Riches; and *Senſuality*, or *Carnal Deſire*, which is the Love of Pleaſure. (Theſe I call ſuch as come within our preſent Deſign, which is to treat of *Love*, as it is vicious, and the Effect of Paſſion; for *Virtuous Love*, which may be diſtinguiſh'd into Friendſhip, Charity, and Natural Affection or Tenderneſs, is out of the compaſs of this Place, and will be ſpoken to under the *Virtue* of *Juſtice.*) Book III.

The *Three* foremention'd *Paſſions* are thoſe Three Gulphs and Precipices, that drown ſo great a Part of the World in Deſtruction and Perdition; the Plagues of Mankind; from the Infection whereof, how few, exceeding few eſcape untouch'd? The Corruptions that taint every Part of us, even all we are, and All we have, and All we take Hand; our Souls, and Bodies, and Poſſeſſion Theſe are the Magazines, from whence the

Book I. Three mortal Enemies of the Peace and Salvation of Mankind, the *Devil*, the *World*, and the *Fleſh*, furniſh themſelves with Arms to aſſault and deſtroy us. They may in Truth be call'd Three *Powers* or *Potentates*, the commoneſt and moſt univerſal Paſſions, whoſe Territories are ſo large, that the Apoſtle hath divided the whole Univerſe between them. *All that is in the World* (ſays he) *the Luſt of the Fleſh, and the Luſt of the Eyes, and the Pride of Life.*

1 Joh. ii. 16.

Of theſe, *Ambition* is the moſt refin'd and ſpiritualiz'd, and hath therefore been eſteem'd more noble, or leſs mean, than the Two others. *Senſuality*, or *Love of Pleaſure*, in regard of its being more Natural and Univerſal, (for even Beaſts, which are wholly unacquainted with the other Sorts, have a Share in this) is more violent, and leſs vicious. When I ſpeak of Violence, I mean, conſidering it ſimply, and according to the Nature of the Thing. For tho' it may, and ſometimes does happen, that *Ambition* prevails over it, yet this is a particular Diſtemper, a Caſe excepted from the common Courſe, and general Rules. But of all the reſt, *Avarice* is the moſt ſtupid and ſenſeleſs Paſſion, the ſureſt Symptom of a ſordid and ſickly Mind.

CHAP. XX.

Of Ambition.

AMbition is a Thirſt of Honour and Glory, a greedy, and gluttonous, and inordinate Deſire of Greatneſs. It is naturally a gentle and pleaſing Paſſion, which with much Eaſe inſinuates itſelf into Great and Generous Spirits, and is not driven out again without great Difficulty. We all think it our Duty and Commendation, to purſue aud embrace that which is *Good*; and of all Things that pretend to this Character, *Honour* is moſt in Requeſt and Eſteem with us. And therefore all of us run full ſpeed, and put our ſelves upon the utmoſt Stretch, where This is the Prize. The Ambitious Man ſtrives to be firſt, keeps his Eye forward upon the Goal, and upon thoſe that have the Start of him; but forgets and takes no Notice of the many he hath outſtripp'd himſelf. He feels more Diſcontent for One Man that hath got before him, than he enjoys Satisfaction for a Thouſand that he hath left lagging after. *Seneca* obſerves very well, * *This is the conſtant Fault, and inſeparable ill Quality of Ambition, never to look behind it.* Now *Ambition* is of *Two* ſorts; The *One* aſpires after Glory and Honour, a Good Reputation, a Great and Immortal Name; and this is of Great Uſe and Publick Benefit: It is 1. *Definition of it.*

* Habet hoc vitium omnis Ambitio, non reſpicit.

not

Book I. not only allowable, but in ſome Senſe, and under certain Qualifications and Reſtraints, highly commendable: The *Other* ſort affects Greatneſs and Power; and this is generally not only vicious, but deſtructive, and of moſt fatal Conſequence to the World.

2. *'Tis natural to us.* *Ambition* hath this peculiar Advantage, that the Seeds of it are ſown, and the Root of it faſt fixed in the Heart of every one of us. We have a Proverb indeed, which tells us, *Nature is contented with a very little*; but then we have another too, that ſays with as great Truth the direct contrary; That *Nature is never ſatisfy'd*, nor capable of being contented at all. A Man never comes to the End of his Deſires, ſo as to ſet up his Reſt, but is always for climbing a little higher, and growing a little richer. No Man goes a moderate Pace, or chuſes to advance leiſurely towards Greatneſs and Glory; but lays the Reins in the Neck, and rides Whip and Spur. * *Humane Nature is greedy of Preference and Power, and drives furiouſly on toward the gratifying thoſe Deſires.* And indeed, their Speed is oftentimes ſo great, that the Riders are thrown, and break their Necks; as Hiſtory and Experience ſhew a world of Aſpiring Men to have done, who have paid dear for all their Hopes, and loſt both Them and Themſelves, juſt when they were in View, and upon the Point of enjoying their promiſed Happineſs. This, in ſhort, is a Paſſion rivetted into, and interwoven with our Conſtitution; it ſeizes us early, 'tis violent while its laſts, and leaves us very late; from

* Natura noſtra Imperii eſt avida, & ad implendam Cupiditatem præceps.

whence

whence ſome of the Philoſophers have wittily call'd it the *Shirt of the Soul*, the *Vice next our Skin*, and that which is laſt pull'd off. * For even Wiſe Men are obſerv'd to ſtrip off all other Vices, before they quit this Deſire of Glory and Reputation. Ch. 20.

3. *Its Strength and Superiority.*

As *Ambition* is the moſt violent and powerful in its Influences and Effects, ſo it is likewiſe the loftieſt and moſt noble in its own Nature, of any Paſſion whatſoever. The Power and Force of it is manifeſt, in that abſolute Maſtery it gains over all other Things, even thoſe which the World is moſt ſubdued by, even all other Paſſions and Deſires. Nay, even *Love* itſelf, which ſometimes pretends to diſpute the Point of Power and Precedence, is yet miſerably vanquiſh'd and tyranniz'd over by it. *Alexander*, *Scipio*, and *Pompey*, are ſo many Inſtances of this Obſervation; and ſo are abundance of great Generals beſides, who have refus'd to gratify their Inclinations, upon extraordinary fine Women, when they had them at their Mercy: And all this from no other Principle than a Point of *Honour*, and a Soul enflamed with *Ambition*; to which the Fires of Love were ſo far from being equal, that they were made ſubſervient to it; and the Conqueſt of theſe Deſires became a Triumph and a Sacrifice to their Glory. Thus it happen'd very remarkably in *Cæſar*; for no Man alive was ever more fiercely addicted to Amours of all ſorts than He, (as the many Extravagancies he had been guilty of both at *Rome*, and abroad in Foreign Parts, abundantly teſtify)

Conquers all other Paſſions.

* Etiam Sapientibus Cupido Gloriæ noviſſima exuitur. *Tacit.*

no

Book I. no Man was ever more choice of his Perſon, more nice in Dreſs, more careful to preſerve and render it agreeable to the Ladies; and yet *Ambition* was evermore his reigning Paſſion. The Pleaſures of Love, though they had him in perfect Subjection, when This came not into Competition with them, were then ſo feeble, and ſo overmatch'd, that they never could prevail for the throwing away upon them ſo much as one Hour, which was capable of being employ'd, or made in any degree ſerviceable to the promoting his Honour. So that, notwithſtanding the Mixture of any other Paſſions, which had their Seaſons too; yet *Ambition* ſate ſupreme in his Soul, and was to all Intents and Purpoſes, as if It had had the ſole and entire Poſſeſſion of him. 'Tis true, we meet with an Example, the very *Reverſe* of this, in *Mark Anthony*, and ſome Others, who have been ſo enſlav'd by Love, as to give up All, baniſh their moſt neceſſary and weighty Cares, and loſe themſelves, and their Crowns, through mere Effeminacy and Neglect. But then theſe have been Perſons of quite different Tempers; for where both meet together, and are fairly weigh'd one againſt the other, *Ambition* will caſt the Scale. Some indeed, who argue for the Force of *Love* above it, tell you, that in reaſon it muſt needs be ſo, becauſe This extends to the Body as well as the Mind, keeps the whole Man in Captivity, and is not only agreeable, but neceſſary and convenient too. But I ſhould think, the Reaſon holds on the contrary Side, and that *Ambition* is therefore the ſtronger, becauſe the more Spiritual Paſſion: What they pretend of the Body being alſo

So concern'd in Love, proves the Passion to be [illegible] so much the feebler; for from hence it must, by [illegible] necessary Consequence, be capable of being [illegible] ted and cloy'd. Again: What is Corporeal [illegible] admits of Corporeal Remedies and Cures, some which Nature provides, and others which Art invents; and accordingly Experience hath approved these, and shewed Instances of many who have beaten down the hottest *Flames of Love*; and of some who have overcome and quenched these quite, by artificial Means, and good Management. But now *Ambition* is so far from being glutted, that its Appetite is never satisfied. [illegible] joyment does [illegible] wholly [illegible] Disease [illegible] ward [illegible] Medicines [illegible]

It does not [illegible] own [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible]

Book I. of uſing it to my Deſtruction. * *Let my Son kill me, ſo my Son may but reign.*

5. *The Laws.* Thirdly; *Ambition* makes its way through all Laws, and tramples Conſcience itſelf under Foot: The great Profeſſors of Morality, who tell you, that a Man muſt make it his Buſineſs to be entirely Virtuous, and pay an univerſal Obedience to Laws; yet when they ſpeak of *Ambition*, begin to mince the Matter, and are content to make an excepted Caſe of it. A Crown it ſeems is ſo ſweet, ſo delicious a Morſel, that the Temptation is invincible, and deſerves a Diſpenſation. The moſt abſtemious Man may ſtrain a Point, and break his Faſt upon this Feaſt. † *If ever Breach of Law and Equity be allowable*, (ſays one) *it is in the Caſe of gaining a Kingdom; but in every thing elſe, be ſure to be ſtrictly Virtuous.* "Not that even "in this, or any Caſe, ſuch Liberties are to be "indulg'd; but They who thus expreſs them-"ſelves, ſignify the ſtrong Propenſity of Hu-"mane Nature to this Paſſion; how ſtrong it is "in all, and how difficult to be ſubdued by any, "who are tempted with very great Advantages.

6. *Religion.* With the ſame Inſolence does it treat the Holieſt Things, eraſes all the Reverence of God, and treads *Religion* under Foot: For what greater Contempt of theſe can be ſhewn, than the World have ſeen in *Jeroboam*, who eſtabliſh'd an Idolatrous Worſhip for the ſecuring his Throne; and *Mahomet*, who gave general Encouragement to all

* Occidat modò imperet.

† Si violandum eſt Jus, regnandi causâ violandum eſt, in cæteris pietatem colas.

Perſua-

Perſuaſions, and valu'd not which was uppermoſt, ſo he might reign: And the old Broachers of Heresies, who rather chuſe to forſake the right Way, and ſo become Heads of Parties, and Ringleaders in Falſhood and Lyes, though a Thouſand Diſorders and Impieties were the viſible and unavoidable Conſequences of that wicked Choice, than to continue in a lower and leſs conſpicuous Station, by being Diſciples and Followers of the Truth? With regard to ſuch as theſe it is, that the Apoſtle hath admirably foretold the Doom of Ambitious Men, That they who ſuffer themſelves to be entangled in theſe Snares, *make Shipwreck of a good Conſcience, err from the Faith, and pierce themſelves through with many Sorrows.* Ch. 20. 1 Tim. i. 6.

7. *Natural Affection.*

In ſhort; It changes Men's Natures, hardens their Hearts, and makes them brutiſh; defaces all thoſe tender Impreſſions and Reſentments, which are moſt cuſtomary, and moſt due to our neareſt Relations. The infamous Accounts, which Sacred or Prophane Hiſtory hath recorded, the Barbarities and Murders committed upon the Perſons of Parents, or Children, or Brethren, are moſt of them inſtigated by this *Paſſion.* Witneſs *Abſalom*, and *Abimelech*, and *Athaliah. Romulus*, *Sei* King of *Perſia*, who ſlew his Father and his Brother; *Solyman* the *Turk*, that diſpatch'd his two Brothers. So unable is any Thing to ſtand againſt the Force of this impetuous Paſſion, which is for removing every Thing out of its way; and wherever it takes its Courſe, overturns, and lays all level with the Ground.

That

Book I. * That which renders the Caſe yet more deplorable, is, that the Nobleſt and moſt Generous Spirits, ſuch as Nature ſeems to have deſign'd for Maſter-pieces and Patterns, are moſt liable to this Paſſion. It is in itſelf a tall and ſtately Quality, and none but great Souls are capable of giving it Reception. This was the Temptation which ſeduced the *Angels* themſelves; a Temptation of all others beſt accommodated to their Circumſtances, and perhaps the Only one the Perfection of their Nature could be corrupted by: For *Ambition* is a Vice not ſuited to mean and little Souls. Your pitiful ſcoundrelly Fellows cannot come up to it; nor can common and indifferent Performances pretend to any Reward or Deſert, ſuch as it thirſts after. Glory and Renown always imply ſomewhat Brave and Great, and of a larger Size than ordinary; they are never to be bought at cheap and eaſy Rates; but are the Recompence and Effects of Good and Beneficial, ſhall I ſay? Nay, rather of Great and Noble, and very Difficult Actions; of uncommon and wonderful Excellencies; ſuch as excite Admiration and Aſtoniſhment, at the ſame time that they command Honour and Applauſe.

8. *It is a lofty Paſſion.*

That ignoble Greedineſs of Reſpect, that baſe and beggarly way of gaining Reputation, which ſubmits to cringing and fawning upon all ſorts of People, and declines the uſe of none, no not the moſt ſcandalous Methods of acquiring it, is ſordid

* Eſt autem in hoc genere moleſtum, quòd in maximis animis, ſplendidiſſimiſque ingeniis plerunque exiſtunt honoris, imperii, potentiæ & gloriæ Cupiditates. *Cic. Lib.* 1. *de Offic.*

and

and ſhameful. Such Honours are a Scandal Diſgrace. A Man muſt take care not to ex ſuch an Eagerneſs after theſe Things, as is in ſiſtent with the Things themſelves; not to be alted and puff'd up with vain Opinions of o ſelf, every time he does well; for he that does thus, procures his own Diſhonour; and while he ſtrives with great Pains to lift his Head above the Crowd, diſcovers his *Nakedneſs* and *Shame* at the ſame time.

Ambition is intricate and various; it takes e- ral Roads, and exerts itſelf by very differen thods. Sometimes it goes to work openly, marches ſtrait up to the Mark; and thus *Alexander*, and *Cæſar*, and *Themiſtocles*, and other tr generous Spirits have proceeded. Sometimes it works in Secret, and goes in crooked Paths; and thus ſome Philoſophers, and great Pretenders to Piety and Virtue, have indulged themſelves in the Exerciſe of it. They fetch a Compaſs, and come in at the Back-Door; like Water-Men, that row one way, and look another; they have laboured to get Honour, by a ſeeming Neglect, and Contempt of Honour: And no Doubt, as *Plato* told *Diogenes*, there is more Glory, and greater Vanity, in refuſing and trampling upon Honours and Preferments, than in ſeeking and enjoying them. And *Ambition* never manages itſelf with greater Cunning and Succeſs, than when it goes out of the beaten Road, and comes up to the Prize ſome unuſual, and unſeen Way.

10. *The Folly of it.*

Ambition is without Queſtion a very vain and fooliſh Paſſion: For after all, what does it ſo Zealouſly purſue, or what can be the Gains of it, when

Book I. rightly computed? It is giving Chaſe to a Vapour, catching at Smoke, inſtead of Fire and Light; embracing a Shadow, inſtead of Body and Subſtance; it is making a Man's whole Happineſs precarious, ſuſpending all the Satisfaction and Content of his Mind, upon Popular Opinion, the Humour, and the Breath of an ignorant and changing Multitude. It is a voluntary, and conſequently the very worſt, and moſt deſpicable Slavery; the parting with our own *Native Rights* and Liberties, and depending upon the *Arbitrary Paſſions* of other People: 'tis the putting one's ſelf under perpetual Conſtraint; and engaging to act contrary to one's own Senſe, in Hopes, by diſpleaſing and diſapproving our ſelves, to pleaſe and gain the Approbation of Standers-by; 'tis a ſacrificing our Affections and Reaſon to the Capriciouſneſs of Spectators; 'tis the *proſtituting* of *Conſcience* to common Opinion; renouncing all Love of Virtue, any farther than the World ſhall pleaſe to like, and keep it in Countenance; and 'tis the doing of Good, not for the ſake of Goodneſs, but merely in Conſideration of the Credit and Advantage to be got by it. In a Word, ſuch Men are like full Veſſels, that muſt be pierced for the Liquor they contain; not one Drop can be drawn from them, unleſs you give them Vent; nor any Benefit to be had of theſe Qualities, but ſuch as takes Air.

11. *'Tis Inſatiable.*

Ambition hath no Bounds; 'tis a deep *Gulph* without Bank or Bottom: This is that true *Vacuum*, or vaſt empty Space, which the Philoſophers after all their ſtudy, have never been able to diſcover in Nature; a Fire that feeds, and grows upon the Fewel we heap upon it. And in t

Reſpect indeed it is juſt to its Maſter, and pays him for his Pains. For *Ambition* is only juſt in this, that it is ſufficient for its own Puniſhment, and never fails to teaze and torment itſelf abundantly. What the Poets have couched under the Fable of *Ixion*, is the Reſtleſs Motion of the Ambitious Man's Deſires: Theſe are the Wheel that rolls to all Eternity within its own Circle, and, by its conſtant and wearyſome Returns, gives no Quiet, no Relaxation to the Mind of the vain Man that is condemn'd to turn it. Ch. 20.

12. *The Excuſes for it, vain.*

Some, who have undertaken to flatter *Ambition*, pretend in its Vindication, that it is of great Uſe to Virtue, a Whet and Spur to brave and noble Enterprizes. For Men are content to abandon many other Vices, for the ſake of This; and by degrees come at laſt to reſign this too, for the ſake of Virtue. But alas! the Matter, when critically examin'd, will be found far otherwiſe. 'Tis true, *Ambition* covers over, and conceals many *Vices*; but it takes away, and throughly reforms never a one. And even that Induſtrious Concealment, is but for a Seaſon. It rakes them up, like Fire in the Embers, under the Duſt and Rubbiſh of Hypocriſy, and Miſchievous Diſſimulation; but it is only to keep the Fire from going out, that it may be blown up, and flame out again more fiercely than ever, as ſoon as this Cheat hath carried its Point, and Men have gain'd Authority ſufficient to bear them out in Bare-faced Wickedneſs. When the Man is in Power, and too Big for Puniſhment, or Controul; then, and not before, you ſee what he truly is. Before that, truſt him not; for if you do,

Book I. you will be apt to miſtake him. When Serpents are numb'd with Cold, they have ſtill the ſame Venom in their Nature, though the Effects of it be ſuſpended for the preſent: And the Ambitious Man hath ſtill the ſame Vices, the ſame Heat and Fury; he carries it about him; how Gentle, and Tame, and Cool ſoever his Diſguiſe may be. The Fiſh is not yet caught; but when it is, then he will come abroad, in his true Colours, and Natural Complexion; and tho' *Ambition* ſhould make ſo good Progreſs toward Virtue, as to quit all other Vices; yet there is but very little Hope or Appearance of its ever renouncing itſelf. It puſhes Men to Brave and Illuſtrious Actions, I confeſs it; and the Benefit of theſe Actions to the Publick is unſpeakable; but though Others may reap the Fruit, and be the better for ſuch Actions, yet it will not follow, that the Perſon who does them is one whit the Better for them. Theſe may be the Effect of *Paſſion*, and not of *Virtue* or Principles; and if they be ſo, this Excuſe is vain. For at preſent it is not the *Profit*, but the *Intrinſick Goodneſs* of ſuch Exploits, that we are enquiring into. I know indeed this Paſſion ſhelters itſelf under that very excellent Maxim, *That We are not born for our ſelves alone, but for the General Good of Mankind:* But how good a Sanctuary this is, the Methods made uſe of for riſing in the World, and Mens Behaviour after their Promotions and Succeſſes, muſt ſhew. And Theſe, if they be nicely obſerv'd, will give us Cauſe to ſuſpect, that the Men, who talk at this Rate, ſpeak againſt their own Conſciences; and that *private Intereſt* is at leaſt an equal, if not a ſtronger *Motive* to the

the Generality of Mankind, than the *Good of others.* Men look nearer Home in all they do, and That, how large ſoever the Pretenſions to it may be, (for we cannot wonder, that Men ſhould pretend at leaſt to One of the beſt and moſt valuable Qualities in the World,) yet a *truly Publick Spirit* is very rarely to be found. Ch. 20.

See Advice *and* Remedies *againſt this* Paſſion *in particular.* Book III. Chap. 42.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Avarice, and the Paſſions oppoſite to it.

1. *What it is.*

BY *Avarice* is to be underſtood an inordinate Love, and vehement Deſire of Riches. Tho', indeed, it is not only the Love and Fondneſs for them that deſerve this Name, but all Sort of over curious Niceneſs, and ſollicitous Concern about Riches will bear it very juſtly; even the Care of diſtributing them; and Liberality it ſelf, if it take up too much of our Time and Pains, in ordering and making it exact. In ſhort, All manner of Anxious Thought, with relation to Riches, ſavours ſtrongly of this Paſſion; for they ought to be entertain'd and uſed with a becoming Negligence, and to be looked upon, as they really are, not worth any earneſt Attention of the Mind, nor a fit Object of our Care and Trouble.

2. The vehement Deſire of Riches, and the mighty

Book I. Pleaſure of Poſſeſſing them, is merely Fantaſtical; a Creature of our own Imagination, and hath no Being, no Foundation in Nature at all. 'Tis a Canker, or Gangrene in the Soul, that ſpreads and mortifies, and with its Venom corrodes and quite conſumes all our Natural Affections, and fills us with noxious and virulent Humours in their ſtead. No ſooner hath This taken up its Dwelling in our Hearts, but immediately all thoſe Tenderneſſes, and kind Concerns are baniſhed thence, which either Nature inſpires, or Virtue recommends, and improves in us. All the Duties and Regards we owe to our Relations, to our Friends; nay, to our very Selves, are no longer of any Conſideration with us. All the World, when ſet in competition with Intereſt and Profit, goes for Nothing; and at laſt we come to that paſs, as even to overlook and deſpiſe our own Perſons; our Eaſe, our Health, our Bodies, our Souls, All are ſacrificed to this Darling, this adored Wealth; and, as the Proverb expreſſes it, *We ſell the Horſe to get the Provender.*

The Folly and Miſery of it.

3. *Avarice* is a mean ſordid Paſſion; the Temper, or rather the Diſeaſe, of Fools and Earth-Worms, who eſteem *Riches* as the *Supreme Good*, and moſt exquiſite Attainment Humane Nature is capable of; and dread *Poverty* as the *Laſt of Evils*; who cannot content themſelves with a bare Competency, or ſuch Proviſions as are neceſſary for their Subſiſtence, which indeed are ſo ſmall, that very few want them. They meaſure their Riches by the Bags and Weights of Bankers, and Goldſmiths; whereas Nature teaches us to make a different Judgment, and directs us to the Standard

dard of our own juſt Occaſions. Now is not this the very Extremity of Folly, to fall down and worſhip That, which Nature hath taught us to deſpiſe, by caſting it under our Feet, and hiding it in the Bowels and dark Caverns of the Earth; as a thing not fit for publick view; but to be trampled and trod upon, as a juſt Object of our Neglect, and an Intimation of its own Worthleſneſs? There it was Originally, and there it had remained to all Eternity, had not the Vices of Mankind ranſack'd thoſe dark Cells, and with great Difficulty and Violence drawn it up: and great their Reward of ſuch Induſtry hath been: For what have they gain'd by it, but the Ground of Infinite Controverſies, and Quarrels, and Blood-ſhed, and Rapine, a Fatal Inſtrument of devouring and deſtroying one another? * *We take unſpeakable Pains to fetch up that above Ground* (ſays one) *which, when we have it, ſerves us only to fight for. Nay, we are not out of Countenance to have thoſe very Things in higheſt Eſteem, which God and Nature had made loweſt, and thought the deepeſt Mines of the Earth a Place good enough for.* Nature indeed ſeems in ſome Meaſure to have given ſure Preſages, how Miſerable thoſe Men ſhould be, who are in love with *Gold*, by the manner of its Growth, and the Quality of the Soil that produces it. For, as That Ground where the Veins of this Metal are found, is Unprofitable for other Uſes; and neither Graſs, nor Plants, nor any other Thing of Value and Ser- Ch. 20.

* In lucem propter quæ pugnaremus excutimus; non erubeſcimus ſumma apud nos haberi, quæ fuerunt ima Terrarum.

Book I. vice to Mankind, will grow there; it is in this Reſpect a moſt lively Emblem of the Minds of Men, which are enamour'd with it; They being, in like manner, the moſt ſordid, and abject, and abandon'd Wretches, curſed and condemned to Barrenneſs; void of all Honour, loſt to all Virtue; and no kind of thing that is good in it ſelf, or beneficial to the World, is to be obtained or expected from them. What a horrible Degradation is this? And how do we leſſen and diſparage our ſelves, when we give up that Dominion and Liberty to which we were born, by becoming Servants and Slaves to the very meaneſt of our Subjects? * For *Riches* (as is moſt truly obſerv'd) *are the Wiſe Man's Servants, and the Fool's Maſter's.* And, in Truth, the Covetous Man cannot be ſo properly ſaid to poſſeſs Wealth, as That may be ſaid to poſſeſs Him. He hath it indeed, but he hath it in ſuch a Senſe only, as he hath a Fever, or ſome violent Diſeaſe, which hath got an abſolute Maſtery over him, and preys upon his Vitals, and all his Faculties. How extravagant is it to dote upon That, which neither hath any Goodneſs of its own, nor was ever able to make any one Man good ſince the Beginning of the World? A Thing that *Providence* diſtributes promiſcuouſly, and with a negligent Hand; ſcatter'd in common to all the World, and the greateſt Share, very often, permitted to the worſt and moſt ſcandalous Part of Mankind? Nor is this all. For, tho' the Thing be indifferent

* Apud Sapientem Divitiæ ſunt in Servitute, apud Stultum in Imperio.

in

in its own Nature, and that ſingle Conſideration is ſufficient to wean, or at leaſt to moderate, our Affections; yet the Effects and Conſequences of it are by no means indifferent, but in the Iſſue and Event, incline ſtrongly to the Worſe. The Debaſement of Mens Minds, and the Depravation of their Manners, being the manifeſt and frequent Effect of it. And, though it cannot be proved, that *Riches* ever reform'd one ill Diſpoſition, and made it Virtuous; yet there are innumerable Inſtances of Perſons otherwiſe well-diſpos'd, who have been corrupted and made Vicious by their Means. And when we have computed all the Conveniencies that attend them, and repreſented theſe in their beſt Light, and to all poſſible Advantage; it muſt be acknowledg'd after all, that a great many Wiſe Men have liv'd very eaſy and happy without them; and a great many more Fooliſh and Naughty Men have dy'd ſcandalouſly for them. So then They are no *neceſſary Ingredient* of *Life*, and they expoſe us to Danger and Diſgrace and Death. In a Word, This is to act upon our ſelves the Barbarity and Tyranny, for which the cruel *Mezentius* was infamous; to tie the Living Body to the Dead Carkaſs, that ſo it may languiſh and expire with greater Torment; to mix a Noble and Refined Spirit, with the Droſs and Excrement of the Earth; to perplex and involve the Soul with innumerable Difficulties and Tortures, which this Paſſion will be ſure to bring upon it; to entangle one's ſelf in the Snares of the Wicked one, and voluntarily to be taken Captive by the *Adverſary of Souls*, as the Scripture admirably expreſſes it. Ch. 21.

And,

Book I. And, indeed, there is ſcarce any Vice more pathetically, and more frequently decry'd in thoſe Holy Books. Where we find theſe very ſignificant Characters given of It; *The Unrighteous Mammon*; *The Thorns which choak the Good Seed* of Piety and Virtue; *The Robber, that ſteals away Mens Hearts and Affections*; *The Nets and Snares of the Devil*; *The Idolatry*, that draws Men off from the Regard and Worſhip of the True God; and *The Love of Money, which is the Root of all Evil.* And ſure, if Men would but turn their Eyes inward, and obſerve that Ruſt and fretting Canker of Sins and Diſcontents, and deſperate Anxieties, which *Riches* breed in their Hearts, with the ſame Attention and Diligence, that they gaze upon their glittering Metals with, the Conſequence of This muſt be, that They would then be as much, and as generally hated and deſpis'd, as now, we ſee, they are belov'd and admir'd. * *Neceſſity* wants many Things; *Covetouſneſs* wants every Thing. † The Covetous Man is good to No Body, but worſt of all to himſelf.

Luk. xvi. 9. Matt. xiii. 22. 1 Tim. vi. 9. Coloſſ. iii. 5. 1 Tim. vi. 10.

4. *The contrary Paſſion.* Not but that there is another Paſſion in the contrary Extreme, which is by no means free from Vice neither; and that is, a down-right Deteſtation, and obſtinate Refuſal of Riches: For this is refuſing the Means and the Opportunities of doing good, and putting it out of a Man's own Power to practiſe many excellent and very beneficial Virtues. There needs but little Conſideration to convince us, that the uſing

* Deſunt Inopiæ multa, Avaritiæ omnia.

† Avarus in nullum bonus eſt, in ſe peſſimus.

Riches

Riches as one ought, and getting an abſolute Dominion over them, is a Taſk much more laborious and difficult, than the being content under the Want of them; and a prudent and virtuous Behaviour in Poverty, is more attainable than a ſteady Goodneſs in the midſt of Plenty. In the former of theſe Circumſtances, a Man hath but One Attack to guard, and may bend all his Forces againſt That without Diſtraction: If he can but keep his Courage up from ſinking under the Affliction, and maintain his Ground with Conſtancy and Reſolution, he hath done his Buſineſs effectually. But the *Temptations of Wealth* and Proſperity are various, I had almoſt ſaid infinite; and the Duties which are expected from Perſons in that Condition, are proportionably ſo too. There muſt be *Temperance* in the Uſe of them; *Moderation* in our Deſires; *Liberality* to thoſe that want the Comforts we enjoy; *Prudence* in the Choice of fit Objects to exerciſe that Liberality upon; *Humility*, and *Meekneſs*, and *Condeſcenſion*, and ſeveral others, too numerous to be ſpecify'd particularly. The Indigent Man hath only his own Virtue to take care of; the Rich muſt preſerve That, and hath another Taſk of Action and Diſtribution to take care of afterwards. He that diveſts himſelf of large Poſſeſſions, is at leiſure for greater and better Things, which mov'd ſome Philoſophers and Chriſtians to do ſo. He does at the ſame time diſburden himſelf of a World of Cares and Sorrows, of Duties and Difficulties unavoidable, which attend the Management of himſelf, firſt in the Purſuit and Acquiſition, then in the Keeping,

Ch. 21.

Book I. Keeping, then in the Uſing and Diſpenſing of Wealth. So that upon the whole Matter, (except when done upon a Principle of Charity and Religion) This is only the declining of Sollicitude, and Buſineſs, and Trouble; and when ſuch Men pretend to Reſignation and Magnanimity, and Contempt of the World, I ſhould make no Scruple to tell them very freely, *Gentlemen, You renounce theſe Things, not becauſe They are advantageous and you are got above them, but becauſe you know not how to make a right Uſe of them, and are afraid of the Trouble and Hazard, which thoſe who make it their Buſineſs to poſſeſs and manage them as they ought, are of Neceſſity expoſed to.* For when all is done, though *Riches* do not deſerve our *Hearts*, and are an Object *too low* for our *Affections*, yet they are as much *too high* for our *Diſdain*. And though no Wiſe Man will ſuffer himſelf to be brought into Bondage to them, nor deſire them immoderately, nor get them indirectly, nor place his Happineſs in them; yet when the Bounty of Providence hath dealt them to us fairly, and made them our *Lot*; in ſuch a Caſe, what *Seneca* hath obſerv'd is undoubtedly true, That *for a Man not to be able to bear a plentiful Fortune, is not an Argument of his Wiſdom, but a Symptom of his Weakneſs and Littleneſs of Soul.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Senſuality; and Carnal Love in particular.

THIS is a burning Fever, and furious Paſſion; and the Conſequences of it are infinitely dangerous, when a Man ſuffers himſelf to be vanquiſh'd and over-born by it. Such a one is no longer at his own Diſpoſal; His Body ſhall endure a Thouſand Tortures in Purſuit of Pleaſure; His Mind a Thouſand Reproachings and Self-Condemnations: In ſhort, he feels a perpetual Hell for the Service and Gratification of his filthy Deſire; That *Deſire*, if allow'd, and let alone, will turn to *Rage* and *Madneſs*; and yet a great part of this is unavoidable: For Nature hath given us the Inclination; and that is the Reaſon why it is common to All, and very ſtrong in the greateſt Part of Mankind. The Care incumbent upon Us muſt be, to keep a ſtrait Hand, and a conſtant Watch over this Paſſion; To check and divert its firſt Irregularities, and cool thoſe Fires which we cannot abſolutely quench: For, if indulg'd, it levels Men with Brutes, ſtupifies all our Wiſdom, baffles our Reſolution, confounds our Prudence and Conduct, breaks in upon our Contemplation, hardens the Conſcience, blinds the Eyes of the Mind, and diſturbs all the Operations of our moſt noble Faculties. This convinc'd *Alexander* that he was *Mortal*;

1. *'Tis ſtrong naturally, and common.*

Book I. *Mortal*; and is ſuch another Argument of our Frailty, as Sleep is; for both of them agree in ſuſpending, ſuppreſſing, and binding up the Powers of the Reaſonable Soul.

2. *The Shame of it, whence.* *Philoſophy* takes upon it to treat of all manner of Subjects, and uſes great Freedom of Expreſſion in doing ſo; that ſo the true Cauſes of Things may be diſcover'd, a right Judgment made of them, and proper Rules and Directions given for the governing our ſelves with regard to them. The ſame Thing *Divinity* does likewiſe, which is a Science infinitely more ſublime and refin'd, of nicer Honour, and greater Modeſty and Reſerve. And this Liberty may ſometimes be very convenient, nay, very innocent and chaſte; for the Sun ſhines upon Dunghils without contracting any of the Pollution, or ill Scents, by his Rays that fall there. "But this is a Caſe that requires "great Tenderneſs and Caution, and uſually "Silence is the moſt becoming, and the moſt "profitable: For one had better altogether con-"ceal and ſuppreſs thoſe Things, which, when "intended for Good, are yet liable and likely "to be made an ill Uſe of by moſt of Thoſe "into whoſe Hands they fall. And highly pro-"bable it is, that many Perſons have learn'd to "be more exquiſite in their Vices of this kind, "by thoſe very Precepts and particular Inſtructi-"ons, deſign'd to teach them how to prevent or "conquer thoſe Exorbitances". 'Tis true, indeed, Nature by ſtrong Impulſes perſuades to theſe Gratifications; but yet it is as true, that ſhe teaches us to bluſh, and be out of Countenance at the very Mention of what ſhe is ſo importunate

portunate for. Some indeed pretend, that we ought to be aſhamed of nothing that is Natural; and that this *Affectation* of *Modeſty* ſerves only to ſharpen Mens Appetites the more; That we may as well be aſhamed for the Infirmities of our Bodies, the ſpontaneous Motions of our Lungs, and Heart, and Veins, and Arteries; our Eating, and Drinking, and Wearineſs, and Pain, and Sickneſs, and Dying; all which, like this before us, have their Motions and Intervals, without our Conſent or Knowledge; return by certain neceſſary Cauſes, and act upon us by unſeen Springs; and All, like this too, betray the great Weakneſs, and indigent State of Humane Nature. Our Brain diſcharges itſelf by Defluxions, our Eyes by Tears, our Body by proper Evacuations; our Faces grow red or pale; our Bodies fat and lean; our Hair black, or white, or grey; and we are not concerned in, or for theſe Things; which yet are no more natural than This; yet They, or any Diſcourſe of Them, is by no means ignominious or unbecoming, and in the preſent Caſe it is. To all which Objections it were ſufficient to oppoſe the general Senſe and Practice of all civiliz'd Perſons and Countries, who, in Proportion to their being poliſh'd and refin'd above others, have ever expreſſed a greater Reſerve in educating their Children, in their own Behaviour and Converſation, and in looking upon all ſuch as impudent and profligate, who indulge looſe and wanton Diſcourſe; and even They, who are but too much Friends and Slaves to this Paſſion, chuſe rather to provoke it by diſtant myſterious Expreſſions, and nauſeate the Roughneſs and Rudeneſs of Ch. 22.

Book I. of blunt uncomely Language. But ſtill you will aſk, whence this *Shame* proceeds, and how that Cuſtom became ſo general. The Gratification of theſe Appetites, I grant you, is not ſhameful in itſelf in the leaſt: It is truly and properly Natural; and no Shame is due to it, ſimply conſidered; for Beaſts, 'tis plain, have no Senſe of any. But why do I ſpeak of Beaſts? The Sacred Oracles of God themſelves, have told us expreſly, that This is no Appendage of our Nature; that while Man preſerved his primitive Purity, and was in that Condition which was originally and truly Humane, he had no ſenſe of *Shame*, nor ever Gen. ii. 25. bluſh'd at his own *Nakedneſs*. Every Work of God is Sacred and Good, and nothing but the Abuſe can caſt a Blemiſh upon it. So that in Truth, Shame is only the Effect of Weakneſs, and that Weakneſs the Effect of Sin. *Shame* came into the World afterwards, and by Accident; it was no Part of the Creation, hath no Being in Nature, but is the *Creature* of our own *Wickedneſs*, and what we have brought upon our own ſelves, by making the *Workmanſhip* of God, *Inſtruments* of Vice and Pollution.

3. *How it is Vicious.* The true Reaſon then, which makes this Paſſion ſo violently condemn'd and run down, is not from any real Vice or Shame in it, when conſider'd abſtractedly, and in its own Nature; but from the general Corruption and Inordinancy Men are betray'd into by it. For how very few are there, that have any Regard to Moderation, or Diſcretion, or Decency? What infinite indirect Methods do they uſe for the gratifying of theſe Appetites? What Quarrels and Diſturbances, what Wars and

Publick Confuſions, what Deſolation and Ruin have been owing to this accurſed Cauſe, this common, but moſt fatal Incendiary of Mankind? Inſomuch that the Wickedneſs of the Means that introduce theſe Pleaſures, and the long black Train of Conſequences they Draw after them, are worſe a thouſand times than the Thing itſelf: The Expence and Damages are infinitely more than the Purchaſe is worth. And all theſe ill Effects are peculiar to Mankind, for other Creatures know nothing of all this Clutter. But Men have uſed great Induſtry to trapan themſelves: On one Side they make Laws to keep them off, urge *Religion*, and *Modeſty*, and *Decency*, to reſtrain their Deſires; and yet, on the other hand, they ſharpen and inflame them, ſet all their Wits at work to contrive, to confound, to get over every Thing for the compaſſing their Deſires: Witneſs *Comedy* and *Poetry* particularly, whoſe pretended Beauties, even when moſt Chaſte, were chiefly ſeen in amorous Subjects; but now they have perfectly proſtituted themſelves to Lewdneſs, and ſeem to deſign nothing ſo much, as the laughing Virtue and Reſerve out of Doors, as if Theſe were the Things we ought moſt to be aſhamed of. But of all others, the moſt miſchievous Corruption of Nature ſeems to be the ſetting an extravagant Value upon ſtoln and unlawful Pleaſures; repreſenting Injuries of this Kind as a Piece of Gallantry and Accompliſhment; and ſuffering thoſe Methods to be deſpiſed and ridiculed, which both Divine and Humane Conſtitutions have aſſigned for ſatisfying Ch. 22.

Book I. Men's Natural Deſires, by *Honeſt and Honourable Marriage.*

For Directions and Remedies againſt this Vice, conſult Book III. Chap. 41.

CHAP. XXIII.

Deſires.

1. *Deſires infinite.* THE Sea itſelf hath not more Waves and Billows, more inconſtant nor more furious in their Toſſings and Rollings, than the Heart of Man hath *Deſires.* This is a vaſt and boundleſs Ocean too, govern'd by Winds and Tides, various and uncertain; it is confus'd and irreſolute; ſometimes wicked and deteſtable, but very frequently vain and ridiculous in its Deſires.

2. *Their Diſtinctions.* But the firſt and moſt neceſſary part of this Conſideration, ought to be a due Care to diſtinguiſh them rightly; for this is what they are very capable of. And here you may obſerve, That ſome of theſe are Natural; and they that be ſo, are juſt and lawful, and common to us with Beaſts: They are likewiſe ſhort, and bounded in a narrow Compaſs; a Man may eaſily ſee to the End of them. For Theſe there is abundant Proviſion, and no Man is poor in this reſpect. An Occaſion of enlarging upon theſe will preſent itſelf more conveniently hereafter; for in truth they do not properly belong to the Subject we are now upon, ſince, ſtrictly ſpeaking, they are not Paſſions.

The Others are either beſide, or beyond Nature;

ure; they have no Foundation in our Frame and Temper, but exiſt only in our Opinions, and are the Off-ſpring of Fancy and Imagination; theſe are Artificially form'd by Induſtry and ſtrong Impreſſion; they are ſuperfluous too; ſerve only to gratify our Humours, not to ſupply any real Neceſſities. And if you would have them diſtinguiſhed from the former by a different Name, call them if you pleaſe, the *Covetings of the Soul.* Theſe are entirely our own; the Portion or the Scandal of our Species. Beaſts are altogether unacquainted with them; Man is the only Creature Irregular in his Appetites. Theſe have no certain Mark to aim at, no End where to ſtop; but are Eternally in Motion, run wild and at random, and know not what they would have. * *The Deſires which Nature ſuggeſts, are determined and finite; but thoſe which ariſe from Opinion and Whimſy, are infinite; for Error knows no Bounds. A Man that goes in the Road muſt come to his Journey's End at laſt; but he that wanders out of the Way, may wander for ever.* With regard to Theſe, no Man ever was, none ever can be Rich or Contented. Somewhat conſtantly falls ſhort, or ſome freſh Thing is wanting. Of theſe it is that the Poet ſpeaks, Ch. 23.

† *Their Stores increaſe, and yet I know not what,*
Still they do ſomething want,

Creech; Horat. Od. XXIV. Lib. III.

* Deſideria naturalia finita ſunt. Ex falsâ opinione naſcentia ubi deſinant non habent. Nullus enim Terminus falſo eſt. Vitâ eunti aliquid extremum eſt, Error immenſus eſt. *Senec.*

† Scilicet improbæ
Creſcunt Divitiæ; tamen
Curtæ neſcio quid ſemper abeſt rei.

Book I. *Which neither Pains can get, nor Heaven can grant,*
To ſwell their narrow, to a full Eſtate.

To ſuch wanton Longings of the Soul, the Characters ſet down at the Beginning of this Chapter agree; and They are what we mean, and are now treating of under this Head of *Paſſions*. Theſe are the Things we ſweat and toil ſo vehemently for, the gaining what we might very well be without, and the ſatisfying Deſires which we ought not to entertain. 'Tis upon the Account, and for the Sake of Theſe, that we compaſs Sea and Land; that we take up Arms, and kill one another; nay, that Men kill and drown themſelves, betray and ruin themſelves; which gave juſt Grounds for ſaying, that *Covetouſneſs is the Root of all Evil.* The Matter indeed is ſometimes ſo order'd by *Providence*, that this inordinate Paſſion of the Mind ſhould be made its own Puniſhment; and while Men are greedy to gratify their *fantaſtical Wants*, and glut themſelves with the Riches and Pleaſures of Fortune, they loſe a *real Good*, and cut themſelves off from the Advantages of Nature: Which are ſo much more valuable than the other, that *Diogenes*, who refus'd the large Preſent of Money offer'd by *Alexander*, deſired as a greater Favour, that he would pleaſe to ſtand aſide, and not hinder him from the Comfort and Brightneſs of the warm Sun-ſhine.

CHAP. XXIV.

Hope and Deſpair.

THOSE Deſires which are Natural, a
theſe Covetings laſt mention'd, which a
Accidental, and Diſeaſes to the Soul, are ch
riſh'd by *Hope*. This inſpires them with
and Strength; this blows up our extravagant in
ginations with a gentle and pleaſing Breath; ki
dles a Fire in our Minds, but raiſes t
Smoak withal, that it quite blinds th
ſtanding; our Thoughts are loſt and bev
and violently carry'd away with it; it keeps u
in perpetual Suſpenſe, and makes us dream with
our Eyes waking. As long as ever our Hopes
laſt, we never let go our Deſires. But on the
other hand, when once *Deſpair* takes poſſeſſion of
us, the Soul is perfectly put upon the Rack; and
the Thought that we ſhall never be able to ob-
tain what we aim at, is ſo torturing and violent,
that it bears down all before it; and we loſe
what we ſtand actually poſſeſt of, for the ſake of
ſomewhat which we apprehend impoſſible to be
poſſeſt. This Paſſion is like froward Children,
who, when you take away one of their Play-
things, throw the reſt into the Fire for Madneſs.
It grows angry with it ſelf, turns its own Exe-
cutioner, and revenges its Misfortunes upon its
own Head. It refuſes to live under Diſappoint-
ments and Croſſes, and chuſes rather not to be

Book I. at all, than to be without the Thing which it hath once imagin'd neceſſary to its Happineſs. And thus you have had a ſhort Account of thoſe *Paſſions* which have ſome *apparent Good* for their Object; we will proceed in the next place to conſider thoſe others, which ariſe from the Apprehenſion of *Evil.*

CHAP. XXV.

Of Anger.

1. *Deſcription.* ANger is a fooliſh and a frantick Paſſion, which puts us quite beſides our ſelves; and by ſeeking ſome means of beating back the Evil, that either approaches and threatens, or hath already reached and fallen upon us, makes the Blood boil in our Hearts, and raiſes wild and furious Vapours in our Mind; ſuch as blind and pervert our Reaſon, and thruſt us headlong upon any, tho' never ſo deſperate Attempts, that may contribute to the ſatisfying thoſe Deſires we have of taking Revenge, and doing Miſchief upon the Perſon that gave the Provocation. It is a ſhort Madneſs, and dangerous, not only for the time it continues, but as it prepares and opens the Way for a laſting Phrenzy and Diſtraction. The Motions of it are ſo ſudden, the Violence ſo ſtrong, that it overpowers all our other Paſſions, ſwallows them up quite, or carries them along with it by the Force of its own Torrent.

The

Ch. 25.

2. *Its Cauſes.*

The *Cauſes* from whence it ariſes are various. I. *Weakneſs of Judgment*, which is moſt remarkable in Women and Children, Aged and Sick People; whom Experience ſhews to be of all others the moſt fretful and peeviſh, and eaſie to be provoked. * *Every thing that is infirm, is naturally diſpoſed to be querulous and froward.* It is a Miſtake as great as it is common, to imagine that Fierceneſs and Rage is an Argument of Courage: for all violent Motions are like the Efforts of old Men and Children, who run when they would walk, and go faſter, becauſe they have not Strength enough to go ſlow. There is not in the World any Thing ſo feeble as an irregular and unſteddy Motion; and therefore *Anger*, which is ſuch in the Mind, is rather a Mark of Infirmity and Cowardiſe. It is a Diſtemper in the Soul, which makes it tender and ſore, not able to endure Offences; as Hurts and Wounds in the Body render the Smart of every little Blow intolerable. Were it in a State of perfect Health and Soundneſs, every Trifle could not create ſo great a Diſorder. † *But when all is full of Aches and Diſeaſes, the gentleſt Touch is troubleſome*, and *it is always complaining, becauſe always ailing.* A Miſer will fume and ſtorm for the loſs of a Penny, for the miſſing of ſome Advantage which he might have gain'd; A jealous Huſband will fall into a Rage for the moſt innocent Smile of his Wife, or the leaſt Glance of her Eye. *Luxury* and *Niceneſs*, or any particular Fancy, II.

* Invalidum omne naturâ querulum eſt.

† Nuſquam ſine querelâ ægra tanguntur.

Book I. that renders a Man Singular and Humorſome, and Uneaſie, is apt upon the leaſt Accident which croſſes that Humour, to put him into *Paſſion*; and * *No one thing* (ſays a great Philoſopher) *che-*

III. *riſhes Anger more than this vain Temper.* So again does the being fond of any little trifling Things, not worth our Affection and Concern: A Glaſs, a Dog, a Bird; This is a Folly that gives us a great deal of Trouble, and often expoſes us to moſt unreaſonable Paſſions; the leaſt of which is more than they can poſſibly deſerve. Ano-

IV. ther Cauſe is *Curioſity*, and a buſie inquiſitive Temper. † *He that aſks too many Queſtions, is ſollicitous to diſquiet himſelf:* This is ſo far from avoiding, and conniving at, that it is ſeeking Occaſions, hunting about, and following the Scent, and with great Eagerneſs and Pleaſure running abroad after Provocations, without having the Patience to ſtay till They come home to Us. *Sometimes indeed* (ſays *Seneca*) *Anger comes to Us, but not near ſo often as We go to It.* Ano-

V. ther is *Credulity* and *Eaſineſs*, the ſuffering our ſelves to be poſſeſt with the firſt Account, and the firſt Chance-comer, and not reſerving an Ear free for the other ſide of the Cauſe, nor ſuſpending our Belief till more perfect Information. But the Principal, and indeed the very formal

VI. Cauſe of *Anger*, is an *Opinion that we have been undervalu'd, and ill us'd*; That ſome Word, ſome Look, (for any thing will ſerve) carried an Air of Contempt, and was leſs reſpectful than it

* Nulla res magis Iracundiam alit, quam Luxuria.

† Qui nimis inquirit, ſeipſum inquietat.

ought

ought to have been. This is always the Argument angry Men lay hold of in their own Juſtification. Ch. 25.

" And no wonder then, that proud " Men are moſt Cholerick, and fuller of Reſent- " ment than any others, ſince no other Diſpo- " ſition makes Men think ſo much their Due, " and conſequently inclines them to be ſo jea- " lous of Affronts, and Omiſſions in point of " Reſpect. For which Reaſon the Scripture tells us, that *Only by Pride cometh Contention*, in one Place, and ſtiles it moſt Emphatically *Proud Wrath* in another. Prov. xiii. 10. xxi. 24.

3. *Signs of it.*

The Signs and Symptoms of this Paſſion are many, and manifeſt, more and more viſible than thoſe of any other; and ſo Strange and Strong, that they make a mighty Difference in the Perſon, alter the whole Temper and Frame both of Body and Mind, transform and turn him into quite another Man. Inſomuch, that * *it is not eaſie to ſay, whether this Vice be more deteſtable, or more deformed and diſfiguring*; Some of theſe Changes and Symptoms are outward and apparent: Redneſs and Diſtortions of the Face, **Fierineſs of the Eyes, a wild and enraged Look, Deafneſs and Inſenſibility in the Ears, Foaming at the Mouth, Palpitation of the Heart; Quickneſs and Unevenneſs of the Pulſe, Swelling and Burſting Fulneſs of the Veins, Stammering in the Tongue, Gnaſhing and Setting of the Teeth, Loudneſs and Hoarſneſs in the Voice, the Speech thick and indiſtinct; and in ſhort, The whole Body is ſet on Fire, and in a perfect Fever.**

* Ut ſit difficile, utrum magis deteſtabile vitium, aut deforme.

Some

Book I. Some have been tranſported to ſuch a Degree, upon theſe Occaſions, that their very Veins have broke, their Urine ſtopt, and they have dropt down dead, being ſtifled and ſtrangled with exceſs of Paſſion. And what Condition can we ſuppoſe their Mind muſt be in in the mean while, when the Diſorders of the Body are ſo violent and Diſmal? *Anger*, at the firſt Bruſh, quite baniſhes *Reaſon* and confounds the Judgment; clears all before it, and takes Poſſeſſion for it ſelf alone; and when it hath got it, then it fills all with Fire and Smoke, with Darkneſs and Confuſion, with Noiſe and Clamour; it is like a Robber, or an Enemy, that firſt drives the Maſter out of doors, and then ſets Fire to his Houſe, and that with ſuch Fury and Madneſs, as to deſtroy and burn it ſelf alive in the Flames. It is like a Ship that hath neither Rudder, nor Pilot; neither Sails, nor Oars, nor Ballaſt; but floats about at Random, and commits it ſelf to the Mercy of Winds and Waves; and that, when the Sea rides higheſt, and the Storms are loudeſt and moſt raging. And what can be expected in ſuch a Caſe, but Strandings and Shipwrecks, when there are ſo many Rocks on every ſide, to break her to Pieces, ſo many Quick-ſands to ſwallow her up, when ſhe thus lets her ſelf drive upon them?

4. *Its Effects.* This leads us to conſider its Effects, which are, indeed, very great, and, for the moſt part, exceedingly wretched and deplorable.

I. For Firſt; *Anger* urges and expoſes us to *Injuſtice*; it takes Fire afreſh, and is render'd more violent and fierce, by any Oppoſition, tho' never

ver ſo reaſonable and fair; and that too, not only by Diſpute from others, but even from a Man's own Senſes and Reflection, and the being conſcious to himſelf, that he is angry, either without any juſt Cauſe, or to a greater degree than the Provocation deſerved. When a Man hath thus ſuffer'd his *Reaſon* to be ſhaken and diſturbed, let one, with all the Calmneſs imaginable, offer the cleareſt Vindication, the juſteſt Excuſe, any thing to remove or mitigate this Paſſion, all is to no Purpoſe, or to worſe than none; for Truth and Innocence are ſtill but more enraging, as *Seneca* obſerves: In ſuch Caſes, * *the Unreaſonableneſs of our Paſſion makes us ſo much more obſtinate and unperſuadable, as if the being very angry, and implacable, were the beſt Argument that the Ground of our Anger is juſt.* The Example of *Piſo* upon this Occaſion is well worth our Obſervation, and the Story is generally known. He, who was in other Reſpects eminent for Virtue and Goodneſs, yet once in Heat of Paſſion put Three Perſons to Death unjuſtly; and ſtrain'd the Law to bring them in Guilty, only becauſe there had been one proved not Guilty, whom he by a former Sentence had adjudged Guilty. *Anger* is likewiſe exaſperated by *Silence* and *Coldneſs*, becauſe ſuch Indifference ſpeaks Scorn and Neglect; and when Men ſee their Reſentments make no Impreſſion, they look upon themſelves to be ſlighted and affronted. This is very uſual with Women, who oftentimes put themſelves into a Paſſion, purely for the Ch. 25.

* Pertinaciores nos facit iniquitas iræ, quaſi argumentum ſit juſtè iraſcendi, graviter iraſci.

Sake

Book I. Sake of putting other People into one too; And when they ſee that a Man does not condeſcend to be angry, and refuſe to heap on more Fewel, they take all imaginable Pains to cheriſh and blow up their own Fire, and grow perfectly outrageous. So wild and ſavage a Beaſt is *Anger*, ſo fierce and Intractable, that neither Vindications nor Submiſſions, neither Excuſing nor Acknowledging, neither Speaking nor holding one's Peace, can do any good upon it. No foul Means can tame, no fair ones win it over, or make it gentle. The Injuſtice of this Paſſion is farther evident, in that it always takes upon it ſelf to be both Party and Judge in the ſame Cauſe, in that it expects all manner of People that hear or know any thing of the Matter, ſhould take its Part, and juſtify its Proceedings; and takes it mortally ill, nay, flies in the very Faces of all that either ſtand neuter, or in any degree ſeem to think it in the wrong.

II. A Second Effect of this Paſſion is *Headineſs* and *Obſtinacy*, Raſhneſs and Inconſideration. It drives us forward, and thruſts us down headlong, into unſpeakable Miſchiefs; and very often draws upon our own Heads the very Calamities we are endeavouring to avoid by being angry; the very ſame Sufferings, or many times worſe than thoſe, which We in the Bitterneſs of our Malice and Revenge, are ſo eager to inflict upon others; and thus, while it puniſhes an Enemy, it tortures and executes it ſelf. This *Paſſion* is no ill Reſemblance of *Great Ruins*, which cruſh indeed, and batter whatever they fall upon, but in the ſame Fall break themſelves to Pieces. *Anger* is

ſo

ſo eagerly bent upon the Hurt and Deſtruction of others, that it fights out of all Guard, and takes no manner of Care to avoid or ward off its own Death. It draws us in, and hampers us in a Thouſand Inconveniencies; puts us upon ſpeaking and doing many Things that are baſe and unworthy, ſuch as by no means become us, and what we cannot but be, at leaſt we ought to be, moſt heartily aſhamed of. To be ſhort; it tranſports Men to thoſe Exceſſes of Extravagance and Rage, that they know not what they do; enſnares them in the moſt injurious, the moſt ſcandalous Actions; hurries them into Miſchief incapable of any Reparation, Murders and Bloodſhed; Treachery and Villany, Poiſonings, and ſecret Aſſaſſinations; Things that leave long and laſting Remorſe behind, and ſuch as they cannot but have very afflicting Remembrance of ever after. *Alexander the Great* was a remarkable Inſtance of this kind; and *Pythagoras* uſed to ſay, that *where Anger ended, their Repentance always began.* Ch. 25.

5. This *Paſſion* is never to be convinced of *Folly*; it is big, and always well ſatisfied with its own Diſcretion and Juſtice; flatters and pleaſes it ſelf with a Notion, that the Man does well and wiſely to be angry; clears it ſelf from all manner of Blame, and lays the whole Fault upon ſome ill or indiſcreet Thing done, that gave the Provocation. But, ſuppoſing another guilty of Injuſtice, it will not therefore follow, that my Anger is guilty of none. Suppoſe I receive Injury from another Hand, will my paying back the ſame, or a greater Wrong, take off what I ſuffer?

Book I. ſuffer? Will it make me any real Amends, or bring any true Profit to me, that another ſuffers as well as I? The Truth is, *Anger* hath too much of Obſtinacy and hair-brain'd Giddineſs, ever to do any Good. It pretends to cure one Evil with another; and when we turn over an Offence to be corrected by this Paſſion, it is no better than ſetting Vice to chaſtiſe and puniſh it ſelf. *Reaſon*, which ought always to bear the Sword, and exerciſe the Supreme Authority in our Breaſts, does not deſire any ſuch hot-headed Officers to execute her Commands, as do Things upon their own Head, without waiting for Orders. *Reaſon*, like Nature, works eaſily and gradually, is ſedate and ſlow; and whatever is violent, is equally foreign, and contrary to both.

But you will ſay, What! muſt Virtue then be ſo tame and ſoft, as to ſee the Inſolencies of Vice Triumphant, without any degree of Indignation and Concern? Muſt ſhe be ſo bound up, as not to take the Liberty of being angry, nor dare to make any Oppoſition againſt unreaſonable and wicked Men? To this I anſwer, *Virtue* hath its Freedoms, but they are ſuch as are juſt; it takes, it deſires none, that are unfit or unbecoming. It hath Courage too, but this Courage muſt not be employ'd againſt it ſelf. Nor muſt another Man's Ill be converted to its Prejudice and Diſturbance. A Wiſe Man is as much obliged to bear the Vices of Naughty People without Paſſion, as he is to ſee their Proſperity without Envy. The Indiſcretion of raſh and heady Men, muſt be endur'd with the ſame Patience and Pity that a good Phyſician exerciſes towards his Patients, when they

are

are under the Ravings of a Fever. There is not any one Inſtance of *Wiſdom* more commendable in it ſelf, nor more uſeful to the general Good of the World, than that of being able to bear with the Follies and Extravagancies of other People. For if we do not ſo, the Conſequence will be, that we ſhall fall into the ſame Extravagancies; and by not ſupporting Their Follies, we make them our Own. Ch. 25

What hath been ſpoken here at large of *Anger* in particular, is in great meaſure applicable to the *Paſſions* that follow; ſuch as *Hatred*, and *Envy*, and *Revenge*; for theſe are the ſame in Subſtance, and at the Bottom; They are Anger too, but they are ſomewhat otherwiſe modified, appearing in different Forms, and cloath'd with different Circumſtances.

Proper Advice *and* Remedies *againſt this* Paſſion, *will be treated of*, Book III. Chap. 31.

CHAP. XXVI.

Hatred.

HAtred is a very odd Paſſion. It gives us a great deal of unaccountable Vexation, contry to all the Reaſon in the World. And yet hat is there more torturing and inſupportable, this Reſentment? By It we put our ſelves ectly under the Dominion of the Thing we ; and give it a Power to afflict and torment

us.

Book I. us. The Sight of it diſturbs our Senſes, ruffles our Spirits, and makes the whole Body ſick and diſorder'd: The Remembrance of it raiſes a Storm in our Minds; and ſleeping or waking, fills us with Diſquiet and Impatience. The Ideas of ſuch Objects are always hideous and ſhocking; and we never entertain them without Indignation and Horror, Spight or Grief; ſome Reſentment not eaſy to be expreſs'd, which puts us beſide our ſelves, and rends our very Heart aſunder. Thus we feel in our own Perſons, all that Torment we wiſh another, and undergo the Puniſhment we think due to Him. He that hateth, is, at this rate, the *Patient*, and he that is hated, the *Agent*. Thus it certainly is to all Intents and Purpoſes; excepting only, that we think fit to expreſs it otherwiſe, and deceive our ſelves with Words, and Names of Things: For it is evident to common Senſe, that the *Hater* is in Pain, and the *Perſon hated* in perfect Eaſe; perhaps too, in perfect Ignorance of the Matter. But, after all, let us conſider and examine this Point a little. What is it that we hate? Men? or Things? Be it the one or the other, 'tis plain we do not pitch upon the right Object. For if any Thing in the World deſerves to be hated heartily, *it is Hatred it ſelf*, and ſuch other Paſſions, which, like this, breed Diſcords, and raiſe Tumults in our Minds, and rebel againſt that Power, which of right ought to command, and bear an abſolute Sway in us. For when our Enemies have done all they can, ſtill neither They, nor any Thing elſe, but ſuch exorbi-

exorbitant Paſſions as theſe, can do us any real and effectual Injury. Ch. 26.

For Particular Directions *againſt this* Evil, *See* Book III. Chap. 32.

CHAP. XXVII.

Envy.

ENvy is own Siſter to *Hatred*; as like as Two Twins, in their Fierceneſs and miſerable Effects. This is a wild outragious Beaſt indeed, more exquiſite in Torture than Ten thouſand Racks; and of all that wretched Mankind feels, beſt deſerves the Title of an Hell upon Earth. This lies perpetually corroding and tearing the Heart-ſtrings, and converts other Mens Happineſs into an Occaſion of our Miſery. And how dreadful, how inceſſant muſt that Vexation be, which both Good and Evil conſpire to aggravate? Of the many ill Effects this Paſſion hath, That is a very conſiderable one; That, while Envious Men look awry upon the Proſperity of others, and grudge them Their Comforts, they unavoidably ſuffer their Own to periſh, and ſlip thro' their Fingers, and have no Pleaſure or true Enjoyment in all that the moſt bountiful Providence does, or can, beſtow upon themſelves.

Directions *and* Remedies, *Proper for this* Evil, *will be preſcrib'd in* Book III. Chap. 33.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Jealouſy.

1. THE Nature and the Effects of *Jealouſy* have a mighty reſemblance to that Paſſion of *Envy* laſt deſcrib'd, excepting only that they differ in this one Circumſtance: The *Good* of other Men is the Object of our *Envy*; but our *own Happineſs* is the Object of *Jealouſy*. Some Good, which we are deſirous to ingroſs to our ſelves, and which we apprehend belongs to Us alone; for which reaſon we dread and deteſt the Communication to any Perſon beſide.

2. *Jealouſy* is a Diſeaſe of the Soul; an Argument of great Weakneſs; an evil and a fooliſh Diſeaſe, but withal a furious and terrible one: It rages and tyrannizes over the Mind; inſinuates it ſelf under the Pretence of extraordinary Friendſhip and Tenderneſs: But when it hath gotten Head, and taken Poſſeſſion, it builds a mortal Hatred upon the Foundation of Kindneſs. Virtue, and Health, and Beauty, and Deſert, and Reputation, which are the Attractives of our Love and Affection, are likewiſe the Motives and Incendiaries of this Paſſion; they kindle and miniſter freſh Fewel to both theſe Fires.

3. This is *Wormwood* and *Gall* to us: It depraves and embitters all the Sweets of Life: and commonly mingles it ſelf with our moſt delightful Enjoyments; and theſe it renders ſo ſoure and unpleaſant,

unpleaſant, that nothing can be more uneaſy to us. It turns Love into Hatred, Reſpect into Diſdain, Aſſurance into Diſtruſt: It breeds a moſt unhappy Curioſity; makes us buſie and inquiſitive to our own Ruin; deſirous and impatient to know what nothing but the Ignorance of, can keep us tolerably eaſie under; and what, when we do know, there is no Cure for, but ſuch as make the Misfortune worſe, and more painful. For whither does all this Information tend, but only to bring the Matter out of Darkneſs and Doubt, into clear and open Day; to have Demonſtration of our own Unhappineſs, and to proclaim it to all the World; to make our ſelves a publick Jeſt, and to entail Shame and Diſhonour upon our Families? Ch. 28.

Advice and Remedies againſt this Paſſion are to be met with in Book III. Chap. 35.

CHAP. XXIX.

Revenge.

THE Deſire of *Revenge* is, in the firſt place, a *cowardly* and *effeminate Paſſion*; an Argument of a weak and ſordid, a narrow and abject Soul; and accordingly Experience teaches us, that Women and Children, and ſuch others as have manifeſtly the feebleſt Minds, are ever the moſt malicious, and diſpos'd to Revenge. *Brave* and *Generous Minds* feel little of theſe Reſentments: they deſpiſe and ſcorn it; either becauſe 1.

Book I. an Injury, when done to them, does not make any great Impreſſion; or that the Perſon who does it, is not thought conſiderable enough to give them any Diſturbance; but ſo it is, that they feel themſelves above any Commotions of this kind, as the Poet ſays,

* *A Wretch beneath the mighty* Cæſar's *notice.*

Hail, and Thunder, Hurricanes and Tempeſts, and Earthquakes, all theſe diſorderly Agitations, and loud Ratlings, which we ſee, and feel, and hear, are form'd in theſe lower Regions of the Air; They never diſcompoſe, or in any Degree affect the Heavenly Bodies and higher Orbs; All there is quiet, and conſtant, and ſerene; Theſe frail, and corruptible, and groſſer Bodies only are they that ſuffer by them. And thus it is with the Rage and Folly, the Noiſe and Brawlings, the Impudent and Impotent Malice of Fools: They never ſhake great Souls, nor carry ſo far as lofty and generous Minds: An *Alexander* or a *Cæſar*, an *Epaminondas* or a *Scipio*, cannot be mov'd by all that ſuch mean Wretches could do or ſay: for all truly Brave Men, and theſe in particular, have been ſo far from meditating *Revenge*, that, on the contrary, they were remarkable *for doing good to their Enemies.*

2. Secondly, This is a very troubleſome and *reſtleſs Paſſion*, full of Heat, full of Smart and Sting; it boils and bubbles in the Breaſt, and gnaws the Heart like a Viper; diſtracts the Men infected, diſturbs their Enjoyments, takes off the Peace and

* Indignus Cæſaris Iræ.

Comfort

Comfort of their Days, and breaks the Sleep of their Nights. Ch. 29.

3. It is alſo a *Paſſion full of Injuſtice*; for it tortures an innocent Perſon, and adds Grief and to him, that was wounded and afflicted before. It is properly the Party's Buſineſs who commited the Offence, to labour under the Remorſe and the Puniſhment; and all thoſe other ill conſequences, which the Deſire of Revenge v ably draws after it. And yet by this, the ſuffering and Guiltleſs Party makes it his Care load himſelf with theſe heavy Burdens, as if the receiving of the Injury were not of itſelf affliction ſufficient, without ſuch voluntary ſtudied Aggravations. Thus it happens t u ly, (generally indeed) that, while the Innocent and Injur'd is racking himſelf with the impatient Deſires, and the Contrivance of proper Methods for Revenge, the guilty Aggreſſor enjoys himſelf in Eaſe and Pleaſure, and perhaps makes the Other's Uneaſineſs a Jeſt and a Diverſion. But This is only the Beginning of Miſchiefs and Injuſtice; for the Means of putting ſuch Deſires in Execution are yet infinitely more ſo; which indeed are of all, of any Kinds; Baſeneſs and Treachery, Perjury and Subornation, a ſecret Stab, or an Ambuſcade of Ruffians; in ſhort, the fouleſt, blackeſt, and moſt villanous Deſigns: For one peculiar ill Effect of this Vice is, that it extinguiſhes all Natural Juſtice, breaks through all the Reſtraints of Honour and Duty, and ſticks at no Practice, though never ſo foul and deteſtable, to accompliſh its Bloody Intentions.

Book I. Laſtly, The very Execution of theſe Deſigns,
is not only painful and difficult, but extremely
4. dangerous: For Experience ſhews us daily, that he who endeavous to revenge himſelf, does not effect his whole Wiſh, nor is in every Point ſucceſsful: Either he meets with a Defeat, and cannot do the Miſchief he would; or, at leaſt, he is diſappointed as to his own Security and Satisfaction, and ſuffers the Miſchief he would not. He attempts to put out One of his Enemy's Eyes, and at the ſame time puts out Both his own. He renders himſelf obnoxious to Juſtice, and brings Trouble and Danger to all his Friends; is loſt to the World, and to his own Quiet; forced to hide and flee from Place to Place, and is every where dogg'd cloſe at the Heels by his own guilty Fears.

5. And after all; the killing an Enemy, and diſpatching him out of the way, may be *Cruelty*; but it is not properly *Revenge*: For a Man does then only take Satisfaction and Revenge, when he humbles his Enemy, and forces him to Suffering and Submiſſion; not when he puts him paſt all Suffering, and out of the reach of his Anger; the rendring of which Senſible and Painful, is the only End Revenge can propoſe to itſelf. Accordingly we ſee, no Man is ſo vain and abſurd, to fall foul upon a Stone, or a Brute; becauſe he knows theſe cannot feel, or cannot conſider the Effects of his Rage. In all true Revenge, it is neceſſary, that the Perſon who executes it, ſhould receive ſome Satisfaction in the Pains he inflicts; and that the Perſon, on whom it is inflicted, ſhould feel

feel the Smart, and be humbled by the Sorrow, Ch. 29.
and pay ſo dear for the Injury he hath done,
that he may be made to repent it. But a Man
that is killed, is out of any Condition of Grief
Repentance; he is indeed from thenceforth
ctually ſecured from all manner of Suffer
Whereas, on the contrary, the Revenger hin
continues in a Capacity of both, and oftentim
feels the Weight of his o by
State of fix'd Sorrow and
ling then is only a Betraying of our Cow
is the Conſequence of our being afraid,
Perſon we intend to puniſh, ſhould re
Prejudice, and take an Opportunity
again in our own Coin. We are
theſe Apprehenſions to make an End
once, and rid our ſelves from any future Hazar
which is indeed to quit our Point, to loſe the End
of Revenge, and caſt a Blemiſh upon our own
Reputation. It is an Artifice, and an Act of Caution, rather than of Courage; It is an Intention
to make ſure Work, and conſults our *Safety* much
more than our * *Honour*.

* Qui occidit longè, non ulciſcitur, nec gloriam aſſequitur.

CHAP. XXX.

Cruelty.

Cruelty is a moſt horrid and deteſtable Vice, a Quality peculiar to Villains and Brutes; ſo contrary to Nature, that it is diſtinguiſh'd by that ſcandalous Name of *Inhumanity*.

It proceeds from, and indeed is the natural Effect of Baſeneſs and Cowardice: For *Valour* and *Generoſity* never exert their Power, except where they meet with Oppoſition. They have done their Buſineſs, and hold their Hand, as ſoon as they find an Enemy ſubdued, and at their Mercy. This was the true Courage of brave old *Romans*, * *To humble the Obſtinate, and ſpare the Vanquiſh'd.*

But *Cowardice*, which affects a falſe Greatneſs, and pretends to Triumphs, which belong not to it, gluts itſelf with Blood and Maſſacres, inſtead of Generous Conquering: And accordingly, we always find, that Carnage and Slaughter, have only Common Soldiers, and the plundering part of the Army, for its Executioners. And no ſurer Sign in the World can be given of Men's being timorous Poultrons, than their being fierce and bloody, and void of Pity and Remorſe. This is the very Thing that diſpoſes Tyrants and Uſurpers to Cruelty; They live always in fear, and never

* Romana Virtus—Parcere Subjectis, & debellare Superbos.

think

think themſelves tolerably ſafe, till thoſe, that Ch. 30.
are in any Condition of giving them Diſturbance,
are utterly extirpated; and therefore they lay
bout them, and fall foul upon every Body, wi
out Diſtinction; neither Age nor Sex can mo
Compaſſion, or ſeem inconſiderable enough to
ſpared.

* *Laviſh of Blood the Coward kills, The Brave*
Holds his relenting Hand, and dares to ſave.

Sneaking and timerous Dogs bite and te
Pieces the Skins and Carcaſſes of wild Beas
which they run away from, when alive and in
Fields. And what Account can be given, wh
Civil Wars, and Popular Inſurrections ſh
ſpill more Blood than foreign Engagement
What more probable than This, that the grea
Ringleaders and Actors in Seditions and Domeſtick Differences, are the Mob and Refuſe of the People; whereas the Other are begun and fought upon Principles of Honour and Juſtice, by fair and generous Enemies? When the Emperor *Mauritius* had received Information, that one *Phocas*, a Soldier in his Army, deſign'd to kill him, he enquir'd into the Temper and Character of the Man: And upon his Son-in-law *Philip*'s acquainting him, that he was a Cowardly Fellow, the Emperor preſently concluded, there was Danger indeed, and that ſuch a one was cut out for Barbarity and Murder. Sometimes, 'tis true, Another Cauſe may be given for this Quality, which is an inward Malignity and Spight; a Soul that

* Cuncta ferit, dum cuncta timet.

rejoices

Book I. rejoices in Miſchief, and feaſts upon Blood; ſuch as *Caligula* ſeems to have been particularly. But it is to be hoped, few ſuch Inſtances of Depravity are to be found; for indeed they are not Men, but Monſters in Humane Shape.

CHAP. XXXI.

Grief.

1. *Definition of it.* *Grief* is a Sinking and Deſpondency of the Mind, when dejected by an Opinion of ſome very great Evils lying heavy upon us. It is a very dangerous Enemy, deſtructive to our Quiet and Comfort; and, if good Care be not taken of it in time, waſtes and weakens the Soul, deprives us of the Uſe of our Reaſon, diſables us from diſcharging our Duties, and looking after our Buſineſs; and in time ſpreads a Ruſt upon the Soul, adulterates and depoſes the whole Man, binds up his Senſes, and lays his Virtues to ſleep, when there is moſt occaſion for rowzing and arming them againſt the Calamity, that ſubdues and oppreſſes him. In order to beget in us a becoming Averſion to this Paſſion, and employing our utmoſt Strength and Abilities to reſiſt and repel it, we ſhall do well to conſider ſeriouſly the pernicious Effects of it, and diſcover how fooliſh, how unbecoming and deformed it is; how extremely inconſiſtent with the Character of Wiſe Men, as the Philoſophy of the *Stoicks* moſt truly repreſents it. But This, as Matters are commonly order'd

is

is no ſuch eaſy Undertaking; for it hath to excuſe, and vindicate, and ſet itſelf off under the ſpecious Colours of Nature, and A and Tenderneſs, and Goodneſs; nay, the rality of the World are ſo far miſled, that keep it in Countenance, pay it Honour an ſpect, and think it a Duty and a Virtue; Wiſdom and Conſcience never appear'd beautiful than in a Mourning-Dreſs.

Now in anſwer to theſe vain Pretences Favour, we may obſerve firſt of all, th ſo far from being agreeable to Nature, as it fain be thought, that, on the contrary, it ther a Matter of Formality, and direct to Nature: which it is very eaſy to dem if Men will lay aſide the Prejudices of it and conſider it impartially. As for thoſe publ and ſolemn Mournings, (I mean not this to prejudice of a real, decent, and affectionate C cern) but for the Mournings which are practi with ſo much Ceremony and Affectation, and were ſo by the Ancients heretofore, as well as by the Generality of Mankind at this Day; Where, I ſay, can we find a greater Cheat, a groſſer Sham and Banter upon the World? How many induſtrious Impoſtures and Hypocriſies? What artificial Conſtraints in our Behaviour are ſought, and counterfeited, both by the Perſons themſelves, who are intereſted in the Occaſion of them; and of all the reſt that are taken in, and bear a Part in this melancholy Pomp? And, as if all this were not enough, we refine and improve the Deceit, we even hire Men on purpoſe to put on this Folly, to ſtand as Mutes, or to make dreadful

Book I. Lamentations; to move and heighten a Paſſion which ought to be ſuppreſs'd; to give Groans and Sighs for a Price, ſuch as we all know are feign'd and extorted; to ſhed Tears for the Entertainment of the Spectators, ſuch as fall, only when they are ſeen to do ſo, and are immediately dry'd up, as ſoon as the Company retires. And, pray, where does Nature teach us any thing like This? What can there be indeed more abſurd and vain? What does Nature condemn; what does it deteſt more than ſuch Inſincerity? This is nothing but Opinion and Faſhion, the Cauſe and Cheriſher of almoſt all our Paſſions; the Tyranny of Cuſtom, and vulgar Error, that inſtructs Men to indulge their Grief in ſuch a formal manner. From hence it is, that, if a Man be not deeply enough affected in his own Perſon, and cannot furniſh a ſufficient Proportion of Tears and hanging Looks out of his own Stock, he is thought oblig'd to hire and purchaſe a Supply from others who make a Trade of it. So that for the ſatisfying what the World calls *Decency*, we put our ſelves to vaſt Expence; which Nature, if we would take her Judgment, is ſo far from preſcribing, that She moſt freely acquits us of, nay, condemns us for it. Is not this, in Truth, a publick and ſtudy'd Affront upon Reaſon and Common Senſe, a Conſtraint, and a corrupting of Nature, a proſtituting and debauching of the Manhood in us, a mocking the World, and making a Jeſt of our ſelves; and that for no other Purpoſe, but merely to comply with the Notions of the abſurd Vulgar, which abound in nothing ſo much as Falſhood and Miſtake, and admire

mire nothing ſo much as Counterfeit and Diſ- Ch. 31.
guiſe?

Nor are our Private Sorrows much better: For *Private.*
Theſe, whatever they may ſeem, are no more Natural than the former. Did Nature inſpire or dictate them, they would be common to all Mankind; they would affect all Mankind almoſt equally; ſince All partake of the ſame Nature, and differ only in ſome few, ſome ſmall Circumſtances. But here we find very different Reſentments: The ſame Objects, which afflict and grieve ſome, are Matter of Joy and Satisfaction to others; and what draws Tears and bitter Cries from one Perſon, and one Country, is received with great Chearfulneſs by another. What One does, Another diſapproves; and the Friends of Mourners Think it their Duty to exhort, to comfort, to chide them; to beg that they would recollect themſelves, call in *Reaſon* and *Religion* to their Aſſiſtance, be Men again, and dry up their Tears. Obſerve the greateſt part of Them who take Pains to afflict themſelves; hear what they ſay when you have given them this good Counſel: They will make no Difficulty to acknowledge, that it is a Folly and a Weakneſs, to be guilty of exceſſive Paſſions; they will commend and call thoſe happy, who can ſtand the Shock of Adverſity, and have ſo much Government of Temper, and ſuch Preſence of Mind, as to meet an Affliction bravely, and bear it ſteddily, and ſet a gallant and maſculine Spirit in Array againſt it. Thus they *excuſe*, but they dare not *juſtify* their own Concern: They ſay, they cannot help it, and by that Apology, lament, if not condemn, themſelves; for

Book I. for this implies they Wiſh, and think it were better, if they could overcome their Grief. And, in truth, the Thing is very plain in theſe private Mournings too, that Men do not ſo much ſuit their Sorrows to their Sufferings, as to the received Notions of thoſe, among whom they dwell and converſe. And if we take a cloſe and nicer View, this will diſcover to us, that *Opinion* is at the Bottom of all our immoderate Melancholy; That our Torment and Vexation proceeds from the falſe Repreſentations of Things; and that we grieve, either ſooner than we ought, by Anticipation, and Fear, and ſollicitous Apprehenſions of what will come hereafter; which, like ſo many falſe Perſpectives, ſet the Object nearer our Sight, or elſe magnify the Bulk of it to our Eye, and ſo make us grieve more than we ought, upon a Suppoſal of the Calamity being much greater than really it is.

3. *Unnatural.* But ſtill all This is contrary to Nature: For *Grief* deforms and defaces all thoſe Excellencies, which are moſt beautiful and lovely in us. Theſe all are blunted and melted down by this corroding Paſſion, like the Luſtre of a Pearl diſſolved in Vinegar. And really we are then a miſerable Sight, our Head hanging down, our Eyes fixed upon the Ground, our Tongue ſpeechleſs, our Limbs ſtiff and motionleſs, our Looks wild and confuſed, our Ears deaf and inſenſible, our Minds void of all Attention and compoſed Thought. How diſtant is this from the Beauty, the Dignity, the Majeſty of our Original Form and Temper? Are theſe *Men?* You may better call them *walking Statues*, which only ſweat forth Moiſture

ſture at their Eyes; like *Niobe*, whom the Po- Ch. 31.
ets, to repreſent the Miſeries of exceſſive Grief, have feigned to be transformed into a weeping Marble.

But it were well, if this Paſſion, being unnatural, were the worſt of it; I have a yet much more heinous Accuſation to charge it with; For it flies in the Face of God himſelf, and arraigns his Juſtice, and Wiſdom, and Providence. What better Conſtruction can any Man in Reaſon put upon our raſh Complaints, and outragious Paſſions, than a Mind diſcontented with the Great Governour of the Univerſe, and his Diſpoſals of Us, and our Affairs? To murmur and repine at what is done by Him, is to find Fault with Him who does it; and in an oblique, and little more reſpectful Way, to charge him with Folly or hard Dealing. The Law and Condition, which he hath fixed to himſelf for the Government of the World, is, that all Things in theſe Sublunary Regions ſhall be changeable and inconſtant, ever in Motion, and ſubject to Decays and Death. If then we know this to be their Condition, why do we afflict our ſelves for that, which is the common Fate of all here below; for that which could not be new, and ſhould not be a Surprize to us; what if we did not, yet we might and ought to have expected? And if we did not know this, the trueſt and only reaſonable Matter for grieving, is our own moſt wretched Ignorance. A Truth, ſo evident, ſo uſeful, ſo neceſſary to be known; a Truth, that Nature hath graven every where, in Characters ſo large and legible, that it is impoſſible for us to go abroad, and not meet it, or

4. *Impious and Unjuſt.*

Book I. to turn our Eyes any way at Home, and not read it. Others, our Selves, and Every Thing carry this Inſcription, Alas! we miſtake our Poſt and Quality. Man's Buſineſs here is not to give Laws, but to receive and ſubmit to them. The Adminiſtration of Affairs is lodged in higher and better Hands. The Order of the Univerſe is eſtabliſh'd; and We, who are but a very ſmall Part of this vaſt Body, muſt follow the Motions of the Whole, and take contentedly what falls to our Share. To fret and vex our ſelves, is to be concern'd, that Eternal Ordinances are not reverſed and diſſetled for our Sakes; that we are not made an Exception to all Created Nature; which, beſides the intolerable Arrogance and Impiety it is guilty of againſt God, is no leſs inſupportable Folly with reſpect to our ſelves; for it mends not the Matter one whit, but adds Weight to what Providence hath laid upon us already, and makes all our Sufferings double.

5. *Deſtructive.* For we muſt add too, that it is exceeding *deſtructive*, and of extreme ill Conſequence to Men; The Danger whereof is but the more increaſed, by its hurting us, under a Pretence of doing us Good. It flatters with falſe Hopes, and a fair Shew of Relief; but in reality aggravates the Misfortune; and while it profeſſes to draw the Weapon out of our Side, makes the Wound wider and deeper, and thruſts a Dagger into our Hearts. Beſides, theſe Thruſts are infinitely the more difficult to defend our ſelves againſt; becauſe it is a Domeſtick Enemy that gives them; One that we cannot run away from, One that is fed

fed and cheriſhed within our own Boſoms, and which we our ſelves have bred up and given Birth to, merely to be a Vexation and a Puniſhment to us. Ch. 31.

6. *Outwardly.*

The Effects, indeed, of *Grief*, are univerſally miſchievous; they ſpread themſelves quite over the whole Man; and while they infect, do very much impair every Part of him. As to the External Appearance, it diſhonours, and is a Reproach to the Man, by that Deformity, and Change of Countenance, brought upon him by this means. Do but obſerve, when once Grief enters, how it fills Men with Shame and Confuſion, ſo that they dare no more ſhew themſelves in Publick, nay, ſo as to ſhun the Sight and Converſation even of their moſt intimate Friends, and particular Acquaintance. When once we are under the Dominion of this Paſſion, the Light itſelf is offenſive, and our great Care is, to ſeek out ſome dark Corner, ſome cloſe Retreat, to crouch, and hide our ſelves in, far from the Eyes and Obſervation of every Body. Now what can be the Meaning of all This, but a plain unnatural Confeſſion of its own Indecency, and how much Men ought to be aſham'd of what they do at that time? Is not this evidently to condemn itſelf? And would you not be apt to think, this was ſome Woman caught in Adultery, that runs away, and hides her Face, and takes ſuch Pains not to be ſeen or known?

Next to the Perſon, obſerve the *Habit*, what ſtrange, uncouth, effeminate Things, the Mourning Weeds are, as if our very Clothes were intended to publiſh to the World, that Grief utterly deſtroys, and takes away all that is manly and

Book I. brave about us, and, in its room, gives us all the Softneſſes and Infirmities of Women. Accordingly the *Thracians* always dreſs'd Men, when they were in Mourning, in direct Womens Habit; and a certain Author obſerves, that Grief enervates Men, and waſts their Strength. The old *Roman* Laws, which were the moſt Noble and Maſculine (like the Spirits of thoſe that made and liv'd under them) ſtrictly prohibited all ſuch Effeminate Lamentations, and long indulg'd Sorrow. They thought very truly, that it was a horrible Abſurdity for Men to act in Contradiction to Nature and Reaſon, and thus Un-man themſelves. And all the Allowance they were content to make, was only for the firſt Guſh of Paſſion, while it was freſh, and tender, or ſurprizing; for there are Tears, that may be permitted to fall from the Eyes of Philoſophers themſelves. A Man may keep up the *Dignity* of his Nature, and yet not abandon the *Humanity* of it: This we are bound to preſerve, as well as not to debaſe the other; and therefore all that thoſe *Roman* Laws, and theſe Reflections aim at, is, ſo to temper and get the Maſtery over our Paſſion, that while the Tears fall from our Eyes, Virtue and Wiſdom may not fall from our Hearts, at the ſame time.

7. *Inwardly.* But the outward Fadings of the Beauty, diſfiguring the whole Man, and changing his Mien and Air, and Behaviour, ſo infinitely to Diſadvantage; no, nor yet that corroding Venom, which eats into our very Joints and Marrow, and, as the Wiſe Man expreſſes it, *drieth up the Bones*; theſe miſerable Effects, I ſay, upon the Body, are not all; it goes deeper yet; decays the Soul,

breaks all its Reſt, confounds and diſturbs its O- Ch. 31.
perations, diſables and draws off the Man from any Virtuous or Honourable Deſigns; palls, and flats his Reliſh of Goodneſs, extinguiſhes the Deſire of Reputation, and takes away the Diſpoſition of doing worthily, either for himſelf, or for any Body elſe: Nay, it does not only unqualify him for the doing, but for the receiving Good from any other Hand. For even the moſt proſperous Occurrences are grown inſipid, or unpleaſant to him; and every thing turns ſour upon his Mind; as all kinds of Meat do upon diſtemper'd Stomachs. In ſhort, Grief imbitters a Man's whole Life, and poiſons all his Actions.

It may be conſider'd with reſpect to the De- 8.
grees of it; and a Difference ought to be made *Diſtinguiſhed.*
between the Greatneſs and the Extremity of it; as there ſhould alſo between that which runs into Exceſs, and grows ungovernable altogether from itſelf; and that which is puſhed on, and aggravated by the Suddenneſs of an Accident. In ſuch a Caſe, Surprize and Conſternation alarms, ſeizes, tranſports the Man; takes away all Motion and Senſe, ſtupifies and turns him into a Stone, like that wretched Mother *Niobe*,

* *Her curdled Blood, ran backward at the Sight,*
And pale numb'd Limbs, a ſhivering Horror took:
She ſtiffens into Statue with the Fright;
At laſt her faltering Tongue, long Silence broke.

And in theſe Caſes, great Allowance is to be made for Natural Affection; upon which account that

* Diriguit viſu in medio, calor oſſa reliquit.
Labitur, & longo vix tandem tempore fatur.

Book I. Painter is admitted to have underſtood his Buſi-
neſs well, who, when he was to draw *Iphigenia* going to be ſacrificed; repreſented the ſeveral Poſtures and Countenances of her Mourning Friends, and more diſtant Relations, with great Curioſity, and Artifice; but when he came at laſt to her Father, he caſt a Veil over his Face: Thus wiſely covering that Sorrow, which no Pencil could ſufficiently expreſs. But *Grief*, as it often exceeds the Power of Art and Repreſentation in the Copy, ſo ſometimes it is too ſtrong for the Original; too grievous to be born, and kills the Man outright. This finds no Vent; but that which is moderate, or indeed, that which is very great, wears off by Tract of Time, by Diverſion, and Buſineſs, and other Avocations of the Mind: And that which helps This forward, is, that it expreſſes and eaſes itſelf by Tears, and Sobs, and Sighs, and ſad Complaints; all which are ſome Mitigation to the Suffering Party, and much more comfortable than Inſenſibility and Silence.

* *Slight Sorrows find a Vent, and Words command;*
The Fierce boil inward, dumb and ſtupid ſtand.

Directions *and* Helps *againſt this* Evil, *are given* Book III. Chap. 29.

* Curæ leves loquuntur, ingentes ſtupent.

CHAP. XXXII.

Compaſſion.

WE mingle Sighs and Tears with thoſe that are in Affliction; we feel, in ſome Degree, their Misfortunes, and take Part in their Pains. Whether it be, from ſome ſecret Sympathies in Nature, whereby the Sentiments of one Man are conveyed to, and produce the like in another; or whether it be from ſad Preſages, by which we are apt to fear, that, whatever our Neighbours ſuffer now, may happen to be our own Caſe another Day.

Now, This (ſo far as it is Vicious) is the Paſſion of a Weak Mind; A Fooliſh Pity, that proceeds from too much Tenderneſs, and from an Indiſpoſition in the Soul, whereby it is apt to be vehemently diſordered, and fall into great Troubles upon ſlight Occaſions. Hence Women and Children are moſt affected with it; and ſo are the Cruel and Spightful too (who, as was ſaid before, are always cowardly and fearful:) for theſe, tho' they know nothing of that Noble and Generous Compaſſion, which is a Virtue; yet of this Vicious One, they have their Share. Such (for Inſtance) as expreſs mighty Concern for Villains and Malefactors, when they endure the Puniſhment of the Law, and ſmart for their Faults. Now, the Effects of ſuch a Pity are very Unjuſt, and ſo are the Cauſes of it too; for to ſpare the

Book I. Guilty, is to injure, and endanger the Innocent; and all that Tenderneſs, proceeds only from ſuperficial Appearances, and want of Thought, which looks no farther than juſt the preſent Circumſtances of the Suffering Party, without any Regard at all had to the Merits of the Cauſe, and how Reaſonable it is, that ſuch Puniſhment ſhould be inflicted upon him.

Concerning This, ſee more Book III. Chap. 30. *Where you have likewiſe the juſt Diſtinction, between the Virtuous and Vicious Compaſſion, omitted here to avoid Repetitions.*

CHAP. XXXIII.

Fear.

1. *Deſcription of it.* FEAR is the Apprehenſion of ſome Evil to come, which ſtands over us, and keeps us perpetually in Awe; it fills us full of Anxious Thought, and very officiouſly runs before, to give Notice of the Calamities, which Fortune threatens us with.

We are not ſpeaking at preſent, concerning that *Fear of God*, ſo highly recommended in Holy Scripture; ſo exceeding Uſeful and Neceſſary a Check upon Mens Minds, in Order to a Good Life: Nor is this Chapter to be underſtood, as if it related at all to that anxious and tender Concern, which proceeds from Affection and Duty; or ſuch as makes a Part of that Obedience

Obedience and Reſpect due from Inferiours, of all Sorts, to their Superiours; but only of that troubleſome, and tormenting Paſſion, which is the Spawn of Sin, and Shame, and a diſordered Mind. For theſe Terrours entred the World, at the ſame Inſtant, with Guilt and Reproach; and are the wretched Off-Spring, of the Corruption of our Souls, and a ſecret Familiarity with the Devil. It was upon yielding to his wicked Suggeſtions, that our General Anceſtor firſt diſcovered theſe miſgiving Horrors upon his Conſcience, *I was afraid, becauſe I was naked, and I hid my ſelf*, Gen. iii. 10. Ch. 33.

2. *The Malice and Tyranny of it.*

It is a Paſſion full of Fraud and Malice; and, indeed, can never hurt, or gain Advantage over us, except when we are cheated, and ſeduced by it. It makes uſe of the Time to come, which we can have no manner of Inſight into; ſo throwing us into a Place of Darkneſs, and making the ſame Uſe of Futurity, which Thieves do of the Night; (which is, to compaſs their Deſigns undiſcover'd, and to ſcare and terrify us much more, than the Occaſion requires.) When it hath got us there, it puts on a Thouſand ſeveral Vizors, and repreſents our Misfortunes under the moſt frightful and ghaſtly Forms imaginable: Thus we are cheated again, as Children are with Fancies and Bugbears; and dread thoſe Evils in variety of Shapes, which can have in reality but one Face; Evils which have nothing in their own Nature, capable of doing us any Hurt; and ſuch as would not be Evils to us, if we did not call and believe them ſo. It is nothing elſe, but merely the Apprehenſion we have of Things,

Book I. which renders thoſe Accidents Evils, that in themſelves are no ſuch Matter. And This is ſo Powerful, and ſo Pernicious, that it turns our very Good into Evil, and from our Proſperity takes Occaſion to afflict, and make us Miſerable. How many Wretches do we ſee every Day, Wretches of their own making, who actually become Unhappy for the very Dread of being ſo, and have improv'd their Empty Fears into Solid and Subſtantial Miſeries? How many People have loſt their Friends, merely through Diſtruſt, and not daring to make Uſe of them? And how many have made themſelves ſick, with the very Terrors and Apprehenſions of Sickneſs? Here is a jealous Coxcomb, that fancies his Wife hath played him Foul, and teazes himſelf into a Conſumption, till he pines and droops into his Grave, with this tormenting Suſpicion. Another anxious Fool is afraid of falling into Poverty, and he racks himſelf into a Diſeaſe; and dies, for Fear of not having enough to live upon. Nay, there are ſeveral, who have been kill'd with the very Fear of Death; and that you may not think this ſo very odd, let me obſerve to you, that ſomething like it happens every Day in moſt, if not in all the Objects of this Paſſion. Our *Fear*, generally ſerving to very little Purpoſe, otherwiſe than the drawing down upon our Heads, the very thing we pretend to run away from. Undoubtedly no Calamity whatſoever, is near ſo great, or grievous to be born, as the Fear of it. For other Evils can hurt us only while they have a Real Exiſtence, and are actually upon us; when the *Cauſe* is removed, the *Effect* and the Pain immediately ceaſe.

ceaſe. But *Fear* is not ſo confin'd; it extends to Things that have no Being, as well as to ſuch as have; nay, to things which neither are, nor perhaps ever will be; and, that we may be aſſur'd there is no End of its Extravagances, it fixes ſometimes upon things which we may be very confident never can be. So very ingenious is this Paſſion to torment us, ſo malicious and ſpightful, ſo mercileſs a Tyrant; it extracts real and cutting Pains out of Shadows; and refines upon Imaginary Evils, till it conſolidates, and makes them weighty ones: And for thoſe which miniſter ſome Ground for Fear, it is wonderful buſie, and troubleſomely officious; it takes Poſt, and brings us News, which it were better not to hear; for it creates imaginary, and anticipates all our actual Sufferings, by Opinion and Expectation. Ch. 33.

5. *Fear* does not only fill us with dreadful Impreſſions, and oftentimes diſturb our Repoſe with falſe Alarms; but, which is worſe, it taints and deſtroys all our Happineſs, breaks in upon our Quiet, and checks all our Delights. No Man can be eaſie, or take Pleaſure in the Enjoyment of a Bleſſing, which he is in perpetual Fear of loſing. Life it ſelf cannot be a Satisfaction to a Man that lives in dread of Dying: And One of the Ancients hath obſerv'd very truly, That no Advantage can miniſter true Joy to us, which we have not ſuch a Maſtery of, as to be prepared to part with it, whenever Providence ſhall demand it back again.

4. It is wonderful to obſerve the Folly and Imprudence of this Paſſion; for indeed it excels all others in Raſhneſs and Indiſcretion. It ariſes ſometimes

Book I. ſometimes from want of Courage, it is provoked by a Proſpect of Dangers; and yet it frequently doubles our Difficulties, and expoſes us to greater Dangers: For it makes us eager and impatient to deliver our ſelves from them; and thus it caſts us into Confuſions and Amazements, perplexes our Judgment, blinds our Underſtanding, and hinders us from diſcerning, and taking the proper Methods of getting out of the Labyrinths we are in. It diſtracts us with Terrors, and drives the Mind back again into it ſelf, where the Violence of its Paſſion interrupts the Debates, and overlooks thoſe very Opportunities of eſcaping, that offer themſelves. Add to this, the great Dejection and Diſcouragements, which will not let us dare to do what we ought, for our Safety; we loſe our Reaſon, and the Reſolution to uſe it; we flee when no Man purſues, ſtart and tremble at our own Shadow; nay, flee from that which is our beſt and only Sanctuary, run away from our Friends, and apprehend Deſtruction from them which advance to our Relief. * *Our very Succours ſtrike new Terrors into us.* Some have been tranſported with this Paſſion, even to the degree of perfect Stupidity; the Senſes are put beſides themſelves, and loſe the Power of diſcharging their Duty; our Eyes are broad open, and yet we ſee not; Men diſcourſe to us, and we hear not a Word they ſay; we attempt to run, and make our Eſcape, but ſtand fixt like Statues, and cannot move a Step.

5. This Paſſion, when moderate, adds Wings to

* Adeo etiam auxilia pavor formidat.

our

our Feet; but when exrreme, and in exceſs, it nails and faſtens us down, or entangles and confounds us in our Flight. Thus *Fear* ſupplants our Natural Powers, depraves and diſables the whole Man, enfeebles Body and Mind, baffles our wiſeſt Deſigns, and baniſhes Thought. Ch. 33.

* *Amazement bore up my erected Hair;*
Nor could my ſtammering Tongue expreſs my Fear.

Sometimes it makes Men deſperate; and ſo, that the giving all for loſt is for their great Advantage; for it inſpires them with Reſolutions of ſelling their Lives as dear as they can, and puts them upon doing Wonders. An Inſtance whereof we have in that *Roman* Legion commanded by *Sempronius*, in their Engagement againſt *Hannibal.*

† *Deſpair and Rage broke thro' th' extreme Diſtreſs;*
Cou'd they have hop'd, their Safety had been leſs.

There are alſo ſome Fears and Terrors, with which Men have been ſtrangely poſſeſſed without any viſible ground; as if they were Thunderſtruck from above; or God by a particular Providence had determin'd to infatuate and diſpirit them, in order to their Deſtruction. Theſe ſudden Amazements are what we commonly call *Panick Fears*; and we read, that the City of *Carthage* was once thus ſeiz'd with Confuſion; for ſuch are not always confin'd to ſingle Perſons, or ſmall Numbers; but whole Nations and vaſt Armies have been univerſally ſeiz'd, and unaccoun-

* Obſtupui, ſteteruntq; comæ, vox faucibus hæſit.

† Una ſalus victis nullam ſperare ſalutem. *Virg. Æn.* 2.

tably

Book I. tably ſtruck with them. And our Bleſſed Saviour inſtances in this, as one of the Judgments ſent Luke xxi. from Heaven upon the wicked *Jews*, *Mens Hearts failing them for Fear.*

Particular Directions *and* Remedies *againſt this* Paſſion, *will be given in* Book III. Chap. 28.

CHAP. XXXIV.

The Second Way of conſidering Man; which is, by ſtating the Compariſon between Him, and other Animals.

1. *An uſeful but difficult Compariſon, ſuch as Man is partial in.*

HItherto we have conſider'd *Man* entire, and with regard to *Himſelf* alone: The next Step, by which we propoſe to advance in the Knowledge of him, is by ſtating a Compariſon between Him and other Animals; and This is a very excellent help toward making a right Judgment in the Caſe. Now this Compariſon is of large Extent; it conſiſts of many Branches, requires great Skill, and would prove of mighty Benefit and Conſequence, if well and truly made: But the Queſtion is, Who muſt make it? Shall Man? He is a Party in the Cauſe, and liable to very juſt Exception; for it is much to be fear'd, when the *Iſſue* is his own Concern, the *Verdict* will not be honeſt. And accordingly we ſee, how partial and unfair he is in all he ſays of Himſelf; for he knows no Mean, he proceeds with no Moderation, but is eternally in Extremes. Some-

times he is big, and pleas'd with Himſelf; looks down upon the lower World with Diſdain; and calls himſelf the *Lord of all the Creatures*; divides their Morſels among them, and cuts out for each Species, ſuch a Proportion of Faculties, and natural Power, as his Lordſhip vouchſafes to allow them: At other times, inſtead of all his Gaiety and Pride, you find him full of black Diſcontent and then he debaſes himſelf as much, murmurs and frets, grumbles and complains, gives Providence hard Words, and calls Nature a cruel Stepmother, that hath made him the Refuſe of the World, the moſt wretched of all her Productions; and dealt to Him the leaſt and loweſt Portion of all her Children. Now, in truth, both the one and the other of theſe Opinions are equally falſe, unreaſonable, and extravagant. But what can we expect better from him? Or how is it to be thought, he ſhou'd carry himſelf evenly and fairly, and act juſtly with other Creatures, when he is, as we ſhall ſhortly ſee, ſo infinitely out of all meaſure, in his Notions towards God, his Superior, and Man, who is his Equal? But, beſides this Byaſs upon his *Judgment*, there is another Difficulty upon his *Underſtanding:* For which way ſhall he get a competent Knowledge of the inward Powers, and unſeen Motions of other Animals? So that if he were inclined to be Juſt, and to hear the Evidence impartially, yet he muſt needs be an improper Judge, to whom the moſt material Part upon which the Sentence ought to be grounded, cannot be given in Evidence. And ſuch are thoſe inward Operations of Brutes, which we can have no certain or competent Perception of.

Ch. 34.

Book I. of. However, we will try at preſent to ſtate this Compariſon as evenly and calmly as we can poſſibly.

2. Now, Firſt, we are to conſider, that the Order and Conſtitution of the Univerſe is not vaſtly unequal; There are no great Irregularities, nor large void Spaces in it; nor ſuch Unlikeneſs and wide Diſproportion between the ſeveral Parts that go into this Compoſition, as ſome People may imagine. The Excellencies of the ſeveral Species riſe and fall gradually; And thoſe, whom Nature hath placed near, or cloſe to one another, have all of them a mutual Reſemblance; though ſome have more, and ſome have leſs of it. And thus we may obſerve a near Neighbourhood, and cloſe Affinity between Mankind and other Animals. They are a kin in many Things, and ſeveral Properties are alike and common to both. Several Things indeed there are, wherein they differ; but theſe are not ſo vaſtly diſproportionate and diſtant, but that they ſtill are next adjoining Links, twiſted within one another, in the great Chain of the Univerſe. So that Man is neither in all reſpects ſuperior, nor inferior in all. *For that which befalleth the Sons of Men, befalleth Beaſts; even one thing befalleth them both*; ſays the *Wiſdom* of God himſelf. (*Eccleſ.* iii. 19.)

3. We will begin with thoſe Things which are common to both, and very near the Matter of being alike in both; ſuch as *Generation*, *Nutrition*, *Motion*, *Action*, *Life* and *Death*. For (ſays the ſame Divine *Wiſdom*) *As the one dieth, ſo doth the other; ſo that a Man* (in this reſpect) *hath no Preeminence above a Beaſt*. And This is a Confutation of

of thoſe fooliſh repining People, and all their melancholy Complaints, that repreſent Man as the only Creature whom Nature hath diſcountenanced and diſgraced, abandon'd and forſaken; turn'd naked into the wide World, and caſt upon the bare Ground; without any Covering, without any Natural Weapons to ſhelter or defend him; bound up and ſwadled, and utterly ignorant and unfurniſh'd of what is fit for him: Whereas to all Others ſhe hath been much more bountiful; Clothed them with Shells, or Hair, or Wool, or Shag, or Feathers, or Scales; Armed them with Tuſks, or Horns, with Bills, or Claws, or Talons, to act offenſively or defenſively, as Occaſion requires; qualify'd them, without any Help of Art or Induſtry, for Swimming, Running, Flying, Singing, Looking out for Food, and Suſtaining themſelves. But *Man*, poor neglected Man, (they tell you) is Taught to Go, Taught to Speak; nay, requires Help and Teaching for the very Feeding and Supporting himſelf, and attains to nothing without Time and Trouble, and ſerving an Apprenticeſhip. In ſhort; He is perfect in no other Inſtance of Nature's Teaching, except that of Crying: This is all we bring into the World along with us; and a very fit Emblem it is of our Fortune and Condition. Now all theſe melancholy Complaints, which make diſadvantageous Reflections upon the Original Compoſition of Mankind, and that which is truly the State of Nature, are altogether unjuſt and falſe. For firſt, our Skin is ſufficiently fortify'd againſt all the Injuries of Weather; and ſo *Nakedneſs* is no Argument of our being leſs Nature's Care, than

Ch. 34.

1. *Naked-neſs.*

Book I. Ch. XIV.

than any other Creature. Several Nations, (as I have obſerved heretofore) never yet ſo much as knew what Clothes are; and even We that do, can go bare in any Parts, even the tendereſt and moſt ſenſible; when Inclination, or Cuſtom, or ſome particular Faſhion, diſpoſe us to it. For where of all our Body is the Senſe quicker, than in the Face, the Hands, the Stomach? And yet what Lady, even the niceſt and tendereſt of her Sex, ſcruples to expoſe her Neck and Breaſts, (when the Mode requires that Dreſs) even in the Extremity of Winter? Swathes and Rollers may be convenient, but 'tis plain they are not neceſſary in Children; for the *Lacedemonians* heretofore made no uſe of them; nor do the *Swiſſes* and *Germans* that dwell in cold Countries; nor *Biſcans*, nor thoſe Vagabonds and Common Cheats, that go by the Name of *Gypſies*, uſe them at this Day. *Weeping* is by no means peculiar to Mankind; Beaſts have likewiſe their Share in it: Some of them ſhed Tears; and much the greateſt Part of them Cry, and Complain, and Bemoan themſelves continually, for ſome time after their coming into the World. As for *Weapons*, Nature hath not been wanting in her Proviſion for Us too; and ſhe hath given us beſides, greater Opportunities of uſing them: For the Muſcles and Motions of our Limbs are more in Number, and of a more uſeful Variety; and Theſe too we are capable of receiving greater Service from, without any Inſtruction at all, than any other Animal whatſoever: Or if ſome few are better provided in this reſpect, we have the Advantage of many others. Nor do we need any Teaching in

2. *Swadling Cloaths.*

3. *Weeping.*

4. *Weapons.*

point

point of *Eating:* We and They are equally fitted, equally dextrous and ready at it by Nature: Who makes any Queſtion, but a Child would look out ſharp for Meat, aſſoon as he is ſtrong enough to feed himſelf? And Meat the Earth produces for our Purpoſe; there wants neither Quantity nor Variety to ſupply our Neceſſities, whether we improve it by Art and Labour, or not: Of which ſeveral Nations are a Proof, who live in great Plenty, without contributing any Tillage, or Care, or Induſtry of their own, toward their Subſiſtence. As for *Speaking*, allowing that to be the Effect of Art, and not of Nature; yet it is certain too, that if it be not natural, it is not neceſſary neither. But yet This may be reckon'd among thoſe Things that are given in common to Men and Beaſts both: For what other Name but *Speaking* can we give to that Faculty of expreſſing themſelves, which we ſee they have upon all Occaſions; thoſe Significations of Pain, and Grief, and Joy; the Methods of Summoning one another together, and aſking mutual Succours; their Arts of Courtſhip and Flattery, and making Love? And as We ſometimes ſpeak by ſome particular Geſtures, the Motions of our Eyes, or Head, or Hands, or Shoulders; (Arts in which Dumb People are exquiſitely perfect, and practiſe even to Aſtoniſhment) ſo do Beaſts likewiſe converſe with one another. And even Thoſe of them that have no Voice at all, maintain an Intercourſe of Good Offices, and aſk and return them as Occaſion ſerves. As Beaſts underſtand Us in ſome degree, ſo do We in part underſtand Them: They flatter and ſooth us; they

Ch. 34. 5. *Eating.* 6. *Speech.*

Book I. threaten and give us Warning; they c
and expreſs their Want of our Help:
to Them, and They to Us after the
And if we underſtand but imperfec
Fault is it? Theirs or Ours? This is w
us can certainly tell, and ſomewhat
for either Side. They, for ought
may think as meanly of Us upon this A
Note. We commonly do of them. *But i
ever they are a Reproach to us, that
ſent Condition of Humane Nature,
underſtand one another. Our almoſt n
bours, remoter Provinces in the very
trey, have Dialects ſo different, that t
comprehend each other at all; where
all perfectly well acquainted with t
not only of their own Kind all the W
but (which is a great deal more)
of Kinds different from their own.
knows how to diſtinguiſh the Barking
that one ſort of Tone imports Miſchie

Note. " *Here we have juſt Occaſion to mak*
" *which I ſhall ſhew to be neceſſary*, Chap. XX
" *Defects Natural and Accidental*: *For of the Lat*
" *of Men's being unintelligible to each other*; *Thi*
" *Languages having been no Part of our Original C*
" *we have infallible Aſſurance, that the whole E*
" *of one Speech. So that what was inflicted as*
" *for a Crime, (as This is expreſly affirm'd to*
" *cannot in any fair Reaſoning, make a Branch*
" *riſon, between the Nature of Man, and that of*
" *indeed, even in this Condition, (thus debaſed a*
See Chapter of Weakneſs. " *we ſtand) will the exquiſite Eaſineſs of expreſſing*
" *and the wonderful Powers of Humane Voice,*
" *compared with the wild and inarticulate Sounds*
" *whatſoever, tho' moſt excellent in their kind.*

ger, and a malicious Deſign; and that another is innocent and ſafe, and intends him no Hurt at all. Nay, I add, that they do not only ma[in]tain a Correſpondence among Themſelves, but Us alſo. In Wars and Engagements, Eleph Dogs, Horſes, underſtand as well as We: The conform all their Motions to the Word of Com- mand; they Run, or they Stand ſtill; [th] March, or they Halt; they Purſue, or they F[ly] they Charge, or they Retreat, as we would them; they receive Pay and Subſiſtence; have a Part in the Victory, and a Share in the Booty; as we ſee particularly they had in the l[ate] Conqueſt of the *Indies*. And thus much may ſuffice to be obſerv'd concerning thoſe Things w[hich] Nature hath diſtributed both to Men and [Beaſts] in common; and that with ſo even a Hand, that there is no great Diſparity on either ſide. Ch. 34.

Differences and Advantages.

The Particulars wherein theſe two differ, and have the Advantage of one another, come next under our Obſervation. Now Some there are, in which Man does manifeſtly excel, and no Animals whatſoever can pretend to equal, or to be like him; and Others again there are, in which Beaſts have the upper-hand of Us. The Divine Wiſdom ſo ordering the Matter, that the ſeveral Parts of the Creation ſhould be ſo nicely interwoven, ſo cloſely connected, that Each ſhould have ſome Pre-eminence peculiar to itſelf; and from All together, ſhould reſult the perfect Harmony, and uninterrupted Order, of One moſt compact and beautiful Whole. The plain and indiſputable Privileges of Man, are the Noble Faculties of his Soul; The Penetration, Sprightli-

On Man's ſide.

Book I. neſs, and Comprehenſion of his Min
in the Fruitfulneſs of his Invention; t
and Solidity of his Judgment; the de
termination of his Choice; Speech to
cate his Thoughts freely, to make
Wants, to aſk and to offer Aſſiſtance
a ready Inſtrument to execute whate
Invention ſhall ſuggeſt, or the Inſtructic
ſhall dictate, or their Performances p
his Imitation; the Majeſtick Form o
the great Variety of Movements he is q
from whence it comes to paſs, that his
the ſeveral Parts of it, are much more
to Him, than thoſe of any Creatures el
Them.

5. *Advantages of Beaſts. General.* But ſtill Beaſts have their Advantag
evident and unqueſtionable as Ours; a
ſome are General, and others Particula
neral are theſe; Health, which in The
more confirm'd, and leſs interrupted,
is in Men; their Conſtitutions more ro
Natural Defects and Imperfections ver
be obſerv'd. Whereas Men are weak
eaſily diſeas'd; blind, and lame, and
times from the Birth. The open Air
them Injury; They are ſubject to no F
dangerous Colds, with which moſt of
Diſtempers begin, and many of them
ther Cauſe. Moderation in their Deſi
ctions, which are bounded by Conve
nocence and Security; perfect Eaſe
quillity; for this muſt needs attend a L
all Fear and Guilt. Full Liberty and
in Matters that are Natural and Lawfu

any Reſtraints of Shame, or Fear of Diſco
a total Exemption from infinite Vices and
bitances; no Superſtition to enſlave them;
Ambition, or Avarice, or Envy, to diſtu
torment them; no uneaſy Fancies, and aff
ing Dreams to afflict and confound them: T
are the Portion of all Animals in common.

Of thoſe that are Particular to ſome ſorts on
We may reckon the pure, clear, who lo
delightful Dwelling, which the Birds e
having the Regions of the Air aſſign'd
The wonderful Perfection they attain to in ſo
Arts: For what Art or Labour, even of the m
celebrated and accompliſh'd Maſters, cou'd ev
pretend to compare with the *Swallows*, and
other Birds, in Building; or with the *S*
Spinning and Weaving; or with the *Nightingale*
in Muſick; or with ſome other Creatures in
Knowledge of Plants and Phyſick? Some aſto- III.
niſhing Effects, and peculiar Properties, that are
inimitable, unaccountable, nay, incredible: Such
as that of the Fiſh call'd *Remora*, becauſe, tho'
ſmall itſelf in Compariſon, yet it ſtops the largeſt
Ships in their Courſe: Inſtances of which Hiſtory
gives us, in the Veſſel that rode Admiral of *Mark
Anthony*'s and *Caligula*'s Fleet: That of the *Cramp-
Fiſh*, which benumbs People's Limbs at ſome
diſtance, and tho' they never touch him: That of
the *Hedge-hog*, which hath a Fore-knowledge of
the Winds: And that of the *Camelion* and *Po-
lypus*, in changing Colours, and taking a freſh
Tincture, according to the Things they reſt upon.
Their ſtrange Prognoſtications; of Birds, for In- IV.
ſtance, in their leaving one Country, and going

1. 34.

Book I. into another, according as the Weather, and Seaſons of the Year change: That of all Beaſts that are Dams, in knowing which of all their Young will prove the beſt; for when they are driven to Straits, and put upon preſerving them from Danger, they conſtantly ſave the beſt firſt. In all theſe Reſpects Man is much inferior to Beaſts; and in ſome he is ſo far from being equal, or near, that he is in no Degree like them. To all which might be added, That other Advantage, which conſiſts in the length of their Lives; the Term of ſome Animals, in the ordinary Courſe of Nature, extending to a Number of Years, Seven or Eight Times as much as that of Man.

6. *Advantages that may be diſputed.* The Advantages, which Man lays claim to above Brutes, but which will admit of ſome Diſpute, and perhaps, upon a ſtricter Examination, would tempt an Impartial Judge, to give it in on the other Side, are ſeveral. Firſt, The *Reaſonable* and *Intellectual Faculties* of his Mind; the Power of comparing, conſidering, arguing, collecting; Learning and Improvement, Judgment and Conduct. Now Two Objections may be offered in Bar to this Claim; the One relating to the Thing itſelf, the Other to the real Worth and Benefits of it. Firſt, It is not out of all Diſpute, whether the Matter of Fact, ſet forth in this Claim, be True; that is, whether Men have theſe Excellencies peculiar to themſelves. It hath ever been, and ever will be, a Point in Controverſy, whether Brutes have none of theſe Spiritual Powers; and that Opinion, which holds the Affirmative, and maintains they have, is ſupported with greateſt Authorities, and ſeems to carry a greater

I. *Reaſoning. Qu. Whether Brutes partake of it?*

Appearance

Appearance of Truth. The moſt Celebrate
Learned Philoſophers have declared for it;
leſs than *Ariſtotle*, and *Galen*, and *Porphyry*,
Plutarch, *Democritus* and *Anaxagoras*. The
ſon, upon which they ground that Aſſertion
this; That the *Brain* is the Particular Organ,
part of the Body, employ'd by the Soul, in
Acts of Ratiocination; and that the Compoſiti
of the Brain, is exactly the ſame in Brutes as it
in Men; and from hence they conclude, that t
Inſtrument of Reaſon is as apt and capable in
of theſe Creatures, as it is in the other. The
ficulty then will be, whether the Souls be equ
ly capable, of uſing this Inſtrument to ſuch Pu
poſes: And for This, they offer Experienc
That Brutes conclude *Univerſals* from *Singular*
as, from the Sight and Form of One Man,
know the ſame Humane Form in All Men; Tha
they are able to compound, and to divide Idea
by aſſenting and refuſing; and that they exerci
a Power of Choice, and make very ſubtle Diſtin-
ctions between *Good* and *Evil*, in ſuch Caſes as
concern the Life, the Liberty, and Preſervation
of Themſelves, and their Young. Nay, they
pretend, that any Man, who obſerves with At-
tention, may read and diſcover ſeveral Strokes
and Footſteps of *Reaſon*, more Bold, more Judi-
cious, more Nice, more Ingenious and Cunning,
than the common ſort of Men are uſed to give us
Proof of. Some of the moſt memorable Actions,
from whence this Concluſion hath been made, I
will briefly recite. The *Fox* deſigning to paſs o-
ver a River, when it is frozen, lays his Ear cloſe
to the Ice, to hearken if there be any Noiſe, and

Book I. whether the Water run underneath; that from thence he may form a Judgment, whether it be Safe to proceed, or Neceſſary to retire. And this Expedient the *Thracians* are ſaid to make uſe of, when they have any frozen Rivers to paſs. The Hound, in Doubt which Way his Maſter, or the Game he is in chaſe of, went, at a Place where Three Paths meet, takes this Courſe of making out his Loſs; he ſcents the ſeveral Paths one after another, and when he finds that in Two of theſe Ways, no Scent hath lain, he never troubles himſelf to lay his Noſe to the Third, but ſprings forward, and takes That without farther Enquiry. *Thales* the Philoſopher's Mule, when heavy loaden with a Sack of Salt, and being to go over a Brook, ſtoop'd down to diſſolve his Salt, and ſo make his Burthen lighter; becauſe he had found once before, that the Salt was lighter, when it fell into the Water by chance: but when loaden with Wooll he did the direct contrary, and ſtrove to keep it dry; becauſe the like Experiment had taught him, that Wooll grows heavier by being wetted. *Plutarch* ſays, That once on board a Ship, he ſaw a Dog caſting Stones into a great Jar, that ſo he might make the Oil in it riſe higher, which before was too low, and out of his reach: And the like is reported of the Crows in *Barbary*, when the Water is too low for them to drink at. Thus *Elephants*, when one of them is ſet faſt in a Bog, are ſaid to bring great Stones and pieces of Timber to help their Fellows out. The *Oxen* in the King's Gardens at *Suza*, which have been long practiſed to turn a Wheel a Hundred Times Round, (the Depth

Depth of the Well requiring juſt ſo much
whence Water is drawn, for the Uſe of t
dens) cannot be made to exceed that Nu
Rounds; and when left to themſelves,
come One turn ſhort. Now what way are all
Things poſſible to be done, without Reaſo
and Diſcourſe; Compoſition and Diviſion, w
are the Operations proper to a Rational So
Muſt not a Man be thought to want Reaſon
ſelf, who thinks it hath nothing to do in
Actions? So again: The marvellous Dexte
of drawing Darts and Spears out of wo
Bodies, with very little Pain to the Patient,
which Elephants are Famous. The Dog m
tion'd by *Plutarch*, that at a Publick Ente
ment lay upon a Scaffold, and counterfeited
ſelf dead; fainting away by degrees, breathing
ſhort, trembling, ſtretching himſelf out, and let-
ting them drag him about as quite dead; then
by degrees coming to himſelf again, lifting up his
Head, as if he had juſt been brought to Life:
And in a Word, the many Strange, Apiſh Tricks
that Jugglers and Strowlers teach their Dogs, and
Dancing-Horſes. The many Doubles, and cun-
ning Contrivancies, that Beaſts of ſeveral kinds
have, to ſecure themſelves from the Attempts we
make upon them: The great Forecaſt, and wiſe
Management of the *Ants*, in drawing out their
Grains of Corn to ſweeten in the Air, and dry
by the Sun, which would otherwiſe corrupt, and
grow muſty: The nibbling off the End of every
Grain, which would elſe be grown, and run to
Seed: The Order of the *Bees* in their Republick;
the Method of their Combs; the vaſt Variety of
Offices

Book I. Offices and Duties appropriated to ſuch and ſuch reſpectively; and the conſtant Regularity and Uniformity of all their Proceedings, will not ſuffer us to think, that theſe are no more than animated *Clock-work*, but ſeem in many Things to equal, and in ſome even to reproach the Conduct of Mankind.

7. *Natural Inſtinct rejected.* In Order to overthrow all this, ſome have been very Ill-natur'd to theſe Brutes, and take Sanctuary in *Natural Inſtinct*, as a ſufficient Solution, and Cauſe of all theſe wondrous Effects: And This they deſcribe by an Inclination in Nature, which is under as perpetual Neceſſity, Slavery, and Conſtraint, as That by which the Stone falls, or the Flame aſcends. Now Firſt, This is ſo far from Truth, that one would wonder, how it could ever enter into any Man's Head: For the forementioned Acts plainly infer reckoning and ſumming up Particulars, comparing of Things together, and reaſoning by Compoſition and Diviſion of Ideas, and by Conſequences drawn from thence. But theſe are ſuch Operations as can never be performed by ſuch a Natural Inclination, and neceſſary Inſtinct, which are only the Refuge of Men, who want ſomething to ſay. But then it muſt be obſerv'd withal, that this Objection returns back again, upon them that make it. For it is, without doubt, more Noble, more for the Honour of any Creature, and a nearer Reſemblance to God himſelf, to do Well by a happy and unalterable Determination of one's Nature; than to do ſo by Art and Induſtry, long Time, and much Learning: To be led by the Unerring Hand of God, than left to our own imprudent Conduct; and

See the Advertiſement.

and to act Regularly, by an Habitual, and Con- Ch. 34.
ſtant, and Neceſſary Impulſe, than by ſuch a
Choice and Liberty, as is ſubject to Hazard and
Raſhneſs. Beſides, by this Notion of Natural
ſtinct, they take away from Brutes all manner
Inſtruction, and Improvement, as well that
they receive from others, as that which t
part to others; but This is abundantly co
cted and confuted by Experience. For it is
They learn what they knew not before,
more Perfect by Degrees, and Imitation, an
ſtom; as *Magpies* for Inſtance, *Parrots*, *Jack*
and *Doves*; and it is as plain, that they teach
another too, from the Examples of *Nig*
and eſpecially of *Elephants*, who of all A
the apteſt to learn, and ſeem to exceed the re
far, both in Largeneſs of Capacity, and
neſs of Apprehenſion.

8. As for that **Power of the Reaſoning Soul, which Man values himſelf ſo very Highly upon; That of conſidering Corporeal Things abſtractedly, repreſenting what is abſent to himſelf, and deveſting Things of what Circumſtances he thinks fit, to conceive them after his own Pleaſure; (for according to the Jargon of the Schools, * *the Object underſtood, is in the ſubject Underſtanding, according to the manner in which the Underſtander repreſents it to himſelf,)** there is ſome Appearance, that Beaſts do all this too. A *Horſe*, that has been uſed to Charge, when he lies aſleep, in his Litter, ſhall ſhiver and ſnort, as if he were in an Action; and plainly forms to himſelf the Sounds

* Intellectum eſt in Intelligente, ad modum Intelligentis.

of

Book I. of Drums and Trumpets, and the Images of an Army, and a Battel. The *Grey-Hound*, in his Dream, pants and blows, ſets up his Stern, ſhakes his Legs, and conceives a *Spiritual Hare* before him. *Maſtiffs*, and *Houſe-Dogs*, growl in their Sleep, and ſometimes open, and bark out-right, imagining that ſome Stranger is coming in. The faireſt Concluſion of this firſt Point ſeems to me then, to be thus; That the Brutes have Reaſon; That They compare, diſcourſe, and judge, but in a much lower Degree, and nothing comparable to that Perfection in which Man does. They have a much leſs Share, but they are not totally excluded. We excel Them vaſtly, and ſo we do one another; and, indeed, the ſeveral Kinds of Beaſts excel each other too. Nay, I know not, whether it may not be ſaid, That the Difference among Men is greateſt; and that ſome Men excel ſome other Men in Reaſoning, more than ſome Men excel Beaſts.

Ariſtotle, 'tis true, pronounces of ſome Men, that they are ſo extremely Ignorant and Stupid, that they differ in nothing but Shape from Brutes. But all this notwithſtanding, to argue, that they have equal Share, and ſtand upon the Level with Mankind; that their Souls are equally Immortal with Ours, or Ours equally Mortal with Theirs, are very malicious and unfair Inferences. For, beſides that Man excels moſt conſpicuouſly in the Operations of Reaſon, there are ſeveral other more Noble Faculties and Prerogatives, ſuch as are entirely Spiritual, which juſtify the Character, of his being the Likeneſs and Image of God; and render him capable of *Immortal Bliſs*; all which the

the Brutes partake not of, in any the leaſt De- Ch. 34.
gree. And theſe are all implied in the Notion of
Intellect, which denotes ſomething more Sublime,
than mere Ratiocination.

The other Argument, upon this Occaſion, con
cerns the Worth and Benefit of this Pre-eminenc
For, Allowing the Matter of Fact alledged, to l
True, that Man hath Reaſon, and Brutes hav
it not, yet, What does he get by it? Are ɔt
Nobleſt Faculties paid very Dear for, and
not do him more Hurt than Good? Are not
the principal Cauſe and Source of the Miſer
that load him? The Vices, the Paſſions, the I
ward Diſtempers, All that Irreſolution, and T
ble, and Deſpair, which embitter and caſt a
miſh upon our Lives? And theſe the Beaſts ha
none of, becauſe they have none of thoſe Pow-
ers, which are the Seat and the Source of them.
Witneſs the Story of *Pyrrho*'s Hog, that eat con-
tentedly on Shipboard in a Storm, at a time when
the Paſſengers and Seamen were almoſt dead with
Fear. "I confeſs, as we manage the Matter, the
"generality of People have but a very indiffe-
"rent Bargain of This. And ſome who conſider
"Things Superficially, and look at what the
"World is, not what it might be, are tempted
"to think that theſe more exalted and larger
"Endowments of the Soul, have been wholly
"deny'd, or at leaſt much diminiſh'd, and im-
"paired to Beaſts, for their mighty Eaſe and Be-
"nefit; and given to Man in their full Strength,
"for his mighty Torment: Since it is by the In-
"terpoſition and Aſſiſtance of theſe, that he
"teazes and perplexes himſelf; reſents and ſad-

Book I. " ly keeps alive the Paſt; is diſtracted with Anxi-
" ety and Amazement for the Future; nay,
" forms to his own Mind, and then is ſcared
" out of his Wits with the ghaſtly Images of E-
" vils, that are not yet, nor are ever like to be."
Now in other Animals, the Senſe and the Apprehenſion of Evil have both the ſame Date; till it comes, they know nothing of it; and when it hath done, they have done with it; and from the Moment of its Ceſſation, are in perfect Eaſe and Tranquillity. And thus you ſee, how Man is render'd (rather indeed, how by his Miſmanagement, he renders himſelf) the worſe for his Advantages; that the Happineſs and Privilege of his Nature, is become the Inſtrument and Occaſion of all his Miſery. And were it not better to have been born naked, than to be provided
Note. with * Weapons, and to ſheath them thus, in our own Bowels?

Note. * " *Did Nature, which furniſhed us with theſe Rich*
" *and Heavenly Accompliſhments, bring us under a Neceſſity of*
" *converting them to our own Sorrow and Ruin; the Gift, in-*
" *deed, had been Treacherous, and Providence cruelly kind.*
" *But ſince they are not the Appetites, and Paſſions, and Facul-*
" *ties themſelves, but the Exceſſes and Indulging of the One,*
" *and the Neglect or Abuſe of the Other, to which theſe Miſeries*
" *are owing. let us not complain of our Condition, nor charge*
" *God fooliſhly; but put all that we ſuffer of this kind, to the*
" *Account of our own Follies and Vices. For from hence*
" *it is, that Brutes can pretend to enter into the Compariſon*
" *with us, even in the Eſteem of thoſe, whoſe Wiſh and Intereſt*
" *it is, to bring us down to their Level And were not we by*
" *cheriſhing our reſtleſs Paſſions, ſo induſtrious to torment our*
" *ſelves, we ſhould not ſee, as now we daily do, that the Dull*

Another

Another Advantage over Brutes, which Man makes Pretenſions to, is that of *Dominion*, and Power to Command them, which he imagines to be veſted in him. But (not to take notice at preſent, that This is but an improper Plea, ſince Men alſo mutually Command, and are Commanded by one another) the Thing in Fact is not true: For where does our Practice and Experience ſhew this univerſal Command in Man, and as univerſal Subjection and Obedience in other Creatures? 'Tis plain in the preſent State of Things, that this is a mere Fancy; and that Men are much more in fear of Beaſts, than ſtood in fear of by them. It is not to be doubted, but this was once the Caſe; and an ample Commiſſion that was, which the Great Lord of the Univerſe iſſued at the Creation, *Let him have Dominion over the Fowls of the Air, and over the Fiſh of the Sea, and over the Cattel, and over all the Earth.* And admirably fitted he is to execute this Commiſſion, by reaſon of the Majeſty of his Perſon, an erect and beautiful Form, and the Greatneſs and Wiſdom of his Mind. But alas! the Face of Affairs is changed, the actual Exerciſe of this Prerogative loſt. And all that remains, is only what theſe Advantages of his Body and Mind give him; and it may much more properly be ſaid, That Man is made fit to Command, and Brutes to Obey, than that He does actually Command, and They Obey.

10. *Dominion and Command.*

Gen. i. 26.

" *and Inſenſible live moſt at their Eaſe, and come off Cheaper* " *with the Sufferings of Humane Life, than Men of Wit and* " *Parts, and more refined Underſtanding.*

Another

Book I. Another Advantage bordering upon the former, is perfect *Liberty*. This Man pretends to, and upbraids Brutes with Captivity, Slavery, and Drudgery; but This, I think, is full as unreaſonable and foreign as the other. Men themſelves lie infinitely more open to Reproaches of that kind: To This let the Inhabitants of *Guinea* ſpeak; elſe what mean the Slaves that are made by Kid-napping and Force, and not only their Perſons enſlaved, but all their Poſterity too? Nay, what mean thoſe willing Slaves, who ſell their Liberty for Sums of Money, or who part with it gladly and freely, or that truck it away for ſome Conveniency? For was not all this done by the Ancient Gladiators? And is it not now done daily, by Women to their Ladies, and Soldiers to their Commanders? But Beaſts know nothing like this; they ſerve not one another; they neither enſlave, nor are enſlaved by one another; but are in all reſpects more free, and at their own Diſpoſal, than Men are.

II. *Liberty and Servitude.*

Man, it is confeſs'd, makes theſe his Diverſion and his Entertainment; they furniſh his Sports and his Table: But if He Hunt, and take, and kill, and eat Them; They do the ſame by Him, as Opportunities offer: And that, in a manner more brave and great than His; not by Toils, and Nets, and Cunning, but by honeſt down-right Force. Nay, He is not murder'd and devour'd thus by Beaſts only, but (which is infinitely more) by another Man, his Equal, his Companion, his Brother. No Beaſts ever aſſemble themſelves in Troops, to deſtroy, and ravage, and lead Captive another Troop of the ſame Kind; but Men,

to

to their Eternal Reproach, not only do the Thing, but glory in it, and triumph in the Deſtruction of their own Species. Ch. 34.

The Fourth and great Advantage Men pretend to above Brutes, conſiſts in their *Virtue*; but if by this Moral Virtue be meant, and if we may be allow'd to judge of Virtue by the commendable Actions and outward Appearances of it, this Claim will admit of ſome Diſpute too; (Though Moral Virtue taken formally, and with regard to the Will, Beaſts cannot have:) For Gratitude, and Friendſhip, and Readineſs to be ſerviceable, Fidelity, Magnanimity, and ſeveral other good Qualities uſeful in Society and Converſation, have been obſerv'd to expreſs themſelves after a more lively, more ſurprizing manner, and with more Conſtancy in Brutes, than is uſually ſeen in the Generality of Mankind. *Lyſimachus* had a Dog call'd *Hircanus*, which lay perpetually upon the Bed with his dead Maſter, and would not be got from thence to eat or drink, but continu'd thus watching and faſting, till the Corpſe came to be burnt, and then leaped eagerly into the Fire, and burnt himſelf with it. The ſame is related of another Dog, that belonged to one *Pyrrhus*. That of the wiſe *Heſiod* detected the Ruffians that murder'd his Maſter: And another did the like before King *Pyrrhus*, and his whole Army. *Plutarch* tells us of another, that hunted about from City to City, and never reſted till he had brought the Robber of the Temple at *Athens*, to Juſtice for his Sacrilege. The Story of *Androdus* is very well known, who had lived and eat with a Lion for ſome Years, after curing

Virtue.

See Gell. Lib. V. Cap. 14.

Book I. him of a painful Wound; and afterwards, when condemn'd at *Rome* to the Wild Beaſts, this Lion would not touch the Slave that had been his Gueſt, and his Surgeon, but approach'd him with all the Demonſtrations of Thankfulneſs and Love; all which, *Appion* declares himſelf to have been an Eye-Witneſs of at *Rome*. An Elephant, that in Heat of Paſſion had kill'd his Keeper, would neither eat nor drink, but pined himſelf to Death, by way of Penance. But now on the other hand, Is there in the World any Creature that can compare with Man, for Injuſtice and Ingratitude, Churliſhneſs and Ill-Nature, Treachery and Baſeneſs, Lying and Diſſimulation? Beſides, allowing Virtue to conſiſt in moderating the Appetite, and curbing one's Pleaſures, Beaſts are then a great deal more regular than We, and keep themſelves more duly within the Bounds of Nature and Convenience. As for thoſe Deſires that are ſuperfluous, extravagant, and unnatural, they never have any Inclination of that Kind: And conſequently are exempted from one great and common Species of Humane Vice, which is, The enlarging our Deſires beyond meaſure, and multiplying, nay, inventing freſh Objects to our ſelves; and employing Artifice and Induſtry to heighten and create new Inclinations. In thoſe which Nature prompts them to, as Eating, and Drinking, and other Bodily Satisfactions, they outdo us much in Temperance and Reſervedneſs. But if we would in good earneſt be ſatisfy'd, whether Man or Brutes be the more Vicious or Virtuous; that is indeed, if we would put Man out of Countenance effectually, and ſilence all the

retenſions to this Excellency quite; Let u
ut the Iſſue upon that ſingle Virtue, which is
ierefore call'd *Humanity*, becauſe look'd upon to
: the moſt proper and inſeparable Quality of
ur Nature; as on the contrary, That of *Cruelty*
eſteem'd the moſt foreign, moſt diſagreeable,
id that which we abandon, as fit for wild Beaſts
nly, by giving it the Denomination of *Ferity*.
ut alas! in this very Inſtance they reproach,
id put us to the Bluſh; particularly upon the
llowing Accounts. They never, or but ſel-
om, fall foul, or do any great Miſchief, upon
ioſe of their own Kind. It is a lamentable and
andalous Obſervation, but hath too much of
ruth in it, That Dens and Deſarts are more
eaceful Habitations than Towns and Cities; and
ven * *Dragons and Beaſts of Prey, agree better toge-*
her than Men do. But Theſe, when they do fall II.
ut, quarrel upon juſt, and weighty, and neceſſary
ccaſions, Provocations that touch them near-
r, and to defend that, which needs and deſerves
eir utmoſt Endeavours to defend it; their Life,
heir Liberty, their Young. Again; They en- III.
age and aſſault each other with ſuch Arms only
s Nature hath provided for them; they come to
ir and open Combat, uſe no Methods of Hoſti-
ty, but plain Strength and Courage; encounter IV.
ingle, One againſt One: No general Rendez- V.
ous of vaſt Herds and Troops on each Side:
Nor do they act with Stratagem and Deſign. VI.
Their Engagements are alſo very ſhort, and pre- VII.
ently decided; for as ſoon as one of them is

* Major Serpentum Ferarumque concordia quàm Hominum.

Book I. wounded, or gives out, the Fray is over; and, which is yet more conſiderable, as ſoon as the Action is ended, the whole Quarrel, the Hatred, and all the Reſentment is at an end too. But

I. Man is the very *Reverſe* of all this; He is ſo far from not quarrelling with his own Kind, that

II. he quarrels with none beſides. The Grounds of theſe Quarrels are frequently trifling and frivolous, and of no Conſideration; nay, which is worſe, they are ſometimes unjuſt, they proceed from Falſhood and Miſrepreſentation; and if the Matter be examin'd to the Bottom, the Quarrels

III. have no real Ground at all. The Arms he uſes, are the Work of Induſtry; ſuch as are treacherous, and kill without Warning, and contriv'd to

IV. be as much ſo as is poſſible. The Method of making War is by Deceit and Cunning, which we colour over with the ſpecious Name of Conduct; and this is ſeen in Stratagem and Surprize, Feints

V. and Ambuſcades. This again is tranſacted by vaſt Numbers of Men met together by ſolemn Engagement, and particular Appointments, to ſtand

VI. and fall by one another. Theſe Wars are vaſtly long too; none lay down their Arms upon the firſt Diſadvantage; but ſtill either Side puſhes on its Fortune; the One to recover their Loſſes, the Other to purſue and perfect their Conqueſts; and the uſual End put to theſe Controverſies, is by the

VII. Death of the Principals. Laſtly, In theſe Quarrels, when Men want the Power, they ſtill retain the Will to do Miſchief; and tho' Acts of Hoſtility may ceaſe, yet the Hatred and Reſentment ſeldom or never ceaſe.

The

The Sum then of this Compariſon, as you found it here ſtated, amounts to thus much; Man hath no ſuch mighty Reaſon to magn Himſelf in the Advantages of his Nature, abo That of Brutes: For, allowing Him ſome Endo ments and Accompliſhments which They have no as the Sprightlineſs and Force of his Mind, a Intellectual Faculties, and all the other nobl Powers of the Soul; yet the Incumbrances upo theſe is very great and grievous; the Evils he i involv'd in upon their Account, infinite and ſupportable: The Inconſtancy and Irreſolutic Superſtition and Solicitude, ſad Remembrances the paſt and anxious Concern for the Future Ambition, and Avarice, and Envy, reſtleſs C rioſity, buſy Detraction, Lying, and Deceit, world of unruly Appetites and Paſſions, Troubles and Diſcontents. Thus this Mind, with the Thoughts and Value whereof Man is ſo much exalted, is the Occaſion of infinite Misfortunes; and of moſt of all then, when it exerts itſelf moſt: For in all vehement Agitations, it does not only hurt and diſturb the Body, and render its Forces and Functions diſorder'd, and broken, and quite tired down; but it hinders and confounds its own ſelf: For what is it that throws Men into Folly and Madneſs, ſo much as the Acuteneſs, and Activity, and Strength of the Mind itſelf? The ſubtileſt Follies, and moſt exquiſite Phrenſies, proceed from the quickeſt, and fineſt, and moſt vigorous Agitations of the Mind; as we may obſerve, that the bittereſt Averſions, and moſt irreconcileable Enmities grow from the tendereſt Paſſions, and moſt intimate

Book I. Friendſhips; and the moſt virulent and mortal Diſeaſes, from a ſtrong Complexion, and healthful Body. Melancholy Perſons are obſerv'd by *Plato*, to be beſt diſpoſed for *Learning* and *Wiſdom*; but they are equally diſpoſed for *Folly* too; much more than Perſons of a different Temper. And to a Man of nice and juſt Obſervation, it will appear, that when the Soul acts freely, and gives her ſelf a *Looſe*, there is none of her Altitudes and Sallies without a Mixture of *Folly*; and in good Truth, theſe Things dwell very cloſe together;

——— *Wit to Madneſs nearly is ally'd,*
And thin Partitions do their Bounds divide.

Once more; If we regard the living in Agreement with Nature, and in Conformity with what ſhe dictates and requires from us, Beaſts ſeem to excel us in this reſpect very much; for they lead a Life of more Freedom, more Eaſe and Security, more Moderation and Contentedneſs, than Men do. And That Man is deſervedly reputed *Wiſe*, who makes *them* his Pattern, and his Leſſon, and reaps Profit by *their* Example; by reforming and reducing himſelf to that Innocence, Simplicity, Liberty, Meekneſs, and Gentleneſs of Temper, which Nature had originally implanted both in Us and Them: And, which in Brutes is ſtill very conſpicuous, but in Us is decay'd, chang'd, and utterly corrupted by our Induſtrious Wickedneſs, and Artificial Depravations; thus debauching and abuſing the particular Prerogative we pretend to, and rendring our ſelves more vile than the Beaſts, by means of that very Underſtanding and

Judgment,

Judgment, which ſets us ſo far above them. Ch. 34.
Hence ſure it is, that God intending to ſhame us into Virtue, ſends us to School in Scripture, and bids us grow wiſer by the Example of theſe Creatures. The *Crane*, the *Stork*, and the *Swallow*; Jer. viii. 7. Mat. x. 16. Prov. vi. 6. Iſa. i. 3. the *Serpent* and the *Dove*, the *Ant*, and the *Ox*, and the *Aſs*, and ſundry others, are recommended as Teachers to us. And after all, To take down our Vanity upon this Occaſion, we ought to remember, that there is ſome ſort of Correſpondence, ſome mutual Relations and Duties ariſing from thence; if upon no other account, yet by reaſon of their being made by the ſame Hand, belonging to the ſame Maſter, and making a Part of the ſame Family with our ſelves. And this ſingle Reflection ought to prevail with us, to uſe our Advantages over them modeſtly, tenderly, and conſcientiouſly; and not treat them with Cruelty and Contempt. For as Juſtice is a Debt from us to all Men; ſo Kindneſs, and Beneficence, and Mercy, muſt needs be due to all Creatures whatſoever, that are in any Condition of receiving Benefit by us.

ADVERTISEMENT.

OUR Author in the midſt of his great Care to ſtate this Compariſon ſo, as might be moſt mortifying to the *Vanity* of Mankind, hath yet found himſelf obliged to acknowledge, that the *Reaſon* of Men is ſo much brighter, and more noble in its Operations and Effects, than any thing diſcoverable in the Brute Part of the Creation, that I might have let this Chapter paſs

Book I. without any Cenſure, had it not been for two or three Sentences, which ſeem obnoxious to very ill Conſtruction: Such as a ſort of Men are (in our Age) but too fond of embracing, who, at the ſame time that they are vain enough to imagine, that neither the *Nature*, nor the *Revelations* of God himſelf, can have any thing in them above their *Reaſon*; are yet ſo ſordid and degenerate, as to be content that Beaſts ſhould be thought endued with the ſame Souls, and to be moved with the ſame Principles of Reaſon with Themſelves. An Opinion, which is the rather entertain'd, for the ſake of a certain Conſequence that recommends it, with regard to a Future State; for it ſeems they can be ſatisfy'd with the Portion of Brutes now, provided they may but partake in it hereafter. And what Favour this Notion might find from theſe Paſſages, *That Brutes and Men both have the ſame Reaſon, though not in the ſame Degree*, and that *ſome Men excel others much more than ſome Men again excel Beaſts*; I was doubtful, and therefore look-ed upon my ſelf concerned, (in purſuance of my Propoſals at the Beginning of this Book,) to offer theſe following Conſiderations to my Reader.

Firſt, That in the Operations of the Reaſonable Soul, a great deal depends upon the Organs and Diſpoſition of that Body to which it is join'd; and (as hath been already explain'd at large) more eſpecially upon the Brain: Now ſince Anatomiſts have not been able to obſerve any very remarkable Differences between the Contexture of the Humane Brain, and that of Brutes; we are not

to

to think it ſtrange, if there appear ſome ſmall Reſemblances in ſome particular Actions of Men and Beaſts, tho' theſe do not proceed from the ſame Principle of Motion; but owe their Similitude to that of the Body and *Medium* put into thoſe Motions! Ch. 34.

Secondly, That the Impreſſions of External Objects have very ſtrong Effects upon the Imagination and Memory; and theſe, aſſiſted by Cuſtom, and Imitation, and Example, will perform many wonderful Things, which yet are not the Operations of *Reaſon*, properly ſo call'd. Of this kind it is eaſy to obſerve great number of Inſtances, in Them, who either by means of their *Infancy*, have not yet attain'd to the Uſe of Reaſon; or Them, who by ſome Natural Defects never have it at all; or Others, who by ſome accidental Diſturbance have loſt it: In all which Caſes, (not during the lucid Intervals only, or when the Powers of the Mind ſeem a little to be awaken'd, but even in the moſt profound Ignorance, or moſt raging Madneſs) Thoſe which are frequently diſtinguiſhed by the Senſitive Faculties of the Soul, put forth ſometimes a marvellous Efficacy and Vigour. And that Theſe are moved entirely by Material and Senſible Objects, and act as neceſſarily as any other Parts of *Matter* whatſoever, hath been the Opinion of many new Philoſophers; ſome of whom imagine, that all the Operations of this kind are as capable of being reſolved by Principles of Mechaniſm, (thoſe Operations, I mean, of Imagination, and Memory, and Cuſtom) as any other Affections and Motions of common *Matter*. How juſt this Concluſion is,

I do

Book I. I do not pretend to determine; for They themſelves ſeem to confeſs it inſufficient, when they call in to their Aſſiſtance another *Principle*, which is,

Thirdly, That of *Inſtinct*; By which is meant, a ſtrong Tendency, and natural Impulſe (diſcernible in theſe Creatures) to certain neceſſary and uſeful Actions. Something of a Principle implanted in them by their wiſe Creator, to qualify them for their own Preſervation, and the anſwering the Ends of his good Providence in making them. And this appears ſo early, as to be plainly antecedent to either Memory or Fancy; and yet is ſo conſtant too, and always the ſame, in the ſame Circumſtances and Occaſions; as neither to depend upon Cauſes ſo mutable as the Impreſſions of outward Objects, nor a Principle ſo capricious, as the Choice of ſuch a Mind perfectly free feels in its Deliberations. And, as Inſtruments put together by a ſkilful Hand, perform many Operations, ſo aſtoniſhing, that a Man unexperienced in the Art, could not poſſibly imagine ſuch Materials capable of them; ſo theſe Philoſophers conceive, that Almighty God, in his Infinite Wiſdom, hath ſo diſpoſed the Senſitive Parts of the Soul, that They, by their wonderful Structure, ſhall be adapted to moſt amazing Effects, and poſſeſſed with ſome Original Propenſions and Impulſes, independent from, and antecedent to, the Impreſſions of Matter, or the Power of Inſtitution and Cuſtom; which, in the needful and moſt profitable Actions of Life, ſerve theſe Animals for Fundamental Principles, and bear ſome kind of Affinity to the firſt common Notions,

Notions, in the Rational and Intelligent
And upon theſe Impulſes join'd to thoſe
Advantages mention'd before, the whole
nomy of Brutes, and even thoſe Actions, w
ſeem moſt exquiſite and admirable in any of th
have, by the Modern Mechanick Philoſoph
been generally thought to depend. Concer
which, though almoſt every Syſtem treat in ſo
meaſure, yet I believe my Reader, (whether
Opinion incline to that Account or not) w
at leaſt think himſelf well entertain'd up
Subject, by the Peruſal of our Learned and
nious Dr. *Willis*, in the Sixth and Seventh C
of his Book *De Animâ Brutorum*.

Two Things are fit to be added upon this
caſion, with regard to what Monſieur *Charron* h
deliver'd concerning *Inſtinct:* The firſt is, That in
regard we obſerve theſe Animals conſtantly going
on in the ſame beaten Tract, and keeping ever
cloſe to one Method; and even in thoſe Inſtances
which have the greateſt Appearance of Compari-
ſon and Choice, of Ten thouſand that make the
ſame Experiment, or go about the ſame thing, not one varying from the common and received Way; This ſeems to be ſome *Governing Principle* in Nature, which gives a neceſſary Determination to them; and very different from that Liberty and Conſideration, which hath ſcarce any more convincing and demonſtrative Proof of the Will, being abſolutely unconſtrain'd in Mankind, than that Multiplicity of Opinions, and ſtrange Variety of Proceedings, obſervable upon Occaſions and Junctures, in themſelves extremely alike.

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Book I. The other Remark, proper upon this Occaſion, is, that what our Author ſuggeſts here, is no Conſequence at all; as if too much Honour were done to theſe Creatures, and ſuch a happy and unalterable Determination, to what is profitable and proper for them, were a Privilege more than Humane; a nearer Approach to that unerring Wiſdom, and unchangeable Goodneſs of the Divine Nature, than We our ſelves can boaſt of. For there is ſo very wide a Difference between *Liberty* and *Neceſſity* of acting; the One is ſo Glorious, ſo truly Noble; the other ſo Mean, ſo Slaviſh a Principle, that no Compariſon can be made between them. The moſt Glorious, moſt Beautiful, moſt Uſeful Parts of the Material Creation, are in this reſpect, infinitely beneath the meaneſt of the Sons of Men; and all their other Advantages put together, cannot deſerve to be laid into the Balance againſt this Single Dignity, of Free and Spontaneous Action. And though the Excellency of the Divine Nature be indefectible and unalterable Goodneſs, yet would not even This be an Excellence, if it were not the Effect of perfect Liberty. It is, indeed, our Misfortune, that our Underſtandings are impoſed upon, our Affections perverted; and ſo the Choice we have the Uſe of, often determines us to the wrong Side, and entangles us in Error and Vice. But Theſe Defects and Temptations are ſo many Clogs and Bars upon our Freedom; and therefore God, who is above any Poſſibility of ſuch falſe Determinations, is ſtill ſo much the more Free. For *Freedom* does not conſiſt in a Power of chuſing *Evil* as well as *Good*, (which is a Power, indeed,

deed, that never was, nor can be, ſtrictly ſpeaking) but in being Self-moved, and Self-acted; ſo as to be the Diſpoſer of one's own Will, without any Compulſion or neceſſary Determination, from a Foreign or External Principle; and only acting, as one is acted upon. If then this Inſtinct in Brutes, be a Matter of *Force*, and neceſſary Determination, they are in no degree the better or more commendable for it; but under a fatal Conſtraint, which is ſo far from reſembling the Divine Perfection, that it admits of no Virtue, nor ought to be eſteem'd any Excellence, but the direct contrary. Ch. 34.

Fourthly, Let us obſerve, what mighty Difference there is between the *Perceptions* of Brutes, and thoſe of Men; ſo great, that in them we find no Footſteps of any but ſuch as are material and ſingle Objects; and what this Author advances as Collections, and Inferences from thence, are not improbably aſſign'd by others, to the Force of Imagination, or the Strength of Memory, or to thoſe Natural Impreſſions, which commonly go by the Name of *Inſtinct*. To the latter of Theſe we find very Learned Men, attributing that uniform Proceſs of Birds, and Bees, and Ants, in their Nutrition, Generation, Production, and the like. To the former, that which *Charron* terms deducing an *Univerſal* from a *Singular*, and knowing by the having ſeen one Man, how to diſtinguiſh the Humane Form, in any, or all Individuals of the ſame Species. But, ſuppoſing we ſhould allow, that this proceeds from a diſtinguiſhing Faculty, and not merely from the refreſhing and awakening an Image, that lay dormant

Book I. mant in the Memory, till revived by this fresh Object; yet what Proportion can even thus much bear, to all those abstracted Ideas by which Men distinguish the Natures and Properties of Things? If a Brute, from the Sight of a Man, could collect so much as should serve to discriminate all other Men from Creatures of a different Species; yet what is this in Comparison of that Penetration, which examines into the Abstruse Causes, and Essential Differences of Things, and informs itself distinctly, wherein that very Character of our Nature, which we call *Humanity*, consists? And what account can there be given of any universal or abstracted Ideas in Beasts? Of any of those which we properly call *Reasonable Actions*? For as to these seeming Demurs, and little Comparisons, which we find instanced in here, and in other Places, it is usual to observe as much, in Children so little, and Naturals so wretchedly stupid, as that there are but very faint, if any Glimpses at all, of *Understanding* in them. I know, indeed, *Monsieur Charron* hath provided a Reply to this Argument, by saying, That we cannot have any competent Knowledge of Their Internal Operations. But tho' we do not see all the hidden Movements of their Souls, nor can distinctly say, whether they are *feeble Reasoners*, or *stupendous Mechanics*; yet we may be very confident, they cannot dive into the Causes and abstracted Ideas of Things; because there do not appear the least Foot-steps, or any of those Noble Effects, of such Knowledge, which Mankind have in all Ages been conspicuous for. For to these abstracted Notions it is, that all the amazing Inventions and

S. 1.

Improvements

Improvements of Arts and Sciences; but eſpeci- Ch. 34.
ally the Wonders of *Mechaniſm* and *Motion*, by
Numbers and Proportions duly adjuſted, owe their Birth and daily Growth. And ſince in the Diſtinction and Perception of Concrete Bodies, where Senſation is chiefly concern'd, the Brutes are acknowledged to equal, if not exceed Us, in Accuracy; it is not to be conceived, that They who excel in a Faculty, which is commenſurate to a Senſitive Soul, ſhould be able to give no Marks at all of their being endued with a Capacity of entertaining and feeding upon thoſe Ideas, which are the peculiar Prerogatives and Glories of a Rational One.

Much more might be added upon this Occaſion, with regard both to the Objects themſelves, and the particular Manner of Conception; and the infinite Diſparities of the Humane Intellect, and that Faculty, which is affected in Brutes. But it is Prejudice ſufficient againſt them, that ſo many very Wiſe and Inquiſitive Perſons have found Cauſe, to do even ſomething more than doubt, whether Brutes be better than a ſort of *Divine Clock-work*, and have any manner of Senſe or Perception at all. This, at leaſt, was never aſſerted of Man; nor the Powers and Operations of his Reaſoning Soul diſputed, (as to the Reality of them,) except by ſuch as ſet up for *Univerſal Scepticiſm*, and are for reducing all to a State of Confuſion and Uncertainty. And therefore if, becauſe Brutes ſeem to act by a Faculty, which we cannot perfectly account for, we ſhould allow, to theſe Brutes, ſome few duſky Glimmerings of Reaſon (which yet there is no abſolute Neceſſi-

ty

Book I. ty for, becauſe they have ſomething like it) yet no impartial Conſiderer can ever admit, that it will bear a Queſtion, whether They or We have the better of this Point; or that *ſome Men excel others, more than ſome again excel Beaſts*; for there is no Man, how mean and untaught ſoever, if provided with what we call *Common Senſe*, but finds an Ability in himſelf, nay, exerciſes that Ability every Day, (even when he does not know or think of it) of conſidering, comparing, and determining in ſuch a manner, as no good Arguments have ever yet been offer'd to ſhew that Beaſts either do, or can do. They are juſtly thought to do ſomewhat very extraordinary, when by long Cuſtom, and ſevere Diſcipline, and daily Example and Inſtruction, brought to imitate ſome very common Actions of Men: But what Divine Heights do Men themſelves aſcend to, when they have proportionable Pains taken with them? And here in Juſtice the Compariſon ought to lie; between the *beſt* of each Kind, not the *beſt* of One, and the *loweſt* of the Other; the moſt unapt and neglected of Men, and the moſt teachable and improved of Brutes: For the Advantages, or the Want of *Art*, cannot at all affect the Diſpute, where the Gifts of *Nature* are the Matter in Queſtion: And theſe are diſtributed with ſo very uneven a Hand in the Caſe before us; that He muſt be either very ſtupid, or very perverſe, who does not ſee the mighty Diſproportion.

As to the other Part of this Diſcourſe, whether *Reaſon* be any *real Benefit*, and we might not have been as well, or better without it; I ſhall need to add, that the ſeveral Inſtances pre

here, are only ſuch as are ſad and very reproach- Ch. 34.
ful Truths, in regard of thoſe Abuſes of Reaſon, Men are guilty of; and the wicked, or the miſchievous Purpoſes they pervert it to: But as to the Thing itſelf, they are no more a Reflection upon it, than the Surfeits and Beſtiality of Gluttons, and Sots, are upon the common Refreſhments of Life. What is ſaid upon this Occaſion, will do well indeed to be conſider'd, by thoſe vicious and indiſcreet Men, who apply That as a *Spur* to their Wickedneſs, and Paſſion, which was intended for a *Curb* to both; And the World ought to be humbled and reformed by a ſerious Reflection, how acceſſary Men become to their own Miſeries, and how obſtinately fond they are of them, when their very *Remedies* are induſtriouſly turned into the worſt of *Diſeaſes:* But all this, notwithſtanding *Monſieur Charron*'s Argument here, is abundantly refuted by himſelf, in the laſt Words of this whole Treatiſe, where he vindicates the Honour of *Eloquence*, from the miſchievous Effects, which ſome ill-deſigning Men apply it to by this Parallel: "For (ſays "he) even That *Reaſon* and *Underſtanding*, "which is the peculiar *Prerogative of Humane* "*Nature*, and ſets us above Brutes, is moſt mi- "ſerably abus'd; turn'd againſt God, and our "Selves; and made the Occaſion of our more "inexcuſable Ruine. But This is only an Ac- "cidental Misfortune; far from the Natural "Tendency of ſo Noble a Privilege. And He, "who would argue from hence, that Mankind "had better want theſe Faculties, may juſtly "ſeem to have degenerated into Brute; and

Book I. " to be quite forſaken of all that Reaſon, which " he ſo wildly and raſhly condemns. So juſt Ground is there for reading this Treatiſe, with thoſe Cautions to be laid down upon the XXXVIIth *Chapter*; and ſo truly does our Author keep up his Character of an *Academick Philoſopher.*

CHAP. XXXV.

The Third Reſpect, under which we propoſed to conſider Man, *is by taking a ſhort View, and ſummary Account of his* Life.

The True Value, the Continuance, and Deſcription of Humane Life, and the ſeveral Parts or Stages of it.

I. Of the Worth, or juſt Eſtimate of Life.

ONE very conſiderable; One, indeed, of the principal and moſt neceſſary Points of Wiſdom, is rightly to underſtand the True Value of *Life*; and to make ſo juſt an Eſtimate of it, as to keep or to loſe it; to cheriſh and preſerve, or to neglect and lay it down; and ſo to manage our ſelves in the whole Conduct of it, as Duty and Decency require. There is not any one Caſe, in which Men are more apt to be wanting, nor where their Failings are of more dangerous Conſequence, for the involving them in new and infinite Difficulties. The Mean, and

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the Ignorant, the Worldling, and the Man of Pleaſure; and, in general, all that do not, or cannot conſider, prize *Life* extravagantly: They look upon it as the *Supreme Good*, and prefer it ſo much before all other Things, as not to admit a Compariſon between them. If Life were to be ſold at a Price; nay, if a ſhort Reprieve only, and lengthening out their Term a little, can be had, they can think nothing too dear, no Conditions too hard to be ſubmitted to; but are ſatisfied the Purchaſe ought to be made at any rate. For This, they tell you, is their *Happineſs*, and *when That is gone, All is gone*; their very Motto is, *Nothing more precious than Life. (Vitâ nihil charius)* They value and love it, not only as the Scene of Action and Enjoyment, and upon the account of the Conveniencies and Opportunities it affords, but upon its own ſuppoſed Intrinſick Worth, and live merely for the ſake of Living. And how can we think it ſtrange, that ſuch Perſons ſhould be ſo very defective in the reſt of their Duty, ſo miſled with Errors and extravagant Notions, when they make the very firſt Step wrong, and ſet out in ſo groſs a Miſtake, concerning this great Fundamental Article of Wiſdom and Virtue? Ch. 35.

There is alſo a Contempt of *Life*, that declines as much to Vice in the other Extreme, and repreſents it as a Burden, or a Trifle; Worth nothing, or worſe than nothing: But this Undervaluing is the Effect of Weakneſs and Ignorance, of Pride and Ingratitude. For we know very well, that when it falls into Wiſe and Good Hands, it is capable of becoming an Inſtrument

Book I. of great and general Uſe, both to our Selves, and to Others. Now I can by no means be of Their Opinion, taken literally and plainly, who give it out for their Principle, That * *the greateſt Happineſs is not to live at all; and the next moſt deſirable Thing is, To live but a very little while.* Nor is that Argument they uſe in Vindication of this Opinion, at all ſufficient or ſatisfactory: What Hurt (ſay they) could there be in *Non-Exiſtence?* And what Matter had it been, if I were never created? To This one may reply with reaſon enough, What do you make of all the Happineſs you have enjoy'd? What wou'd become of This, if you had had *no Being?* And would it not have been ſome Matter, ſome Hurt never to have enjoy'd it? For certainly, tho' the Loſs of the Good which we have, and know the Worth of, be a more ſenſible Evil; yet the mere Privation of Good, and never having it at all, is one ſort of Evil too; even tho' that Good be ſuch as we ſhould never have miſſed, nor ſuch as was neceſſary to us. Theſe Extremes are too wide; they overſtrain the Point on both ſides, and degenerate into Vice; tho' they are not equally vicious and erroneous neither.

I confeſs, ſpeaking in the Quality of a Philoſopher, and with regard to the preſent State of Affairs only; I do not think that Wiſe Ancient much out of the way, who acknowledged † *Life to be good; but ſuch a Good as no Man would accept of, if it were left to his own free Choice.*

* Optimum non naſci; aut quàm citiſſimè abe

† Vitam nemo acciperet, ſi daretur ſcientibus,

he were fairly inform'd before-hand, what Incum- Ch. 35.
brances lay upon it. It is not at all amiſs, that we are engaged in it, before we know what it is: We come into the World blind-fold; but that is no reaſon why Men ſhould afterwards put out their own Eyes, or hood-wink themſelves. For the Miſchief is, that, when we are got hither, we run into different Ways: Some cheat themſelves into ſo extravagant a Fondneſs for Life, that they would not part with it again at any rate: Others fret themſelves into ſo ill an Opinion of it, that they grumble eternally, are diſcontented at every thing, and pretend to be weary, and ſick of Living. But Wiſe Men have juſter Notions of the Matter; They conſider that this was a Bargain made without their Knowledge or Conſent; (for no Man lives, or dies, aſſoon, or as late, or in ſuch Manner and Circumſtances, as he pleaſes himſelf) But ſtill it is a Bargain we are bound to ſtand to; and if it be a hard one, we muſt try to make the beſt of it. Sometimes we ſhall meet with rough Ways; but the whole Paſſage is not ſo: And therefore Philoſophers agree, that the beſt Courſe is, to create no Diſturbance, nor ſtruggle and flounder unprofitably, but for Men to ſuit their Tempers, and comply with their Circumſtances as well as they can; to carry it off with Evenneſs and Moderation, and make a *Virtue of Neceſſity*; for That is the Character of Wiſdom and good Management: And when they have fixed themſelv
this Method, then to live as long as i
them, conſiſtent with their Duty and
Not as long as is poſſible for them,

Book I. Principle of Fooliſh and Profligate People. For there is a Seaſon proper for Dying, as well as one for Living; and a Virtuous Honourable Death is a thouſand times rather to be choſen than a Wicked and Infamous Life. Now a Wiſe and Good Man makes it his Buſineſs to live juſt ſo long as Life is better than Death, and no longer: For, as we obſerved before, that They are in the wrong, who eſteem the ſhorteſt Life beſt; ſo is that common Opinion a Miſtake too, which raiſes the Value by Computation of Years, and accounts that Life beſt which laſts longeſt.

2. *Of the Shortneſs of Life.* The Shortneſs of that Term allow'd us in this World, is a great and a general Complaint: We meet it in every Mouth; not from the Ignorant and Vulgar only, where we cannot expect better, than that They ſhould be willing to live always; but (which may be allowed a little to ſurprize us) even Great Souls, and Wiſe Men, reckon it among their very greateſt Unhappineſſes. Now to ſay the very Truth, as Men uſually manage the Matter, and indeed as Nature hath in ſome meaſure contriv'd it, Life is very ſhort; For the greateſt Part of it is employed and diverted otherwiſe; and a very ſmall Proportion left for the true Uſes and Ends of Living. The Time of our Infancy and Ignorance, the Decays and Infirmities of Old Age, the neceſſary Intervals of Sleep, the Diſeaſes of our Bodies and our Minds, and the infinite other void Spaces of it, wherein we are incapable of doing Good, away with a great deal of our Time: And the Whole is ſumm'd up, and theſe Al

made, the Remainder is not much. But yet, Ch. 35.
without troubling our ſelves with the contrary Opinion, which aſſerts the Shortneſs of Life to be greatly for our Advantage, we ſhall find Reaſon enough to accuſe this Complaint of Injuſtice; and to think it more the Effect of Inconſideration and Ill Nature, than of good Arguing, and virtuous Diſpoſition. For what Advantage would a longer Life be to us? Shall we wiſh for it to no other Purpoſe, but merely to Live in; to take our Eaſe, to Eat, and Drink, and Sleep, to look about us, and ſee more of the World? What need is there of ſo much Time for this? We have already ſeen, and known, and taſted what we are capable of, in a very little time; and when we are got to the End of our Curioſity, This is ſufficient. What Good will it do us, or wherefore ſhould we wiſh to act the ſame Things over and over again, and be always beginning afreſh? Who would not be cloy'd with eating upon the ſame Diſh every Day? If this be not nauſeous and troubleſome, yet to be ſure it is ſuperfluous and unneceſſary. This is but One Circle, which is perpetually rolling, and brings the ſame Things uppermoſt again; ſometimes they remove to a little Diſtance, and then they quickly return back upon us: 'Tis but a ſpinning the ſame Web; and that which may ſerve a Child to play with, but can never be a fit Entertainment for grown Men. Si we then wiſh it for nobler Ends; that grow wiſer and better, and aſpire to grees of Virtue and Perfection; that more Good, and be more uſeful in

Book I. tions? This, indeed, carries the Appearance of an excellent Diſpoſition; but They that know us, will not be impoſed upon by it: For Who ſhall teach, Who ſhall improve us? Alas! That little which is committed to our Truſt, is ſo ill uſed, that we cannot have the Confidence to aſk for more. We neglect what we have already, and ſuffer the greateſt Part of it to ſlip thro' our Fingers. We ſquander it away profuſely upon Vanity and Trifles; nay, we abuſe and miſemploy it upon Wickedneſs and Vice. And yet after all this Unfaithfulneſs and Folly, we cry and complain for more, and think our ſelves ill dealt with, that we have not enough. Enough for what? For the ſame inſignificant and ill Purpoſes to be ſure; for That would be the Conſequence of a more liberal Allowance too. But, ſuppoſing Men ſerious in this Matter, and that they wou'd really do as they pretend, yet of what Uſe wou'd this vaſt Treaſure of Knowledge and Experience prove? For the Soul muſt change its Dwelling at one time or other; and whenever That diſlodges, all our Wiſdom goes with it. Since therefore This cannot ſtay always, why ſhould we take it ill that it ſtays ſo little a time? For if it ſink into a State of Oblivion, and all muſt be loſt, What mighty Difference is there, whether this be done ſooner or later? But if it removes into a better Condition, and be (as it really will be) put into a State of clearer Viſion, and more perfect Knowledge, why ſhould we deſire to have that Happineſs delay'd, and kept back from us?

But

But you will ſay, perhaps, This *Gift of Life* is very unequally diſtributed; for there are ſome Creatures that live three or four times as long as the uſual Age of Man. I might anſwer, That the Accounts we have of this Kind are many, if not moſt of them, fabulous. But waving That, and allowing the Objection; yet it muſt be confeſs'd withal, that ſome, nay the much greater part of Animals, live not near ſo long; ſome never arrive at a Fourth part of our Years, and very few ever come to an equal length with us. Now pray, what Right, what Privilege, what Reaſon hath Man to challenge a longer Duration here, than the reſt of his Fellow-Creatures have a Title to? Where did God ever grant him ſuch a Charter, or how will he be able to make good the Claim? Is it reaſonable He ſhould be indulged more than They, becauſe he puts out his Time to better Intereſt, and employs it upon Buſineſs more noble and ſublime in itſelf, more worthy and deſerving of this Favour, than They are capable of? I greatly fear, this Argument may be thrown back in our Faces, and prove the ſtrongeſt Plea againſt us: For ſure He ought rather to be cut ſhorter than the reſt, as a Puniſhment for his Abuſe and Miſmanagement. And in this He is ſingular, and ſtands alone. The whole Creation cannot furniſh a Parallel; not any one Inſtance of this Bleſſing ſo grievouſly perverted; not ſuch another *Monſter* of Wickedneſs and Unfaithfulneſs, of Ingratitude and Baſeneſs, of Intemperance and Debauchery, and all manner of diſorderly Living. This *Charge* hath been ſufficiently proved upon him already, when we ſtated th

Ch. 35.

Compa

Book I. Compariſon betwixt Him and the Beaſts; and therefore I urge my Point, and aſk that Queſtion once more, What Benefit would a longer Life be to him? Nay, I back that with a Second, and add, What an Inconvenience would it be to Himſelf, and how miſchievous to the World? It would make his own Account the heavier, his Crimes and Arrears the greater, and it would encourage him to yet more Extravagancies than he is guilty of already: For this very Coſideration would put him upon bolder and more deſperate Attempts. The Shortneſs of his Continuance in the World, as Matters now ſtand, is ſome Check to his wild Career, and breaks all his Meaſures; and the Uncertainty of it abates and damps his Fury: But if theſe Reſtraints were removed, and Aſſurances given of a larger Term, Nothing would be able to ſtop him; his Projects would be always New, without Number, without End; and he would *live* as if he were to *live for ever.* You ſee how ſtrong theſe Inclinations are now. He cannot but feel and fear his own Mortality; and yet theſe Reflections are ſo over-balanc'd by a corrupt Principle within, that he cannot forbear holding faſt what he hath, and eager Deſires and Purſuits of what he hath not, and forming vaſt and very diſtant Deſigns, as if he were really Immortal. *'Tis a juſt Reproof which *Seneca* gives, *Ye live, as if Life were never to have an End. The Frailty of your Nature is never thought of; or, be, 'tis remember'd to no Purpoſe; for a*[illegible]

* Tanquam ſemper victuri vivitis. Nunquam gilitas veſtra ſuccurrit; omnia tanquam tanquam Immortales concupiſcit.

time that your Fears are infinite, and this proves you Mortal; your Deſires are infinite too, as if you look'd upon your ſelves to be Immortal. Ch. 35.

Again; What Neceſſity is there for all thoſe great and goodly Deſigns, and that mighty Buſineſs, which is pretended to merit a *longer Life* for Mankind, than any other Animal? Does Nature require more back than is given us? No ſure. Men have no juſt Ground of Complaint, but abundant Cauſe for Indignation and Remorſe, for treating themſelves no better. The *Life* allow'd us is enough to anſwer All the Purpoſes of it; but the Miſery is, that we turn Negligent and Prodigals, and do not huſband it ſo well as we might and ought to do: It is not ſhort of itſelf, but we make it ſo, by waſting it unprofitably. We labour under no Wants of this Kind, but what our own Prodigality brings upon us; and are ſcandalouſly laviſh of the Thing we pretend to need moſt. * We loſe it, we ſell it, we throw it away; we vilify it, and complain that it hangs upon our Hands; we are at ſome Pains to paſs it away, as if it were a Matter of no Worth at all; as if our Stomachs were over-loaded, and we ſick and cloy'd with too great Abundance. There is not any of us, but is guilty of one or other of theſe Three Faults; either employing it Ill, or not employing it at All, or employing it Inſignificantly, and to no purpoſe. † *A great part of our Life* (ſays *Seneca*) *is run off in doing what we ſhould not; much the greateſt in doing nothing at all;*

* Non inopes vitæ, ſed prodigi.
Magna vitæ pars elabitur malè agentibus, maxima nihil
in aliud agentibus.

and

Book I. *and almoſt the whole of it in doing things by the by, and ſuch as are not our proper Buſineſs.* No Body takes Pains in learning how to Live; but All lay out their Studies and their Time upon any other Subject, rather than This. And yet This, like all other Arts, is not to be attained ſlightly and eaſily; a Man cannot be expert in it without long Practice, much Diligence, and very ſollicitous Application of the Mind. Some put off all Thought of *living well*, till they can *live no longer*. They ſpend the Vigour and Flower of their Years in Toil, and Trouble, and Folly; and propoſe great Enjoyments to themſelves hereafter, and wondrous Comforts in their declining Age. How are they ſure they ſhall live to that Age? But if they were, what a wretched Madneſs is This? 'Tis directly as if a Man ſhould ſet his Caſk to running, and let out all the beſt and ſprightly Liquor, that he may reſerve the Dregs for his own Drinking. *Age* is the *Lee* and *Sediment of Life*; All we can do then, is to try if we can ſuſtain and ſweeten it a little; but to defer our Satisfactions till then, is to give them quite away, and loſe them for altogether. Nay, many never go thus far, but finiſh their Day without ever beginning their Work, and go off the Stage without conſidering why they were brought on, or what Part they were to act. * *Some* (ſays the Philoſopher) *begin to live when they ſhould make an End; others ceaſe to live before ever they began: Among the many Miſchiefs that Folly brings upon us,*

* Quidam vivere incipiunt cùm deſinendum: Quidam ante deſiverunt quàm inciperent; Inter cætera mala, hoc que habet ſtultitia, ſemper incipit vivere.

This is not the leaſt, That it is always beginning to live. We think of Buſineſs, and intend to ſet about it; but make no Progreſs at all, nor bring any thing to Perfection. Ch. 35.

3. *Deſcription of it.* The World is a Theatre, and our preſent Life in it, the Beginning and the End of a Play; our Birth draws the Curtain, and our Death ſhuts it up again: 'Tis a Comedy of Errors; a conſtant Succeſſion of Accidents and Adventures, a Contexture and Chain of ſeveral Miſeries linked cloſely, and interwoven within one another; nothing but Evil on every Side; That which paſſes off, and that which approaches, and comes into its Place; and theſe drive out, and puſh forward each other, as the Waves of the Sea do in their Ebbings and Flowings: Trouble and Diſquiet are always at hand; but for Happineſs, we are cheated with the empty Shadow of it. Blindneſs and Inſenſibility take up the Beginning of our Lives; Labour and anxious Care, the Middle; Weakneſs and Pain, the Latter End; but Ignorance and Error reach from the Beginning to the End: Theſe are inſeparable, and keep us Company quite through.

4. The *Life* of Man hath its Inconveniencies and Miſeries of ſeveral ſorts. Some of them are in Common, extending to all Perſons, and all Times; Others are Peculiar and Succeſſive, and diſtinguiſh'd by the different Parts, and Age, and particular Seaſons and Accidents of Life: As Childhood, Youth, Maturity, Man's Eſtate, and Age; for Each of theſe hath its diſtinct Calities; ſome Embaſements and Incumbrances which may be properly call'd its own.

Book I. When *Youth* and *Old Age* come to be weigh'd one against the other, it hath been uſual to give the Advantage to the latter: And moſt Authors ſpeak of Age with Honour and Reſpect, as having attain'd to greater Degrees of Wiſdom, more Maturity of Judgment, more Moderation and Temper: All which good Qualities are marvellouſly cry'd up, with a Deſign to put Youth out of Countenance, and to charge upon it the contrary Characters of Vice and Folly, Licentiouſneſs and Extravagance. But with the leave of thoſe, who have thus decided the Controverſy, I muſt take Liberty to declare, that this Verdict is in my Opinion very unjuſt: For, in good Truth, the Defects and the Vices of Age are more in Number, worſe in Quality, and leſs to be reſiſted or recover'd, than thoſe that are peculiar to Youth. Years deform our Minds as much as our Bodies; bring Wrinkles there as well as in our Faces, and turn our Tempers ſower and mouldy with long keeping. The Soul keeps Pace with the Body; Both are ſpent, and Both decay, till at laſt we grow ſo weak, ſo perfectly helpleſs, as in reſpect of both, to verify that Proverb of *Old Men being twice Children*. *Age* is a neceſſary, but a ſtrong Diſeaſe; it loads us inſenſibly with grievous Imperfections, and then contrives to cover the Shame of them with creditable Names. What is in effect no other than moroſeneſs of Humour, a peeviſh Diſlike of the preſent Enjoyments, and Diſability to do as the Man did heretofore, paſſes for Wiſdom and Gravity, Experience, and an Inſight into the Vanity of the World. But Wiſdom is ſomewhat much more noble than all this comes

5. *Youth and Age compar'd.*

Ch. 35

…o, and far above making uſe of ſuch mean Inſtru-
…ments. There is a vaſt Difference between *grow-*
…ing older and *growing wiſer*; between forſaking all
Vice, and the changing one for another; and, as
…t often happens in this Caſe, changing for the
Worſe. Old Age condemns the Pleaſures a
Gaieties of Youth; but how much of this n
be allowed to its not being now able o
them any longer? It is like *Æſop*'s Do
and deſpiſes what it cannot enjoy. Bu
not to diſdain and give over Pleaſure ; …
to be diſdain'd and given over by it. Ple…
always airy and entertaining; and theſe are P…
ſons no longer for its Turn. But why ſho
they caſt a Reflection upon That, which
themſelves? Why ſhould Impotence corru… …
Judgment? For this, if impartially conſulte
would tell Young Men, that there is Vice in th…
Pleaſures; and Old Men, that there is
in Vice. And if this were rightly underſtoo
and frankly confeſs'd, Youth would be a grea…
deal the better, and Old Age not one whit the
worſe.

The Vices more peculiar to *Youth* are, Raſhneſs and Heat; Forwardneſs, and an unguarded Converſation; Debauchery, and all manner of Senſual Exceſs. And theſe are in ſome Degree natural to that State; the Effects of Warmth and Vigour, and the Boilings of a Florid Blood: All which, as they need and ought to be corrected, ſo they have ſomething to ſay in their own Excuſe. But **what Apology** ſhall we make for the ill Qualities **that attend** *Old Age?* The lighteſt and leaſt of **are vain Arrogance** and Pride; a trouble-

Book I. ſome and peremptory way of Converſing, and an engroſſing all the Talk to themſelves; froward and unſociable Humours, Superſtition and Whimſy; Love of Riches when paſt the uſe of them; ſordid Avarice, and fear of Death; which generally is not (as ſome have favourably interpreted the Caſe) the effect of a cold Blood, and low Spirits, and of Courage damp'd by theſe Natural Cauſes; but it proceeds from long Cuſtom, and Acquaintance, and a fooliſh Fondneſs for the World; by which the Old Gentleman hath corrupted his Judgment, and hath a greater Tenderneſs for it, than young Men, who enjoy more, and know leſs of it. Beſides theſe, there are Envy, and Ill-Nature, and Injuſtice; but the moſt exquiſite and ridiculous Folly of all, is, that Affectation of a ſevere, and grave, and wiſe Character; and hoping to gain Reſpect and Deference, by an Auſtere Look, and Scornful Behaviour; which indeed does but provoke Laughter, and become itſelf a Jeſt, while it pretends to extort Obſervance and Fear: For the Young Fellows combine together againſt this formal Auſterity, which they ſee put on only for a Diſguiſe; and with a deſign to amuſe and affright them into Reverence, where real Merit, which would engage it, is wanting. In ſhort, the Vices of Old Age are ſo numerous on the One Hand, and the Infirmities of it on the Other, and Both together conſpire to render it ſo deſpicable, that the beſt and moſt ſaving Game it can play, is to ſecure Mens Affections, and to win them by Methods of Kindneſs, and Affability, and Good-Nature. For Churliſhneſs, and an Imperious Humour, and whatever

whatever aims at Fear and Dominion, are not by any means Weapons fit for Theſe Perſons to manage. The affecting ſo very much Awe, does by no means become them; and if the thing could really be compaſſed (which it rarely or never is) yet they ſhould much rather chuſe to render themſelves Agreeable, and think the Love, and Reſpect, and Honour of young Perſons, more to be deſired, than the keeping them in Conſtraint and Fear, and Tyrannizing over all that converſe with them. Ch. 35.

THE

Fourth Conſideratio

CONCERNS

Man, with regard to his Manner Humour, and Condition, &c.

A general Draught of Man.

THE Ancient Sages, and as many have apply'd themſelves to the ſtudy Humane Nature, when they repreſe *Man* to us, have this remarkable Agreement mong them, That in all their Draughts and D ſcriptions, their principal Lines are the ſame. F they All conſpire to paint him, as a Creat made up of theſe Four Things; *Vanity*, *Weakn Inconſtancy*, and *Miſery*. They ſtyle him *The Pl of Time*; *The Sport and Geugaw of Fortune*; *The mage of Inconſtancy*; *The Pattern*, nay rather *Prodigy of Weakneſs*; *the Balance of Envy and M ſery*; a *Dream*; a *Phantome*; *Duſt and Aſhes*; *Vapour*; a *Morning-Dew*; a *Flower that preſe fadeth*, *in the Morning Green and growing in the Evening cut down*, *dry'd up*, *and withere* a *Wa*

a *Wind*; *Graſs*; a *Bubble*; a *Shadow*; a *Leaf born* Ch. 35.
away by the Wind; a *Sponge full of Excrements in*
his Beginning; a *Bundle of Infirmities and M*
in the Middle State; *Rottenneſs and a Nuiſance,*
Food for Worms, in his Latter End. In a Wor
The moſt *Deſpicable*, the moſt *Calamitous Part*
the whole Creation. *Job*, who was as well fl
and as much experienced in this Subject, as an
Man ever was, hath drawn him at full Le
in his true Colours and Proportions: And
mon after him hath done the ſame in his o
Pliny's Piece of him is *in Little*, but extreme
like the Original, when he calls him * The mo
wretched, and yet the proudeſt and moſt i
lent Creature in the whole World. Under
Former of theſe Attributes, (That of Wretche
he comprehends all the Characters already men
tion'd, and the Deſcriptions other Writers ha
given of him. The Second (That of Proud
concerns another Head of very great Conſidera-
tion; and in theſe Two Words he ſeems to have
comprized all that can be ſaid upon the Matter.
Theſe Two Qualities, I confeſs, ſeem utterly in-
conſiſtent, and deſtructive of each other. For
what in Appearance more diſtant, what more con-
tradictious, than Emptineſs and Preſumption,
than Miſery and Pride? So ſtrange, ſo monſtrous
a Compoſition is *Man*, in which theſe wide Ex-
tremes are Ingredients.

Now the very different Parts whereof Man
conſiſts, Body and Spirit, make it exceeding hard

* Solum ut certum ſit nihil eſſe certi, nec miſerius quic-
quam homine aut ſuperbius.

Book I. to give a tolerable Deſcription of him entire, and altogether. Some charge all that can be ſpoken in Diſparagement of Man, upon the Body, and repreſent him a moſt excellent Creature, complete and ſuperior to any other, in regard of his Mind. But this Method is ſo far from juſt, that, on the contrary, All that is truly ill, not in Man only, but in the whole World, is the Product and Contrivance of the Mind. And much the greateſt Part of the Vanity, Inconſtancy, Miſery, and Preſumption, with which Humane Nature is debaſed, reſides in this Part of us; which gave *Democritus* occaſion to call the Mind *An unknown World of Miſeries*; and *Plutarch* * proves it by a Tract written on purpoſe, and upon this very Subject. This General Conſideration then, which regards Man in his own Nature, and in the Groſs, ſhall conſiſt of theſe Five Particulars: *Vanity*, *Weakneſs*, *Inconſtancy*, *Miſery*, and *Preſumption*; which are indeed the moſt Natural, the moſt Inſeparable and Univerſal Qualities, of any that belong to him; tho' the Two laſt ſeem more intimately to concern, and touch him moſt to the Quick. I add too, that there are ſome Things reducible to ſeveral of theſe Five Heads; and it is not eaſy to determine which of them they moſt properly belong to, particularly the Topicks of *Weakneſs* and *Miſery*, between which there is great Affinity and Reſemblance.

* Utrùm graviores morbi animi quàm corporis. *Plut. Lib.*

CHAP. XXXVI.

I. *Vanity.*

OF all the Qualities that belong to Human Nature, *Vanity* is the moſt Eſſential; very Peculiar of Man, and Predominate over the reſt. For, whether we regard Moral Evil, Misfortune, or Inconſtancy, or Irreſolution, or any other ill Property, (of which, God knows, this Soil always bears a plentiful Crop) yet it abounds in nothing ſo much as in Worthleſneſs, and Emptineſs; Senſeleſs Folly, and Ridiculous Vanity. Upon this Account *Democritus* was certainly more in the right, when he laugh'd at all Mankind, and treated them with Scorn and Contempt, than *Heraclitus* was, who wept and afflicted himſelf; and ſo expreſs'd ſome ſort of Eſteem for Men, as if he thought them worth his Trouble and Concern. And *Diogenes* took a better Courſe in reproaching and diſdaining them, than *Timon* did, who profeſs'd to hate Mankind, and fled away from all Converſation. *Pindar* hath given a livelier Image of This, than any Author beſides, in that bold Stroke, where he hath joined the Two vaineſt Things in the World together, to finiſh his Idea, calling *Man* the *Dream of a Shadow.* This Conſideration hath driven ſome Wiſe men to ſo very great a Contempt of Humane Nature, that when a Difficult, Bold, and Noble Undertaking was mention'd to them, they

Book I. would frequently reply, That all the World was not worth a Man's giving himſelf any Trouble for it; ſo ſaid *Statilius* to *Brutus*, (when they diſcourſed the Conſpiracy againſt *Cæſar*) That a Wiſe Man ought not to do any Thing upon any Account but his own. And that it was by no means fit, that Wiſe Men and Wiſdom ſhould ſuffer any Diſquiet, or be expoſed to any Hazard, for the ſake of Fools and Sots.

2. *Vanity of the Thoughts.* This Vanity hath great Variety of Ways to expreſs itſelf by. As, Firſt of all, In our Thoughts, and ſecret Conferences with our Selves, which are very often even worſe than vain, frivolous and ridiculous. And yet in theſe trifling Imagitions we ſpend a great deal of Time, and are not ſenſible of it. We enter upon them, continue in them, and come out of them again, without ever being conſcious of our Motions: Which makes the Vanity double, and argues great Inadvertency, and Diſregard of our ſelves. Here is one walking in his Dining-Room full of Care to manage his Feet ſo, that each Turn may be compaſs'd with ſuch a Number of Steps, and that ſuch Parts of the Boards only may be trod upon: A Second forms, with great Seriouſneſs, long Harangues to himſelf, compoſes a Scene of Action, what he would ſay, and how he would maintain his Port, if he were a King, or a Pope, or ſome other Thing, which he is ſo far from, that he knows it is impoſſible he ever ſhould be ſuch. And thus he feeds upon Wind, nay, upon ſomewhat yet leſs ſubſtantial, upon a Thing that never had, nor ever will have, any ſort of Exiſtence. Another is taken up in Contrivance for the

the Management of his Perſon, the Affecting a Ch. 36.
particular Motion of his Body, an Air of his Face,
a Singularity of Addreſs, odd Sentences, an
uncommon Pronunciations; and This he is in
nitely delighted with, as a Thing extremely gra
ful and engaging, and what other People m
needs admire, and be taken with too.
how prodigiouſly vain and fooliſh are we in
Wiſhes and Deſires; from whence ſpring
culous Opinions, and our yet more ri
Hopes and Expectations? And This
only at ſuch Times as we ſurfeit with Leiſure,
have no other Buſineſs to employ our Thoughts
but it very often interrupts our ſerious and m
important Affairs, and breaks our Thread in
very Heat of Action. So *natural* is *Vanity* to
and ſo *prevalent* over us, that it ſpirits us away,
and plucks us forcibly from Truth and Solidity,
and real Subſtance, to loſe us in Air, and Empti-
neſs, and Nothing.

But, of all Vanities, the moſt refined in Folly, 3. *Concern for Futurity.*
is that anxious Care of what ſhall happen hereaf-
ter, when we are gone, and cannot feel it. We
ſtretch our Deſires and Affections beyond our
Perſons and Subſiſtence; and are much concern-
ed for Things to be done to us, when we ſhall be
in no Capacity of receiving them. How impor-
tunately do we covet Praiſe and Applauſe after
Death? And how egregious a Folly is this? What
can be vainer? This is not Ambition, as Men
may be apt to imagine; for that deſires a ſenſible
Honour, ſuch as a Man can enjoy, and reap ſome
Benefit from. So far as our Good Name indeed is
capable of doing Service to our Children, or Re-

Book I. lations, or Friends, that ſtay behind, I own there is Uſe of it; and am content Men ſhould deſire it in Proportion to this Convenience. But to propoſe That, as our own Happineſs, which can never reach, or in any degree affect our ſelves, is mere Vanity. Such another Folly is Theirs, who perplex their Lives with Fears of their Wives marrying Second Huſbands, and paſſionately deſire they would continue ſingle; nay, are content to purchaſe the Gratification of this Whimſy, at a dear rate, by leaving in their Wills a great Part of their Eſtates to their Widows, upon this Condition. What an inſupportable Folly? And, as it ſometimes falls out, what horrible Injuſtice is this? How directly the Reverſe of thoſe Heroick Spirits in Former Ages, who, upon their Death-Beds, adviſed their Wives to marry again, as ſoon as Decency and Prudence would permit; and to render themſelves uſeful by bringing Children to the Publick? Some again, conjure their Friends to wear ſuch a Ring, or a Lock of Hair, or ſome other Relick, as a conſtant Remembrance of them, when they are dead; or leave Directions for ſome particular Thing to be done about their own Bodies; What can we make of all this? Hath it not a very untoward Aſpect? Methinks, it looks, as if Men could be content to part with *Life*; but could not even then ſubmit to part with *Vanity* at any rate.

4. Another *Vanity* is this, That the Generality of Mankind live for Other People only, and not for Themſelves. We are not half ſo much concern'd what we really and truly are in our own Perſons and Diſpoſitions, as what the World takes us for, and

and how we ſtand in Character and Reputa
broad. And thus we frequently cheat our
and caſt away the true Happineſs and Advant
of Life, and do a thouſand inconvenient Thir
though at the ſame time we torture our ſelves
be agreeable to the Standers-by, and to put
what we know is moſt in Vogue. And this
plainly ſo, not only in our Eſtates, and our E
dies; the Table, the Equipage, the Furniture
the Dreſs, the Figure, all adapted to the prefe
Mode, and what the World expects from Perſo
in our Circumſtances; But, which is a great d
worſe, and more deplorable; in the Advant
of the Mind the Obſervation holds too. For eve
Theſe are thought of no Uſe or Worth, u
they draw the Eyes and Approbation of oth
People. And Virtue itſelf is neglected and
eſteem'd, if it be not publickly acknowledged and
commended: As if the Teſtimonies of one's own
Breaſt were no Satisfaction; as if thoſe Things
which were given for our proper Uſe and Bene-
fit, had loſt all their Efficacy, and changed their
Nature, when Others do not ſee, and ſhare in
them, as well as our Selves.

5. *Commotions of the Mind.*

Nor is our *Vanity* confin'd to ſimple Thoughts, and Deſires, and calm Diſcourſe; but it often riſes higher, puts both Body and Mind into violent Agitations and Pains. Men often teaze and torment themſelves more, for Matters of little or no Conſequence, than for thoſe which are of neareſt Concern, and upon which their All depends. Our Soul is frequently thrown into violent Diſorders, by little Whimſies, a mere Fancy, a Dream, a Shadow, an empty Amuſement, without

Book I. without Subſtance, without Ground; and works itſelf up to all the Exceſſes of Anger and Revenge, Joy and Grief, and Confuſion; and all This with building Caſtles in the Air. The Ceremony of taking leave, the Idea of ſome particular Geſtures in a parting Friend, ſtrikes us deeper, and gives us more real Trouble, than all the Reaſoning in the World, upon Matters of greateſt Moment, is able to do. The Sound of a Name repeated, ſome certain Words and melancholy Accents pronounc'd pathetically; nay, dumb Sighs, and vehement Exclamations, go to our very Hearts. Tricks which all your former Haranguers, Enthuſiaſts, Buffoons, and Others, whoſe Trade it is to move the Paſſions, know, and practiſe in great Perfection. And this airy Blaſt ſometimes ſurprizes the moſt cautious, and tranſports the moſt reſolved, unleſs they ſet a more than common Guard upon themſelves. So ſtrong an Influence hath *Vanity*, and We ſo mighty a Tendency to it. Nay, as if it were not Reproach ſufficient to be agitated and toſſed about with Toys and Trifles, even Falſhood and Cheat hath the ſame Effect, and (which is ſtrange) even when we know it is nothing but *Falſhood* and *Cheat*. Such Delight do we take, ſuch Induſtry do we uſe, to bubble our ſelves with our Eyes open, and to feed upon Fable and Nothing. * How *dextrous we are to deceive our ſelves*, we need no other Inſtances than thoſe that cry heartily, and fall into violent Paſſions upon hearing diſmal Stories, and ſeeing deep Tragedies, at the ſame time that they

* Ad fallendum noſmet ipſos ingenioſiſſimi ſumus.

know

know the moving Parts of theſe to have been in- Ch. 36.
vented and compoſed for Entertainment and Di-
verſion, at the Diſcretion of the Romancer, or
the Poet: Nay, ſome of them mere Fables; ſo
far from Truth now, that they never were true
any Circumſtance at all. Shall I mention one
nity more? That of a Wretch poſſeſs'd, fond a
dying for Love of an ugly old Hag; One, whos
Age and Deformity he knows, and knows tha
hates and deſpiſes him too; and, notwithſtan
all this, is bewitched with a painted Face,
Colours well laid; the Affectation of a Coquett
or ſome other Impoſture, which he ſees and con
feſſes to be an Impoſture; and all the while m
mad, and owns no other Charm, but wha
perfectly ſees through the Fallacy of.

But to ſhew you what Footing *Vanity* hath got, 6.
and how cloſe it ſticks to Humane Nature; we *Viſits a*
will now paſs from private Deportment and Diſ- *Matter*
poſitions to Publick Converſation; by which this *Civility.*
will plainly appear, to be no particular and perſonal *Defect*, but the *Vice* of the whole Species in common. And here, what *Vanity*, what Loſs of Time may we obſerve in the Impertinencies of Viſits, Howd'you's, Forms of Addreſs, mutual Entertainments; in the Offices of Civility, ſet Speeches, and Ceremonious Behaviour; in Proffers of Service, in Promiſes, and Praiſes? How many fulſome Strains of Complement, what Infinite Hypocriſy, Falſhood and Deceit? How open and barefaced, ſo that the Perſon that utters it, and he to whom it is directed, and every one that ſtands by, ſees and knows, and is ſatisfied it is falſe? Thus Converſation is now become little elſe,

Book I. elſe, than a Tryal of Skill for Diſſimulation; and looks like a common Confederacy, where Men have combin'd together to lye, and bubble, and abuſe, and make a Jeſt of one another. Nay, good Manners require, that at the ſame time a Man tells you an impudent Lye, you ſhould return him your Thanks, for what you know he intends not a word of; and He again, who is ſatisfied you believe not a Syllable of what he ſays, receives thoſe Acknowledgments of yours with a ſet Face, and an Air of Confidence; and thus you ſtand cringing, and fawning, and dodging for the laſt Word; each ſtriving to begin, and fearing to leave off, and ſhrugging, when both are heartily weary, and would fain be well quit of one another. What Inconveniencies are we content to endure for theſe Formalities? We expoſe our Selves to the Air, to Heat, to Cold; diſturb the Peace of our Lives, and are in perpetual Pain for theſe courtly Follies; We neglect our Buſineſs of Weight and Conſequence, and attend upon Wind and Smoke. We are vain at the Expence of our Eaſe, nay, of our Health, of our very Life. And what can prove Mankind more enſlav'd to *Vanity* than This, That *Levity* and Accident tramples *Subſtance* under Foot, and Air carries away ſolid Body, whither it will? Eſpecially, when a Man that behaves himſelf otherwiſe, muſt be look'd upon as a Sot, and a Fool, one that knows nothing of the World, nor what becomes him to do in it: Thus to play this Farce dextrouſly, is the greateſt Mark of Wit; and the moſt affected *Harlequin* in it, is the fineſt Gentleman; but not to be Vain is contemptible Stupidity, and he that declines

declines playing the Fool, betrays his own want of Senſe and good Breeding. Nay, when there is no need of all this Form and Complaiſance, *Vanity* hangs about us ſtill: Witneſs the freer Diſcourſes of the moſt familiar Acquaintance, and intimate Friends. How many trifling Impertinences, Falſhoods, Banters, (I omit the wicked and miſchievous Part, becauſe that falls not under this Head) How many arrogant and vain Boaſtings go to the making up this ſort of Converſation too? Men are ſo induſtrious to take, to ſeek, to make occaſions of Talking of themſelves, or of ſomewhat that belongs to them; They do it with ſo ſenſible, and yet ſo nauſeous a Pleaſure; if they think they have ſaid or done a good thing, or that ſomewhat they are poſſeſt of is better than ordinary, They are ſo uneaſie till they have publiſh'd and enlarg'd upon it; as if all their Wit and Worth were loſt, unleſs other People were made ſenſible of it too: They catch at the very firſt Convenience, cry it up to the greateſt Degree imaginable; nay, they perfectly bring it in by Head and Shoulders, and interrupt all other Diſcourſe to ſtart This: And when any Body elſe is Talking, we preſently thruſt our ſelves in, and take an Advantage of ſhewing our Parts; ſo eager are we that People ſhould underſtand what we are, and have a regard for us; and not for Us only, but for every thing that we have a regard for.

Ch. 36.

7. *Publick Commotions.*

As a yet greater Demonſtration, how abſolute a Sovereignty *Vanity* hath obtain'd over Humane Nature, we need but recollect the moſt conſiderable Revolutions that ever happen'd in the World, and

Book I. and the Occaſions of them: For thus it will ſoon appear, that the moſt general and moſt formidable Convulſions of Cities and Kingdoms, and whole Empires; the Seditions, and Revolts, and Fates of Armies; the bloodieſt Battles, the barbarouſeſt Murders, the ſharpeſt Diſputes, and moſt implacable Quarrels, have proceeded from very trifling, ridiculous, and inſignificant Cauſes. Witneſs the long War between *Troy* and *Greece*, the Piques of *Sylla* and *Marius*, and all the Confuſions that follow'd from thence, in the Civil Wars of *Cæſar* and *Pompey*, and *Auguſtus* and *Anthony*. The Poets have repreſented this well enough, by pretending an Apple to have been the *Boutefeu*, the Original of all that Blood and Devaſtation in *Aſia* and *Greece*. And indeed the firſt Springs, upon which theſe vaſt Events move, are commonly Things of no Conſideration; but That which begins very ſmall, ſwells to a vaſt Bulk afterwards; and the blowing it up thus, is an irrefragable Proof of the Vanity and Folly of Mankind. Nay, many times an occaſional Thing goes further with us than the principal Cauſe; and ſome paltry little Circumſtances make more ſenſible Impreſſions, and gall us more than the main Matter to which they retain; as *Cæſar*'s Robe put *Rome* into a greater Paſſion and Concern, than his Death it ſelf, and the Two and twenty Stabs in his Body had done before.

Notions of Happineſs and Content.

8. The Laſt, and indeed the moſt exquiſite *Vanity*, is our ſeeking with ſo much Induſtry and Paſſion, and pleaſing our ſelves ſo highly, nay, placing our very *Happineſs* in Advantages, which have

have neither real Worth, nor Neceſſity to recommend Them: But as they are trifling and frivolous in themſelves, ſo they are ſuch as we may be very happy, and live very comfortably and conveniently without. Whereas on the other hand, thoſe that are neceſſary, and eſſential to our true Happineſs, find little or no part of the Regard due to them; and every Body is indifferent whether he hath Them or not. Thus the Condition of Man is all Air and Speculation; His whole *Happineſs* imaginary; Opinion and Dream is all he purſues; and in this he ſtands Alone, and cannot match himſelf in the whole World. *God* hath all *Good* in Eſſence and Reality, and *Evil* in Notion and Underſtanding only. *Man*, on the contrary, hath only fantaſtical *Good*, but his *Evils* are weighty and ſubſtantial. *Beaſts* are not ſatisfy'd with Opinion, nor do They feed upon Fancy, but require ſomewhat that is preſent, and ſenſible, and real, to content them. *Vanity* is reſerv'd to Man for his Portion, the Inheritance and peculiar Right of his Nature. He runs, he buſtles, he fights, he dies, he flies, he purſues; he graſps at a Shadow, he worſhips the Wind; he ſweats and toils all Day, and in the Evening, when his Gains come to be computed, a Mote is all the Wages he receives for his Work.

Ch. 36.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXVII.

II. *Weakneſs.*

1. WE are now advancing to the Second Head, under which Humane Nature is to be conſidered; and This cannot be any Surprize, after what hath been ſaid already. For how ſhould ſo much Vanity be otherwiſe than Feeble and Frail? Accordingly, this Frailty is frankly confeſſed by all People, and ſeveral Inſtances of it reckoned up, which are too plain not to be diſcerned: But then it is not obſerved in its due Proportion, nor in all Caſes where it really hath a Part; as in thoſe, for Inſtance, which ſeem to have more of *Strength*, and a leſs Mixture of *Weakneſs*; ſuch as Deſire; The Uſe and Enjoyment of what a Man is poſſeſt of; In his Good and his Evil; in ſhort, ſuch as Man takes a Pride in, and values himſelf upon. And yet, even Theſe ſuppoſed Glories and Excellencies of his Nature, are undeniable Arguments of his Weakneſs. This may poſſibly ſeem a Paradox at firſt Sight; but a few particular Reflections, will give us a clearer and more diſtinct View of the Thing.

2. *In deſiring and chuſing.* *Firſt*, As for Deſires; It is manifeſt a Man cannot fix upon any Thing, not even in Wiſh and Imagination, ſo as to ſit down with That, and reſt himſelf contented. We have it not in our Power, to chuſe what is neceſſary, and fit for us; nor to ſay, in Particular, what This would be.

And if Providence in Wiſdom and Kindneſs, beſtow what we deſire, and what really is fit, upon us, yet it does not ſatisfie. We are Eternally gaping at ſomewhat Future and Unknown; and find, that what is preſent never fills, never contents; but what we have not, is ever eſteemed above it. Could we ſuppoſe a Man ſo far indulged, that a Blank ſhould be put into his Hands, to write his own Terms; yet even that Fortune of his own Carving, would not be ſo to his Palate, but that in a ſhort time he would retract it; ſome Alterations and Amendments, ſomething to be added, or taken away: In ſhort, he deſires he knows not what. How well ſoever the Particulars may pleaſe, yet when the Account comes to be ſummed up, nothing contents him; for, to ſay the Truth, he is uneaſie and diſcontented with his own ſelf. Ch. 37.

His *Weakneſs* is ſtill greater, and more conſpicuous, in the Uſe and Enjoyment of what he hath, than in the Deſire of what he hath not; and that in ſeveral Reſpects. Firſt, in that he cannot manage, nor reap the Benefit of Things as they really are, and in their Native Purity; but there is a Neceſſity of diſguiſing, and adulterating them, that they may be accommodated to our Purpoſe. Elements, Metals, and other Things in their Primitive Simplicity are perfectly uſeleſs to us; Pleaſures and Delights, are never to be enjoyed without a Mixture of Pain and Inconvenience. 3. *In Uſing and Enjoying.*

* —— *For ſtill ſome bitter Thought deſtroys*
Our fancied Mirth, and poiſons all our Joys. Creech.

* —— Medio de fonte leporum
Surgit amari aliquid, quod in ipſis floribus angat. *Lucret.* L. 4.

Book I. Extremity of Pleaſure, carries with it an Air of Melancholy and Complaint; and the higheſt Gratifications of Senſe, are Weakneſs and Faintings: And that which gives true and perfect Contentment hath much more Solidity, and a ſevere Satisfaction, than of Gaiety and Tranſport in it.

* *Even* Happineſs *it ſelf, if it do not moderate itſelf, oppreſſes and deſtroys itſelf.* Which gave occaſion to one of the Ancients to ſay, *That God ſold us all the good Things we receive from him*; meaning, that none of them are Pure and Unmingled; and we cannot be ſaid to have That *gratis*, for which we pay the Price of that Evil and Uneaſineſs which attends it. The Caſe is directly the ſame with *Grief* too, for This is never without ſome ſort of Pleaſure annexed to it. † *Pleaſure and Pain, though in their Nature the moſt unlike that can be, are yet ſo contrived, by Nature, as to be conſtant Companions, and go Hand in Hand* ——

Even Tears are ſhed for Pleaſure and Relief,
And Humorous Man turns Epicure in Grief.

Thus all Things in this World are mingled and tempered with their Contraries, and it is not amiſs to obſerve, what Maſters in Painting teach us, That the very ſame Motions and Muſcles of the Face are employed both in Laughing and Crying. And common Experience ſhews us, that exceſſive Laughter brings Tears. There is

* Ipſa felicitas, ſe niſi temperat, premit.

† Labor voluptaſque diſſimillima naturâ, ſocietate quâdam naturali inter ſe ſunt juncta; eſt quædam flere voluptas.

no

no good Quality in us, without ſome Tincture of Vice, as ſhall be ſhewn in its proper Place hereafter; nor is there any Evil, without ſome Abatement of Good *. Every Misfortune is capable of being turned to Advantage; there is Good without Evil, no Evil without Good in Man; every Thing is a Mixture, and nothing comes to our Hands ſincere and unmingled. *Secondly*, All that happens to us, is miſmanaged, and taken by the wrong Handle; Our Palates are humourſome and uncertain, and know not how to reliſh Things as they ought; and from This variety of Taſtes, it is, That the endleſs Diſputes, and Irreconcilable Opinions, concerning the *Chief Good*, have proceeded. The very beſt Things, oftentimes, decay and die upon our Hands; are corrupted by our Weakneſs, or our Wickedneſs; or are loſt and come to nothing, for want of Ability to make the Beſt of them; nay, ſometimes they do not only turn to No Account, but to a very Ill One; and what is Good in it ſelf, proves to Us a mighty Evil, and manifeſt Diſadvantage. Ch. 37.

But the Weakneſs of Humane Nature is moſt copiouſly diſplay'd, with regard to Good and Evil, to Virtue and Vice. My Meaning is, That a Man with all his Induſtry and Endeavours cannot be entirely Good, nor entirely Wicked. He is Maſter of nothing, in ſhort. Upon this occaſion we will conſider Three Points. The firſt is, That it is not poſſible to exerciſe every kind of Virtue; The Reaſon is, that ſome of them are incompa-

4. *In Good and Evil.*

I. *Virtue and Vice.*

See Advertiſements at the End of the Chapter.

* Nullum ſine authoramento malum eſt.

Book I. incompatible, and can never dwell together; the ſame Perſons, and the ſame Circumſtances, are not capable of them. As for Inſtance, The Chaſtity of a Virgin, and that of a Widow; the Virtues of a Single, and thoſe of a Married Life; Theſe Latter in each Kind, Widowhood and Marriage, being Conditions of much more Encumbrance, and Trouble, more Difficulty, and therefore more Virtue, than the quiet and undiſturbed State of Celibacy and Virginity; though Thoſe on the other hand, have the Advantage in Purity, and Grace, and Freedom from Buſineſs and Care. The Conſtancy and Greatneſs of Mind, which exerts itſelf in Poverty and Want, in Affliction and Pain, is very different from that which preſerves a Man's Temper in Proſperity and Plenty; and the Patience and Thankfulneſs of the Receiving Beggar, from the Liberality of the Giver. And as This holds in Virtues, ſo does it much more in Vices, ſeveral of which are not only very far diſtant, but diametrically oppoſite to each other.

5. It is no leſs obſervable, Secondly, That many times our Matters are ſo order'd, as not to permit the Performance of ſuch Actions as relate to One Virtue, without encroaching upon ſome Other, and doing what is inconſiſtent with, or offenſive to that very Virtue we are practiſing; becauſe Things often interfere and obſtruct us, ſo that we cannot ſatisfy One Duty, but at the Expence of Another. This is like what our Proverb calls *Robbing Peter to pay Paul*; and yet thus it is, not from any Deficiency in Virtue itſelf, but from the Impotence and Inſufficiency of Humane Nature,

ture, which is too ſhort, too narrow, to give or receive any certain, conſtant, univerſal Rule of acting virtuouſly; and Man cannot ſo contrive his Methods, and provide himſelf with Helps, and Occaſions of doing Good, but that they will frequently croſs and interrupt one another. Thus *Charity* and *Juſtice* are ſometimes impracticable at once. If I engage againſt my Relation, or my Friend, in a Battle, *Juſtice* requires me to take his Life, and treat him as an Adverſary; *Charity* and Affection bid me ſpare and preſerve him as a Friend. Suppoſe a Man mortally wounded, and that he had nothing to expect but the languiſhing out the miſerable Remains of Life in extreme Torture; it were certainly an Act of Charity to put this wretched Creature out of his Pain, by killing him out-right, as the Perſon who kill'd *Saul* alledg'd for himſelf; and yet this is ſuch a Mercy as Juſtice would call one to an Account for; and *David* puniſhed it accordingly. Nay, the being found near ſuch a Perſon in a lonely Place, when Search is made for the Murderer, tho' one be there with Intentions of Kindneſs, is exceeding dangerous; and the leaſt that can come of it is, the being made to undergo the Courſe of the Law; and brought upon Trial for a Misfortune which one had no Hand in. And this laſt Inſtance ſhews, how *Juſtice* does not only offend againſt *Charity*, but alſo how it entangles and obſtructs itſelf, according to that moſt true Obſervation; * *The Extremity of Right is the Extremity of Wrong.*

Ch. 37.

* Summum Jus ſumma Injuria.

Book I. The Third Caſe, and indeed the moſt remark-
6. able of all, is, The Neceſſity Men are ſometimes under of uſing Evil Means to deliver themſelves from ſome greater Evil, or for the compaſſing ſome Good End. So that Things in themſelves not Good, nay, much otherwiſe, are ſometimes legitimated, and have Credit and Authority given to them, for the Sake of the Purpoſes they ſerve: As if Men might, nay as if they muſt, be Wicked in ſome degree, in Order to becoming Good in a greater. And this not only Policy and Juſtice, but Religion too, furniſhes Examples of.

7. II. *Politicks.* In *Politicks*, How many indirect Practices are allow'd, and daily made uſe of? And this not merely upon Permiſſion and Connivance, but even by expreſs Direction and Approbation of the Laws. * *Crimes are Eſtabliſh'd by Publick Edict*, as we ſhall have Occaſion to obſerve more at
Book III. large in another Place. When a State is full and
Chap. 2. overgrown, like a replete Body, whoſe Humours are either too noxious, or too many to be endured; the Method of diſcharging this Oppreſſion, is, to ſend off its Superfluities of Men, or thoſe among them, who are of the hotteſt and warlike Diſpoſitions, to be knock'd on the Head abroad. Thus a Vein is breath'd; but the Eaſe it gives, is at the infinite Expence and Trouble of ſome other Countrey. And this we know hath been the Practice of *Franks* and *Lombards*, *Goths* and *Vandales*, *Turks* and *Tartars*. So again, a Foreign War is often begun and maintain'd

* Ex Senatûs conſultis & plebiſcitis ſcelera exercentur.

abroad,

abroad, on purpoſe to keep buſy Spirits em- Ch. 37.
ploy'd, and to prevent Inſurrections and Civil Diſſentions at Home. *Lycurgus*, as a Leſſon of Temperance, uſed to make Slaves drunk; that Men of Quality, from Their Extravagancies, might learn to deteſt this Vice. The *Romans*, to harden their People, and make Dangers and Death familiar and contemptible, inſtituted thoſe Inhumane Sights of their Gladiators, and entertain'd them with Blood and Slaughter every Day. This at firſt, indeed, was confin'd to condemn'd Malefactors only; then it came to innocent Slaves; and at laſt Free-Men, and People of Condition, practis'd, and valu'd themſelves upon it. The Stews in ſome great Cities, are of the ſame kind; and ſo are the Uſury, the Divorces of the Law of *Moſes*, and among other People and Perſuaſions; Whoſe only Recommendation is this, That they are allowed for a preſent Neceſſity, and to put a Stop to greater Miſchiefs.

So likewiſe in *Juſtice*, which cannot ſubſiſt nor be put in Practice, without ſome Mixture of *Injuſtice*. Nor is this the Caſe of *Commutative Juſtice* only: This were no ſtrange Matter; for here it is in ſome ſort neceſſary; Men could not live by their Trades, nor maintain Commerce with one another, without ſome reciprocal Injuries and Offences; every Man muſt ſell a Thing for more than it is ſtrictly worth; and therefore ſome Laws have allow'd Men to cheat, provided it be not above half the Price of the Goods: But *Diſtributive Juſtice*, which conſiſts in dealing Rewards and Puniſhments, does the like; ſo ſhe 8. III. *Juſtice.*

Book I. her ſelf confeſſes, * *Extreme Right is extreme Wrong.* And all *eminent exemplary Caſes have ſome Allay of Injuſtice in them; wherein, however, the Hardſhips which Private Men ſuffer, are well paid with the Advantages that accrue to the Publick from them.* *Plato* allows, in ſeveral Places, that Publick Miniſters ſhould draw Criminals to a full Diſcovery, by falſe Hopes and Promiſes of Pardon and Favour, which they never intend to make good. Which is to make a way to Juſtice thro' Impudence, and Cozenage, and Falſhood. And what ſhall we ſay of that curſed Invention of Racks, which are a Trial of Patience indeed, but none at all of Truth? For you ſhall never be able to get the Truth out of Them that can, nor out of Them that cannot, endure them. Why ſhould we think Extremity of Pain can more diſpoſe a Man to tell what is, than to tell what is not? If an Innocent Man be ſuppos'd endu'd with Patience enough to bear the Torture, why ſhou'd the Concern for ſaving his Life inſpire a guilty Perſon with the ſame degree of Reſolution? I know it is commonly reply'd in Excuſe of this Barbarity, That the Pain aſtoniſhes and enfeebles the Guilty, and extorts a Confeſſion of his Treachery from him; whereas it hath the quite contrary Effects of confirming and fortifying the Innocent. But the contrary of this happens ſo often, that to ſpeak the Truth, This is an enſnaring and a pitiful Method; a poor and baſe way of Dealing, full of Doubt

* Summum Jus ſumma Injuria. Et Omne magnum Exemplum habet aliquid ex iniquo, quod contra ſingulos Utilitate publicâ rependitur.

and

and Uncertainty. For what would not a M
ſay or do to get quit of ſuch Miſery? * *Pai*
torts Lies from the moſt Innocent; ſo that a Ju
which examines upon the Rack, to prevent
Death of Innocent Perſons, firſt racks the Inn
cent, and then murders him. Many a thouſ
People have loaded themſelves with falſe Acc
tions. But were it not ſo, what intolerable In-
juſtice and Cruelty is it to torture and break a Man to pieces, for a Fault which as yet there is no Proof of? To avoid killing him without Cauſe, they do ten times worſe than kill him. If he be innocent, and bear it out, What Juſtice can there be in putting him to any Pain at all? You'll ſay, By bearing the Rack he is abſolv'd; I thank you very kindly. But This, however, though an Evil, is the leaſt Humane Infirmity could contrive; and yet this is not practiſed every where neither. I confeſs, to Me, the Cuſtom of determining Controverſies, and clearing Men's Innocence by Combat, ſeems to have leſs of Injuſtice and Barbarity in it. And yet This, tho' formerly much in requeſt, is long ſince very juſtly condemn'd and exploded. For Chriſtianity allows no ſuch bloody Methods, nor warrants any Dependence upon them, for a Diſcovery of the Truth.

But if *Man* be ſo weak (as we have ſeen) in regard of Virtue, and in his *Practical* Capacity; he is much more ſo in his *Intellectual*, and in relation to *Truth*. 'Tis prodigious, that Man ſhould be ſo form'd by Nature, as to deſire Truth ea- V. 9. *Truth.*

* Etenim Innocentes mentiri cogit Dolor:

gerly

Book I. gerly, and grudge no Pains to attain it; and yet ſo at the ſame time, as not to bear it when it offers itſelf to his View. The Flaſhes of it blind him, the Thunder of it ſtuns him; it is too bright, and too loud to be born. This is not Truth's Fault however, which is exceeding beautiful, exceeding lovely, exceeding good and beneficial to Mankind; and what was ſaid of *Virtue* and *Wiſdom*, is at leaſt as properly applicable to *Truth*; * *That could we behold all its Charms, the whole World would be infinitely in Love with it.* But the Defect is on Man's ſide; his Faculties cannot bear ſo ſtrong a Light; its Beams dazzle, nay, hurt his Senſes. In Affairs merely Humane, he that ſets it before us is eſteem'd our Enemy. Truth and plain-dealing are diſobliging Things. And what Perverſeneſs is this, that what we love and ſeek ſo paſſionately, we ſhould be ſo loth, ſo angry to find? Truth is not only amiable, but knowable too, yet not perfectly ſo by Us; for at preſent it ſeems Man is only ſtrong in Deſire, but weak in his Enjoyment of it; and not able to receive what he deſires. The Two chief Means made uſe of to bring him to the Knowledge of the Truth, are *Reaſon* and *Experience*. But both theſe are inſufficient and ſo very weak, (tho' of the two, *Experience* ſeems the more ſo) that no certain Concluſions can be drawn from them. *Reaſon* hath ſo many Tricks and Turnings, is ſo flexible in its Arguments, and ſo diſguis'd in its Forms, that any thing may be made plauſible from it; (as will be obſerv'd in another

* Quæ ſi occulis cerneretur, mirabiles ſui amores excitaret. *Cic. Off. l.* 1.

Place)

Place) *Experience* is no leſs fallible, becauſe E- Ch. 37.
vents are conſtantly unlike one another. No-
thing in Nature is ſo univerſal as Diſparity; no-
thing ſo rare, ſo difficult, ſo impoſſible indeed,
as Likeneſs: And nothing argues greater Weak-
neſs, and want of Judgment, than the not being
able to diſcern and diſtinguiſh the Difference.
This, however, is to be underſtood of ſuch a
Likeneſs and ſuch a Diverſity as is perfect, and
holds in every Circumſtance: For indeed both
Similitude and Diſſimilitude are every where in
ſome reſpect and degree. No Two Things are in
every regard like; none in all reſpects unlike one
another. So exceedingly ingenious hath Nature
approv'd her ſelf in the Mixture and Compoſition
of the World.

But, after all, What can make more full Diſ- 10.
coveries of Humane *Infirmity* than *Religion* itſelf
hath done? Its main Intention and End is, to
lower Man in his own Eſteem; to ſhew, and
make him duly ſenſible, how *wicked*, how *weak*,
how *mere a Nothing* he is; and, in this humble
Senſe, to drive him to God for Succour and
Support, who is, indeed, his *Happineſs*, his *Re-
fuge* and *Strength*; nay, his *All*. The firſt Me-
thod taken to inculcate theſe mean Notions of
our Selves, is by inſtructing, reminding, upbraid-
ing us; ſetting before us the reproachful Titles
of *Duſt and Aſhes*, *Earth*, *Fleſh and Blood*, *Graſs*,
and the like.

After that, it inſinuates this Truth after a moſt
noble, and excellent, and ſtupendous manner; in-
troducing God, humbling, debaſing himſelf, and
becoming weak for the ſake of Man; ſpeaking,
expoſtu-

Book I. expoſtulating, entreating, promiſing, ſwearing, growing angry, threatning; and, in a Word, entring into Treaty and Terms, and managing him by all the endearing Arts of Perſuaſion, in the ſame tender, kind, condeſcending Methods, with which a fond Father wins and gains upon his Children, by ſtooping to their little Follies, and imitating their Infant-Imperfections. So very great, it ſeems, ſo inſuperable was the Weakneſs of Humane Nature, that no Acceſs could be attain'd, no Correſpondence held with the Divinity, till God himſelf was pleas'd to make the firſt Approaches; and by deſcending to our Capacities, and our Level, to draw us nearer to himſelf. While He continu'd in his Native Majeſty, the Diſtance was too vaſt; and therefore the only way to bring Us up to Heaven, was for God to come down upon Earth.

A Third Inſtance is in the *Ordinary Exerciſe of Religion*; for what more lively Emblems, more expreſſive Symbols, more unanſwerable Proofs of our Impotence and Infirmity, than the *Principal* and moſt *Solemn Acts* of *Worſhip* have ever been?

What ſhall we ſay to *Sacrifices*, which in Former Ages ſeem to have been in uſe all the World over? I mention not the horrible unnatural Cruelties, into which, through the Corruption of Mankind, and the wicked Artifice of the Devil, this Cuſtom degenerated in Idolatrous Countries; thoſe barbarous Oblations, or rather Murders and Maſſacres of Men and Children, of the beſt and moſt innocent Perſons among them: But, confining our ſelves to that of Beaſts only, we

ſhall

ſhall be clearly convinc'd that Theſe were ſo many Marks and Remembrancers of Mens own Vileneſs and Infirmity. Ch. 37.

For, firſt of all; In the very Nature o Thing, they were ſo many *Teſtimonies* of the *Cu and Condemnation we lay under*; a ſort of Publi Authentick Acknowledgement, that the Offe himſelf had juſtly deſerv'd that Death, inflicted Him upon the Beaſt, and a beſeeching G to accept that *devoted Life*, in the ſtead of h *own forfeited Life:* For, without all Diſpute, h there been no *Curſe*, no Condemnation to whi Men were liable, neither wou'd there have be any Place, or poſſible Occaſion for *Bloody Offe ings*, Expiations, or Propitiatory Sacrifices.

This is a farther Evidence, Secondly, of ou Weakneſs, if we look at the Meanneſs of the In tention, upon which that Uſage grew and was encourag'd; and That cou'd be no other than the Hope of Appeaſing and Gratifying Almighty God, by ſuch Bloody Oblations. I ſpeak not now of the Reaſons why God inſtituted Sacrifices; but of that Notion which plainly appears to have been predominant in the Minds of Men, who did not ſee into the Myſterious End of them, which the Generality of the *Jews* themſelves never did; and much leſs could it be expected that the *Pagan* World ſhould penetrate into it.

It is true, indeed, Almighty God, in great Grace and Compaſſion to thoſe more early and ignorant Ages of the World, which knew no better, did very favourably accept Good Men, when they approached him with this ſort of Devotion;

Book I. votion; and the Apoſtle takes particular Notice of his having *Reſpect to Abel and his Offering*; as Heb. xi. the Hiſtory of the Old Teſtament does, of his teſtifying that Acceptance by viſible Signs, in the Caſe of *Noah*, *Abraham*, and Others. There being this Motive to his Mercy, that what was done of that kind proceeded from an Intention to ſerve and honour him; and that the Underſtandings of Men were groſs and heavy; they were in their Minority, and under a *Schoolmaſter*, (as St. *Paul* expreſſes it of the *Jewiſh* People) but at the ſame time honeſt and well-meaning: And it is not improbable, that this Opinion, ſo univerſal at That time, might repreſent Sacrifices to them, as a Dictate of the Law of Nature, and the only proper Method of Divine Worſhip.

There was, it is confeſſed, another Conſideration, which rendred *Sacrifices* very valuable and well-pleaſing to God; whereby they were made uſe of, as *Figures* and Repreſentations of that One truly meritorious *Sacrifice*, to be offer'd upon the Altar of the Croſs afterwards. But this is a Myſtery peculiar to the *Jewiſh* and *Chriſtian* Religion. And as it is a Common, ſo is it an Excellent and Adorable Inſtance of the Divine Wiſdom, to convert what is of Human Inſtitution, Natural Uſage, or of a Corporeal Nature, to High and Holy Purpoſes, and makes ſuch things as the Ceremonial Law conſiſted of, turn to a Spiritual Account.

But ſtill This does not by any means infer, that God took Pleaſure in theſe things, as of any real Intrinſick Worth and Good in themſelves; For

For even before Grace and Truth ſet this Matter in its cleareſt Light by the Goſpel, the Prophets were not ſparing to declare the Contrary; and Thoſe among the *Jews* of more enlighten'd Underſtandings, ſaw this perfectly well, and acknowledged it, even while the Practice of offering them continu'd. Thus *David*; *Thou deſireſt no Sacrifice, elſe would I give it thee, but thou delighteſt not in Burnt-Offerings. Burnt-Offering and Sacrifice for Sin haſt thou not required.* And again, ſpeaking in the Perſon of God himſelf, *I will take no Bullock out of thy Houſe, nor He-Goat out of thy Folds.* They call'd upon Men for Oblations of another kind, more Noble and Spiritual; more becoming Them to bring, and more worthy and fit for a Holy Deity to receive. *The Sacrifice of God is a Contrite Spirit, and the Offering of a pure Heart: Mine Ears haſt thou opened, that I ſhould do thy Will; yea thy Law is within my Heart. Offer unto God the Sacrifice of Praiſe and Thankſgiving. I will have Mercy and not Sacrifice.* And many other Paſſages to the ſame Purpoſe. And at laſt, to clear this Matter, and put it beyond a Doubt, the Son of God himſelf, who was *Truth*, and the Teacher of it, and who condeſcended to come into the World, that he might diſabuſe Mankind, and reſcue them from their Ignorance and Errors, hath utterly aboliſh'd this way of ſerving God: which he wou'd never have done, had there been any *Eſſential Goodneſs* in it, which cou'd have recommended it for its own ſake to God his Father. But when He was come to be the End of the Law, and the Univerſal Propitiation, the Uſe of Sacrifices was at an End too; and then it

Ch. 37.

Pſal. li. xl. l.

Book I. is, *They that worſhip God muſt worſhip him in Spirit and in Truth; for the Father ſeeketh ſuch to worſhip him.* And without Queſtion, next to the extirpating Idolatry, This of aboliſhing Sacrifices, is One of the moſt Glorious, Publick Effects; One of the beſt Reformations, which Chriſtianity hath wrought in the World. And hence it was, that *Julian*, the Emperor, its moſt profeſſed, moſt inveterate Enemy, in Deſpight to it, offer'd more *Sacrifices*, than perhaps any other Man ever did; and endeavoured to introduce This Way of Worſhip, and Idolatry again, as being both directly in Contradiction to the Chriſtian Religion. But of This we have ſpoken ſufficiently; and therefore let us now take a ſhort View of ſome of the other conſiderable Branches of Religion.

John iv. 23, 24.

The *Bleſſed Sacraments*, when Adminiſtred to us in Elements ſo common, and of ſuch mean Eſteem, as *Bread* and *Wine*, and *Water*, and not only ſo, but in the very Act of Adminiſtration, bearing Reſemblance to the moſt Vulgar and Deſpicable Actions of Life, as *Waſhing*, *Eating*, and *Drinking*, are plain *Memento*'s of our continual Weakneſſes, and Wants, our Miſeries and Pollutions. And as the marvellous Efficacy magnifies the Almighty Power and Goodneſs of God, ſo the Need we have of them, ſhould humble us, with mortifying Reflections upon our own feeble Condition.

Thus again, *Repentance* is preſcribed, as the neceſſary, the only Remedy for our Spiritual Diſeaſes; and 'tis plain, This, conſidered in itſelf, is an Act full of Shame and Reproach; it upbraids us with our Faults and Follies; afflicts our Souls

Souls with Grief and ſad Remorſe; and ſhews us to our Selves in the worſt, and moſt deformed Figures that can be: But, however Evil and Uncomely this may ſeem in itſelf, yet it is Neceſſary for reconciling Us to God, and That is enough to reconcile Us to it. Another Inſtance may be taken from *Oaths*, which are, indeed, Religious Acts, when lawfully practiſed, by Reaſon of the Name of God, ſolemnly invoked in them: But yet, it is evident, that the common Uſe and Adminiſtration of theſe, is a ſcurvy Symptom, a moſt ſhameful Argument, how little Mankind are to be truſted; What Monſters of Falſhood, and Treachery, of Error and Ignorance, we are! How vilely ſuſpicious and diſtruſtful the Perſon requiring them is, and how liable to Jealouſy, the Perſon from whom they are demanded; and what a mean Opinion thoſe Law-givers, who ordered them, had, of Mens *Honeſty* and *Truth*, when one's bare Word will not give Satisfaction; and (as our Saviour ſays) *whatſoever is more than this, cometh of Evil.* Thus you ſee, not only how Weak and Sickly our Condition is; but likewiſe what ſort of Remedies, *Religion* hath found it Neceſſary to apply for our Cure: Since it may be ſaid, in ſome Senſe, with Regard to theſe Matters, *That God hath choſen the weak Things of this World.* He did not appoint ſuch as were Nobleſt and moſt Excellent in their own Nature, but condeſcended to conſider the Circumſtances of the Patients, and hath accommodated his Applications to Our Capacities. So that the Goodneſs theſe Things have, is not ſo much inherent in their own Nature, as it is Relative, and derived

Ch. 37.

Matt. v. 37.

1 Cor. i.

Book I. from the Uſes they ſerve, and the Ends to which they are directed. They are Good, as Medicines are, becauſe they check Evil, and prevent that which is Worſe. They kill the Cauſe and Occaſion of themſelves; for, they ſprung from Sin, and their Buſineſs is to extirpate, and reſtrain Sin. They are Good, as publick Executions are in Common-Wealths; as Sneezing, and Vomiting, and other ſuch violent Evacuations in our Bodies, whereby the noxious Humours, which oppreſs Nature, are diſcharged; ſuch as are at once the Sign and the Remedy of a Diſtemper. In ſhort, it is well for us that we have them; but it had been abundantly better for us, if we had never had any Occaſion to make uſe of them; and that Occaſion we never ſhould have had, if Man had continued as God made him, and preſerved his Original Wiſdom and Integrity. And accordingly we may take Notice, that Theſe are Things fitted for this frail and mortal State only; and not any of Thoſe more Noble Parts of Religion, which ſhall be the Eternal Exerciſe of our Souls hereafter, when we are releaſed from this Bondage of Fleſh and Corruption. When our Imperfections and our Sins ceaſe, Theſe ceaſe with them; whereas our Praiſes, our Love of God, and other Duties of Intrinſick Goodneſs, are of Eternal Uſe and Obligation; ſo far from dying with our Sins and Bodies, that they will be the more Conſtant, the more Delightful Employment, of our Sinleſs and Exalted State; and make a conſiderable Part of that Heavenly, and Divine Life.

II. The former Remarks have ſhewn Man's Inability in *Goodneſs* and *Truth*; what follows

erhaps ſurprize you more, becauſe it undertakes Ch. 37.
› repreſent him no leſs impotent in *Evil* too.
or They who do their utmoſt Endeavour to be
Vicked, cannot be entirely ſo, but are always
›rced to leave ſomewhat unfiniſhed. There is
›nſtantly ſome Secret Remorſe, ſome Conſide-
ition of Honour, or Fear, that checks, and pulls
iem back; ſlackens and enervates the Will, and
eeps them from part of the Villany they intend-
l. And this Reſtraint hath been the Ruin of ma-
r a One, who hath propoſed to ſave himſelf, by
:nturing no farther. Which ſort of Folly, and
e Miſcarriages that have been owing to it, gave
ccaſion to that Proverb, *That a Man muſt never*
zy the Fool by halves.

This *Rule* is Judicious enough, but deſerves a
tle Illuſtration, becauſe, as it hath a *Good*, ſo is
likewiſe capable of a very *Bad* Senſe. To un-
erſtand it, as if a Man ought to abandon all
onſcience, and might in any Circumſtances do
Vell and Wiſely to be Wicked without Reſerve,
a very perverſe Interpretation, and would ren-
er it a moſt pernicious Maxim. In this Reſpect,
hat contrary Proverb is moſt true, that *The ſhorteſt*
Follies are the Beſt. But it is True too, that in
ome Caſes Mildneſs and Moderation are of Dan-
;erous Conſequence; as particularly, when we
ave a deſperate and formidable Enemy to deal
vith, and (as we commonly ſay) *Hold a Wolf by*
the Ears. A Man then hath no ſafe Middle-Way
eft; no Courſe to take, but either the winning
im over entirely by Courteſy, or abſolutely to
ubdue, and put him out of a Capacity, to do us
arther Miſchief. This was the conſtant Method

Book I. of the *Romans*, and a very prudent One no doubt it is. Thus *Camillus* remonſtrated to the Senate in the Caſe of the *Latines*, after ſeveral Revolts, ſuing for Terms of Reconciliation; That they muſt either be admitted into Friendſhip, or not ſuffered to be a People any longer; and * That there was no other Way left to ſecure a laſting Peace, but either *Extremity of Rigour*, or a *Generous Pardon.* In ſuch an Exigence of Affairs, to do Things by Halves, is to ruine All; as the *Samnites* found by woful Experience, who for want of following the Advice of a † Wiſe Old Senator, who when they had hemm'd in the *Romans*, and had them at their Mercy, gave his Opinion, either for obliging them by Honourable Treatment, or for cutting them all off, paid very dear. That of *Courteſie* is the Nobler Conqueſt, and ought to be a Man's Firſt Choice; The Second is only for Caſes of Extremity, and ſuch Enemies as Kindneſs will do no Good upon. Now, from all theſe Inſtances, the Infirmity of Humane Nature appears very evidently, both with Regard to *Good and Evil.* A Man can neither perform, nor avoid either entirely, and without reſerve; and what he does, or ſo much as he declines of it, is neither the One nor the Other, abſolutely and without mixture. There is ſome Allay, ſome Abatement in both Extremes,

Herennius.

* Dii immortales ita vos potentes hujus conſilii fecerunt, ut ſit Latium deinde, aut non ſit, in veſtrâ manu poſuerint. Itaque pacem vobis, quod ad Latinos attinet, parare in perpetuum, vel ſæviendo, vel ignoſcendo poteſtis. *T. Liv.* Lib. VIII. Cap. 13.

† Vid. *Tit. Liv.* Lib. IX. Cap. 3.

and thus Man hath it not in his Power to be *exquiſitely Good*, or *exquiſitely Wicked*, but finds himſelf checked and confined on either Hand. Ch. 37.

12. Let us proceed to obſerve ſome other Effects, and plain Indications of Humane Infirmity. It is a Littleneſs of Soul, which makes Men, that they neither dare, nor can *reprove* others, when they have done amiſs, nor can bear being reproved Themſelves, when they deſerve it. And this farther Remark is likewiſe True, That Men, as they have, or want Courage, for One of Theſe, ſo do they conſtantly, for the Other of them too. Now, This is a very Fooliſh Niceneſs, to deprive our Selves, or our Friend, of ſo Beneficial and Neceſſary a Kindneſs, merely for a ſlight Scratch, which at the moſt does but pinch our Ears, and make them tingle a little. And near of Kin to This, is that other Folly, of not daring to deny what we are ſenſible is not fit for us to grant, and not being able to receive a Repulſe, with any manner of Temper.

13. *False Suſpicions, and Accuſations.* When Men are *falſely ſuſpected*, and *wrongfully accuſed*, they are liable to a Two-fold Nicety, and each of Theſe is chargeable with Weakneſs. (In ſuch Accuſations, I mean, as common Report lays, and not Thoſe which fall upon them in the Methods of Law and Juſtice) One of theſe Extremes, is the being too eaſily moved, and over-induſtrious to excuſe, or to juſtifie Themſelves, and this ſometimes moſt Impertinently and Officiouſly.

* —— *Falſe Reports diſgrace*
And trouble, Whom? The Vicious and the Baſe. Creech.

A Man cannot wrong his Innocence more, than thus, to ſtake his Conſcience upon every ſlight Provocation, and refer his Honeſty to the Arbitration of all Companies he comes into. † *When Things are plain of themſelves, a ſet Argument does but perplex and confound them.* *Socrates*, upon his Tryal, would not ſubmit to be vindicated, either by Himſelf or by any Other; and rather choſe to die Silently, than accept the Aſſiſtance of that Eminent Pleader *Lyſias*, in his Defence.

But the other Weakneſs is juſt oppoſite to This; when a Man of Courage gives himſelf no Trouble, nor takes the leaſt Pains about his own Juſtification; tho' the Charge upon him have gain'd Ground, and prepoſſeſt many; when he deſpiſes the Accuſation, and the Perſons that lay it, as not worth his Anſwer or Notice; and thinks it would be a Diſparagement and a Reflection to engage with them. This indeed hath been the Practice of ſome great and generous Spirits; of *Scipio* eſpecially, who ſeveral times weathered his Point thus, with marvellous Conſtancy and Firmneſs of Soul. But a great many Perſons diſapprove this Method, and take offence at it; for they think it proceeds from Haughtineſs and Diſdain, too great a Value of Themſelves, and want of due Regard for other

* —— Mendax infamia terret
Quem niſi mendoſum & mendacem? *Hor. Ep.* XVI. *Lib.* I.
† Perſpicuitas argumentatione elevatur.

People.

People: That the depending too much
one's own Innocence, and not ſubmitting to re-
move Jealouſies, is ill Treatment: Or elſe, t
obſtinate Silence and Contempt, they interpr
Conſciouſneſs of Guilt, Diſtruſt of Juſtice, an
Want of Ability to juſtify one's ſelf effectual
Miſerable Condition of Mankind in the mea
while! that when they are ſuſpected and accuſe
have no poſſible way of giving entire Satisfac
on; but whether they ſpeak, or whether they
ſtill and hold their Peace; whether they do, c
do not take care to defend their Names fro
Reproach, are ſure to incur the Imputation
Weakneſs and Cowardice. We think it a Ma
of Courage, and adviſe Men not to be ſ
tous in making Excuſes; and when they take o
Advice, we are ſuch Fools to reſent it, and com-
plain that they do not think Us worth excuſing
themſelves to.

Another Evidence of *Weakneſs* is the enſlaving 14.
our ſelves to any particular Manner, and affecting *Niceneſs and Affectation.*
to be diſtinguiſhed by ſome uncommon way of
Living. This is a vile Effeminacy, a Niceneſs
moſt unbecoming a Man of Honour; it renders
us ridiculous and diſagreeable in Converſation;
and is highly injurious to our Selves; by ſoften-
ing our Minds, and making us tender and deli-
cate, and unfit to ſtruggle with any Accident,
which may conſtrain us to change our Courſe of
Life. Beſides, it is a Reproach, not to dare to
do, or endure, what the reſt of the Company do.
Such People are fit for no Place but an Alcove,
or a Dreſſing-Room. The beſt Faſhion, when
all is done, is to be negligent, and complying,

Book I. and hardy, if need be; to dare, and be able to do any thing; but to uſe this Power in ſuch Things only, as are innocent and good. A Man does well to know and obſerve Rules; but not to enſlave himſelf to them.

15. *Conſulting of Books.* Another vulgar Folly there is, and a very general one, which comes under this Head of *Weakneſs*. 'Tis the running after Foreign Examples in Authors; being fond of Quotations, allowing no Teſtimony to have Weight or Credit, except it be in Print; nor any Thing to be true, but what is *Old*, and in *Books*. According to this Rule, the Preſs may give Reputation to the greateſt Follies; whereas, in truth, every Day preſents us with freſh Inſtances of Things in no degree inferior to thoſe more celebrated ones of Antiquity. And if we had but the Wit and the Judgment to make good Reflections upon theſe; to cull and collect carefully ſuch as are for our Purpoſe; to examine them curiouſly, and diſcover all their Beauties, the Improvement would be wonderful; And every Age would be equal to any of the paſt, the Tranſactions whereof we ſo zealouſly ſtudy and admire; and to be plain, we ſtudy and admire them for no other Reaſon ſo much, as that they have Antiquity and Authors to recommend them.

16. *Extremes.* This again is an Evidence of *Weakneſs*, That Men are capable of nothing, except in moderate Proportions; *Extremes* of any kind are what they cannot bear. If they are very ſmall, and make a deſpicable Figure, we deſpiſe and diſdain them, as not worth our Conſideration: If they be exceeding great and glorious, we are afraid of the

admire, and take Offence at them. The Former of theſe Remarks concerns Men of great Quality, and great Judgment: The Second is more generally true of meaner Attainments and Circumſtances in the World. Ch. 37.

17. *Sudden Accidents.*

This appears very plain too, in our Hearing and Sight, when we are ſtruck all on the ſudden with ſome unexpected and ſurprizing Accident, which ſeizes our Spirits before we know where we are. The Amazements of this kind are ſometimes ſo great, as to deprive us of our Speech, of our Senſes; ſo *Virgil* deſcribes the thing;

* *Her curdled Blood runs backward at the Sight,*
And pale numb'd Limbs a ſudden Trembling ſhook;
She ſtiffens into Statue with the Fright,
Swoons, and at laſt long Silence hardly broke.

nay, ſometimes Life itſelf hath gone too. And this, whether the Event were proſperous, as that *Roman* Lady, who dy'd for Joy, to ſee her Son ſafe return'd out of a beaten Army; and the Examples of *Sophocles*, and *Dionyſius* the Tyrant, teſtify; or whether it be unhappy, as *Diodorus* dy'd upon the Spot, for Shame that he was baffled in a Diſpute.

One Inſtance more I will add, which diſcovers itſelf two ways, in direct Oppoſition to one another. Some Perſons are vanquiſh'd into Mercy by Tears, and Submiſſions, and earneſt Entreaties; and are offended at Firmneſs and Courage,

* Diriguit viſu in medio, calor oſſa reliquit:
Labitur, & longo vix tandem tempore fatur. *Virg. Æn.* III.

as

Book I. as if this were Sullenneſs, and Obſtinacy, and Pride. Others Acknowledgments, and Prayers, and Complaints make no manner of Impreſſion upon; but Conſtancy and Reſolution wins them. The former of theſe proceeds, no doubt, from *Weakneſs*; and accordingly, we find it more incident and common to mean, and effeminate, and vulgar Souls. But the Second it is not ſo eaſy to give an account of; and yet this Temper is incident to Men of all Conditions. One would think it an Argument of a brave and generous Spirit, to be wrought upon by Virtue, and a generous Manly Behaviour; and ſo, no doubt, it is, if This be done out of a due Veneration for Virtue, as *Scanderbeg* receiv'd a Soldier into Favour, for the gallant and obſtinate Defence he made againſt him; and as *Pompey*, the whole City of the *Mammertines*, out of the regard he had to *Zeno*, who was one of their Body: And as the Emperor *Conrade* forgave the Duke of *Bavaria*, and the reſt of them that were beſieged with him, for the Bravery of the Women, who convey'd them away upon their Heads. But if this Yielding proceed from the Surprize and Confuſion, occaſion'd by the over-bearing Power of ſome Superior Virtue, (as the People of *Thebes*, who were quite diſpirited, when they heard *Epaminondas*, in his Defence, reckon up his good Services, and noble Exploits, and reproach their baſe Ingratitude with a becoming Indignation; and *Alexander*, when he deſpiſed the noble Reſolution of *Betis*, who was taken with the City of *Gaza*, of which he was Commander) then there is another Account to be given of it. The

Former of theſe was Weakneſs; the Second, neither the Effect of Courage nor Weakneſs, but of Anger and Rage; which in *Alexander* was never ſubject to any Check, nor ever knew Moderation. Ch. 37.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THIS Author had ſaid in the Preface to Book, that his Deſign was to write after manner of the Academick Philoſophers; made it their Buſineſs, to repreſent each ſide the Queſtion in its utmoſt Beauty and Streng without delivering any deciſive Opinion in Caſe, or being bound to ſtand by either of the Controverſy. An Attentive Reader eaſily obſerve, That Monſieur *Charron* hath th far maintain'd the Character he propos'd for Pattern, as to make the moſt of the Argum that offer'd for his preſent Purpoſe, without precluding himſelf from putting quite another Face upon the Matter, when the Subject requir'd that it ſhould be taken by another Handle. Thus you will find him varying concerning the Attaining of Knowledge by Senſe, and whether This be the only poſſible way of Information; by comparing Chapter X. and Chapter XIII. And in the very Subject of this Chapter and Sect. 10, Section, how diſtant is the Reflection he 11. makes here, from thoſe others which He and other Philoſophers propoſe to us elſewhere, upon the Noble Excellence of Virtue, the Largeneſs of its Scope and Extent, its Independence upon Fortune and Caſualties, and the mighty Conve-

Book I. Convenience of furniſhing ſomething commend-
able and proper for our Exerciſe, and ſo making us happy in every poſſible Condition of Humane Life?

This Variety then of Thought is a good Warning to avoid what our Author ſo frequently condemns; Too eaſy a Credulity, and taking his Notions upon Truſt: For we find even thoſe Notions not always the ſame, but accommodated to his preſent Subject and Deſign: And That Deſign well attended to, and taken along with us, will be a very good Guide to our underſtanding him aright. For Inſtance; He had laid it down in the beginning of this Treatiſe, as a Fundamental Principle, That the Ignorance of a Man's Self is the great and moſt governing Error of his Life; of an Influence ſo univerſally pernicious, that all his Vices and Misfortunes are owing to it. But then This was ſuch an Ignorance, as diſpoſed Men to over-value and neglect themſelves, by covering, and quite overlooking the Defects and Diſadvantages of Humane Nature; and ſo kept the Patient incurable, becauſe inſenſible of his Diſeaſe. In order to remedy this Evil it is, that Monſieur *Charron* undertakes to ſhew Men to Themſelves; and 'tis evident his Deſign requires that he ſhould ſhew the worſt of them; and paint only thoſe Features and Lines ſtrong, which may diſcover their Deformity, and tend to humble and to mortify them firſt; and then to awaken that Care, which can never be vigorouſly employed, till they are firſt convinc'd of the Weakneſs and Danger of thoſe Circumſtances that want it.

Of Weakneſs.

A Philoſopher now under theſe Circumſt ıe is thus far like a Law-giver, that it will b dence in him to ſuppoſe and provide a the worſt; and therefore, as I would not e nuate the Art or Wiſdom of my Author, nor Injury to his Argument, ſo neither can I juſt to the Dignity of our Nature, and gratef to the Wiſe and Good Creator of it, unleſs give my Reader theſe ſhort, and (as I concei neceſſary Directions in peruſing this *Firſt Part* the Book.

Firſt, That what is here truly ſaid of ſome, (moſt Men, (and was fit to be ſaid in gene Terms, becauſe the worſt Men have moſt ne of ſuch Treatiſes, and ſo are moſt concern'd i them) muſt not be ſo univerſally apply'd, or underſtood, as to be taken for a common Standard, and univerſal Repreſentation of all Mankind, without Exception.

Secondly, That in thoſe Vices and Defects, which are general, we ſhould make a Diſtinction between ſuch as are eſſential to Humane Nature, and inſeparable from its Original Conſtitution; and ſuch as are the Effects of Cuſtom and Corruption, of either *Adam*'s, or our own Sin.

Thirdly, That what we charge as a Defect, be really ſo, and owing to the Cauſe we aſcribe it to. Theſe are neceſſary Cautions for the ſake of doing common Juſtice, as well as preventing Miſtakes in our Selves. It were unreaſonable to take our Meaſures of all Mankind in reſpect of their Bodies, from the Sick or Lame; and from the Fools or the Sots, every whit as extravagant for

their

Book I. their Souls. It were a charging God fooliſhly, to aſcribe thoſe Impotencies and Evils to Him, which have been the Conſequences of our Diſobedience againſt Him. And it is a moſt unthankful Aſperſion upon the Beauty and Wiſdom of his Providence, to charge That upon a Defect in Nature, which is really no other than a natural Reſult of the different Fortunes and Conditions of Men: Which is exactly the Caſe here before us: For wherein is the excellent Wiſdom of that Providence more clearly ſeen, than in that uſeful Variety of Circumſtances, which Men are placed in? And what can more vindicate the *Juſtice* and *Goodneſs* of God from any reaſonable Exception than this, That there are particular Virtues appropriated to every ſort of Perſons and Accidents; and that no Circumſtance of Life is poſſible, or ſuppoſable, but it may be adorned and recommended by Virtues, which are ſeaſonable and diſtinguiſhing for that very Condition? This Variety of Virtues then is far from a Natural Weakneſs; it is not owing to Nature, but to Fortune and Providence; and is ſo far from a Diſparagement, that it is rather an Ornament and Advantage to the World. Indeed, if Nature have any thing to do in it, it is the Nature of Virtue itſelf; for even Almighty God, who is Goodneſs in Perfection, yet does not exerciſe both Juſtice and Mercy (for Inſtance) at once, to the ſame Perſon, and in the ſame Reſpects: And how is Man the worſe for not doing Things inconſiſtent and incompatible, and what even Almighty God himſelf does not do? The ſame may be ſaid of the Defects of Juſtice, taken

taken Notice of afterwards; at leaſt, in ſome degree: Thoſe being the unavoidable Conſequences of Multitudes incorporated into Civil Societies, and ſo many Intereſts nicely interwoven with one another: All which I thought it my Duty to hint at, thereby to prevent any mean, repining, or ungrateful Thoughts, which ſuch Reflections as Theſe, when laviſhly ſpoken, or unwarily received, might be apt to raiſe in Mens Minds, to the Diſquiet of their own Hearts, and the Diſhonour of the Maker and Governour, not only of the Humane, but of Univerſal Nature.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

III. *Inconſtancy.*

MAN is a Creature wonderfully various and mutable; and the great Difficulty of coming to any Judgment concerning Him, which ſhould be certain, fix'd, and univerſal, proceeds from hence, That our Lives are not all of a Piece, but made up of diſagreeing and different Parcels. Moſt part of our Actions do not ariſe from ſteddy Thought, but are ſudden Starts and Sallies, the Effects of Accident and Impulſe, and look like Shreds of ſeveral Stuffs, patch'd up, and ſewed together. Firſt Irreſolution, and then Fickleneſs and Change of Meaſures, when we have reſolved, are the commoneſt and moſt apparent Vices of Humane Nature. And our Actions,

Book I. Actions, 'tis plain, do ſo ſtrangely croſs and contradict one another, that it is not eaſy to believe ſo many Contrarieties ſhould all be deriv'd from the ſame Original. We change and are not ſenſible of it: We run eagerly after every Whimſy of our own Appetites, and are born away by the Stream of Accidents and Paſſions; 'Tis no more Reaſon, but Inclination that governs us: * *But ſure it is, nothing can ever be regular and ſteddy, which is not directed and order'd by Reaſon and Method.* Thus our very Minds and Tempers vary too; the Climate, the Weather, and the Motions of Time and Seaſons, make conſiderable Alterations and Differences in us.

† *In each Man's Breaſt This Weathercock, the Mind,*
Moves with the Sun, and ſhifts with every Wind.

Our whole Life is nothing elſe, but one unequal, irregular, and many-figur'd Motion; nothing ſtrait, nothing ſteddy; We are perpetually moving and turning; and the very change of our Poſture is ſo frequent, as to be an Uneaſineſs and Trouble to us. ‡ *No Man continues to wiſh and deſign the ſame thing two Days together. Now the Man is for Marrying; by and by a Miſtreſs is preferr'd before a Wife: Now he is Ambitious and*

* At nil poteſt eſſe æquabile, quod non à certâ ratione proficiſcitur.

† Tales ſunt hominum mentes, quali pater ipſe
Jupiter auctiferâ luſtravit lampade terras.

‡ Nemo non quotidie conſilium mutat & votum; modò uxorem vult, modò amicam; modò regnare vult, modò non eſt eo officioſior ſervus: nunc pecuniam ſpargit, nunc rapit; modò frugi videtur & gravis, modò prodigus & vanus; mutamus ſubinde perſonam.

Aſpiring,



Of Inconſtancy.

Aſpiring, and looks Big; preſently the meaneſt S
vant is not more humble, more condeſcending t
He. This Hour he ſquanders his Money away;
next he turns Miſer, and ſcrapes all he can. S
times he is frugal and ſerious; ſometimes proj
airy, and gay. Thus we ſhift our Characters e
Moment, and act a Thouſand ſeveral Parts.

* *The Mind is with itſelf at Strife,*
And diſagree in all the Courſe of Life:
For what it hated now, it ſtreight deſires;
What now it threw away, it moſt admires. Cre

So little is any of us the ſame; and ſo much h
der is it to ſound and know ***Man*** perfectly, t
any other Creature whatſoever: For he is
of Doubles and Trickings; the cloſeſt, cunni
eſt, and moſt counterfeit Part of the Creatio
He hath a Thouſand little Cloſets and falſe
Doors, where he hides, and comes out again;
ſometimes a Man, ſometimes a Monſter; a Thou-
ſand Breathing holes, at which he blows ſome-
times Hot, ſometimes Cold, and almoſt blinds
you with Cloud and Smoak. Every Agitation
is but a freſh Folly; and the Courſe of his Life
One continu'd Error. He is born in the Morn-
ing, and dies at Night; is ſometimes in Chains,
and ſometimes at large; ſometimes a God, and
ſometimes an Inſect: He Laughs and Cries for
the ſame thing; is ſatisfy'd and diſſatisfy'd, ever
wiſhing, and never knowing what he would be
at. Sometimes tranſported, and ready to leap

* Quod petiit ſpernit, repetit quod nuper omiſit,
Æſtuat & vitæ diſconvenit ordine toto. *Horat.* 1 *Ep.* 1. 1.

Book I. out of his Skin for Joy; and presently again so melancholy and dejected, that nothing can content, nothing quiet him, or make him ever Life tolerable.

CHAP. XXXIX.

Misery.

1. Misery proper to Man.

WE are now to draw the largeſt and moſt diſtinguiſhing Line of the whole Piece. *Man* hath been, already, deſcribed *Vain* and *Feeble*, *Frail* and *Inconſtant*, with regard to *Goodneſs* and *Happineſs* and *Eaſe*; but he is *ſtrong* and *luſty*, *conſtant* and *hardened*, and *tough* in *Miſery*. He is in a manner *Miſery alive*, and in *Human Shape*; and no one Word is equally expreſſive of his Condition. For all *Miſery* centers in him, and dwells in no other part of the World beſides. To be Miſerable is the Property of our Nature; Man alone is ſo, and every Man is ſo, as will appear by and by. For a true Repreſentation of this Matter, it were convenient to run over all the Parts of his Life; to deſcribe his Eſſence, his Coming into the World, his Stay in it, and his Departure out of it. This were an endleſs Undertaking, and I pretend not to it; nor need I indeed, becauſe ſo many have handled the Subject before me. What I intend at preſent, is only to inſtance
not commonly taken
Unhappineſſes; as I

throughly consider, nor are sufficiently sensible of, tho' they be in reality very grievous, if we make a true Judgment of them. Ch. 39.

2. *In his Beginning and End.*

Take this then for the First Proof of Man's Misery, That his First Appearances in the World are Mean and Despicable, but his Going out of it, his Death and Destruction, are esteem'd Glorious and full of Honour. By which One would be tempted to think this a monstrous Creature, in the Production whereof there is so much Shame, and so much Reputation in the Unmaking him again. What relates to the former of These, Modesty draws a Veil over; but the latter is proclaimed and receiv'd with Triumph; the Instruments are prepared with great Expence; we wear them constantly about us, and look upon Them as Ornaments to our Persons. We are born in Chambers privately, but die before many Spectators, in Fields and Camps, in the Sight of the Sun, and with Sound of Trumpet, and are proud of Butchering one another. Nature hath provided but one Way of coming into the World, but a great many Passages out; and, as if even thus Nature had done too little, Invention and Industry have added their Assistance, and make Men every Day more Ingenious in new Arts of Killing. Laws and Customs have not assigned any Recompence for Mens Skill in multiplying, or in preserving Mankind; but all our Ensigns of Honour, are for the destroying it. Arms of Families, Advancements, Riches, Commands, Triumphs and Trophies are decreed to Them that are mighty to oppress, to grieve, to murder Mankind. The Two great Heroes of all

[redacted]

Book I. Story, *Alexander* and *Cæsar*, were each of them (according to *Pliny*'s Computation) the Death of more than a Million of Men, and yet neither of these added One to the Number. And heretofore, Men were slaughter'd in Publick Theatres, merely for Pleasure and Pastime. * *Man, a Creature Venerable and Sacred, is slain for Sport and Diversion; Death in Man is Entertainment sufficient. Innocent Persons are brought upon the Stage, to be sacrificed for the People's Pleasure.* In some Nations it is usual to curse the Day of their Birth, and bless That of their Death. And the wisest Man that ever lived, hath taught us, that the Latter of These is much Better of the Two. Now, no other Creature is so discontented with itself; nor are the Particulars here mention'd, True of Beasts, or any Part of the Creation besides.

3. *Destroying his Pleasure.* The Second Evidence of his Misery, may be taken from the Retrenchment of Pleasures; those poor and low Pleasures of which he is capable (for the Head of *Weakness* may have satisfy'd us, that the Pure and Exquisite are too refin'd for him) the Care taken to abate of the Number, and to check the Relish of them. If this be not done upon a Religious Account, how monstrous a Folly is it? Thus far Man is oblig'd to become his own Enemy, to rob and betray Himself; so that even his Pleasures are Burdens, and he contributes to his own Uneasiness. And this some are so superstitiously severe in, that they

* Homo res sacra per jocum & lusum occiditur; [illegible] spectaculi in homine mors est. Innocentes in ludum [illegible] niunt ut publicæ voluptatis hostiæ fiant. *Senec. Tert.*

avoid Health, and Good Humour, and Mirth, as Evils. Ch. 39.

* *Oh wretched Men! whoſe Pleaſures are their Crime.*

We are exceedingly ingenious to our Diſadvantage; and the Force of our Wit feeds upon nothing more, than the contriving new Arts of Uneaſineſs to our Selves.

4. *Creating Misfortunes to our ſelves.*

Thus it is plainly in a much worſe Inſtance than the former: For the Mind of Man does not only ſpoil Good, and deny its own Appetites, and check even lawful Delights; but it is eternally buſy in framing and forging Pains and Evils. Thus Things which have in reality nothing of Evil in them, and ſuch as Beaſts ſtand in no Fear at all of, our Minds draw in the blackeſt Colours, and moſt hideous Shapes, and then tremble, and ſtart, and run away, from Monſters of their own making. Thus we eſteem it a mighty Unhappineſs, not to be Honourable, and Rich, and Great; and look upon Cuckoldom, want of Children, and Death, as inſupportable Evils. Whereas, to ſpeak freely, I know no Temporal Affliction which is really Evil, and felt to be ſo, but *Pain* only. And the Reaſon why ſome wiſe Men have been known to fear thoſe other Things, w not upon the Account of the Things tl ſelves, but of the Pain which may happen t an inſeparable Attendant upon them. For ſometimes is a Forerunner of Death; and times it follows upon Poverty and Diſgrace if you conſider theſe Matters, (abſtracti

* O miſeri, quorum gaudia crimen habent. Gall

Book I. Pain) all the reſt is mere Imagination; a Thing that hath no Being, but in our own Brains; which are eternally cutting themſelves out new Work, and forming Evils that are not, to add to Thoſe that are; thus enlarging our Miſery, and finding it freſh Employment, inſtead of quieting and cutting it ſhort. For the Beaſts feel nothing of all this; and therefore it is plain they are *Evils*, not of *Nature*'s, but of *Fancy*'s making.

5. *Born to Pain.* As for *Pain*, which ſeems the only real Evil, Man is perfectly fitted for That, and born to it. The *Mexicans* welcome their Children into the World, with this Salutation; *Child, thou art come into this World to ſuffer; take it patiently, and hold thy Peace.* And Three Arguments there are, which may convince us, that Pain is in a manner Natural to Man; and a State of Indolence or Pleaſure foreign to his Conſtitution. The Firſt is, that every Part about a Man is ſuſceptible of Pain, and but very few capable of Pleaſure. The Second, That Thoſe which are capable of Pleaſure, can receive but one or two ſorts of it; but all the Parts receive great Variety of Pains, and Thoſe of the moſt different Kinds too; Extremity of Heat and Cold, Pricking, Burſting, Bruiſing, Scratching, Playing, Beating, Scalding, Fainting, Swooning, Extenſion, Oppreſſion, Relaxation of the Parts; and others without Number, that want a Name, beſides Thoſe of the Soul; ſo that a Man is much more able to ſuffer, than to expreſs his Sufferings. To this muſt be added, that a Man cannot continue long in Pleaſures: All his Delights are a ſhort Blaze; ſhould they laſt long, they would deſtroy Themſelves,

ſelves, and become painful and inſupportable. Ch. 39.
But his Pains are of great length, and not con-
fin'd to certain Seaſons, as Pleaſures are. Thus Pain hath a more abſolute Dominion over us; its Territories are larger; its Reign more laſting, more general, more uncontroll'd, and, in a Word, more Natural, than that of Pleaſure is, or can poſſibly be.

To theſe Three Remarks may be added as many more; as Firſt, Pain and Sorrow is much more common, and comes oftner upon us; Pleaſure is hard to be met with, and ſeldom returns. Then Pain comes of its own accord, without any ſeeking or Endeavour of ours to procure it; but Pleaſure never approaches voluntarily; we are fain to court it, to buy it dear, and oftentimes pay more for it than it is worth. Pleaſure is never Entire, but hath always ſome Abatement, ſome Allay of Uneaſineſs, ſomewhat attending it that we cannot like, and had much rather were otherwiſe; but Pain and Diſſatisfaction are often without any manner of Mixture or Mitigation. And after all this, the worſt part of the Bargain, and that which moſt clearly proves our Miſery, is, That Extremity of Pleaſure does not affect us ſo ſenſibly as a very ſmall Degree of Pain or Sickneſs. * *Humane Nature is more accommodated to the Senſe of Evil, than of Good.* Perfect Health and Eaſe makes no manner of Impreſſion; but the leaſt Indiſpoſition makes a very great one. † *The Prick*

* Segniùs homines bona quàm mala ſentiunt.

† Pungit—in cute vix ſummâ violatum plagula Cor
Quando valere nihil quenquam movet——

Book I. *of a Pin, though the Skin be ſcarce razed, puts the whole Body into Diſorder; and yet That whole Body, when in a State of perfect Eaſe, takes no particular Senſation, or Motion of Joy relating from it.*

Remembrance and Anticipation of Evils.

6. As if all this were ſtill too little, and neither Real and Subſtantial Evils, nor Falſe, and of our own forming, could complete our Miſery; we ſtretch, and lengthen both the One and the Other of theſe; give them new Life, and ſuſtain them longer than they could poſſibly ſubſiſt without our cheriſhing; as if we were perfectly in love with Uneaſineſs. This we do ſeveral ways; as Firſt, by calling to remembrance that which is paſſed, and foreſtalling that which is to come. This Method can never fail, becauſe the Two great Privileges our Nature boaſts of, are *Memory* and *Foreſight*; and theſe Advantages and Prerogatives of our Species, we ſo pervert, as to render them the Inſtruments of our Unhappineſs. * *The Paſt and the Future both put us upon the Rack; many of our Advantages do us an Injury; Memory calls back our Terrors; and Fore-thought antedates them: No Man bears the preſent Burden, and no more.* Now what can expreſs a more importunate deſire of Miſery, than the not ſtaying till the Calamity comes, but going out to meet and find, to ſeek and to invite it, to haſten its Approaches towards us? This is like the *Men that kill themſelves for fear of Dying*; which is, out of Curioſity, or Weakneſs, to pull down upon us

* Futuro torquemur & præterito; multa bona noſtra nocent; timoris tormentum memoria reducit, præanticipat; nemo præſentibus tantum miſer eſt.

what we moſt apprehend. And thus we do not only wait for our greateſt Evils, and real Inconveniencies, with a fooliſh Impatience, but oftentimes terrify and torment our ſelves with the Expectation of thoſe, which perhaps would never reach us at all. Theſe Perſons take great Pains to be miſerable before their Time; nay, to be doubly ſo, by the Senſe of the Calamity, when upon them, and by long Premeditation at a Diſtance; which is a thouſand times worſe than the Calamity itſelf. * *The Fatigue of Senſe is much leſs in enduring, than the Torture of Men in expecting.* The real Exiſtence of Miſery is, it ſeems, too ſhort and tranſitory, and therefore the Mind muſt give it Birth, and lengthen out its Life, and entertain itſelf with it before-hand. † *He that afflicts himſelf before he needs, is ſure to be afflicted more than he needs.* Beaſts are ſecure from ſuch Wretchedneſs and Folly, and are in this reſpect much beholding to Nature, for not having given them the tormenting Faculties of Wit, and Memory, and Foreſight, like ours. *Cæſar* uſed to ſay, that *the beſt Death was that which was leaſt thought on.* And there is no doubt but the Pomp and Expectation of Death is frequently more painful and terrible than the Thing itſelf. It is not here any Part of my Deſign, to diſcourage or reflect upon that Premeditation which Philoſophy and Religion require of us: For This is the very Tempering that hardens the Soul, and makes it Proof againſt all Accidents

Ch. 39.

* Minùs afficit ſenſùs fatigatio quàm cogitatio.

† Plus dolet quàm neceſſe eſt, qui ante dolet quàm neceſſe eſt.

Book I. and Aſſaults; and a Place ſhall be reſerved for recommending this particularly. But what I would explode, is that Apprehenſion of Evils to come, which is always Poor-ſpirited, and ſometimes Groundleſs, and ever Fruitleſs; which troubles and ſullies the Soul with Black Thoughts, deforms its Beauty, diſturbs its Quiet, and embitters all its Joy. And ſure it is much better to be abſolutely ſurpriz'd, than thus forewarn'd: Rather than think thus of Future Evils, never think at all. But, ſetting aſide this Antedating of Evil; the very Anxiety, and Care, and perpetual Hankering after Future Contingencies of any kind, the Sollicitude of our Hopes, the Eagerneſs of our Deſires, the Miſgivings of our Fears, are a very great Miſery. For beſides, that What is *future*, is equally out of our Power with What is *paſt*, (and ſo theſe Thoughts are vain) we are certain to receive Detriment by that which can do us no Service. *(For* * *the State of a Mind always in Pain for what will happen hereafter, is certainly moſt deplorable)* It robs us of all ſedate Thoughts; deſtroys all that comfortable Senſe, and quiet Enjoyment, we might have of preſent Advantages; and makes it impoſſible for Men to ſit down eaſy and ſatisfy'd under any Diſpenſations of the kindeſt and moſt bountiful Providence to them.

Book II. Ch. 7, 11.

7, *Uneaſy Enquiries.*

Nay, Man ſtops not here; but, as if he were concern'd to furniſh new Matter for that Miſery, which comes up but too thick of its own accord; he cultivates and encreaſes it, by a reſtleſs Curio-

* Calamitoſus eſt animus futuri anxius.

ſity,

fity, and ſtudious Purſuit of freſh Objects, which may create or cheriſh his Unhappineſs. With what Eagerneſs and Pleaſure does he thruſt himſelf into Buſineſs; and how inquiſitive and impatient is he to diſcover That, which, if it would preſent itſelf to his View without any Trouble of his, he ought rather to turn away, and hide his Eyes from? And this buſy Temper is owing either to a Natural Reſtleſneſs, diſpoſing us to be miſerable; or from a vain Affectation to be Judicious, and Wiſe, and always employ'd; that is, in plain *Engliſh*, to make our ſelves Fools and Wretches: As we needs muſt be, when our Induſtry to perplex our ſelves is ſo great, that when we have no Buſineſs of our own to diſquiet us, we go abroad in queſt of Troubles, and officiouſly concern our ſelves with the Affairs of other People. In a Word, Man is under exceeding great and perpetual Agitation of Mind, not only from ſuch Thoughts and Cares as are unneceſſary, and turn to no account; but ſuch as are thorny, troubleſome, and injurious to him: The *Preſent* gives him Pain; the *Paſt*, Regret, the *Future*, Perplexity; and, by his Behaviour under all this, one would think him afraid of nothing ſo much, as the not being ſufficiently miſerable, after all his Endeavours to render himſelf ſo. And may we not juſtly uſe this Exclamation? *O wretched Mortals! how many Evils do you continually endure, which might with great Eaſe have been avoided! how many more indeed are thoſe of your own, and how few, in Compariſon, thoſe of God's and Nature's making!* But thus, alas, it is! Man delights himſelf in Miſery, and

Ch. 39.

Book I. and is obſtinate in ſeeking and cleaving to it. He chews the Cud upon each Misfortune, and takes great Pains that none ſhould be forgotten, but renews their Images daily and hourly. Nothing is ſo frequent, ſo familiar, as Complaints; and where Occaſions are but light and trivial, he cheriſhes and heightens the Reſentment, calls himſelf the moſt unhappy Man in the World, and takes it ill not to be thought ſo; * *Such Pleaſure does he find in indulging his Grief.* And ſure the being ſo very ambitious to enhance our Miſery, and to get the Character of thoſe who excel all others in it, is a much greater Miſery than never feeling or knowing our Unhappineſs at all. † *And yet this is that querulous Creature Man, that ſits with great Eagerneſs brooding upon his own Miſeries.*

8. *In the Remedies of Miſery.* Thus you ſee him abundantly miſerable, by Nature and by Choice; in Reality and in Imagination; by Conſtraint, and with Induſtry and Pleaſure. He hath too much of it in deſpight of all Endeavours to the contrary; and yet his great Fear is, that he ſhould not have Miſery enough. He is always in Chaſe of ſome freſh Unhappineſs and in Pain till he hath overtaken it. But now we will take him in another Proſpect, affected with a Senſe, and weary of ſome particular Evil; (for even This does not happen always; and many Miſeries are endur'd without any uneaſy Reſentments at all) And when his Mind is thus far awaken'd, let us next obſerve, how he endea-

* Eſt quædam dolendi voluptas.

† Homo animal querulum, cupidè ſuis incumbens miſeriis.

vours

vours to diſengage himſelf, and what Remedies are to be apply'd in order to a Cure. And Theſe are ſuch, in truth, as rather fret and anger the Sore, than heal it; for by quitting one Evil, he only exchanges it for another, and oftentimes for a worſe. But ſtill the very Change is pleaſing, or at leaſt, it ſooths and allays the Pain a little. He fancies one Evil may be cured by another; and this Imagination is owing to a vulgar Error, that ſeems to have bewitch'd Mankind; which makes them always ſuſpect Things that are eaſy and cheap; and eſteem nothing truly valuable and advantageous, but what coſts us dear, and is attended with much Labour and Difficulty. And This again riſes higher, (for it is not more ſtrange than true, and nothing can more fully prove, that Man is exceeding miſerable) That, let the Evils we lie under, be what they will, ſome other Evil is neceſſary for expelling and ſubduing them; and whether the Body or the Mind be the Part affected, the Caſe in this reſpect is much the ſame. For the Diſeaſes both of the one and the other, are never to be healed and taken off, but by Torture and Pain, and great Trouble: Thoſe of the *Mind* by Penance, Watchings, and Faſtings; hard Uſage, and coarſe Fare; Confinements and Mortifications; which, notwithſtanding the Voluntarineſs and Devotion of them, muſt of Neceſſity be afflicting and pungent; becauſe the whole Effect of them would be loſt, if we could ſuppoſe them in any degree ſubſervient to Eaſe and Pleaſure. Thoſe of the *Body* require nauſeous Medicines, Inciſions, Cauſticks, and ſevere Dietings; as They whoſe

Ch. 39.

Book I. whoſe Unhappineſs it is to be oblig'd to a Courſe of Phyſick, know by woful Experience. They are got between the Mill-ſtones (as they ſay) ground and bruiſed on one ſide by the Diſeaſe, and on the other by a Regimen as bad as the Diſeaſe. Thus Ignorance is cured by long laborious Study; Poverty by Sweat and Toil; and Care and Trouble are as natural in all the Proviſions for Body and Mind both, as it is for Birds to fly.

9. *Miſeries of the Mind.* The ſeveral Miſeries hitherto inſiſted on, are ſuch as the Body ſuffers in; or, if not peculiar to that alone, yet at leaſt ſuch as it bears a part in with the Mind; and the higheſt they go, is only to the meaneſt of our Faculties, *Imagination* and *Fancy*. But Thoſe, which next fall under our Conſideration, are of the moſt refin'd and Spiritual Nature, ſuch as are more truly deſerving of that Name; full of Error; full of Malignity; their Activity greater, their Influence more general, more pernicious, and more properly our own; and yet at the ſame time leſs acknowledg'd, leſs perceiv'd by us. And this enhances, nay, doubles Man's Miſery; that of moderate Evils he hath a quick and tender Senſe, but thoſe which are greateſt, he knows not, feels not at all. Nor can he bear to be inform'd of them. No Body dares mention them to him; none will do the ingrateful good Office of touching this ſore Place; ſo harden'd, ſo obſtinate, ſo loſt is he in his Miſery. All therefore that can be allow'd us in the Caſe, is to handle them with all imaginable Gentleneſs, and juſt glance upon them by the by; or rather, indeed, to point them

out

out at a diſtance, and give him ſome little Hints to exerciſe his own Thoughts upon, ſince of his own accord he is by no means diſpoſed to take any Notice of them. And Firſt, In reſpect of the *Underſtanding*; Is it not a moſt prodigious, and moſt lamentable Conſideration, that *Humane Nature* ſhould be ſo univerſally tainted with *Error* and *Blindneſs?* Moſt Vulgar Opinions (and commonly the more general, in a more eminent manner) are erroneous and falſe; not excepting even thoſe that are receiv'd with the greateſt Reverence and Applauſe. Nor are theſe ſo Sacred Notions falſe only; but, which is worſe, very many of them miſchievous to Humane Society, and the Publick Good. And tho' ſome Wiſe Men (and they alas! but very few) think more correctly of theſe Matters, than the Generality of the World, and have a truer Notion of them; yet even Theſe Men ſometimes ſuffer themſelves to be carry'd down with the Stream; if not always, and in every Point, yet now and then, and upon ſome Occaſions. A Man muſt be very firm and well fixed, to ſtem the Tide; very hardy, and of a ſound Conſtitution, whom an Infection ſo epidemical cannot faſten upon. For, indeed, Opinions that have got footing every where, and are entertain'd with general Applauſe, ſuch as ſcarce any Body dares to contradict, are like a ſweeping Flood, that bears down all before it.

Ch. 39.

The Underſtanding.

* *Good Heaven! what Errors darken Humane Sight!*
And wrap our Souls in groſs ſubſtantial Night!

* Proh ſuperi! quantum mortalia pectora cæcæ
Noctis habent?

Blind

Book I.

* *Blind wretched Man! in what dark Paths of Strife,*
We walk this little Journey of our Life! Creech.

To inſtance in all the Fooliſh Opinions, with which the Generality of Mankind are intoxicated, were much too tedious an Undertaking. But ſome few ſhall be juſt mention'd here, and reſerv'd to their proper Places, for a more full Enlargement upon them; and ſuch are Theſe that follow.

See Book III. Chap. 1.

1. The forming a Judgment of Counſels and Deſigns, and pronouncing them Prudent, and Seaſonable, and Good; or the direct contrary; according as they ſucceed well or ill. Whereas the Iſſues of all theſe Things are in no degree at our own Diſpoſal, but depend entirely upon a higher Hand; One, who, as his own Infinite Wiſdom ſees fit, proſpers the moſt unlikely Methods, and defeats the wiſeſt Meaſures, and moſt promiſing Attempts.

See Book II. Chap. 8.

2. The condemning, and utterly exploding all foreign and ſtrange Things, *Manners*, *Opinions*, *Laws*, *Cuſtoms*, *Obſervances*, and looking upon them as barbarous and wicked, without ever examining into the Matter, or knowing of what Nature and Conſequence they are: And all this, for no other reaſon, but that they are new to Us, and practiſed only in remote Countries, and different from the Vogue and Uſage of our own. As if We were the common Standard for all the World to take Meaſures by; and nothing co[illegible]

* O miſeras hominum mentes & pectora cæca,
Qualibus in tenebris vitæ, quantiſque periclis
Degitur hoc ævi quodcunque eſt! *Lucret.*

poſſibly be commendable or convenient, but what hath been receiv'd, and is in requeſt, in that little Spot of Ground, where our particular Lot hath fallen. Ch. 39.

3. Somewhat diſtant from This, is the eſteeming and extolling Things, becauſe they are *New*, or *Scarce*, or *Strange*, or *Difficult*; which are the Four powerful Charms, that attract, and get ſo abſolute Aſcendent over Vulgar Souls: And very often it happens, that the Things prized highly upon theſe Accounts, are mere Vanities and Trifles, and have neither intrinſick Goodneſs, nor Uſefulneſs, nor any other Conſideration to recommend them. For what can be more juſtly deſpicable, than That Prince, who is ſaid to value himſelf extremely, upon an Art he had of ſtanding at a Diſtance, and throwing Grains of Millet through the Eye of a Needle? *See* Book II. Chap. 10.

4. All thoſe Superſtitious Opinions, and unaccountable Whimſies, which debaſe and enſlave the Minds of Children and Women, and all the weak and ignorant Part of Mankind.

5. The eſteeming Men more or leſs, according to their Worldly Advantages; and proportioning not our Reſpects only, but our Opinions too, to their Riches, Honours, and Preferments; as if the Value of a Horſe were to be taken from his Trappings, and the Buyer, to know his good Qualities and adjuſt his Price, ſhould look no farther than the glittering Bridle, and embroider'd Saddle. Ibid.

6. The rating Things not according to their real, natural, and intrinſick Worth, which ſometimes is conceal'd; but according to the

Book I. Face and Shew, the Pomp and Figure,
Noiſe they make, and the Reputation they h
in the World.

7. The thinking, that a Man is ſufficiently
venged of his Enemy, when he kills him; whe
This is to put him under Shelter, and out of
Reach of all manner of Evil, and to expoſe o
own ſelf to it. 'Tis to take away from him
power of Feeling, or being hurt by the Reve
we intend; and that very Act, which deſigns l
the greateſt Miſchief, ſets him at perfect E
This is a Folly that may be reduc'd to the for
Head of *Weakneſs*, and is a Branch of That,
well as of *Miſery*.

8. The reckoning it a moſt inſupportable I
ry and Unhappineſs, and that a Man beco
an Object of Contempt for being a *Cuckold*.
how can we poſſibly wrong our Judgment m
than by thinking meanly of a Man, and that
is juſtly ridiculous and deſpicable, for the F
of another; which he is ſo far from hav
any hand in, that 'tis plain he never appro
it? The Caſe is much the ſame in our hav
a worſe Opinion of any Man, for being a
ſtard.

9. The diſeſteeming what is preſent, and
own, and ſuch as we are in ſecure and peace
poſſeſſion of; and being infinitely fond of
very ſame Things when we have them not,
merely becauſe they belong to ſome Body
As if Preſence and Poſſeſſion abated the
Worth of a Thing; and the not having it w
a Recommendation ſufficient to raiſe the Price
it in our Accounts.

Ch. 39.

* *Poor Envious We deſpiſe*
Virtue, when preſent; when it flies,
Stand and gaze after it with longing Eyes. Creech.

Hence came the Proverb of *No Prophet being received with Honour in his own Country.* Thus to lower the Value of any Thing, there needs no more than to be the Owner and Enjoyer of it: Thus Huſbands look upon their own Wives, and Fathers upon their Children, with Indifference and Diſdain. *If you would put an End to your Love,* (ſay the Men of the *Town*) *Marry your Miſtreſs, and the Buſineſs is done effectually.* Thus every Other Man's Servant is better, his Horſe fleeter, his Houſe more convenient than our Own. 'Tis pretty odd, I confeſs, to prefer Things purely imaginary, before Thoſe that are real and ſubſtantial; and yet this is the Caſe of that unreaſonable Valuation we put upon Things that are abſent, and at a diſtance, and other People's; upon Things before we have them, and after we have loſt them. The Reaſon of ſo unequal a Proceeding in theſe two Caſes laſt mention'd, ſeems to be this; That the Value we ſet upon Things before we have them, is not proportion'd to their real intrinſick Worth, but to the falſe Ideas our own Imaginations form, or the vain Boaſts other People make of them; both which are always bigger and more beautiful than the Life: But Poſſeſſion and Experience diſcover the Truth, and then we learn to

* Virtutem incolumem odimus,
Sublatam ex oculis quærimus invidi. *Horat. Ode 24 Lib 3.*

Book I. rate them after the Excellence they actually have, and the Benefit that can be made out of them. Again; The Things we have loſt are look'd upon with Melancholy, and much Regret, becauſe then we conſider them entire, and in the Groſs, whereas the Uſe and Enjoyment we had of them was not ſo, but by Piece-meals, and by little at a time. In which Men are commonly much more unkind to Themſelves, than they need to be: For they defer their own Happineſs, reſerve it for a farther Day, and always promiſe themſelves Time and Opportunities enough for enjoying it hereafter; ſo that even what they have, they are ſo ſtingy in the uſe of, that they are ſcarce ſenſible of what they poſſeſs; and it is in a manner all one as if they had it not. And This ſeems to be the true Account, why the Paſſion and Concern for our Loſſes and our Wants, is more vehement and viſible, than the Pleaſures and Satisfactions taken in what we poſſeſs. And in this no doubt we muſt allow a great Mixture of *Weakneſs* as well as *Miſery*. We are not ſufficient for full and perfect Enjoyment, and only capable of Deſiring intenſely, and in Perfection. There is indeed a vicious Temper of the Mind, directly oppoſite to That I have been ſpeaking of; which is, That Degree of Self-ſufficiency and Satisfaction, that whatever We are, or have, appears to us incomparably better than all the World beſides. We can be pleas'd, nay we can be in common Charity with nothing but our Own; and whatever is ſo, nothing can be ſuperior, nothing equal, nothing like or comparable to it.

I dare

I dare not ſay this Quality argues Men any Wiſer than the other; but all the World, I believe, will admit, that it makes them Eaſier, and contributes much more to their Happineſs and Content. Ch. 39.

10. The ſhewing one's ſelf forward and zealous upon all Occaſions, to reſent Things warmly, and engage in Diſputes with Peremptorineſs and Paſſion, as often as there is any fair and plauſible Pretence given, of appearing to be a Man affectionately concern'd for Juſtice, or Religion; for promoting the Publick Good, or gaining the Love of the People. "For as theſe are Things "which ought to be very precious, and no good "Man muſt neglect them in their Seaſons; ſo it "requires Diſcretion to chuſe thoſe Seaſons, and "to manage and temper an honeſt Zeal. Every "Man that is well-diſpoſed, is not qualified for "the Undertaking; and every Time and Com-"pany is not fit for him that is qualified to un-"dertake it in.

11. The putting on exceſſive Melancholy, or ſuffering our ſelves to be really afflicted, and mourn to a great Degree, upon the Death of a Friend, or any other Calamity that befals him: And to imagine, that a Moderate Degree of Paſſion upon ſuch Occaſions, argues want of Affection and ſincere Friendſhip. This is not only *Miſery*, but an exceeding *Vanity* too, and as common as it is vain. Chap. XXXIII.

12. The bearing a very great Regard to thoſe Actions, which require a great deal of Buſtle and Stir in the doing, and make a Noiſe in the World; and to ſlight and undervalue all that are done in a ſtill, ſedate, and obſcure manner: As if no Ef-

fects could ever follow upon ſuch a dull, heavy way of proceeding; but all Men were aſleep, and did nothing, that do it not with Hurry and Clutter. In ſhort; All thoſe vain Preferences which Men give to Art above Nature, are likewiſe of this Kind; for One of Theſe, works with Labour and Obſervation; the Other eaſily, quiet, and unſeen. And thus whatever is ſwell'd, and blown up by Induſtry and Invention; that which cracks about our Ears, and ſtrikes ſtrongly upon our Senſes, (and all this is Artificial) we reſpect and value highly, infinitely above that which is mild, and gentle, and ſimple, and uniform, and common; for ſuch are the Products of Nature. The former of Theſe awakens us into Attention; the latter advances ſilently, and leaves, or lays us aſleep.

13. The putting unfair and perverſe Interpretations upon the good Actions of Others; and when the Thing is well in itſelf, attributing it to baſe, or trifling, or wicked Cauſes or Occaſions. So did They, whom *Plutarch* is angry with, for pretending, that the Death of *Cato* the Younger proceeded from no other Principle, than his Fear of *Cæſar*; And ſome Others yet more ſenſeleſly, charg'd it upon Ambition. This is a moſt infallible Symptom of a ſick Judgment; a Diſeaſe that proceeds, either from Wickedneſs at home, and a general Corruption of the Will and Manners, diſpoſing Men to pervert every Thing to the worſt Senſe; or elſe from Uneaſineſs and Envy againſt Perſons that are better than Them from a Miſgiving Quality within, all their Belief to the Compaſs

own Abilities; ſo meaſuring others by their own Standard; believing every one as bad as they know Themſelves to be, and abſolutely incapable of doing Things better, or propoſing nobler Ends in their Actions, than their own uſually are. Or perhaps, as probable an Account of this as any of the former, may be a Natural Weakneſs and Littleneſs of Soul, which, like tender Eyes, cannot bear to look at ſo ſtrong and clear a Light, as that which Virtue ſheds, when pure, and in its native Beauties. Nor is it amiſs here to take notice of a Practice exceeding common; which is, Mens affecting to ſhew the *Nicety* of their *Judgment*, and the *Smartneſs* of their *Wit*, in finding Faults, ſuppreſſing, extenuating, diſguiſing Circumſtances, ſetting Things in their worſt Light, and eclipſing the Glory of the braveſt Actions. In all which, one would wonder they ſhould ſuppoſe any thing worth valuing themſelves upon; ſince it is manifeſt, all Dexterity of this kind is a much greater Demonſtration of their Ill-Nature, than it can be of their Parts; and as it is the Vileſt and moſt Diſingenuous, ſo is it the Eaſieſt and moſt Vulgar way of Wit, in the World. Ch. 39.

14. Another, which ſeems to be a very convincing Teſtimony of the *Miſery of Humane Minds*, (tho' ſomewhat more nice, and out of the way of common Obſervation) is, That the Soul in its calm, and ſound, and compoſed Eſtate, can riſe no higher than the Perception of Things, and the Performance of ſuch [illegible] Common, and Natural, [illegible] But in order to the raiſ[illegible]

Book I. Divine and Supernatural, ſuch as admit Men into the Secrets of Heaven, it is diſtemper'd, and violently agitated; either by vehement Impulſes, Extaſies and Enthuſiaſms; or by Trances and deep Sleeps. This I gather, not only from the *Tripos* and *Oracles* of the Heathen *Pythia*, but from the authentick Accounts given us of Revelations, and the extraordinary Manifeſtations God was pleaſed to make of Himſelf to Prophets, and Holy Men in Scripture: Such as *Abraham*, and *Ezekiel*, and *Daniel*, and others in the Old Teſtament; and St. *Peter* and St. *Paul* in the New. All which Inſtances ſeem to argue, that the only Natural ways of attaining to theſe extraordinary Communications, are by Tranſport and Sleep, by *Viſions* and *Dreams*. So that our Mind, it ſeems, is never ſo Wiſe, as when it is out of its Senſes; nor ever ſo truly Awake, as in Sleep. It arrives beſt at its Journey's End, by leaving the Common Road, and takes the nobleſt and moſt ſucceſsful Flights, when its own Faculties appear moſt depreſſed; as if it were neceſſary to Loſe itſelf for the Finding ſomewhat better and more lofty; and to be Miſerable in order to its being Happy. "This "ſeems moſt Natural, becauſe we are aſſured it "was moſt uſual; not that there was an Impoſ-"ſibility of other Methods, but that theſe were "beſt adapted to Humane Infirmities. And "therefore it is worth obſerving upon this Oc-"caſion, what Truth Himſelf mentions, as a "Prerogative, by which *Moſes* was diſtinguiſhed "from other Prophets: *In that God talked with "him Face to Face, as a Man talketh to his Friend*; "that is, Eaſily and Familiarly, without any of

"thoſe

" thoſe vehement Commotions of Body, or extatick Raptures of Soul, which the reſt of Mankind uſed to feel upon ſuch Occaſions. And this proves, both that the Other Method was ſo ordinary as to juſtify our Author's Obſervation; and yet that there was no utter Incapacity for this freer way, in Humane Nature, (which deſerved this additional Remark upon it;) for God, who is abſolute Maſter of Nature, can reveal himſelf in what manner he ſees fit. Ch. 39.

15. *Laſtly*, Can any greater Defect or Miſery be imagin'd incident to the Minds of Men, than the Neglect and Diſeſteem of their beſt and moſt uſeful Faculty? And yet this is almoſt every one's Caſe, while we extol *Memory* and *Imagination*, and are fond of excelling in Theſe, but let the *Judgment* lie idle and unimprov'd; no Care taken to employ it, nor any Account at all made of it. Do but look abroad a little, and you will ſoon be convinced of what I ſay. For what are all the neat Harangues, the learned Treatiſes, the quaint Diſcourſes, the celebrated Sermons and Books, with which the World is ſo mightily taken; What, in a Word, are all the Productions of this fruitful Age, (the Works of ſome few Great Men only excepted) but common Places and Quotations, tack'd and fill'd up together; a Collection of other Mens Labours put into a new Method, with ſome few Strokes and Illuſtrations, and ſo naturaliz'd, and made all our Own? And what can we make of this, but a Work of *Memory*; the Excellency of a School- which requires very little Ju ll that part which

Book I. we pick up from Authors, and find ready cut to our Hands; And the Work of *Imagination*, for thoſe little Graces and Garnitures, which make up the much leſs part, added by our Selves? This oftentimes is mere Vanity; no one Stroke of a Judicious Man, no one eminently Good Quality diſcernible in it; and accordingly the Authors themſelves, under whoſe Names good Things are publiſhed, are often known to be Perſons of weak Parts, and very indifferent Judgment; looſe in their *Principles*, and debauch'd in their *Morals*. And how much better than all this is it, to hear a good honeſt Farmer, or a common Shopkeeper, talking in their own Gibberiſh, plain downright Truths, in a dry rough way, without Trick or Dreſs, to adorn and ſet them off; and giving good uſeful Advice, which is the Natural Product of ſound Senſe, and an unſophiſticated Judgment?

10. *The Will.* Thus much for our *Underſtanding*. The *Will* is in no degree inferiour in Miſery, but hath at leaſt as many Sources; and the Inſtances of it are more deplorable, than any under the former Head. Theſe are indeed innumerable; ſome few of them are ſuch as follow.

1. The being more deſirous to be *thought* Virtuous and Good, than really to be ſo; and when one does good Actions, doing them more for the ſake of Others, than our Own; making Reputation a more powerful Motive and Principle of Virtue, than Conſcience; coveting and taking greater Satisfaction in the Commend plauſe of the World, than in the ſe neſs and Comfort of having

2. The being much more forward and eager to *revenge* an Injury or Affront, than to *acknowledge* a Favour, and return a Kindneſs. Inſomuch that to own an Obligation is a perfect Trouble, and Mortification, a leſſening one's ſelf; but the taking Satisfaction reputed a Pleaſure, a Pride, an Advantage. And what can be a greater Reproach to our Nature, what more betray the Baſeneſs and Malignity of it, than the verifying that Obſervation; * *Thanks are a Toil and a Burden; but a Retaliation of Injuries is eſteem'd an Addition, and a Gain?* Ch. 39.

3. The being more violent and fierce in the Paſſion of *Hatred*, than in that of *Love*; more diſpoſed to, more vehement in Detraction and Calumnies, than in our Commendations and good Characters of Men and Actions; to feed upon Evil rather than Good; and entertain ill Reports and an odious Repreſentation of our Neighbour, with more ſenſible Reliſh than his Praiſes; to enlarge more willingly upon theſe, allow them a greater Share in our Converſation, to employ one's Wit, and Arts of Expreſſion upon this Subject rather than the contrary. As the Generality of Hiſtorians, Orators, and Poets do, who are cold and flat in relating Men's *Virtues*, but ſharp and poignant, eloquent, and moving in the Deſcription of their *Vices*. And thus we find, that the Expreſſions and Figures of Rhetorick, which ſerve to expoſe and blacken Men and Things, are mighty different, much more full and copious, [illegible]matical and ſignificative, than thoſe

* Ingratio in quæſtu habetur.

Book I. which are employ'd in Recommendation and Praiſe.

Book I. Chap. 3. 4. The declining Evil, and addicting one's ſelf to Good, upon falſe and improper Ends; when this is not the reſult of Virtuous Motions and Inclinations from within, nor the Dictate of Natural Reaſon, nor the Love of Virtue, nor the Senſe of Duty; but ſome Conſideration altogether foreign, and wide of the Matter. Some mean and ſordid Proſpect of Gain and Intereſt; the Itch of Vain glory, the Hope of Advancement, the Fear of Reproach, Compliance with Cuſtom, Obſequiouſneſs to the Company; and, in a Word, the not doing Good for the ſake of doing it, and becauſe it becomes us, and binds our Conſcience; but upon ſome occaſional Motive, and external Circumſtance, that happen'd to fall in with us at that time. And at this rate, the greateſt Part of Mankind are only good by Chance. Which gives the true Reaſon of their being ſo extremely various, and unequal, and fickle, and inconſiſtent with Themſelves; for ſo muſt all Things needs be, that are govern'd by Impulſe and Accident; and nothing but true and well-weigh'd Principles, grounded upon Duty and Reaſon, can produce a ſteddy, conſtant, and uniform Virtue.

5. The leſſening our Affection for the Perſons we have wrong'd, and that for no other Reaſon, but merely becauſe we have done them an Injury. Is not this very odd? What Account can be given of it? We cannot pretend that this Coldneſs always proceeds from Apprehenſions of Revenge; for perhaps the injur'd Party hath no ſuch Thought, and is as kindly diſpos'd to

ever: But the Reaſon ſeems to be, that the very Sight and Remembrance of him accuſes us to our ſelves, and our Conſcience takes theſe Occaſions to fly in our Faces, and reproach our Baſeneſs and Indiſcretion. So that if the Perſon offending does not abate of his Kindneſs, this is a good Argument that he did not offend wilfully, and is not conſcious to himſelf of any thing that can give him a juſt Diſſatisfaction at his own Proceedings. For, commonly ſpeaking, Every one that offends knowingly, and, with a malicious Deſign, changes in his Affection afterwards, and either turns an Enemy, or at leaſt very cold and indifferent; according to that uſual Proverb, * *He that does the Wrong never forgives.* Ch. 39.

6. An Obſervation not much unlike the former, may be made, concerning Perſons who have highly oblig'd us: The Sight of ſuch is often an Uneaſineſs; it upbraids us with a Debt, and awakens ungrateful Remembrances of our Want, either of Diſpoſition, or of Power to requite them. Nay, ſometimes Men are ſo abominably wicked, as even to rejoyce at the Death of a Benefactor, becauſe it eaſes them of this ſort of Pain, according to the Remark of an Old Author; *Some, the more they have been oblig'd, the worſe they hate: A ſmall Debt will make a Man your Friend, but a great one will be ſure to make him your Enemy.*

7. The taking Delight in Miſchief; being glad at the Pains, and Dangers, and Difficulties of other People; and conceiving a ſecret Indignation and Diſpleaſure at their Proſperity and Pr

* Chi offende mai non pardonna.

Book I. Nor do I mean here any ſuch Envy or Uneaſineſs, as proceeds from Paſſion and particular Reſentment; for this is chargeable upon the Vices of ſingle Perſons only. But the Thing I aim at is the common Temper, and natural Condition of Mankind in general, which, without any Pique, or Spleen, or Provocation, diſpoſes even Good Men to receive a ſort of Satisfaction from the Riſques of Men in Seas and Storms; to be angry at any Preference of our Friends before us, either in Point of Merit or Fortune; to laugh at any little Misfortune that happens to them; All this argues the Seeds of Ill-Nature to be thick ſown, and to have taken deep Root in us.

" The Firſt of theſe Inſtances, which, of all " the reſt, ſeems moſt hard-hearted, *Lucretius* " gives a much more innocent Account of, and " acquits it of the ſevere Imputation laid upon it " here, in the Beginning of his *Second Book* *. And, " indeed, what is ſaid there upon that one In- " ſtance, is applicable to all here mention'd, " which are owing to the Love of our Selves, and " comparing our own Caſe with that of other " People.

'Tis pleaſant when the Seas are rough, to ſtand,
And view another's Danger, ſafe at Land;
Not 'cauſe he's troubled; but 'tis ſweet to ſee
Thoſe Cares and Fears, from which our ſelves are free.
Mr. Creech.

" And ſure there is a great Difference between " Malignity and Self-Love; between Tenderneſs

* Suave Mari magno, &c. *Lib.* 2.

" for

" for our own Safety, and a Malicious Joy in Ca- Ch. 39.
" lamities and Dangers.

In a Word; To give you a true Representation of the Greatness of our *Misery*, I only add, That the World abounds with Three sorts of Men, which out-do all the rest, both in Number and Reputation; and those are the *Superstitious*, the *Formal*, and the *Pedantick*; These, tho' they are concern'd in different Matters, move by different Springs, and act upon different Stages, (for the Three principal Topicks are *Religion*, *Common Conversation*, and *Learning*; and each of these is the Field appropriated to each of these Persons; *Religion* to the *Superstitious*; *Common Conversation*, and the Dealings of Humane Life, to the *Formal*; and *Learning* to the *Pedants*.) But these, I say, tho' engag'd in Matters so distant, are yet all cast in the same Mould, and agree in their general Qualities and Characters; that they are all weak and mean Souls, extremely defective either in Natural or Acquired Abilities, incapable or ignorant; Men of dangerous Opinions, sick Judgments, nay, sick of a Disease that scarce ever admits of a Recovery. For all the Pains and Trouble you give your self to instruct these Men better, is but so much Time and Labour lost upon them. They are so much in the wrong, and so highly conceited that none who differ from them can be in the right, that no Good [illegible] If you will take [illegible] rable to [illegible] *stina* [illegible] too great [illegible] and [illegible]

11. *Conclusion of Spiritual Miseries.*

Book I. once drunk in the Infection of theſe Evils, there are little or no Hopes left of ever making him a ſound Man again. For what is there more exquiſitely fooliſh, what more ſtiff and inflexible than theſe Fellows? They are ſecured by a double Barrier from the Conqueſts of Reaſon and Perſuaſion; Firſt, by their Weakneſs, and Natural Incapacity, which diſables them from ſeeing the Strength of Arguments and Reproofs; and then by a falſe Confidence in their own Excellencies above the reſt of the World, which makes them deſpiſe all Others, as their Inferiors, unable to adviſe, and unfit to reform Thoſe, who are already ſo much wiſer and better than they.

The Superſtitious. See Book II. Chap. 5.

As for the *Superſtitious*, they are highly injurious to God, and dangerous Enemies to True Religion. They diſguiſe themſelves with a Maſk of Piety, and Zeal, and Reverence, and Love for God; and this Jeſt they carry ſo far, as to teaze and torment themſelves with Auſterities and Sufferings, that were never required at their Hands. And what is to be done with ſuch infatuated Wretches as theſe, who imagine that thoſe voluntary Afflictions are highly meritorious; that the Almighty is indebted to them, and much obliged by Works which he never commanded; and that all the reſt ought to be releaſed in Conſideration of theſe? Tell them, they take Things by the wrong Handle; that they ſtretch, and pervert, and miſunderſtand the Scriptures, and lay Burdens upon themſelves more and heavier than God ever laid: Their Anſwer is, that They intend well; (and that Intention they doubt not will ſave them) that what they do is from a Principle of Piety and

and Devotion, and cannot want Merit or Ac- Ch. 39.
ceptance upon that Account. Beſides, there is
ſomething of Intereſt in all this, which you can never prevail with them to part with; for what Gain is to be propoſed in Proſpect, what Satisfaction to be receiv'd in Preſent, which can make them amends for the mighty Expectations and Raptures of that fond Notion, that by this means God becomes Their *Debtor*, and they *Merit* at His Hands?

Formaliſts. The *Formaliſts* are a ſort of People entirely devoted to *Form*, and *Shew*, and Out-ſide; and Theſe think themſelves at liberty to indulge their Paſſions, and gratify any, though never ſo unlawful, Deſires, without Check and Controul, provided they do not offend againſt the Letter of the Law, nor omit any of thoſe External Obſervances, which are required in their Behaviour, and look'd upon as the Rules of Living. Here you ſhall ſee an old griping Jew, that hath brought God knows how many Families to Beggary and Ruine; but he hath done no hurt in all this: For he never aſk'd for more than his Own, at leaſt, what he thought ſo; and if upon theſe Demands, Arreſts, and Suits, and Priſons have enſu'd, yet he only ſuffer'd the Law to take its Courſe; and who can blame this honeſt Man for coming by his Right in the way of Juſtice? But O Good God! how many good Things are neglected, and how many wicked and barbarous Things done, under the Pretence of *Forms*, and the Protection of the *Laws!* Nothing can be truer, than that *Extremity of Right is Extremity of Wrong.* He that makes this the Rule of all his Proceedings, and allows

Book I. himſelf to take the Advantage of the Law up every Occaſion, is ſo far from an *honeſt Man*, th he is one of the moſt *dangerous Knaves*. Sa Reaſon was there for that Saying uſed to th Purpoſe, *God deliver us from the Formaliſts.*

Pedants. By *Pedants*, I mean a ſort of prating Fellow who firſt tumble over Books with great Pains a Study, and afterwards let fly in all Compani and vend all they have pick'd up in their Readin with as much Impertinence and Oſtentation; a all this too, to turn a Penny, and promote the Intereſt or their Credit by it. There are not in th World a Pack of more little Mercenary Wretche more unfit for Buſineſs, and yet at the ſame time more forward, and preſuming, and conceited o Themſelves. Hence perhaps it is, that in all Coun tries, and all Languages, *Pedant* and *Scholar* ar Terms of *Ridicule* and *Reproach*. To do a Thing aukwardly, is to do it like a *Scholar*. To behave one's ſelf like a Clown, and be ignorant of the World, is to be a *mere Scholar*. Such Scholars, I mean, as theſe I am now treating of; for theſe Reflections do not concern Learned Men in ge neral, but ſuch ſuperficial Pretenders to it, as are only walking and living *Nomenclatures*; that have a Memory ſtuffed full of other Men's Knowledge, but none at all of their Own. Their Judgment, their Will, and their Conſciences are not one whit improved by it; They are never the wiſer, nor more prudent; never the more dextrous in Buſineſs, nor the more honeſt and virtuous, for all the Schemes and Inſtitutions they have run thro'. They can repeat theſe, but they have not digeſted

ɛſted them; are Maſters of the Speculative Ch. 39.
t, but know nothing of the Application and
ctice. So that all the Fruit of their Study is
to make them the more acquired, more egre-
ıs Fools; more full of Themſelves, and more
y and inſupportable in all Companies. They
ll their Memory, but ſink their Wit, and ad-
rate their Underſtandings. And in ſuch Per- *See* Parag.
ɜ as theſe, that *Miſery* is moſt conſpicuous, 9. Fig. 15.
ch we lately placed the laſt of that ſort, with
ch the Intellectual Faculty of the Mind ſeems
ıcipally affected.

CHAP. XL.

V. *Preſumption.*

WE are now come to the laſt and moſt hide- 1.
ous Line of the whole Picture; which
tes up the other Branch of *Pliny*'s Deſcription;
this is indeed the Deformity of our Nature,
Bane of our Minds, the Source of the worſt
moſt erroneous Opinions, both Publick and
vate; and yet, as bad as it is, 'tis a Vice na-
l to, and born with, every Man. Now we
l do well to conſider this *Preſumption* in its ſe-
ıl Reſpects, above, below, up[illegible] level,
ıin, and without us; as the [illegible]od,
the Celeſtial Bodies, Te[illegible]nd
ſts, Man our Equal, [illegible];
d the whole Matter will [illegible]
o Points, The ſetting

Book I. upon our Own, and too low upon other Things; every Man in this Senſe deſerving the Character given by our Bleſſed Saviour of the *Phariſees*, *They truſted in Themſelves, and deſpiſed Others.* A Word or two now upon each of the fore-mention'd Particulars.

2. *Preſumption in reſpect of God.* And Firſt, with regard to Almighty God, (it is a horrible and melancholy Truth, but true it is, that) all Superſtition and falſe Worſhip, the affected Exceſſes, and the wilful Defects in our Religious Services, are entirely owing to the want of a ſufficient Eſteem and Reverence for God; the not being ſenſible what ſort of Being He is, and entertaining ſuch Opinions and Ideas of the Divine Nature, as are not ſufficiently lofty, and pure, and refined. Now by ſaying *ſufficiently* ſo, I would not be underſtood, that our Apprehenſions ſhould bear any Proportion to the Eſſential Greatneſs of his Majeſty; for God is Infinite, and admits of no Proportion at all. Conſequently there is no Poſſibility in Nature, that our Conceptions ſhould ever ſoar up to ſuch a height and *ſufficiency* as This; and therefore I mean that *ſufficiency* only to be wanting, which Nature hath made us capable of, and Duty requires from us. We do not raiſe nor direct our Minds, nor dart our Thoughts ſtrong, or high enough, when we form Notions of the Divinity: Alas! why do I ſay, not high and ſtrong enough? when it is but too evident, and our Actions ſpeak it out, that we entertain very feeble, and mean, and low Apprehenſions of him. And we ſerve him indeed accordingly; we offer him Things moſt unworthy of him, and deal with him more baſely and diſreſpectfully, than we pretend,

tend, or dare to do, with ſeveral of his Creatures. Ch. 40.
We diſcourſe, not of his *Works* only, (which yet command ſome Regard becauſe they are His) but we talk of his *Eſſence* and *Majeſty*, determine his *Will*, interpret his *Judgments*, paſs Sentence upon the *Diſpenſations of his Providence*, and all this more peremptorily, more ſawcily, than any Man of good Manners would take upon him to do, with the Counſels and Proceedings of his Prince. And yet every one thinks he may make bold with his God in Caſes, where to uſe the ſame Freedoms with any Perſon of Honour, would be condemned for inſufferable Rudeneſs and Contempt. A great many Men would reject ſuch Service and Homage, and think themſelves highly injured and affronted, if we ſhould talk ſo meanly of them, and make uſe of their Name upon ſuch trifling Occaſions, and in ſo contemptuous a manner as we do that of God. We undertake to manage him, go about to flatter and careſs, to bend and bring him over, to bribe and to compound with him; nay, I might tremble to ſay it, ſome think even to brave and dare him, to ſnarle and grumble, to take Things ill, and be exceeding angry at him. *Cæſar* bad his Pilot hoiſt Sails boldly, and fear nothing, tho' Winds and Seas, and Stars and Fate were againſt him, but buoy himſelf up with this Confidence, in oppoſition to all Difficulties, *That he who had* Cæſar *aboard, could not miſcarry.* *Auguſtus*, after having been Tempeſt beaten at Sea, took upon him to ſet *Neptune* at Defiance, and by way of Revenge, ordered his Image to be taken away from among the reſt of the Gods, and excluded the ſolemn Proceſſion at the *Ludi Circenſes.*

Book I. *Xerxes* ſcourged the Seas, and ſent a Challenge to Mount *Athos*. The *Thracians*, when it Thunders and Lightens, ſhoot Arrows up againſt Heaven, with all their Might, that by this means they may bring the Gods to Reaſon. And there goes a Story of a certain Chriſtian King, in a neighbouring Countrey, whom when God had ſeverely chaſtized, he ſwore he would be revenged on him; and to make his Words good, commanded, *That for Ten Years next enſuing, no Perſon within his Dominions ſhould dare to put up any Prayers to God, or make mention of his Name any other way.*

* *Nought is too hard for Man:*
Grown Giants in Impiety,
Our Impious Folly dares the Sky.
We dare aſſault Jove's *glorious Throne,*
Nor (ſtill averſe to his Command)
Will we permit his lifted Hand
To lay his Thunder down. Creech.

But not to inſiſt longer upon ſuch prodigious Extravagancies, does not the general Temper and Practice of Mankind juſtify that Character given by *Pliny*; *That no Creature is more miſerable, and yet none more proud than Man?* For, on the one hand, he forms to himſelf vaſt Conceits of the particular Love, and Regard, and tender Care God hath for him; thinks himſelf the chief, the only Favourite of Heaven; and yet this Darling

* Audax Japeti genus ——
Nil mortalibus arduum.
Cœlum ipſum petimus ſtultitiâ, neque
Per noſtrum patimur ſcelus
Iracunda Jovem ponere fulmina. *Horat. Lib.*

ſerves him after a moſt unbecoming manner, and worſe than the pooreſt and moſt deſpicable of all his Creatures. How then ſhall we reconcile theſe Extremes? How can a Life ſo wretched, a Homage ſo poor and baſe, meet and dwell together in the ſame Perſon, with ſuch glorious Notions of Himſelf, and a Preference ſo vaſtly great above all the Creation beſides? Is not This to be an Angel and a Swine at once? And indeed Men, who entertain theſe Opinions, and diſhonour God, by living in a Diſagreement with them (as the generality of Mankind do) muſt be content to bear the Reproach of a great Philoſopher to ſome Vicious and Hypocritical Chriſtians; *That they were the braveſt Fellows in the World at talking, but the pitifulleſt and moſt contemptible Wretches in their Lives and Actions.* Ch. 40.

We are apt to think our Selves of Moment, and great Conſequence to *God*, to the *World*, and to *Nature* in general; That all Theſe are in great Pain and Anxiety upon our Account; That They only watch for our Safety and Preſervation; and This makes us look upon *Calamitous Accidents* with Surprize; but eſpecially, to be perfectly aſtoniſh'd at *Death*, as if it were a moſt ſtrange Thing how That ſhould break in upon us, notwithſtanding ſo many Guards that keep Centry about our Perſons, and are all (as we imagine) concern'd to ſecure us from it. For this, among other Reaſons, few People ever perſuade themſelves that any Ho is their laſt; but almoſt every Body, ſuffers hi ſelf to be cheated with falſe Hopes, at the Inſtant of expiring. And what is all this but ſumption? We think our ſelves too ſignificant 3. *Nature.*

Book I. fondly fancy, that this whole Univerſe muſt bear a part in our Death; that ſome great and general Revolution will happen upon it; that all things decay in proportion with our own Bodies, and fall one another in the ſame Degrees They fail Us; That there is no avoiding it, but They muſt all undergo the ſame fatal Shock, the ſame Diſſolution that We do. And in this Univerſal Deluſion Mankind live, like People upon the Water, who, when their own Veſſel moves, ſeem to draw Houſes, and Towns, and Heaven, and Earth along with them. No Body conſiders that he is ſingle, and but One; a very ſmall and inconſiderable Part of the Creation: One out of many Millions, whom few have any Intereſt in, and perhaps fewer yet are the worſe for looſing; and the Matter is ſo far from every Body's going along with him, that ſcarce any Body will ſo much as miſs him when he is gone; no more than a Grain of Sand diminiſhes the Sea-ſhore, or the falling of a Star, changes the Face of the Sky.

4. Then again; *Man* pleaſes himſelf, that the Heaven, the Stars, and all that Glorious Movement over our Heads, and indeed the whole Frame and Order of this Material World, was thus created and conſtituted merely for his Sake: As if that Deſcription of the Heathen were his due, That * *ſo many Gods were perpetually Ambitious, and contending about his ſingle Perſon.* And this is a very extravagant Imagination indeed. He is lodged [illegible] in the laſt and loweſt Story of the World, [illegible] great diſtance from the Ætherial Roof

* Tot circa unum caput tumultuantes D

that in compariſon of the purer Regions above us, Ch. 40.
may be call'd the Sink of the World, where all
the Lees and Dregs ſettle, with Creatures of the meaneſt Condition, and liable to receive all thoſe Evacuations of Rain and Vapours, which fall down upon his Head; nay, from Theſe he receives his very Subſiſtence; he lies open to Accidents, that beſet and oppreſs him on every Side; and yet this poor Wretch looks upon himſelf as the Maſter and Commander in Chief of the Univerſe. 'Tis true indeed, Almighty God hath given him a Dominion over ſome of his Fellow Creatures; and it is likewiſe true, that the reſt over which he hath not the ſame Dominion, are contriv'd for his Mighty Benefit and Convenience; but it will not follow from hence, that the whole Creation had no other End than his Service; nor that thoſe vaſt Globes of Light, and ſo many Pure Incorruptible Bodies, whoſe leaſt Virtue is not diſtinctly known, and which he muſt be content to gaze at with Wonder and Aſtoniſhment, were fram'd and are continued in this Regularity and Perpetuity of Motion, for Man only. From hence, it is confeſt, this Indigent Wretch derives his Food, his Maintenance, and unſpeakable Conveniencies; the Rays, the Beauty, the Heat of the Sun, the Rain, and Dew, and other Diſtillations from Heaven cheriſh and ſuſtain him; and This, no doubt, was one Intent of the bountiful God that made them. But ſhall we preſume to determine from hence, that this was the ſole Intent and Uſe of them? Shall we call the Heavens and the Elements our Own, and pretend that Their Motions are only ſo many Taſ[illegible] Pa[illegible] This

Book I. were, as if the Beggar ſhould call himſelf Proprietor of the Wealth out of which he is reliev'd; and the Benefits in this Caſe are ſo general, ſo far from being confin'd to Man alone, that the meaneſt Fowl of the Air may as well make the ſame Pretenſions; nay, in ſome Senſe, theſe Creatures may make them better; for Man, who receives Conveniencies, hath ſome Inconveniencies too from the Bodies above him; he hath none of them at his own Diſpoſal, he cannot underſtand how far their Efficacy will extend; nor make any certain Concluſions, what will be hereafter; and this puts him into perpetual Uneaſineſſes, and Fears and Amazements, leſt theſe Bodies ſhould not keep their Courſe, nor ſhed propitious Influences, but occaſion barren and ſickly Seaſons, and ſo every thing ſhould prove Unkindly and in Confuſion; and under the Weight of theſe Apprehenſions he lies and trembles, for what ſhall fall upon him from Thoſe very Bodies, of which he vainly thinks himſelf Lord and Maſter; Whereas Beaſts, as they receive the ſame Advantages of Life and Subſtance with our Selves, ſo they receive it without any Diſturbance of Mind, or diſquieting Preſages of the Future; yea, and without any of thoſe diſcontented Murmurs and Complaints at what is paſt too, which reſtleſs and ungrateful Man is ever bewailing himſelf in. I conclude this Obſervation with that Paſſage of *Seneca*; * *We are*

* Non nos cauſa mundo ſumus, hyemem æſtatemque rendi, ſuas iſta leges habent quibus divina exercentur; nos ſuſpicimus, ſi digni nobis videmur, propter quæ moveantur. Non tanta cœlo nobiſcum ſocietas eſt, ut fato ſit ille quoque ſiderum fulgor.

not the proper Cauſe of the World's enjoying the ſeveral Seaſons, and their Viciſſitudes; Thoſe Things are order'd by Laws peculiar to themſelves, in the Obſervance whereof the Will and Purpoſes of God are executed. We think too highly of our ſelves, if we ſuppoſe we are of ſuch Worth and Conſequence, that ſuch and ſo many Glorious Motions ſhould be contrived merely for our Sakes; nor is our Correſpondence with Heaven ſo intimate, that all the uſe of the Stars ſhould be to direct, or to declare our Fortunes. Ch. 40

Note. "Some Perſons, ſince the Improvement "of Aſtronomy, have given us juſter Notions of "the Magnitude of theſe Heavenly Bodies; that "ſeveral of them equal, and ſome very much ex-"ceed the Proportion of this Earthly Globe; "have entertain'd Notions of a Plurality of "Worlds, furniſh'd with Inhabitants, as different "from Thoſe we know, as the Regions they in-"habit are. A Notion, which I only mention "upon this Occaſion, to hint, that there may be "many Uſes unknown to us, ſerved by the Hea-"venly Bodies; And becauſe the Opinion ſeems "to carry no Impiety at all in it, but pretends "to conſult the Glory of God, by exciting Men "to a greater Admiration of his Infinite Power, "and Wiſdom, and Goodneſs, exerted in ſo "much a greater Variety of Creatures, than what "we are or can be acquainted with, I thought it "not amiſs to inſert it here, though, as I ſaid, "'tis a Notion only; and what, as we cannot "have an abſolute Certainty for, ſo we have none "againſt it. If Reaſon give any Countenance to "this Speculation, Revelation no where forbids

Book I. " it. For *Moſes*, who made it his Buſineſs to de-
" ſcribe the World we inhabit, had no Reaſon to
" mention Others, in which we have no Concern;
" and his not mentioning Them, was agreeable to
" the Deſign of his Hiſtory; but does not exclude
" the Reality or Poſſibility of any ſuch other Sy-
" ſtems, as were foreign to his Purpoſe, and ſo
" in no Degree neceſſary to be taken Notice of.
" The Reader, if he be deſirous of farther Satiſ-
" faction in this Point, may pleaſe to conſult the
" Eighth of Dr. *Bentley*'s Excellent Sermons a-
" gainſt *Atheiſm*, p. 4, *&c.*

5. *Animals.* As for the Things here below upon the Earth, that is, Beaſts and all Living Creatures, Man looks upon them with Scorn and Contempt, as if they were of no Conſideration at all: Forgetting, that they are form'd by the Hands of the ſame Almighty Artificer, and are reckon'd among the Riches and Poſſeſſions of the ſame Lord; that the ſame Earth is our Common Mother, and that They and He, are of the ſame Family; and conſequently ought not to be ſlighted and diſdained, as if they were worthy no part of his Concern, nor bore any Relation at all to Him. Hence it is, that theſe Poor Creatures are ſo much abuſed; and treated with an Inſolence and Cruelty, that flies back upon Their and Our Common Maſter; for it is an Affront, and an Impiety, to deal thus by any Thing of His making, ſuch as he does not only own, but expreſs a Tenderneſs for; thinks them worthy his own Care, and hath appointed [illegible] Laws for their Benefit and Preſervation: tho' inferior to Us in the moſt valuabl
he ſeems in ſome Things to have gi

vantage to; nay, ſuch as, in ſeveral Inſtances, Ch. 40.
ſhame and reproach our Follies, and are therefore
recommended in Scripture, as Maſters for Man to be ſent to School to. But this hath been already mentioned in another Chapter.

It is indeed a Doctrine commonly receiv'd, that *the World was made for Man, and Man for God*; which in ſome Senſe is certainly true, and what I have ſaid is no Derogation from it. For, beſides that Inſtruction, which all the Creatures in general contribute to, whether thoſe above or below us; Thoſe uſeful Hints and Reflections they miniſter concerning Almighty God, Our Selves, and Our Duty: Some ſort of Uſe, with regard to Profit, or Serviceableneſs, or Delight, may be drawn from every one of them in particular. From that Part above us, which we have a leſs diſtinct Knowledge of, and which is not at all in our Diſpoſal; This Firmament ſo nobly vaulted, ſo richly deck'd with Light, and all thoſe rolling Fires above us; The Advantage Man receives from them, is that of *Contemplation* only. His Soul by theſe is raiſed and tranſported to admire and to love, to fear and to honour, and to pay moſt profound Reverence to the Almighty Maſter and Maker of ſo Glorious a Frame. In this reſpect it was no ill Remark of *Anaxagoras*, that *Man was created to contemplate Heaven*; and ſome of the Old Philoſophers accordingly gave him the Title of θεωρητικόν. From the Creatures in this lower World, he reaps Advantage and Aſſiſtance, receives great Supplies, and Service properly ſo called. But for Men to perſuade themſelves, that God [illegible] making all theſe Things, had no other En[illegible] Thoughts and Deſigns,

Book I. Deſigns, but purely to conſult the Convenience of Mankind: This is too great a Stretch upon the Doctrine mention'd juſt now, and an Arrogance which I think may very deſervedly be charged with all that Folly and Preſumption I have laid upon it.

6. Man himſelf. The laſt, but principal Inſtance of this Preſumption, hath *Man* for its Object; and this muſt be conſider'd with regard to *Himſelf*, or to his *Fellows*; *Within*, as to the forming of his Judgment and private Opinions; or *Without*, as thoſe Sentiments are imparted by converſing with other People. And, upon this Occaſion, we will inſiſt upon Three Things, as ſo many Topicks in cloſe Connexion and Conſequence upon one another; by which Mankind betray at once their great *Weakneſs* and great *Preſumption*; and, in both, great *Folly*.

Three Degrees of Humane Preſumption.

The firſt of theſe conſiſts in Believing and Diſbelieving. (I meddle not here with Religion, or Divine Faith, but deſire my Reader to recollect what was ſaid in the Preface,) where Two contrary Vices are obſervable, which are exceeding common in Humane Life. One of theſe, and the more general of the two, is *Levity* and *Credulity*; that is, a Diſpoſition to receive Things, and be perſuaded too eaſily, upon the ſlighteſt Inducements; ſo that to gain our Aſſent, any the leaſt Circumſtance of Probability, or Pretence of Authority, is ſufficient. This is the Effect of Eaſineſs and Simplicity in the worſt Senſe of the Word; a Softneſs and Weakneſs of Mind, ſuch as we obſerve in mean Parts and Education, the feminate, the Superſtitious and great Zeal and little Judgment,

1. Believing and Miſbelieving.

Wax, always in a readineſs to receive any new Impreſſion, and ſuffer Themſelves to be led about by the Ears with every idle Story. Hence it is, that we ſee the greateſt Part of the World carry'd about with every Blaſt of Opinion, and poſſeſs'd with Notions, before either Age or Maturity of Judgment render them capable of chuſing; and accordingly Theſe Opinions are not the reſult of *Conſideration* and *Choice*, but the Prepoſſeſſions of *Time* and *Cuſtom*; the Rudiments of their Infancy, the Mode of their Countrey, or, it may be, mere Chance, have taken faſt hold of them; ſo faſt, that they are inſeparably wedded to, abſolutely ſubdued and enſlaved by them; and no Arguments are able to looſen theſe Prejudices, and ſet their Minds at Liberty from them. * *Some violent Guſh of Wind drives them upon an Opinion, and there they cling, as if they were to ſave themſelves from a Storm, by keeping cloſe to that Rock.* Thus, indeed, the World is managed; We take Things upon Truſt, and depend upon other People. † *Each Man* is willing to ſave himſelf the trouble of examining; and ***had rather believe than judge:*** *A Miſtake that hath paſſed through many Hands ſucceſſively, turns and tumbles us about at Pleaſure: And all this from a Cuſtom of aſſenting too eaſily, which is exceeding dangerous and unfaithful.* Now this *Credulity*, ſo common in the World, though it be really a very great Inſtance of [illegible], yet Ch. 40.

* Veluti tempeſtate de[illegible], tanquam ad ſaxum adhæreſ[illegible]

† Unuſquiſque mavult [illegible] non & præcipitat tradit[illegible] aſſentiendi periculoſa & [illegible]

Book I. is it not without a large Mixture of *Preſumption* too: For, to receive and ſtick by Opinions, and maintain them for certain Truths, without knowing any thing at all of the Matter, this is too much in all Conſcience; and therefore ſome little Enquiry is made into the Cauſes, and Reaſons, and Conſequences, tho' none at all is made concerning the Truth of the Thing. We commonly aſk, What Account can be given of This? Or, What can be the Manner of bringing that about? All along taking the Matter of Fact for granted, and that Things really are as they are repreſented, when there is nothing at all in it. We write Tracts, manage Arguments, engage in Diſputes, enquire curiouſly after Cauſes and Effects of a Thouſand Things, which never had any Foundation in Nature; and the whole Argument on both Sides is falſe. One contends it is This way, another That way; and, in truth, it neither is, nor ever was, Any way at all. How many Jeſts and Banters, pretended Miracles, ſham Viſions, and counterfeit Revelations, have crafty People impoſed upon Ours, and ſome late Ages of the World? And why ſhould a Man believe ſuch Pretenſions to Events, neither Humane nor Natural, when they may be confounded and diſproved by Natural and Humane Methods; when Reaſon can ſay nothing for them, and Revelation is ſo far from giving them Countenance, that it ſays a great deal againſt them? Truth and Falſhood have Faces and Features alike: Their Mien, their Reliſh, their Motions reſemble one another, and the ſame Eye judgeth of

a

both. * *Truth and Falſhood* (ſays one) *cloſe upon one another, that a Wiſe Man truſt himſelf upon the Brink of them, but ily, for fear of ſliding into the Wrong.* No ;hr to be believed concerning Matters : Power and Underſtanding of a Man; comes with Authority from above, and n Credentials along with him, as are ſu- l, and exceed the Operations of Hu- ength; and ſuch no Teſtimony can be, Divine. But it is to God alone that this ive of Right belongs, To be believed ver he ſays, for this ſingle Reaſon, *be- ys it.*

Ch. 40.

:her Vice oppoſite to This, is a ſtupid and *Rajhneſs* which condemns at all Adven- id rejects every Thing for falſe, which er do not underſtand, or are loath to be- id therefore will by no means have that ich Intereſt or Inclination makes them not be ſo. This is a Property more eſ- viſible in ſuch as abound in their own nd think Themſelves more capable and icious than their Neighbours; ſuch as Pe- Pretenders to Learning, Men addicted to and Thoſe that are violent in any Party, of Church or State. They fancy ſome irpneſs in their Wit, and that They ſee ito Things than the Generality of People This, with a Byaſs of their own within, iem forward and fierce; [illegible] upon

int finitima falſa veri[illegible]rum
t ſe ſapiens committ[illegible]

Book I. them to determine every Thing with an A
Authority, and expect that their Sentence ſh
be receiv'd for Law. This Vice is yet worſe
greater than the former; for it is the Extrem
Folly and Madneſs, to think we know the ut
Bounds of Poſſibilities; the ſecret Springs,
full Extent of Nature; that We can compr
the Operations of God, and pronounce wha
is able, and what He will pleaſe to do; to
ſure all Truth and Falſhood by our own Cap
and Underſtandings; and yet This ought
the Meaſure of True and Falſe, to juſtif
Confidence and the Fierceneſs, which theſe
Men expreſs in all their Diſputes and Defin
of Things: For this is the Eternal Jargon
run you down with, *That's Nonſenſe*, *That's*
That's Impoſſible and Abſurd. And yet how
Things are there, which for a time have
thought extremely ridiculous, and rejected a
poſſible, and afterwards have brought ſuch
dence of their Truth, that we have been forc
acknowledge and yield to them; nay, and
Theſe have been eſtabliſh'd, we have, by T
been led to the entertaining of Others yet
ſurprizing and odd than the former? And, o
other hand, how many that have been rec
for Goſpel, have in time loſt all their Vener
and Credit, and been diſcover'd to be mere
rors, and Impoſtures, and idle Fancies?

8. The Second Inſtance of this kind, which, in
2. *Affirming and Condemning.* is an uſual and a natural Conſequence of the
mer, is the being *poſitive* a
denying, approving or co
we have been led to en

out ſufficient Grounds for our Belief or Mi- Ch. 40.
:. This differs from the former only in de-
, excepting that it adds Peremptorineſs and
inacy to it, and ſo the Preſumption is worſe
more apparent. That *Eaſineſs* and *Credulity*
ens in time, and by degrees degenerates into a
Conceit and *Poſitiveneſs*, which no Arguments
onquer, no Perſuaſions move or correct. Nay,
times the Humour is carry'd on ſo far, that
are more eager in aſſerting what they do not
r, than what they do. * *Men perſuade them-*
more firmly of the Things they leaſt underſtand,
aſſent with greater readineſs to Points dark and
rious, that they may be thought to comprehend
really they do not, and from a natural Eagerneſs
Mind, that catches at every Thing greedily. It
unted a Reflection, to be out at any Point
is ſtarted; or to yield a Diſpute, in which a
is once engag'd; and therefore Men diſ-
e with Reſolution and Obſtinacy, and great
ance, and come ready fix'd and determin'd
aintain their Ground at any rate, how little
r they have to offer in Defence of it. Now
xceeding Poſitiveneſs, and abounding in one's
Senſe, are commonly Signs of Brutality and
ance, attended with Arrogance and Folly.

ne Third, which is a natural Product of thoſe
, and the very Top and Extremity of *Pre-* 3. *Perſua-*
ion, is, The *perſuading* others, recommending *ding.*
ropagating our own Opinion; and this, not
nild and gentle Method of fair Reaſoning;

ajorem fidem homines adhibent iis quæ non intelli-
cupiditate humani ingenii lubentiùs obſcura cre-

but with Autho
impoſe it, as
lieve us, and ou
of any Thing w
Tyranny and Uſu
receiv'd an Opinion,
to win others over,
can of it too; and to
Charitable Deſign, he gi
Advantage he can; repr
beſt Light, and adds from
much more, as he thinks m
to make amends for any De
which he ſuſpects may be met w
prehenſion of the Perſon he pro
to. And, generally ſpeaking, th
thing for which Men are more tend
than for the putting about their O
gaining as many Proſelytes as they can.
is content to be miſtaken alone, but every
in others into the ſame Error with himſelf.
zealous are Men in this Particular, that w
dinary Means of Perſuaſion are found inſu
the Defect is ſupply'd by *Violence* and *Terror*,
and *Fire*, and *Faggot*. This is properly the Vic
Dogmatical and Ambitious People; ſuch as
at abſolute Dominion, and would fain be gove
ing and preſcribing to all the World. And,
the facilitating this Deſign, and to captivate M
Underſtandings, they make uſe of two Artifi
The Firſt is, To lay down ſome general Prop

* Nemo ſibi tantùm errat, ſed aliis erroris Cauſa &
thor eſt.

tio

tions, which are term'd *Fundamental Principles*; and ſuch as muſt be preſuppoſed and granted on all Hands; and from Theſe, they tell you, you muſt be ſo far from departing, that you are not allow'd ſo much as to diſpute, or admit the leaſt Doubt, whether they be true or not. Upon theſe they raiſe what Superſtructure they pleaſe, and ſo bring the World over to their ſide; which hath been a very ſucceſsful Cheat, in propagating many groſs Errors, and giving Authority to Things abſolutely falſe. And, indeed, the Fraud lies chiefly in Thoſe Principles, which ought to be *Truth's Self-evident*, and clear to every conſidering Man; but ſome have been advanced for ſuch, which upon ſtrict Examination will be found, not only as diſputable, but as weak, as falſe, as any of the Concluſions endeavour'd to be drawn from them; and the Propoſitions contrary to Theſe, carry at leaſt the ſame Face of Probability, and have as much to ſay for themſelves. Ch. 40.

Some Eminent Perſons, we know, of late, have taken upon them quite to alter and overthrow the eſtabliſh'd, and ſo long unconteſted, Principles and Rules of the Antients, in *Aſtrology*, *Phyſick*, *Geometry*, and concerning the Nature and Motion of the *Winds*. Now all the Propoſitions and Notions of Men are equal to be ſure, and ought have the ſame Authority with us, excepting ſo far as Reaſon gives one the Advantage a another. *Truth* does not depend upon the or *Teſtimony of Man*; nor are there any P tions that command an abſolute Aſſent, and Authority is unconteſtable, but what G been pleaſed to reveal; the reſt are mere Copernicus, Paracelſus.

Book I. and Pretence, that challenge Aſſent ſo imperiouſly from us. Now theſe Gentlemen require us to take their Word, and ſwallow All they ſet before us without chewing; not any Trial or Examination is allow'd you, which is the greateſt Injuſtice and Tyranny in the World. God (as was obſerved before) hath this Right incommunicable to any beſide Himſelf, to command our Aſſent in all he ſays, upon this Score merely, *becauſe he ſays it.* Where, by God's ſaying it, is included the Meſſage of all thoſe that are ſent, and atteſted by him, and not any immediate Revelation intended, and nothing elſe; for in oppoſition to ſuch Meſſengers, ſo commiſſioned and approv'd it is, that our Lord ſays, *He that ſpeaketh of himſelf is a Lyar.*

The Other Method, by which many have been drawn into Errors, is by counterfeiting this Seal from Heaven, pretending ſome new Miracle, or particular Inſpiration, or ſtrange Apparition, or the like; a Trick, which Hiſtory tells us, hath been often play'd with great Dexterity and Succeſs, by Princes, and Law-givers, and Generals of Armies. The firſt Perſuaſion taken from the Party concern'd, ſoon gets poſſeſſion of the weaker ſort; but this is ſo nice, ſo feeble, and ſo frail, that the leaſt Miſtake, or Miſmanagement, would ſpoil and break all to pieces again: And wonderful it is to reflect, what famous Impreſſions have been owing to poor and frivolous Beginnings. But when this Impreſſion comes abroad into the World, it grows to a prodigious Bulk, and ſtretches itſelf ſo, by the help of Time and Numbers, as to take in Men of better Senſe, and more diſcerning Judgments.

For

For it is to no purpoſe then to kick againſt a general Belief; a Man hath nothing left to do, but to come in, and make One. The ſtrongeſt Evidence, and moſt diſtinguiſhing Teſt of Truth, is the number of Believers, and the number of Years that have maintained it: And yet it is certain, that *Fools* are more than *half the World* in every Age. But, notwithſtanding this Diſparity, it is a hard matter to fix in an Opinion, contrary to the general Senſe of Mankind. The Fallacy however laſt mention'd hath been abundantly ſeen in the many Juggles and Cheats which have aſtoniſh'd the Multitude, and been palmed upon them for new Miracles; but by ſome Accident or other, or by a nicer Obſervation of ſome more jealous and acute than the reſt, the whole Cheat hath been detected and expoſed within a very little while; and yet Theſe very Cheats, if they had gather'd Strength, and not been ſtifled in their Infancy, had done their Buſineſs, and met with Wonder and Adoration every where. Theſe Diſcoveries however of falſe Miracles, and ſuch as are taken upon Truſt, are a greater Confirmation of the True, ſuch as the Faith of Chriſtians is built upon; which have neither wanted Time to ripen them, nor Curioſity of Enquirers to detect them, nor the Malice of Enemies to pervert and overthrow them, nor the Biaſs of wicked Inclinations to render Men averſe from ſurrendring themſelves up to the Doctrines confirmed by them. And yet in deſpite of all Theſe, They did, and do, and will continue to prevail and triumph in the Minds of Men. And well it were, if better Care were taken to examine all Pretenſions of this kind

very

Book I. very nicely, that ſo the True might not ſuffer in their Reputation and Effect, for want of being diſtinguiſh'd from the Falſe; and That poor Shift of profane Wretches might be expoſed and beaten down, who take Shelter in ſome ſuch Diſcoveries as have been here mention'd, and, from a few acknowledged Impoſtures, and ſome Others which look ſuſpiciouſly, and perhaps, if carefully traced up to their firſt Head, might have been found no better, endeavour to inſinuate, that None ever were otherwiſe. It muſt be confeſs'd, in the mean while, that the Things theſe Tricks are contriv'd to ſupport, and lead Men into, are of a mortifying Conſideration; the great Variety of contending Sects and Religions, and the infinite Superſtitions ſtill in uſe among ſome Parts of *Chriſtendom*, the Ceremonies, and corrupt Cuſtoms which are Relicks of *Pagan* Idolatry, and which there is no bringing the People off from. And now, by this whole Diſcourſe, we ſee what precious Creatures we are, and what we are like to come to at laſt, when we blindly follow ſuch blind Leaders.

The End of the Firſt Volume





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